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Sir Charles Tupper and the Franco-Canadian Treaty of 1895: A Study of Imperial Relations

R. A. SHIELDS

WHEN SIR CHARLES TUPPER, Canada's second high commissioner to London and a long-time member of Conservative cabinets, concluded a commercial treaty with France in 1893, it marked the culmination of a lengthy period of complicated and often disputatious negotiation.¹ During this time the problems and difficulties inherent in treaty negotiations between a sovereign country and a self-governing colony of the empire became apparent. Many of these difficulties resulted from long-established policies of the mother country.

In the first instance, the free-trade bias and international obligations of the United Kingdom had to be weighed in the balance. By a series of treaties dating as far back as 1825 and containing the most-favoured-nation clause, Britain was obliged to grant several countries as favourable a market in her colonies as was enjoyed by any foreign power. Thus, if Canada granted tariff preference to France, a host of other nations could demand the same privilege.² It should be emphasized, however, that the self-governing colonies could withdraw from

¹Though the discussions with Paris had been initiated as early as 1878 by Tupper's predecessor in London, Sir Alexander Galt, they had come to nothing and the project lay dormant throughout the eighties.

²In 1888 the Foreign Office cited a lengthy list of foreign countries enjoying most-favoured-nation treatment in the British colonies. Included were Austria, Montenegro, Paraguay, Roumania, Servia, Uruguay, Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Greece, Hamburg, Italy, Mecklenburgh-Schwerin, Russia, Salvador, the Sandwich Islands, France, Portugal, Sweden, and Norway. See Memorandum by Sir Edward Hertslet, May 14, 1888, "Treaties of Commerce in Force Between the United Kingdom and Foreign Powers Which Preclude Preferential Fiscal Treatment of British Goods in the Colonies and Dependencies of the British Crown," Great Britain, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1888 (C.5369), XCVIII.

agreements of this nature if they had been concluded after 1882. With their deep-seated aversion to tariff preference and protection, the policy-makers of Whitehall also insisted that any tariff reduction made by a colony to a foreign power or a sister dependency had to be extended unconditionally to the rest of the empire. This requirement affected both Belgium and Germany who, by the terms of treaties concluded with London in 1862 and 1865 respectively, enjoyed the same conditions of trade in the colonies as the mother country. Thus, concessions made to Britain by Canada immediately opened the Canadian market to these two countries following which the other most-favoured nations could raise similar demands.

Though Canada had protested strenuously since 1878 against the restrictions created by the Belgian and German treaties it had availed little. In 1888 the parliamentary undersecretary to the Foreign Office, Sir James Ferguson, had urged that no action be taken to abrogate the treaties before a careful study had been made of the effect it would have "upon British commercial interests."³ Prior to the French negotiations, Tupper himself had appeared before the Trade and Treaties Committee of the Board of Trade to recommend denunciation of the agreements. The committee, reporting in 1891, rejected the request on the grounds that it involved "a great break-up of existing commercial relations."⁴

Given this background, it was obvious that treaty discussions between Canada and France would commence in a less than friendly atmosphere. Imperial hostility to any breach with free-trade principles loomed large as did a growing Canadian determination to develop an independent commercial policy. It should also be recalled that when the United Kingdom renewed its commercial agreement with France in 1873 the colonies had been specifically excluded. From that date forward British goods had enjoyed the French minimum tariff while Canadian products had been subject to the maximum rates. Sir Charles' predecessor in the Franco-Canadian discussions, Sir Alexander Galt, had bitterly described this as the occasion when imperial policy had left Canada "out in the cold."⁵

Though Tupper admitted the applicability of Britain's treaty obligations and was keenly aware of London's dislike of tariff preference, he was not prepared to let such obstacles go unchallenged. Writing on November 21, 1892, to the ambassador in Paris, Lord

³Great Britain, *Hansard*, CCCXXV (April 23, 1888), 155.

⁴Second Report of the Trade and Treaties Committee, Confidential, Feb. 10, 1891, FO 83/1153, Original Correspondence with the Board of Trade, the Colonial Office, and Other Departments on General Topics, Public Record Office (PRO).

⁵Galt to Macdonald, private, Madrid, Jan. 20, 1879, Macdonald Papers, vol. 216, Public Archives of Canada (PAC).

Dufferin, he stated that the Belgian and German treaties had been negotiated while the Canadian-American reciprocity agreement of 1854 was still in effect. When Belgium had claimed the benefits of the treaty, London had ruled against her on the ground that most-favoured-nation status did not entitle a country to the privileges of a reciprocity convention. He also noted that the expiration of the Anglo-Spanish agreement on July 31, 1892, which had included Canada, and the conclusion of a reciprocity treaty between Spain and the United States had "practically destroyed" Canadian trade with the Spanish West Indies. With these developments in mind, Ottawa did not feel "obliged to give any advantages to Spain" which might be extended to France as the result of a successful negotiation.

Sir Charles' criticisms hardly endeared him to the Foreign Office. The foreign secretary, Lord Rosebery, argued that there was nothing to confirm the statement that Belgium had claimed the benefits of the Reciprocity Treaty and had then been refused. To prevent Tupper from using this argument, he warned Dufferin that London had agreed to that treaty on the understanding that any product entering Canada from the United States duty free had also to be admitted without hindrance from countries claiming most-favoured-nation privileges in the colonies. Though Rosebery admitted that Sir Charles was quite correct in denying concessions to Spain, he suggested that if France was granted special consideration Madrid might well retaliate by placing Canadian goods under the maximum rather than the minimum tariff. What the Foreign Secretary was seeking was not so much to obtain a reasonably accessible market for Canadian goods as to avoid an embarrassing war of tariffs at a time when London herself was bending every effort to conclude a new treaty with Spain.⁶

The first serious discussions were begun in Paris by Tupper with the assistance of Sir Joseph Crowe, the commercial attaché to the embassy, on November 7, 1892.⁷ Representing France were Gabriel Hanotaux, director of commerce at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later minister of foreign affairs from 1894 to 1898; Georges Roume, director of foreign commerce at the Ministry of Commerce; and Ernest Pallain, director general of customs. Sir Charles emphasized that he was anxious to reach an agreement as favourable to Canada as the recently

⁶Rosebery to Dufferin, copy, London, Nov. 30, 1892, CO 42/815, Canada, Original Correspondence, PRO.

⁷Though both Tupper and Lord Dufferin had been formally accredited as joint plenipotentiaries, Crowe carried most of the burden ■■■ Dufferin could not attend all the meetings. The Foreign Office felt obliged to point out that Crowe was only a technical adviser and not a full-fledged negotiator as Tupper had assumed. Reflecting on Dufferin's previous post as Canadian governor general, the Office suggested he would have preferred a more exalted status for Crowe "in order to please Canada." See Minutes of Oct. 15, 1892, FO 27/3107, France, Original Correspondence, PRO.

concluded Franco-American convention was to the United States. Ottawa did not seek abolition of the surcharge on Canadian goods trans-shipped to France through other European ports or any reduction of the French minimum tariff. Rather, all that Canada desired was the minimum rate applying to the American products listed in the treaty. The United States had promised France the free list on such items as sugar, molasses, and hides with the further consideration that duties on these commodities would not be applied by executive proclamation. Tupper agreed to meet these concessions while pointing out that on other items in the tariff Canadian rates were 50 per cent lower than the American. Further, the Canadian government would pledge itself to establish a direct line of steamers to France by means of a subsidy estimated at £150,000 annually and in this manner avoid the surcharge.

Sir Charles' offer hardly impressed the French. They made the point that the convention with the United States had not come into force, leaving the impression that Paris could well gain broader concessions from Washington before ratification. What France sought from Ottawa was a concession of duty reduction for every concession made in favour of Canadian products. Tupper replied that his government was willing to grant any reductions that had already been made to other countries and that Ottawa had the power to remit in France's favour the existing 30 per cent tax on wine imports.⁸

The second meeting on November 10 witnessed a stiffening in French demands. Hanotaux went so far as to suggest that Canadian concessions would have to be confined to France alone blithely overlooking the fact that Canada was bound by the United Kingdom's host of most-favoured-nation treaties. In this context he proposed that Canada should grant tariff preference solely to French wines and thus discriminate against other wine-producing countries. If this was found impossible, then the Canadian government should consider allowing the import of all wines of up to fifteen degrees alcoholic strength duty free or limit wine imports to Spain and France alone. In either case, French producers would benefit. Sir Charles parried this proposal by requesting the minimum tariff on wood, fish, and fruits of all kinds. Of particular importance was a preferred market for Canadian-built wooden ships as a means of alleviating chronic unemployment in Quebec and New Brunswick.⁹

⁸Foreign Office to Colonial Office, Nov. 11, 1892, enclosing copy of Crowe's report of Nov. 8, CO 42/815.

⁹During the 1878 negotiations, Sir Alexander Galt described the opening of the French market to Canadian shipping as promising "employment . . . to thousands of destitute woodsmen" in these provinces. See Galt to his wife, Paris, Dec. 20, 1878, Galt Papers, vol. VIII, PAC.

Throughout the discussions the French officials kept insisting that Canadian concessions would be more valuable if confined to France alone, placing Tupper in the position of having to acknowledge that his bargaining powers were limited. Canada was a subordinate member of the empire, bound by the mother country's international commitments, and could no more make unilateral tariff reductions to France than France could confine her minimum tariff to any one country. Tupper did concede, however, that Ottawa would not grant other countries the same privileges without "obtaining a substantial reduction in return."

Sir Charles was attempting to make Canadian concessions appear unilateral despite the existence of the confining imperial treaties. He argued that if Ottawa remitted the duties on wines of up to fifteen degrees alcoholic strength it would amount to a major benefit for France as Spanish wines were generally above this strength. Further, even if the Canadian government eventually opened negotiations with Spain, "a valuable concession" would be demanded from Madrid if reductions were approved on Spanish wines.¹⁰

The negotiations did not win imperial approval at this stage though some sympathy was expressed for Canada. The Colonial Office felt that the French were making "preposterous demands" and had not entered the discussions with any serious purpose in mind.¹¹ On the other hand, the Foreign Office, ever anxious to maintain the United Kingdom's commercial relations with Europe, was highly critical of Tupper's performance. Sir Charles Kennedy, head of the Commercial Department, insisted that Canada could not make unilateral tariff concessions to France. He denounced Tupper as "a partisan of the U.S. doctrine" that concessions made in reciprocity treaties could not be claimed by other countries regardless of most-favoured-nation engagements. This was not British policy, Kennedy emphasized, and the sooner Ottawa appreciated this fact the better imperial relations would become.¹²

During subsequent meetings, Tupper presented proposals not entirely of his own making. Present in Paris in the late fall of 1892 were Sir John Abbott, the prime minister, and George Foster, the minister of finance. Together with Sir Joseph Crowe and Sir Charles, they decided that Canada would reduce the duty on wines in return for the French minimum tariff on a lengthy list of goods. Armed with these conditions, Tupper proceeded to his final and acrimonious meeting on November 21. On this occasion he severely criticized

¹⁰Crowe to Dufferin, No. 71, Paris, Nov. 19, 1892, FO 27/3089.

¹¹Minutes of Nov. 21, 1892, CO 42/815.

¹²Minutes of Nov. 12, 1892, FO 27/3008.

French unwillingness to consider seriously his suggestions. He emphasized that, generally speaking, French goods entered the Canadian market on much better terms than they did the American market. Further, Canada imported nearly six times as many French products as France accepted in return. Tupper's proposals failed to sway his co-negotiators and faced with their recalcitrance he stood down.¹³ The discussions remained in abeyance until the new year.

To a considerable degree a series of events in Europe combined to make the French more amenable. After the meeting of November 21, Sir Joseph Crowe reported that the French parliament had rejected the terms of a proposed commercial treaty with Switzerland. According to Crowe, the Swiss were so infuriated that they intended to retaliate "severely" and were contemplating raising differential duties on no less than 200 articles of common export from France. He noted that the Swiss had been in touch with the Belgian and Spanish governments with a view to common action against Paris. The commercial attaché suggested that it might be wise if he travelled to Berne, Brussels, and Rome to sound opinion on the French action.¹⁴

Crowe's proposals fell afoul of Foreign Office determination to maintain the best possible relations with Europe. The Foreign Office pointed out that if he made the rounds of interested capitals it would appear that the United Kingdom was intent on becoming a member of a trade coalition against France. Sir Charles Kennedy phrased this point delicately. Demonstrating considerable concern for Britain's market in France, he suggested that "our trade interests do not require it."¹⁵ The Foreign Secretary was equally anxious to avoid any suggestion that London was contemplating bringing pressure on the French to resume negotiations with Canada. He recommended that Crowe absent himself from Paris when the French government displayed a willingness to resume discussions with Tupper. With Crowe away, it was implied, France might feel less intimidated by hostile neighbours and more willing to look favourably upon an agreement with Canada. Further, his departure would serve to preserve the United Kingdom's commercial relations with France particularly when it was recalled that Crowe had engaged in an abortive attempt to bring economic pressure upon Spain only a year previously.¹⁶ Lord Rosebery's attempt to assuage Paris was highly successful. One month following the collapse of the negotiations, Lord Dufferin informed London that the French Foreign Office was "anxious" to know when Tupper would be ready to re-open the talks.¹⁷

¹³Memorandum presented by Tupper in Paris, Nov. 21, 1892, FO 27/3089.

¹⁴Crowe to Dufferin, secret, No. 87, Paris, Nov. 27, 1892, *ibid.*

¹⁵Minutes by Kennedy, undated, *ibid.*

¹⁶Minutes by Rosebery, undated, *ibid.*

¹⁷Dufferin to the Foreign Office, Paris, telegram, Dec. 27, 1892, *ibid.*

By the end of January 1893 Sir Charles and the French had reached a general agreement. Canada would reduce the duty on wines while France promised the minimum tariff for a specific number of articles. Tupper agreed that if Ottawa raised the wine duties, Paris would have adequate grounds for denouncing the treaty. He also indicated that Canada would enjoy the minimum tariff not only in metropolitan France but in the French colonies as well.¹⁸

Whitehall viewed the negotiations at this stage with a relatively benevolent eye though misgivings were voiced about a possible Canadian breach of the sacred tenets of non-discrimination. At the Foreign Office, Sir Henry Bergne, the head of the Treaty Department, insisted that no treaty could be signed before London had given full approval. He took a bleak view of Ottawa's promise to establish a line of fast steamships between Canadian and French ports, considering such a move highly detrimental to the British carrying trade. But, as the promise was not an actual part of the proposed agreement, he admitted that little could be done by the imperial government. Bergne, who throughout this period tirelessly promoted British commercial interests, argued that United Kingdom goods would have to receive as favourable treatment in the French market as Canadian products. Further, under no circumstances could Canada grant concessions that in any way discriminated against Britain or other foreign countries.¹⁹ Sir Edward Hertslet, the Foreign Office librarian and archivist, seized upon Canada's major concession as one that might possibly create trouble for London. Examining the proposed reduction of wine duties, he argued that Germany could claim equal treatment under her 1865 treaty and that this preference would then be demanded by all countries enjoying most-favoured-nation status in Britain's colonies.²⁰ Sir Charles Kennedy took a more sanguine attitude. He observed that Ottawa was well aware that Germany and other powers were entitled to preferred treatment and had no intention of discriminating against either the mother country or the foreigner.²¹ This spate of intra-departmental soul-searching indicated quite clearly that Tupper's conduct in Paris was the subject of keen imperial scrutiny.

Though the negotiations appeared to be proceeding smoothly in the first weeks of 1893 they almost foundered on January 25, when the draft treaty was first considered as a whole, including Article II which proved to be highly contentious. Tupper stated that he was not empowered to grant France most-favoured-nation treatment. Though he obtained agreement that Canada could not discriminate against

¹⁸Tupper to Mackenzie Bowell (Canadian minister of trade and commerce), Paris, Jan. 21, 1893, contained in Crowe's No. 7 of Jan. 24 to Dufferin, FO 27/3125.

¹⁹Minutes of Jan. 27 and 28, 1893, *ibid.*

²⁰Minutes of Jan. 28, 1893, *ibid.*

²¹*Ibid.*

either the United Kingdom or the British colonies, Sir Charles was faced with an emphatic demand that France be granted most-favoured-nation treatment identical to whatever tariff concessions Ottawa might make in the future to any third power. Tupper replied that he was only empowered to grant France equal terms with other foreign countries regarding the products that would be specifically listed in the treaty. This, of course, was entirely different from conceding most-favoured-nation privileges in the entire Canadian tariff which Hanotaux and his colleagues were demanding.

Faced with Sir Charles' explanation, which read like an ultimatum, Hanotaux and Pallain expressed their regrets and officially broke off the discussions. As Tupper and Crowe made their way out of the ministry, the commercial attaché suggested that if Sir Charles assumed additional responsibility, there not being adequate time to contact Ottawa for instructions, a way out of the impasse could be reached. He indicated that Hanotaux would be satisfied with an assurance that whatever tariff concessions Canada might make in the future to other powers, the United Kingdom excluded, would be extended to France. Tupper accepted this proposal and returned to the conference chamber where the French quickly fell in with the idea. Agreement was speedily reached on a revised version of Article II.²²

The entire episode did not reflect favourably on Sir Charles. On January 12, 1893, Ottawa had cabled that the cabinet would only agree to "most favoured nation treatment" for France "so far as articles in the treaty are concerned."²³ Two weeks later, Tupper, on the urging of Crowe, granted France, Algeria, and the French colonies whatever concessions might be made to a third power in the future. It was obvious that Sir Charles had exceeded his authority. Why had Tupper gone beyond Ottawa's guidelines? According to him, he was anxious to keep the door open for any future Canadian attempt to establish preferential trade with Britain. This, he stated, was now possible under the terms of Article II as amended. Referring to the imperial law officers of the crown, he noted that they had ruled that Canada was prevented from concluding preferential agreements whose terms would not be extended to either Belgium or Germany. As both commercial agreements and the French treaty could be terminated on one year's

²²Crowe to Dufferin, secret, No. 11, Feb. 1, 1893, contained in Dufferin's No. 35 of the same date to the Foreign Office, *ibid.* The original version of Article II read as follows: "Tout avantage accordé à un autre état, notamment au Royaume Uni de grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, sur un ou plusieurs des articles du tarif Canadien énumérés ou non dans la disposition qui précède, sera de plein droit, étendu à la France et ses colonies et possessions." The revised draft read: "Tout avantage commercial accordé à une Puissance tierce sera étendu de plein droit à la France."

²³Mackenzie Bowell to Tupper, copy, Ottawa, Jan. 12, 1893, CO 42/818.

notice, Tupper felt imperial preference was merely a matter of time and that the French agreement would not stand as an impediment.²⁴ He could not have been aware that a full five years would pass before a sympathetic colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, denounced the Belgian and German treaties and agreed to undertake a study of Britain's other most-favoured-nation treaties as they affected the commercial freedom of the self-governing colonies.²⁵

On February 6, 1893, Lord Dufferin signed the treaty on behalf of the imperial government. Generally, London was quite satisfied with the result of the negotiations though not with Sir Charles' ability.²⁶ Sir Charles Kennedy hailed the agreement as the first tariff engagement concluded between the United Kingdom and a European country affecting a British colony. He described the agreement as a "new departure" and looking back on imperial policy, he stated that it was an "important event" exemplifying a changing relationship between London and the dependencies. The mother country had deliberately adapted her commercial policy to suit the needs of the colony and in this manner had "cut off the ground from separatist agitation."²⁷ Apart from this oblique reference to the movement for commercial union with the United States which had only recently engaged Canadian politics, Kennedy was quite inaccurate in profusely lauding the treaty.

Ottawa very swiftly came to the conclusion that it would not ratify the treaty until a number of major problems had been settled. Tupper was bluntly informed that the provision of the minimum tariff for Canadian "wooden seagoing ships" was worthless. On January 31, 1893, the Chamber of Deputies had approved legislation providing for the payment of bounties to ships registered as French before January 29, 1881. Ships coming under French registry after that date and before January 31, 1893, would be eligible to receive only one-half the proposed bounty. According to Ottawa, this enactment, of great benefit to French shipbuilders, made the concession of the minimum tariff meaningless and Tupper was sharply told that he had agreed to this part of the treaty before the bounty legislation had been approved. Worse still, he had failed to keep Ottawa abreast of

²⁴Tupper to Mackenzie Bowell, copy, Paris, Jan. 25, 1893, *ibid.*

²⁵For the background to Chamberlain's decision to denounce the treaties and to assess the effect Britain's other commercial engagements had upon colonial fiscal policies see R. A. Shields, "Imperial Reaction to the Fielding Tariff of 1897," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXXI (1965), 524-37.

²⁶Robert Meade, permanent undersecretary to the Colonial Office, stated the negotiations would have failed had it not been for Crowe while Sir Edward Grey, parliamentary undersecretary to the Foreign Office, suggested that the details of how close the talks came to failure not be published for fear of jeopardizing Franco-Canadian relations. See their minutes of Feb. 3, 1893, FO 27/3125.

²⁷Minutes of Feb. 8, 1893, *ibid.*

the development. The minister of trade and commerce, Mackenzie Bowell, all but rejected the arduous weeks of negotiation with the withering comment that "one of the principal bases" of the treaty had been "totally altered by after-legislation."²⁸

Ottawa's reaction to the announcement of the French shipping legislation was based on solid grounds. Tupper should have been aware of the experience of his predecessor, Sir Alexander Galt. When Galt had commenced his negotiations with Paris in 1878 he had been candidly informed by the Foreign Office that there was little hope of an increased market for Canadian shipping as the French were "red hot" when it came to protecting their merchant marine.²⁹ Further, the contents of the shipping legislation had been published in the *Journal Officiel* on January 31, 1893, a full week before Dufferin had officially signed the treaty. It is reasonable to suggest that Tupper, despite the burdens of day-to-day negotiation, should have been aware of this development. Kennedy suggested that the embassy in Paris had failed in its duties by not bringing the shipping issue to Sir Charles' attention while the talks were proceeding.³⁰ Essentially, this was a veiled slap at Sir Joseph Crowe's expertise not only as Tupper's adviser but as commercial attaché.

Ottawa's dressing down of Tupper did not stop with the bounties legislation. Mackenzie Bowell took him to task for exceeding his authority in re-drafting the problematical Article II.³¹ If the clause were permitted to stand, Ottawa would be prevented from entering trade discussions with the United States or other countries without giving France the same concessions.

As a final rebuke, Sir Charles was informed that he had conceded much and gained nothing for Canadian trade with St. Pierre and Miquelon. The cabinet had laboured under the impression that tariff reductions on the islands were reserved exclusively for Canada only to find that they applied to all countries. According to Mackenzie Bowell, the United States had become a "close competitor" in this region and enjoyed all the benefits Tupper had purchased by "very material concessions" without being obliged to grant France any privileges in the American market. With these factors in mind, the cabinet had no intention of seeking ratification of the treaty.³²

The agreement was not only seriously questioned in the cabinet but

²⁸Mackenzie Bowell to Tupper, copy, Ottawa, March 19, 1893, CO 42/818.

²⁹Galt to Macdonald, private, London, Dec. 3, 1878, Macdonald Papers, vol. 216.

³⁰Minutes of March 24, 1893, FO 27/3153.

³¹Tupper acknowledged that he had gone beyond his powers when he initially informed Mackenzie Bowell that he had exceeded "in a slight degree the instructions." See his letter of Jan. 25, 1893, copy, CO 42/818.

³²Mackenzie Bowell to Tupper, copy, March 19, 1893, *ibid.*

was also subject to a searching examination in the House of Commons. On March 13, 1893, government and opposition made common cause. George Foster, minister of finance, repeated Mackenzie Bowell's private communications to Tupper.³³ The leader of the opposition, Wilfrid Laurier, agreed with Foster's several objections and made much of the loss of the French market to Canadian shipbuilders.³⁴ In what can only be described as a complete rejection of Tupper, Foster emphasized that though Lord Dufferin had been associated in the negotiations as co-negotiator, the treaty had been concluded "wholly and solely" by the High Commissioner. Until "more satisfactory assurances" about many of the questionable aspects of the agreement had been received, the government would not ask the House for ratification.³⁵

The attitude of Paris was extremely hostile. According to Gabriel Hanotaux, Tupper had agreed to grant France most-favoured-nation status after lengthy discussion of the issue. He added that the High Commissioner would not have assented had he not been certain of Ottawa's approval. Hanotaux admitted that the bounty legislation had been enacted following agreement on the draft treaty and this admission would seem to substantiate the argument that Canada had grounds for complaint though it does not explain Tupper and Crowe's ignorance of the development. The French official glossed over protests about the surcharge on goods trans-shipped through European ports to France with the observation that this had never been officially discussed and would be resolved when Ottawa approved the line of steamships. The dispute over the tariff at St. Pierre and Miquelon was dismissed with the curt comment that none of the French negotiators had even hinted that duty reductions in that region would be reserved solely to Canada.

Hanotaux's conclusions posed the most serious danger for Canada's treaty-making aspirations, a goal that had been promoted assiduously by both Galt and Tupper as high commissioners to London. He emphasized that his government would have to accept, although reluctantly, an immediate and forthright rejection of the treaty by the Canadian parliament. The postponement of ratification was an entirely different matter. Foster's policy, Hanotaux warned, "would probably induce the French government from henceforth *to avoid engaging in negotiations with British Colonies.*"³⁶

³³Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, I (March 13, 1893), 2278.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 2280.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 2282-3.

³⁶Memorandum by Crowe reporting a meeting with Hanotaux of March 16, 1893, contained in Dufferin's No. 88 of the same date to the Foreign Office, FO 27/3126. Italics the author's.

Sir Charles' reaction to the postponement of ratification was immediate and bitter. Writing to Abbott's successor as prime minister, Sir John Thompson, who was en route to Paris to discuss the Behring Sea arbitration, he tendered his resignation as high commissioner. He expressed his anger at having learned of Foster's refusal from a Reuters press despatch and described the Finance Minister's statement in the Commons as not only "misleading" but also insulting to both Rosebery and Dufferin. Tupper then cited an announcement he had made to the London press justifying his role as negotiator. It read in part: "The Canadian Government, with every detail before them authorized the British Plenipotentiaries to sign the Treaty. It was made in exact conformity with their wishes, except that most-favoured-nation treatment to France was not confined to the articles named in the Treaty."

Understandably, Tupper attempted to meet in sequence the specific charges levied against him by Ottawa. French shipping bounty legislation was well known to Foster. Tupper, here, may have been implying that the progress of this law through the Chamber should have been known to the Finance Minister through the French consul at Quebec. Exclusive tariff privileges for Canada at St. Pierre and Miquelon had never been suggested nor had he received "the slightest intimation of disapproval of the Treaty" since he had forwarded a draft copy in February. Tupper warned that if the government evaded its international duties it would bring discredit to Canada and "seriously impair the important position for the first time attained by a colony." His notice of resignation was replete with bitterness: "My deep interest in the prosperity of Canada, and the great regard for yourself, had induced me to overlook the studied hostility of Mr. Foster, which has greatly impaired the usefulness of my office, but assuming this report of the Finance Minister to be correct, the only recourse now open to me is to place my resignation in your hands."³⁷ It is only fair to note that Sir Charles had attempted to bring pressure upon Ottawa before submitting his resignation to Thompson. On March 15, 1893, he had granted an interview to the London correspondent of the *Montreal Star*. In this interview he categorically stated that the government would either have to submit the treaty to parliament for ratification or resign.³⁸

Tupper's threat to resign was complemented by the actions of his son, Charles Hibbert, then minister of marine and fisheries and also

³⁷Tupper to Thompson, London, March 17, 1893, Tupper Papers, vol. XVII, PAC.

³⁸See issue of March 15, 1893. In the same issue the *Star's* correspondent quoted an unnamed imperial official as follows: "... if the Canadian Ministry keep up this practice of throwing everything overboard after the treaty has been signed, their desire for treaty-making power will receive very little encouragement from the Imperial authorities."

en route to the Behring Sea arbitration. He informed George Foster that he would submit his resignation upon the Prime Minister's arrival in the French capital.³⁹ This communication at least resulted in a delaying action by the Finance Minister. He hastily contacted the younger Tupper urging him not to act precipitately as the treaty was already before the Commons. He added, however, that ratification could not proceed until adequate explanations had been received from Paris and that given the prevailing mood of the House the members could not be induced to complete the procedure.⁴⁰ Foster's explanation hardly satisfied Charles Hibbert. He repeated his father's warnings that the government was "honour bound" to submit the treaty for ratification and that if parliament accepted the Finance Minister's views it would result in "incalculable injury" to the country. Charles Hibbert insisted that the imperial government would seriously question lending its services to the colonies in future negotiations when success or failure depended upon the whim of colonial assemblies.⁴¹

The correspondence between the younger Tupper and Foster revealed a basic policy cleavage in the Canadian cabinet. It did not bring to the surface the deep feelings of the High Commissioner. His emotions were displayed much more prominently in correspondence with his son. Writing to Charles Hibbert, he gave full vent to his spleen:

The Government of Canada stands completely disgraced before the world. Lord Rosebery says that if they had any doubt on any point it should have been communicated to him so that he could have approached the French Government instead of the announcement having been made in this unheard of not to say as he might have brutal manner. It is the old story of put a beggar on horseback.

What a commentary all this is upon thirty-eight years of unselfish and successful devotion to my country and the still greater sacrifice which you have made in abandoning your professional career . . . but it enhances the bitter mortification I feel when I see our country degraded and its best interests sacrificed by the incompetency and miserable selfishness and jealousy of those who have been intrusted with power they are incapable of using aright.⁴²

With the recriminations thus exchanged, the entire issue came to rest on the shoulders of Sir John Thompson. On March 22, 1893, two days after his arrival in Paris, he attempted to mollify Tupper. He urged him to await a complete report from Foster with the hope that the latter's comments would appear in a less critical light. The Prime Minister quite correctly proceeded to smooth Lord Dufferin's ruffled

³⁹C. H. Tupper to Foster, telegram, London, March 17, 1893, Tupper Papers, vol. XVII.

⁴⁰Foster to C. H. Tupper, telegram, Ottawa, March 17, 1893, *ibid.*

⁴¹C. H. Tupper to Foster, Paris, March 19, 1893, *ibid.*

⁴²Tupper to his son, London, March 19, 1893, *ibid.*

feathers. At a meeting with the Ambassador he stated that though he was most reluctant to make any derogatory remarks about Tupper, he would not accept any suggestions that Ottawa had acted in bad faith. This would appear to have been a less than subtle means of damning the much maligned High Commissioner with faint praise! Dufferin indicated that he had acted implicitly on Sir Charles' "repeated assurances" that Ottawa was "perfectly satisfied" with the terms of the draft treaty. Subsequently, he had been "greatly confused" when he learned that the government had not authorized the signing of the document. Dufferin and Thompson came to an agreement that Canada would inform London of the reasons for seeking delay and the Foreign Office would then contact Paris in a manner "satisfactory to the French Government."⁴³

The essence of Canadian policy by late March was obviously a re-opening of the talks in order to resolve the problems raised by Mackenzie Bowell, Foster, and Thompson. This placed Whitehall in a highly embarrassing position. In order to preserve amicable Anglo-French relations the permanent undersecretary to the Colonial Office, Robert Henry Meade, immediately contacted Tupper. His task was to clarify the transatlantic dispute raging between the High Commissioner and Ottawa and to sooth French irritation. One member of the Office pungently commented that the entire affair was "a hideous mess."⁴⁴ Following a hastily arranged meeting with Tupper, the Colonial Office forwarded to Ottawa a severe reprimand, observing that the government's action had been "most unfortunate" as it would cause the French to question Canada's good faith and could well prejudice the successful arbitration of the Behring Sea controversy. Paris had assumed all along that the treaty would be submitted to parliament with all the support the Thompson administration could muster. This course, London warned, was the only one "consistent with the interests of Canada and the Empire." Any re-opening of the discussions as suggested by Mackenzie Bowell and Foster was rejected as "useless."⁴⁵

London's rebuke to Ottawa only seemed to exacerbate the conflict between Tupper and his government. Foster, whose initial comments in the Commons had precipitated the "hideous mess," contacted

⁴³Thompson to Mackenzie Bowell, private, Paris, March 25, 1893, Mackenzie Bowell Papers, vol. XI, PAC. In this letter, received on April 10, Thompson noted that he had enclosed Tupper's notice of resignation. Evidently he succeeded in changing the High Commissioner's mind as the resignation was omitted from the despatch.

⁴⁴Minutes by John Anderson, March 21, 1893, on Lord Stanley's (Canadian governor general) confidential telegram of March 19, 1893, to Lord Ripon (colonial secretary), copy, FO 27/315.

⁴⁵Colonial Office to Stanley, confidential telegram, copy, London, March 22, 1893, *ibid.*

Thompson to deliver himself of a scathing denunciation of Sir Charles. Taking Tupper to task for his interview with the *Montreal Star*, Foster argued that he displayed a complete lack of appreciation for his position as an official agent of the Canadian government. In some of the bluntest language employed in the entire imbroglio, he asked that Sir Charles be silenced and the task of settling the problem be left to Ottawa. Foster insisted that Tupper had exceeded his powers as negotiator, which was true, and concluded with the observation that the controversial most-favoured-nation clause was not only highly distasteful to the Conservative administration but would be vigorously opposed by Laurier and the opposition.⁴⁶

Following the news of Ottawa's reluctance to commence ratification, a slight break developed in the impasse. Lord Dufferin reported that Tupper was anxious for Sir Joseph Crowe to meet with the French in order to clarify the points of contention. He said that it would be better for the High Commissioner to come to Paris for this stage of the discussions as the various problems were "so involved and complicated,"⁴⁷ thus politely suggesting that as the dispute seemed to be entirely of Canada's making it should be resolved by a Canadian emissary, not an imperial representative. Dufferin had discussed the entire matter with Thompson and agreed to a re-opening of the talks provided nothing was decided which would be "adverse to imperial interests or discourteous to France."⁴⁸

Given the irritation on both sides of the Atlantic, a clarification of the treaty seemed the best course to follow though even here the awkward political situation in Ottawa threatened to impede progress. Lord Stanley, the governor general, informed London on March 24, 1893, that only one week remained in the parliamentary session and if ratification was to be obtained action would have to commence within a few days. He pointed out that in its present wording Article II would be rejected and if he refused to prorogue parliament, the bill would most certainly be defeated in the Commons. Stanley's solution to a bad situation was for the cabinet to press for ratification in order to prevent further annoyance to the French with the reservation that parliament retained the right "without imputation of bad faith" to demand that Article II should not prevent Canada from concluding a liberal commercial treaty with the United States or any other third power.⁴⁹

⁴⁶Foster to Thompson, Ottawa, March 22, 1893, Sir John Thompson Papers, vol. 179, PAC.

⁴⁷Dufferin to the Foreign Office, cypher telegram, Paris, March 24, 1893, FO 27/3126.

⁴⁸Thompson to Bowell, cypher cable, Paris, March 24, 1893, Thompson Papers, Letter Book XXXVII.

⁴⁹Stanley to Ripon, secret, telegram, Ottawa, March 24, 1893, CO 42/816.

Stanley's proposed policy did not win Colonial Office approval. Robert Meade protested that it was impossible for the Canadian parliament to ratify a treaty and then denounce a particular clause without, in logic, denouncing the entire agreement. Noting that the treaty could be cancelled with one year's notice, he suggested that it be ratified and if it was later felt that Article II unduly hampered Canada's commercial interests, action could be taken to re-negotiate that provision or the entire agreement abrogated. Meade, however, was a realist concerning Canadian politics and admitted that in its "present temper" and "inefficient condition" parliament would not begin ratification in the dying moments of the session. Accordingly, after consultation with Tupper, the undersecretary proposed that a telegram be sent to Dufferin urging him to obtain French approval for a postponement. He made the point that the cabinet had been "weakened" by the absence of Thompson and Charles Hibbert Tupper and seemed incapable of grasping "the effect of the several provisions of the Treaty."⁵⁰

Though Meade was taking the only course possible in a delicate international affair, French annoyance was of little concern to Canada's Sir John Thompson. Lord Stanley reported that the Prime Minister had cabled from Paris that the French government had no grounds for complaint. The only reason for ill will in Paris lay in the "announcement in the House of Commons" of the cabinet's decision not to proceed with ratification "*without previous notification to Imperial or French government.*"⁵¹ The Foreign Office was hardly satisfied with this explanation. Lord Rosebery bluntly observed that the Canadian cabinet "only pretend to contradict discourtesy to the French Government."⁵²

A frantic spate of cabling from Ottawa to London and Paris finally gained French approval for a policy of postponement. On March 27, Jules Develle, the foreign minister, informed Lord Dufferin that the Chamber of Deputies was to be prorogued and that the government was willing to "put the affair to sleep for the present." He expressed the hope that when the Canadian parliament resumed its labours the "British Government would use its influence to secure the ultimate carrying into effect of the important agreement happily arrived at."⁵³ Apart from the Gallic wit suggesting that the treaty had been "happily arrived at," there remained Develle's broad hint that imperial pressure be brought to bear upon a recalcitrant Ottawa.

⁵⁰Minutes of March 25, 1893, *ibid.*

⁵¹Stanley to Ripon, cypher telegram, Ottawa, March 25, 1893, copy, FO 27/3153. Italics Lord Rosebery's.

⁵²Minutes of March 26, 1893, *ibid.*

⁵³Dufferin to the Foreign Office, Commercial No. 94, Paris, March 27, 1893, *ibid.*

The problem having been consigned to additional discussion, Canada seems to have felt that she had gained the best of both worlds and could defy the imperial government. Sir John Thompson admitted that Anglo-French relations had recently been strained due to conflict over Newfoundland and Egyptian affairs. On account of such developments, London was understandably reluctant to see another issue develop with France but this was no reason why Ottawa should be "hustled" by Whitehall. He sharply rejected any suggestion that the government had acted in bad faith though he candidly noted that as "we are having our own way about the whole affair we ought, perhaps, to be satisfied without seeking a triumph of words."⁵⁴ Tupper did not view the situation in this light.

Upon receiving word that the Prime Minister had cabled Foster not to submit the treaty for ratification, Tupper stated that nothing would induce him "to remain in office under a Premier capable of such deception." He later retracted this bitter comment upon learning that his information had been based upon an erroneous Reuters despatch from Ottawa. Sir Charles admitted that Thompson had acted loyally concerning Canada's international obligations though he could not "help deploring" the opportunity the country had lost and which could not be "easily" regained.⁵⁵ Tupper seems initially to have confused postponement of ratification until 1894 with an outright rejection by the government ever to proceed to that stage.

On July 10, 1894, the Canadian House of Commons began debate on ratification. During the intervening fifteen months some of the contentious issues had been resolved thereby encouraging the government to proceed with the debate. Ottawa was informed that France fully intended to grant Canadian building timber and lumber of all kinds the minimum tariff. As these commodities loomed large as export items at least one doubt had been removed. Gabriel Hanotaux assured Canada that as the treaty was designed to expand trade between the two countries, Canadian products exported in bond through the United States to French ports would not be subject to additional duties though goods destined for France and delivered at European ports would be assessed the extra charges.⁵⁶ Subsequent negotiations resulted in French agreement that Canadian goods listed in the treaty would be granted the minimum tariff not only in France

⁵⁴Thompson to Bowell, London, March 28, 1893, Thompson Papers, Letter Book XXXVII.

⁵⁵Tupper to his son, Cologne, April 2, 1893, Tupper Papers, vol. XVIII. In his retraction, Sir Charles admitted that the news of Thompson's alleged despatch was "not only untrue but the very reverse of the fact." See his letter to Meade, London, April 10, 1893, CO 42/818.

⁵⁶Tupper & Crowe to Thompson, copy, Paris, March 29, 1893, CO 42/818.

and Algeria but in the colonies as well thus removing the dispute over St. Pierre and Miquelon.⁵⁷ Though Paris made no concessions regarding Article II, the Canadian cabinet was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the treaty could be denounced with one year's notice thus leaving the door open for preferential arrangements with the United Kingdom. This expectation was based on the highly dubious proposition that London was prepared at that date to denounce her agreements with Belgium and Germany and the other most-favoured nations. Without such action, Anglo-Canadian trade preference was impossible. Nonetheless, arguments of this nature were employed by Sir John Thompson when he presented the treaty to the Commons.⁵⁸

The agreement, given its degree of notoriety, was subject to massive criticism by the opposition. Laurier noted that on the very day the treaty was signed both Tupper and Dufferin had assured Paris that parliament had voted a subvention of £100,000 for the establishment of the line of steamships. He scathingly observed that Foster had denounced the subsidy and that the treaty had therefore been obtained under "deceit." If the steamship line was not established, Canadian goods could not enter France directly and with exports then subject to the customs house surcharge, the treaty was "without value."⁵⁹ Despite such oratory, the treaty was carried on second reading by a vote of 120 to 41.

On August 17, 1894, the Colonial Office was informed that the treaty had passed both Houses of Parliament but had not been proclaimed. The reason for the delay was stated to be the growth of prohibitionist strength in the country and the administration wanted to be absolutely certain that London would denounce the agreement if this sentiment became dominant. Ottawa made much of the fact that although Canada had entered the 1886 Berne Copyright Convention on the clear understanding that Whitehall would give notice of Canadian withdrawal whenever Ottawa desired, the imperial authorities had failed to meet a request of this nature for over five years. Given this background, the cabinet argued that it would be "open to severe censure" if the treaty was proclaimed without an ironclad imperial guarantee that it would be denounced whenever Canada desired.⁶⁰

Canadian unwillingness to complete ratification hardly equalled imperial concern that Ottawa would not respect Britain's host of most-favoured-nation treaties. Upon receipt of news that the French

⁵⁷Tupper to Meade, Feb. 20, 1894, CO 42/825.

⁵⁸Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, II (July 10, 1894), 5648.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 6554.

⁶⁰Aberdeen (Canadian governor general) to Ripon, No. 237, Halifax, Aug. 17, 1894, CO 42/823.

Chamber had completed ratification, Sir Henry Bergne insisted that no official exchange of ratifications take place until assurances were received that Canada would faithfully meet the mother country's commercial obligations. The new foreign secretary, Lord Kimberley, bluntly stated that he would seriously query any "promise" the Thompson government might give on this point.⁶¹

London was obviously concerned that the debates in the Canadian Commons seemed to imply that duty reductions would be confined solely to France. Complaints had already been received from Austria-Hungary that Canada's behaviour violated the most-favoured-nation treaty of December 5, 1876. At the Colonial Office John Anderson, a second-class clerk in the North American Department and at this period probably the best informed official on Canadian affairs, agreed that the legislation was designed to benefit France alone. He described the action as a "breach of faith" particularly as Ottawa had been "fully advised" concerning Britain's treaty responsibilities.⁶²

Canada's policy in meeting imperial requirements was at best ambivalent. Tupper informed the Colonial Office that the reduced rates on French goods would only apply on the issuance of a proclamation that the treaty was in effect. As this procedure had yet to be completed, there was no need for foreign powers enjoying most-favoured-nation status to fear that they would be subject immediately to discrimination. He noted that he had received assurances from Sir John Thompson that Canada would live up to Britain's obligations "*at the proper time*" and then proceeded to justify Ottawa's procrastination by introducing the delicate topic of Canada's responsibility to extend tariff concessions to the rest of the empire. Sir Charles reported that Ottawa would extend the French tariff concessions to "the rest of the British Dominions" as soon as the ratification formalities had been completed. This, he insisted, was not to be regarded by London as establishing a precedent. Canada was not obliged to favour the other parts of the empire and this had been recognized by London on more than one occasion.⁶³

Tupper's statement, which more than hinted at a declaration of commercial independence, created a flurry of concern in the Colonial Office over imperial unity and the validity of Canada's pledged word. It fell to John Anderson to rebut Tupper's challenge. He suggested that the High Commissioner was influenced by the 1884 negotiations in which Canada sought a commercial agreement with the Spanish

⁶¹Minutes by Bergne and Kimberley, undated, FO 27/3180.

⁶²Minutes of Oct. 17, 1894, CO 42/827.

⁶³See Tupper's letters to Meade of Dec. 4 and 10, 1894, CO 42/825. Italics the author's.

Antilles. At that time Ottawa had questioned whether Canadian concessions would have to be extended to the British West Indies without a guarantee of reciprocal advantages for Canadian products in those islands. More to the point, Anderson emphasized that when discussions were begun between the United States and the West Indies for a trade treaty, London had assured Ottawa that whatever tariff privileges were granted to American goods would be extended to the similar range of Canadian products. To round off his criticism, the Colonial Office official referred to the negotiations begun in 1891 between the United States and Newfoundland. Fearing that the Newfoundland market would be closed to Canada, Charles Hibbert Tupper and Sir John Thompson had issued a joint minute on February 29, 1892, opposing any agreement whereby a foreign country was able to favour one colony at the expense of another. Both politicians had suggested that the conclusion of a treaty of this nature would lead to "political results affecting the relations of the Colonies to each other and the Empire." Eventually, London had accepted the Canadian protest, though reluctantly, and called off the talks with Washington. At the time, Anderson had described the negotiations as a matter in which Canada had "no claim to interfere."

With his résumé of recent imperial policy Anderson had successfully refuted Tupper's arguments. A tariff war between British colonies could not fail to lead to imperial disunion and would result in an empire that was nothing more than a "farce." He admitted that it would be difficult to coerce Canada on this point. As the objections to Ottawa's stand were so considerable, Anderson recommended that every effort be made to have the Thompson administration change its projected policy.⁶⁴

Despite growing unrest in Whitehall, there was precious little evidence that Ottawa was prepared to follow imperial guidelines. Tupper urged the cabinet at least to assure the Colonial Office that the treaty benefits would be extended as soon as the necessary power had been received from parliament. As a temporary palliative, he suggested that a promise be given that all duties assessed on foreign goods would be refunded when the supplementary legislation had been passed. The High Commissioner was undoubtedly under considerable pressure as he referred to the atmosphere of "anxiety" prevailing in the Colonial Office.⁶⁵

By the spring of 1895 Tupper felt that Ottawa had finally met London's demands. The cabinet had approved two orders-in-council. The first declared that the treaty would be amended to extend the tariff

⁶⁴Minutes of Dec. 29, 1894, *ibid.*

⁶⁵Tupper to Bowell, London, Jan. 15, 1895, Tupper Papers, X.

concessions to eligible nations as soon as parliament met. The second called upon the colonial secretary to give an imperial guarantee that implementation of the treaty would not prevent Canada from granting preference to British colonies regardless of French claims under the agreement.⁶⁶ The orders-in-council were essentially Canadian demands upon London. The cabinet was asking the imperial government to accept the first as evidence of good faith on Ottawa's part and as adequate reason for an immediate exchange of ratifications. The second order was equally a demand that London begin to consider seriously denouncing the treaties with Belgium and Germany in order to make imperial preference possible.

Ottawa's action hardly satisfied the imperial government. John Anderson pointed out that the Canadian government had still given no guarantee concerning goods entering the country during the period between ratification and the passage of the supplementary legislation. He recommended that no action be taken until a definite promise had been received that the additional duties would not be levied.⁶⁷ The Foreign Office was even more critical. Sir Henry Bergne argued that ratification without the appropriate amendments to the treaty would be "dangerous." Faced with the burning Manitoba schools question,⁶⁸ the Canadian government could well be turned out of office or, even if retaining power, might be incapable of meeting Britain's commercial responsibilities to other powers. Ever mindful of the United Kingdom's trading interests abroad, Bergne insisted that Canada must accept imperial policy or the British government would find itself "involved in *very awkward difficulties* with Foreign Countries." Sir Edward Grey was more blunt. He stated that he was not even prepared to accept "an assurance as to the *intention* of the Canadian Government" in meeting Britain's responsibilities.⁶⁹ Given the growing skepticism over Canadian equivocation, the imperial government finally issued an ultimatum. So critical was this chastisement that its contents merit some consideration. The Colonial Office declared: ". . . in a matter of such importance from an international point of view Her Majesty's Government feel that they would not be justified in leaving anything open, and they are reluctantly compelled therefore to postpone the exchange of ratifications *until legislation has been actually passed* extending the benefits of the Convention to all nations

⁶⁶Tupper to Meade, London, March 8, 1895, CO 42/832.

⁶⁷Minutes of March 11, 1895, *ibid.*

⁶⁸The Conservative administration was under considerable pressure to revoke legislation enacted in 1890 by the province of Manitoba abolishing the state-supported Catholic school system.

⁶⁹Minutes, undated, on Colonial Office to Foreign Office of March 8, 1895, FO 27/3252. Italics the author's where Bergne's minutes are concerned.

entitled under Treaty to most-favoured-nation treatment in Canada and to the rest of Her Majesty's Dominions."⁷⁰

Imperial pressure carried the day. Armed with amendments provided by the law officers of the crown in London, the Canadian parliament enacted remedial legislation on July 27, 1895. Though the bill now met all the objections that had been raised over such a lengthy period its passage was by no means smooth. Acceptance of Downing Street's directives earned the comment "snub" in the Commons while Laurier described the situation as nothing more than dictation from London which cast a very considerable doubt on the "commercial independence of Canada."⁷¹

With the treaty formally in effect as of October 12, 1895, there came to a close a lengthy period of tortuous negotiation and international wrangling among Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. The implications were obvious. Ottawa's negotiating powers were seriously restricted by imperial policy and the mother country's international obligations. These restrictions were generally enforced, despite Canadian complaints, by the disciplined administrators of Whitehall. For the generation of John Anderson and Sir Henry Bergne, Britain's relations with the foreign world took precedence over colonial aspirations. Their policies, skilfully applied as they were in the case of the French treaty, undoubtedly stiffened Ottawa's determination to be rid of United Kingdom agreements which hampered Canada's commercial autonomy.

From the diplomatic point of view the Canadian government and Sir Charles Tupper displayed considerable naïveté in the negotiations. Tupper had exceeded his authority in guaranteeing Paris complete most-favoured-nation treatment though it must be admitted he had made this concession on the advice of an imperial emissary, Sir Joseph Crowe. Ottawa's lengthy procrastination in amending the treaty certainly flew in the face of established imperial policy. The administration's reluctance to meet British obligations appears to have been an almost deliberate attempt to ignore Canada's subordinate status within the empire and to force London's hand on the Belgian and German agreements.

As Canadian negotiator, Tupper was certainly rebuffed by his government. The highly inadequate support he received from Mackenzie Bowell, Foster, and Thompson at the height of the crisis bears testimony to this. Given the tenor of Foster's correspondence and Thompson's discussions with Lord Dufferin, it is entirely reasonable

⁷⁰Colonial Office to Tupper, April 4, 1895, contained in Colonial Office to Foreign Office, April 13, 1895, *ibid.* Italics the author's.

⁷¹Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, II (July 4, 1895), 3825.

to argue that many within the Canadian cabinet were using the treaty incident as a means of downgrading the High Commissioner. Subsequent to Sir John A. Macdonald's death in 1891, many Conservatives declared themselves opposed to Tupper's return from London to head the party. The animosity displayed over the treaty issue was merely another example of the general hostility he engendered in certain political circles in Canada.⁷²

On the surface it appeared that the Franco-Canadian treaty had accomplished little in Ottawa's campaign for a broader degree of commercial autonomy.⁷³ However, the entire episode must be viewed in the light of a changing imperial policy. Within the Colonial Office John Anderson, though describing Canadian attitudes as "very wrong and stupid," admitted that the self-governing colonies viewed trade and tariffs in an entirely different light than the free-trading mother country. He even went so far as to suggest that Ottawa need not extend the duty reductions on French wines to Australian wines unless those colonies were prepared to make reciprocal concessions to Canadian goods.⁷⁴ Sentiments of this nature, opposed though they were to the long-established practices of the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade, gave evidence that Whitehall was not completely rigid where colonial aspirations were concerned. When Joseph Chamberlain's dramatic decision to abrogate the Belgian and German treaties only a brief two years following the ratification of the French agreement is considered, it can logically be argued that Sir Charles' lengthy negotiations had accomplished much. By bringing to London's attention a growing Canadian restiveness over imperial commercial policy he dramatized the divergence between free trade and tariff preference and ultimately obtained the support of a highly sympathetic colonial secretary. The marked expansion of colonial tariff autonomy in the beginning of the new century was due in part to Tupper's efforts from 1892 to 1895.

⁷²For examples of Tupper's unpopularity in Canada see D. G. Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain* (Toronto, 1955), p. 568, and *The Canadian Journal of Lady Aberdeen*, ed. J. T. Saywell (Toronto, 1960), p. 166.

⁷³Two years following the proclamation of the treaty, while visiting Paris as prime minister, Laurier attempted to have Article III abolished as it provided that Canadian goods would only enjoy the minimum tariff if exported directly to French ports. The government's refusal prompted John Anderson to observe wryly that the French were "not disposed to give any material expression to their sentimental expressions." See his minutes of Aug. 12, 1897, CO 42/853.

⁷⁴For evidence of a growing change of attitude within the Colonial Office, see R. A. Shields, "Imperial Policy and the Ripon Circular of 1895," *Canadian Historical Review*, XLIX (1966), 119-36.

The Search for Economy: Imperial Administration of Nova Scotia in the 1830s

PETER BURROUGHS

ONE OF THE MAIN PRINCIPLES of Whig colonial policy during the 1830s was the search for economy: the desire to alleviate the financial burden which colonies placed on the British Treasury. This ministerial preoccupation with retrenchment was in part a response to nagging parliamentary criticism of the level of public expenditure at home and overseas. The most vociferous demand for governmental economy emanated from a small group in the House of Commons led by Joseph Hume and including such radical and independent members as Sir Henry Parnell, Henry Labouchere, George Robinson, Robert Gordon, and Henry Warburton. Hume and his associates were few in number, but they were vocal, persistent, and well armed with facts. Moreover, their basic contention, that "the best interests of the country require that its resources should be renovated and strengthened by retrenchment and economy in time of peace,"¹ commanded considerable sympathy amongst less outspoken members of the House of Commons who appreciated the evils of extravagance and the threat of increased taxation. The arguments of the radicals also echoed a general feeling in parliament and in the country at large that the British taxpayer was excessively burdened with the upkeep of inflated civil and military establishments, and that this form of extravagance was directly related to the persistence of patronage and corruption in British politics. Imperial expenditure connected with the administration and defence of British North America attracted particularly heavy fire

¹Great Britain, *Hansard*, XVIII (12 Feb. 1828), 349.

from the parliamentary radicals. During the late 1820s the civil and ecclesiastical establishments in many colonies, including Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Upper Canada, were still being largely financed by annual parliamentary grants. It was equally well known that many incidental expenses of the civil governments, as well as the cost of military garrisons overseas, were defrayed from monies voted each year for "army extraordinaries." The annual debates on navy, army, and ordnance estimates therefore provided the advocates of economy with an ideal opportunity every spring to attack the ministry of the day for its maintenance of exorbitant and unnecessary establishments in the colonies.

The campaign for retrenchment was closely linked with a growing criticism of the prevailing system of colonial government which developed after 1827 as parliament began to display a renewed interest in colonial affairs. For the first time since the dispute with the American colonies in the 1770s, internal dissensions and signs of impending political crisis in Canada, the West Indies, and other parts of the empire produced parliamentary repercussions at home and became the subject of acrimonious debate in the House of Commons.² In the days before Gibbon Wakefield and the colonial reformers began to mount their scathing attacks on "bureaucracy" and the rule of "Mr. Mothercountry" ensconced in Downing Street, instances of extravagance connected with the administration or defence of the empire provided the radicals with excellent pretexts to denounce the ineptitude and illiberality with which the ministry handled colonial grievances. The radicals plausibly argued that the inhabitants of British North America would wholly defray these civil and military expenditures if they were allowed to administer their own affairs: economy for the British people and redress of colonial grievances went hand in hand.

What effect did this constant criticism in parliament have on the conduct of successive ministries, and how far did it result in a reduction of colonial expenditure? Although the radicals seldom came near to defeating the government of the day on a particular vote, they did keep the whole question of public expenditure and colonial commitments at the forefront of parliamentary attention, and their attacks on extravagance and misrule were not without considerable effect. The pressure of this critical inquiry encouraged Earl Bathurst in 1825 to examine possible methods of financing the civil establishments in

²For the renewal of parliamentary interest in colonial affairs in the late 1820s, see H. T. Manning, "Colonial Crises before the Cabinet, 1829-1835," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, XXX (1957), 41-61.

the colonies without recourse to an annual vote in the House of Commons.³ In 1830 the Duke of Wellington's ministry was constrained to appoint a commission to inquire into the details of colonial expenditure,⁴ and in May of that year Sir George Murray felt obliged under persistent questioning to promise the House that he would present a "colonial budget" detailing the cost of the colonies to the British Treasury—a pledge that subsequently caused the Whigs considerable embarrassment after they came into office.⁵ Nevertheless, the Tory ministries of the late 1820s were generally unable to justify the current rate of government spending to the satisfaction of the radicals and, despite the occasional profession of good intentions, appeared unresponsive to the demand for retrenchment.⁶

A marked change of attitude was at once noticeable with the arrival of Lord Howick at the Colonial Office in November 1830 as parliamentary undersecretary in the Whig ministry of Earl Grey. Howick soon showed himself to be a more radical and resolute reformer than the average occupant of Downing Street, and from the first he exerted a strong influence over Lord Goderich, his vacillating and indifferent chief. Amongst his many enthusiasms, Howick was an ardent advocate of retrenchment. He had previously voted with the radicals on numerous occasions over this issue, and once in office he was willing to provide parliament with the fullest information on the cost of the colonies and evidence of his efforts to reduce expenditure, even though the permanent members of the department were highly sceptical of the wisdom of this publicity and Robert Hay predicted that "it will end in placing the Government of the Colonies practically in the hands of Mr. Hume and his associates."⁷ For the first time, the demand for retrenchment had found a distinctly sympathetic response within the Colonial Office. Indeed, a disproportionate amount of Howick's time and energy appears to have been devoted to the examination of colonial accounts and budgets on behalf of the British taxpayer. During his short tenure of office between 1830 and 1833, he set a pattern of

³Hay to Goderich, 4 Jan. 1832, ff. 302–9, Ripon Papers, British Museum Add. MSS. 40862; circular from Bathurst to the lieutenant governors of Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, 8 Oct. 1825, Report from the Select Committee on the Civil Government of Canada, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1828 (569) VII, 686–7.

⁴*Hansard*, XIII (22 March 1830), 715. The Reports of the Commission were published in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1830–31 (64 and 194) IV, 1–179.

⁵*Hansard*, XXIV (10 May 1830), 506–16, and V (25 July 1831), 280–1.

⁶See for example Hume's comments, *ibid.*, XX (20 Feb. 1829), 450; *Mirror of Parliament*, 22 Feb. 1828, p. 311.

⁷Hay to Goderich, 4 Jan. 1832, Ripon Papers. For Howick's radical views on economic reform, Howick to Goderich, 9 Jan. 1832, ff. 310–15, Ripon Papers. See also H. T. Manning, "The Colonial Policy of the Whig Ministers, 1830–37, Part I," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXIII (1952), 206–8.

retrenchment in colonial administration that was largely followed for the rest of the decade by Lord Goderich's less adventurous successors.

In 1830, when the Whigs came into power, the colonies were costing the British Treasury £2,232,000 a year.⁸ This money was spent on a variety of projects, ranging from the discipline of convicts in Tasmania to the defence of Heligoland, but by far the largest proportion was used to meet the expense of civil and military establishments in the colonies. These amounts may not have represented very considerable sums for a government whose total budget at this time amounted to £55 million, but they provided plenty of ammunition for Hume and his associates and ample scope for the attention of Lord Howick. The effects of Howick's careful scrutiny can be illustrated by an examination of his handling of the parliamentary estimate for Nova Scotia. This annual grant naturally formed only a very small percentage of the total expense of the colonies, but the attempts in the early 1830s to reduce imperial expenditure in this particular instance reflect the general policy of retrenchment that was simultaneously being pursued throughout the empire.

Furthermore, events in Nova Scotia during these years indicate that the British government's attempts to reduce colonial expenditure had salutary repercussions on imperial relations. Although the devious financial manoeuvres of officials in London were not always well conceived or practicable, retrenchment was the parent of colonial reform. The pursuit of economy actively assisted the gradual progress towards internal self-government since there was an intimate connection between the questions of who should control the government of a colony and who was expected to pay for it. This relationship can be aptly illustrated in Nova Scotia where the reduction of imperial subsidies, and the transfer of items of expenditure to colonial revenues, were both closely related to redress of grievances and to negotiations for the grant of a civil list. A study of the search for economy in the 1830s is therefore particularly relevant to both Nova Scotian and imperial history in the years when basic constitutional issues were being consciously clarified at home and in the colonies.

The parliamentary estimate for Nova Scotia in each of the three years between 1828 and 1830 totalled £10,445, and this amount

⁸It has been estimated that the total cost of all the civil establishments overseas amounted in 1830 to some £2,360,000, of which four-fifths was borne by the colonists and one-fifth, or £472,000, by the British Treasury. Military establishments in the colonies cost a further £2,200,000 a year, of which one-fifth was met by the colonists and four-fifths, or £1,760,000, by the British taxpayer. Statistics compiled from the Reports of the Commissioners appointed to enquire into the Receipt and Expenditure of the Revenue in the Colonies and Foreign Possessions, 1830, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1830-31 (64 and 194) IV.

represented about half the total cost of the civil establishment. The grant was distributed as follows: towards the salary of the lieutenant governor, £2000; chief justice, £850; attorney general, £150; secretary, registrar, and clerk of the council, £250; surveyor general, £150; treasurer, £50; allowance to the bishop, £2000, with a further £150 for travelling expenses; prothonotary, £100; minister of the Church of Scotland, £75; archdeacon, £300; widow and daughter of Dr. Cox, a former president of King's College, Windsor, £100; the vessel for the superintendent of fisheries, £1500; governors of King's College, £1000; Mrs. Tonge, widow of the late naval officer, £80; agent, £200; surveyor general of Cape Breton, £100; retired officials of Cape Breton, £850 (chief justice, £500; secretary, £300; naval officer, £50); provost marshal, £100; Mrs. Hartley, £40; and the establishment on Sable Island, £400.⁹

Howick approached the current estimate for Nova Scotia with a clear purpose in mind. He intended to reduce the parliamentary grant, and eventually discontinue it entirely, by eliminating certain items of expenditure and transferring others to the casual and territorial revenues of the province. By the 1830s these crown revenues represented the one remaining source of colonial revenue which the British government could appropriate as it thought fit. In Nova Scotia they consisted principally of the rent and royalties from the coal mines at Sydney and Pictou, the fees charged for warrants, commissions, and other official papers, and the quit rents payable on all grants of crown land but not in fact being collected. In an attempt to reduce the parliamentary estimate for 1831, the Colonial Office informed Lieutenant Governor Maitland that the allowances to the bishop and the pensions of widows Cox and Tonge and of the officials of Cape Breton would be transferred to the casual and territorial revenues. There were at once protests from the bishop, and so it was decided to return his salary to the parliamentary estimate and substitute those of the chief justice and the attorney general. The Colonial Office also attempted to dispense with the vessel provided for the superintendent of fisheries, but it was finally decided to retain the brig for another year, charging £1000 to the British Treasury and £500 to local revenues. The final arrangement meant that the charges placed on the casual revenues for 1831 had been increased by £2820, while the parliamentary grant had been reduced to £6625.¹⁰

⁹See D. C. Harvey, "The Civil List and Responsible Government in Nova Scotia," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXVIII (1947), 375-6.

¹⁰Goderich to Maitland, 1 Dec. 1830 and 3 April 1831, CO 218/30, Public Record Office (PRO).

The following year Howick pruned the estimates even more severely, and so successful was he that the parliamentary grant to Nova Scotia was entirely discontinued in March 1832. The lieutenant governor was informed that his salary would be reduced by £500 to £3000 a year, half of which was to be paid from casual revenues as at present, and half from quit rents which Howick optimistically assumed would be collected during 1833. The salary of the provincial secretary was reduced to £1000, exclusive of legitimate expenses. To assist the local government to make this transition, parliament was asked to vote £800 for the first quarter of 1832, but thereafter all items of expenditure were to be transferred to the casual and territorial revenues, except the salaries of the clergy and the grant to the governors of King's College. All grants to the Anglican clergy throughout British North America were to be consolidated in one account, and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel was notified that its annual subsidy would be gradually reduced. The governors of King's College were warned that they would receive only £500 in 1832 and 1833, and that thereafter the grant would entirely cease.¹¹

It might be supposed that Howick's attempt to eliminate the imperial financial commitment in Nova Scotia was thus completely successful. But this policy of transferring expenditures to revenues raised in the colony was clearly dependent for its success on the existence of casual revenues adequate to meet the new charges. In December 1830 the Colonial Office had some reason for confidence because Howick discovered in the most recent accounts from Nova Scotia a surplus of over £7000 in casual revenues.¹² This appeared a promising amount, but it became an essential part of imperial policy to stimulate the productivity of these revenues for the future. Here the Colonial Office expected to secure a greater income from the coal mines as their production increased, and the initiation of a vigorous campaign to enforce the payment of quit rents was also envisaged. The feasibility of financing the local administration without recourse to the imperial treasury was therefore dependent on the success of these concomitant measures, and here there was in fact little justification for Howick's optimism in 1830.

One immediate difficulty came to light when Lieutenant Governor Maitland drew attention to the inconvenient fact that the existing income from casual revenues could not defray the new charges. Annual

¹¹Goderich to Maitland, 1 March 1832, vol. 71, Manuscript Documents, Despatches, Public Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS); Harvey, "Civil List and Responsible Government," p. 376.

¹²Goderich to Maitland, 2 March 1831, CO 218/30.

receipts did not exceed £3500, and the fund already had to meet a variety of salaries and allowances totalling £2918, distributed as follows: £500 additional salary and £1000 in lieu of fees to the lieutenant governor; allowance to the provincial secretary in lieu of fees, £1000; treasurer of casual revenue, £100; superintendent of the Cape Breton coal mines, £100; harbour master at Sydney, £100; pension for Campbell, £100; and office rent for the surveyor general of Cape Breton, £18. After the payment of these fixed expenses, there would be a surplus of only £600 a year and this small amount could hardly support the new charges which totalled £2820.¹³ The temporary accumulated surplus of £7000 would defray the additional charges for perhaps two years, but thereafter the imperial scheme would fail for want of local revenue.

A second basic obstacle that faced the Colonial Office was the difficulty of increasing the productivity of casual revenues in Nova Scotia until they could support the whole cost of the civil government. One of the sources of crown revenue to which Howick looked hopefully in 1831 was the income from the coal mines at Sydney and Pictou. In 1828 the General Mining Association, an organization formed by a firm of London jewellers, Rundell, Bridge and Rundell, had secured from the Duke of York, in payment of his heavy debts, a lease of the rights which he had earlier obtained over the mines of Nova Scotia. The Association then received a sixty-year lease giving it a monopoly of coal mines in mainland Nova Scotia and Cape Breton in return for an annual rent of £3000 sterling and the payment of a royalty of 2s. per chaldron on the amount of coal raised above a fixed annual quota of 20,000 chaldrons.¹⁴ During the 1820s the income from the mines had provided the colonial authorities with a very convenient fund to cover emergencies, but it was already apparent in 1831 that this source of revenue, no matter how carefully it was cultivated, could not finance the whole cost of the civil establishment in the foreseeable future. Between 1828 and 1831 the Association did not pay any royalties because they raised less than 20,000 chaldrons each year, and when the quota was exceeded in 1832, the surplus was offset against the deficits of the previous two years.¹⁵ When the Association was at

¹³Maitland to Goderich, 1 Feb. 1831, CO 217/152.

¹⁴J. S. Martell, "Early Coal Mining in Nova Scotia," *Dalhousie Review*, XXV (1945), 166-7.

¹⁵Maitland to Goderich, 28 April and 10 Aug. 1831, CO 217/152. Between 1828 and 1836 the Association raised the following annual amounts of coal, calculated in Winchester chaldrons:

1828	14,662	1831	27,830	1834	32,136
1829	16,507	1832	42,861	1835	39,124
1830	19,045	1833	43,807	1836	73,673

Campbell to Glenelg, 17 Jan. 1838, vol. 115, PANS.

last due to pay royalties in 1833, a dispute arose over the terms of the lease which did not specify whether the quota was to be calculated in Winchester chaldrons or in Newcastle chaldrons which were twice the Winchester measure. In return for a settlement in favour of Newcastle chaldrons, the Association agreed to pay an increased annual rent of £4000 for three years beginning July 1, 1833.¹⁶ It was not until 1836, therefore, that the Association paid any royalties on its mines, though it is worth noting that the rental was easily the largest single annual payment received as casual and territorial revenue in the intervening years.

A further potential source of income which the Colonial Office hoped to exploit involved the quit rents attached to grants of land. Until 1831 crown lands in Nova Scotia could be acquired in the form of free grants, in return for which the grantee was required to pay an annual quit rent of 2s. per 100 acres. In actual fact, these rents had not been paid or collected in Nova Scotia since 1774, though collection had been threatened in 1802 and 1811. Because of this official neglect and the universal reluctance of settlers to meet their obligations, large arrears had accumulated. In 1831, however, when the Colonial Office adopted sale by public auction as the sole method by which crown lands could thereafter be obtained in the province, Lord Goderich gave instructions that quit rents payable on all former grants would in future be collected. Since grantees had obtained their lands on more favourable terms than would now be offered, there seemed no injustice in requiring settlers to meet their legitimate obligations.¹⁷ The current imperial desire to reduce British financial commitments in Nova Scotia made the collection of quit rents a matter of some urgency. As Edward Stanley, the colonial secretary, pointed out in 1833, "in the present Financial difficulties of the Province . . . the Crown can but ill afford to forego the prosecution of any claims which can fairly be advanced, & upon which it has reckoned to afford the necessary supply."¹⁸

It was easy enough for officials in London to justify the exaction in principle, but the long history of quit rents in the colonies offered ample proof of how impolitic and impracticable it had always been to enforce their payment in the face of unanimous opposition from the inhabitants. Not unexpectedly, therefore, John Spry Morris, the commissioner of crown lands, was forced to report in 1832 that colonial opinion was universally hostile to enforced collection and that it was quite impossible for him to comply with his instructions from London.

¹⁶Stanley to Acting Governor, 2 Aug. 1833, CO 218/31.

¹⁷Goderich to Maitland, 7 March 1831 and 1 March 1832, vol. 68, PANS.

¹⁸Stanley to Acting Governor, 1 June 1833, CO 218/31.

Furthermore, Morris and other local officials predicted that, even if payments could be enforced, the expenses of collection would absorb virtually all the revenue.¹⁹

Although the Colonial Office continued to threaten, the whole procedure was really used as a weapon for extracting money from the local assembly for the payment of the salaries of the civil officers. The imperial authorities were quite prepared to abandon their demands as soon as the legislature was willing to commute quit rents for a suitable lump sum. The assembly, however, was inclined to be intractable and base its opposition on constitutional principle: "we would have accepted of the offer of a commutation already proposed by Your Majesty's Government," explained the legislature in March 1833, "did we not know that the great body of our constituents would submit to any privation rather than adopt a measure which they are apprehensive has a direct tendency to subvert the fundamental principle of British liberty."²⁰ Since the threats of 1831 proved unavailing, Stanley reversed his tactics and agreed in June 1833 to postpone the threatened collection of quit rents for a short period in the hope of persuading the assembly to grant a fixed civil list in return for the surrender of all casual revenues.²¹ This calculated generosity also failed, though narrowly, to elicit a favourable response, and the growing deficiencies of revenue again forced the Colonial Office to threaten drastic measures in May 1834. Since "an application to Parliament for any part of the Civil Establishment is impossible," Stanley explained, "it becomes absolutely necessary to find some other resource within the Colony. None such is available to His Majesty except the Quit Rents."²² Unless the assembly was now willing to commute them for £2000 towards the salaries of the lieutenant governor, provincial secretary, and judges, the Colonial Office had no alternative but to begin collection. Whether or not the tone of Stanley's ultimatum was decisive, the legislature passed an act later in 1834 granting £2000 towards the salary of the lieutenant governor in commutation of quit rents. This restriction on the appropriation of the money was specifically designed to guard against the possibility of it being used for the support of the Anglican clergy or for increased judicial salaries, which the assembly considered were already far too high.²³

The failure of the Colonial Office at this time to make provision for salaries other than that of the lieutenant governor indicates another

¹⁹Jeffery to Goderich, 29 April 1833, CO 217/155; also Goderich to Officer Administering the Government, 4 Dec. 1832, CO 218/31.

²⁰PANS, *Journal of Assembly*, 27 March 1833, p. 421.

²¹Stanley to Acting Governor, 1 June and 30 Sept. 1833, CO 218/31.

²²Stanley to Campbell, 27 May 1834, *ibid.*

²³Campbell to Spring Rice, 29 Dec. 1834, CO 217/156.

respect in which imperial policy palpably failed. Because the casual and territorial revenues were totally inadequate to meet the increased charges placed upon them, considerable arrears of salaries began to accumulate by 1833, much to the consternation of those civil and judicial officers whose incomes were dependent on a dwindling fund. In 1832 the earlier surplus of £7000 had fallen to £4828, and within another twelve months the balance in hand was down to £1182. By December 1833 there was a deficit of £1489 and colonial officials had received only a third of their salaries for the previous half year. At the end of 1834 the arrears stood at £4225.²⁴ In these circumstances it was only to be expected that the Colonial Office should receive many complaints from officials adversely affected by the growing deficiencies of revenue. Memorials were received in London from Brenton Halliburton, the chief justice, Sir Rupert George, the provincial secretary, John Spry Morris, the commissioner of crown lands, Thomas Crawley, the surveyor general of Cape Breton, J. W. Nutting, the prothonotary, and S. G. W. Archibald, the attorney general, who was at the same time trying to have his salary raised from £350 to £600 a year.²⁵ These memorials make it clear that, in addition to current financial inconveniences, officials in the colony feared that, if a civil list was in fact granted, they would then be dependent on the assembly for their salaries, and that there was every prospect that the existing rate of remuneration would be substantially reduced by a legislature already critical of the current level of official salaries. Unless the British Treasury came to their rescue, therefore, the civil and judicial officers in Nova Scotia would be faced with the bleak prospect of having their incomes paid either from inadequate crown revenues or from the funds of a parsimonious assembly.

Meanwhile, the growing arrears of salaries also placed the British government in a quandary. The Colonial Office was reluctant to alter existing arrangements for the payment of salaries, or to deal favourably with individual requests, until a general agreement could be reached with the assembly on the grant of a comprehensive civil list. Yet these negotiations dragged on inconclusively, and the arrears of salary meanwhile increased. Eventually in 1835 the authorities in London were forced as a temporary expedient to apply to parliament for a grant of £6685 to meet the arrears and other incidental expenses connected with the administration of Nova Scotia: £4318 to pay salaries, £467 to meet the expenses of the recent cholera epidemic,

²⁴Maitland to Goderich, 18 April 1832, CO 217/154; Jeffery to Goderich, 20 Jan. 1833, CO 217/155; Jeffery to Stanley, 6 March 1834, CO 217/156; Campbell to Aberdeen, 18 Feb. 1835, CO 217/158.

²⁵See Jeffery to Stanley, 15 April 1834, CO 217/156; Campbell to Glenelg, 5 Nov. 1835, CO 217/158.

£1500 towards the salary of the lieutenant governor, and £400 for the establishment on Sable Island. The last two items remained on the parliamentary estimates for the next five years. In 1840 £1000 of the lieutenant governor's salary was transferred to the casual revenues, and in 1842 the remaining £500; thereafter parliament voted only the £400 for Sable Island.²⁶ Lord Howick's triumph of March 1832 had enjoyed a short-lived success of only three years.

While the Colonial Office adopted the practice of transferring certain expenditures to crown revenues in Nova Scotia, efforts were also made to reduce or eliminate other items from the colonial budget; but here again local opposition was often stronger than imperial retrenchment and charges kept creeping back into the estimates. An example of this process is provided by the attempt of the Colonial Office in 1830 to discontinue the colonial vessel, *Chebucto*, which was hired from Samuel Cunard at a cost of £1500 a year and used by the superintendent of fisheries and for the general service of the local government. The whole issue gave rise to a protracted correspondence between Halifax and London. Lieutenant Governor Maitland protested that the vessel was essential to protect the fisheries, to transport troops, specie, and stores, to prevent smuggling, and to conduct the lieutenant governor on his travels about the province. Maitland was fully aware of the need for the most rigid economy, but he was induced "to solicit this favour in consequence of the liberality which has marked the conduct of Mr. Cunard in keeping the Vessel while she has been employed by the Government in every respect in the most efficient state."²⁷ Whether or not he was impressed with Mr. Cunard's liberality, the colonial secretary agreed to continue the vessel, with a third of its expense met out of casual revenues, and the remaining £1000 paid by the British Treasury out of army extraordinaries.²⁸ In 1832, however, it was decided to limit the expense to £1000 a year to relieve crown revenues, and the lieutenant governor was accordingly instructed to hire the vessel on freight as the need arose and not to maintain it permanently in government service.²⁹

In the attempt to economize even the income of the lieutenant governor came under review. In 1833 it was proposed that his total official salary should be reduced to £3000 a year. Until this time Maitland had received military pay and allowances as a general officer, together with £3000 for the civil government of Nova Scotia, £500 for the administration of Cape Breton, and £947 as military governor

²⁶Grey to Campbell, 1 Aug. 1835, CO 218/31; Harvey, "Civil List and Responsible Government," p. 380.

²⁷Maitland to Hay, 7 Feb. 1831, CO 217/152.

²⁸Goderich to Maitland, 3 April 1831, CO 218/30.

²⁹Goderich to Maitland, 1 March 1832, vol. 71, PANS.

of Annapolis. It was decided that in future the lieutenant governor would no longer receive military pay and allowances, or the salary for Cape Breton, but would be paid £3000, together with £947 as governor of Annapolis which would be discontinued when Maitland's successor was appointed. It was suggested, however, that a salary of £3500 should be proposed to the assembly as part of any civil list.³⁰

The whole issue became a matter of considerable dispute with the appointment of Sir Colin Campbell as lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia in 1834. Campbell threatened to relinquish the office if he was not guaranteed a salary of £3500 from the assembly and his staff pay of £691. He was "confident that the Government never contemplated reducing his Salary so low as to preclude the Governor from upholding the respectability of the situation in the manner it ought, without encroaching upon his own private means."³¹ There followed a busy exchange of correspondence with Robert Hay at the Colonial Office before Campbell left London, because he was fully aware that the casual revenues could not at present meet his full salary, and because he was most reluctant to depend for his future income on the uncertain vote of the assembly. In the event Campbell's influence at the Horse Guards was powerful enough to induce the colonial secretary to give him the necessary assurances and restore the old level of salary to the parliamentary grant in 1835.

The problem of salaries for the civil officers of the Nova Scotian government was difficult to handle and produced many individual protests, but it was not nearly so controversial a matter as the bishop's salary, which aroused religious issues as well as questions of economy. In general the Whigs were sincerely anxious to recognize the fact, which the Tories had previously been determined to ignore, that the great majority of inhabitants of the North American colonies were not members of the Church of England.³² But this admirable realism did not aid the government in its search during the 1830s for some scheme which would permit the bishopric of Nova Scotia to become self-supporting, or at least financially independent of the British Treasury. Howick's attempt in 1830 to transfer the bishop's salary to the casual revenues brought immediate protests from his lordship. Bishop John Inglis asserted that "every real friend of the Church would deeply lament such an arrangement, if it were practicable," and he himself condemned the measure as "inexpedient and injurious," even "if there were no difficulty from the insufficiency of the Fund."³³

³⁰Minute by T. F. Elliot, 13 Jan. 1834, CO 217/156.

³¹Campbell to Hay, 8 Jan. 1834, CO 217/156. Further exchange of correspondence, and a letter from the office of the Commander-in-Chief, included in CO 217/156-7.

³²Manning, "The Colonial Policy of the Whig Ministers, Part I," pp. 214-15.

³³Bishop's letter of 28 Jan. 1831, enclosed in Maitland to Hay, 4 Feb. 1831, CO 217/152.

What worried the bishop most was the likely effect of this scheme in arousing still further jealousy and hostility to the privileged position of the Established Church amongst dissenters who greatly outnumbered adherents to the Church of England in the province. Although casual revenue was the property of the crown to be employed as His Majesty thought fit, the colonists regarded it as a local tax, and if any ecclesiastical dignitary was paid from this fund, the dissenters would at last have a "colourable pretext" for objecting that they were taxed for the support of the Church of England. This would be contrary to the provisions of the act of 1758 which had established the church in the province and had explicitly exempted dissenters from any taxes levied for the support of the Anglican church. Inglis argued that the salaries of the bishop, archdeacon, and governors of King's College, an institution considered as being connected with the Church of England, were the very last items that should be transferred to any fund raised within the province. Moreover, the bishop maintained that the British government had a clear duty to support the church.

If the Ministers and Members of the Church be deserving of regard, as the ascertained and distinguished adherents to the Crown in time of severest trial—If the Church be worth cherishing for its peculiar congeniality and affinity with the Civil Constitution of the Empire, which render it an important Pillar of the State—and above all, if it be worth support as the Pillar and Ground of the Truth; it may be hoped that the Government will take a lively interest in the extension and increase of its influence in these distant but growing portions of the Empire; and that it will be regarded as a pleasing duty to save the Church and its Ministers and Members, from the unmerited obloquy and injury, that would inevitably result from an attempt to provide for any of the Officers of the Church, in a manner which Dissenters must consider as an infringement of their Chartered Rights.³⁴

This grandiloquence had its effect: the bishop's salary was immediately restored to the parliamentary estimate.

Nevertheless, this concession did not solve the government's basic problem. "Something must be done," Lord Goderich demanded of Lieutenant Governor Maitland, "to secure the Bishop's Income on your side of the Atlantic."³⁵ Goderich may have accepted the validity of Inglis' arguments concerning the dangers of subsidizing the Established Church with provincial revenue, but the colonial secretary was undoubtedly more concerned about the criticism that would be aroused in parliament by the continued inclusion of the bishop's salary in the annual estimates. Both this item and the grant to the S.P.G. towards the salaries of Anglican clergymen in North America were bitterly denounced by the radicals in the House of Commons on the

³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵Goderich to Maitland, 24 Nov. 1831, CO 218/30.

ground that public monies were being used to bolster the exclusive position of the Established Church in colonies where its adherents were in a minority. "The effect of the vote," according to Joseph Hume, "was to cause the utmost jealousy and ill-will where the money was distributed. In Canada it had set the whole population against the Established Church. . . . Every other sect paid their own clergy; but the Episcopalians, who were the minority, had this money lavished on them."³⁶ Robert Gordon enquired in 1831 why the bishop of Nova Scotia was paid £2000 a year when the leading Presbyterian minister received an annual salary of only £75, and this in a colony where Presbyterians were three times as numerous as adherents of the Established Church.³⁷ But whatever the amount, the failure to raise adequate revenue by the collection of quit rents, or by Lord Howick's suggestion of endowing the bishopric with crown lands,³⁸ meant that his lordship's salary continued to appear as an item on the parliamentary estimates. Goderich had been unduly optimistic in 1831 when he had predicted that the bishop "may rely on it that the pecuniary existence of his See depends upon some arrangement by which he shall sooner or later be removed from the finances of this Country."³⁹ It was in fact much easier to transfer the salaries of the civil officers to colonial revenues than that of the bishop.

The experience of the Colonial Office in Nova Scotia during the 1830s indicates that it was no easy task to translate a desire for economy into practical savings. Although the determined efforts of Lord Howick went far towards allaying the more outspoken criticisms of the radicals in the House of Commons,⁴⁰ the Whigs discovered that permanent reductions in colonial expenditure were difficult to accomplish. The total cost of civil establishments overseas was gradually cut as administrative expenses were transferred to colonial revenues and local self-government was conceded to various parts of the empire. Compared with £472,000 at the beginning of Whig rule, civil expenditures in the colonies amounted to £347,445 in 1832 and £228,500 in 1839. In British North America small grants continued to be made to Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, and the S.P.G. received subsidies for the Church of England totalling £20,975 in 1835 and £14,190 in 1839. Military commitments were more difficult to reduce so long as Britain possessed a dependent empire which had

³⁶*Hansard*, V (26 July 1831), 383.

³⁷*Ibid.*, V (25 July 1831), 299.

³⁸For Howick's imaginative but unrealistic scheme, see Goderich to Maitland, 24 Nov. 1831, CO 218/30.

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰See the comments of George Robinson, in *Hansard*, V (25 July 1831), 282, and Joseph Hume, XIII (2 July 1832), 1248.

to be defended by overseas garrisons. The cost of defending British North America fell to £655,192 in 1834 and £382,000 in 1839, but military expenditure in the colonies generally grew with the acquisition of new territories in India, Africa, and Australasia, and the total stood at £1,830,000 in 1839, compared with £1,760,000 ten years earlier.⁴¹ The Whigs' quest for economy in colonial expenditure produced inconsiderable financial benefits for the British taxpayer.

Nevertheless, the campaign for retrenchment was intimately associated with the prospective reform of colonial government, at a period when the Whig ministries accepted in principle the need to redress colonial grievances and give colonists control over their own internal affairs. Events in Nova Scotia during the 1830s indicate that the determination of the British authorities to eliminate their financial commitment in the colony materially promoted the progress towards local self-government. One aspect of this development involved the extension of the assembly's control over the appropriation of all revenues raised in the province and, more particularly, the management of casual and territorial revenues in exchange for a civil list covering the salaries of the leading civil and judicial officers. It is beyond the scope of the present study to examine the protracted negotiations between assembly and Colonial Office, opened in 1832 and not finally settled until 1848, which have been recounted elsewhere.⁴² During these discussions in the 'thirties, however, not only were fundamental constitutional principles raised, but the desire for economy, both in England and in the colony, had a direct bearing on the character and content of successive proposals and counterproposals and on the devious course of the negotiations.

The basis for an agreement on this contentious issue certainly existed. The British government, for its part, was very willing to surrender crown revenues to local control as soon as the assembly voted what was considered in London an adequate civil list, and the very insufficiency of this fund to meet the salaries and other expenses charged to it made a settlement of the whole issue extremely desirable. Only if the legislature assumed full financial responsibility for the civil and judicial establishment in Nova Scotia could the imperial authorities be certain that future appeals for parliamentary assistance

⁴¹For these statistics, see R. M. Martin, *Statistics of the Colonies of the British Empire* (London, 1839), statistical chart and Appendix I, p. 290; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1835 (144, 374, 408) XXXVIII, 1837 (149) XL, 2, and 1840 (179) XXX, 2; *Spectator*, 5 Jan. 1833. According to the Reports of the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, Britain's net expenditure on the colonies in 1834-35 amounted to £2,431,900, of which military charges accounted for £1,924,337 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1834 (570) VI and 1835 (473) VI). These figures do not take into account the substantial cost of suppressing the Canadian rebellions in 1837.

⁴²See Harvey, "Civil List and Responsible Government," pp. 365-82.

would not be made. The assembly, meanwhile, was prepared in principle to provide a civil list in return for the surrender of casual and territorial revenues. Control over the appropriation of all revenue raised in the province was claimed as a traditional right of colonial assemblies. In a series of resolutions in March 1833 the legislature of Nova Scotia asserted that

. . . no principle has ever been held more sacred than that by which Your Majesty's Subjects are entitled to direct and control the expenditure of all Monies paid by them for the purposes of Government, and in no portion of the Empire is this principle more anxiously cherished than in Your loyal Province of Nova Scotia. . . . Its inhabitants feel that a Revenue derived from their labour, and expended without the control of their Representatives, by which a fund is secured which may hereafter be applied to create an influence that may endanger the independence of this, the popular, branch of the Legislature, is at variance with the existence of their undoubted rights; and calculated to weaken that affectionate attachment which now universally prevails towards Your Majesty's Government.⁴³

Although there was agreement during the 1830s on the principle of exchanging crown revenues for a civil list, practical difficulties arose when it came to converting generous intentions into an acceptable settlement. One basic source of contention concerned the choice of officials to be included in the civil list, since their salaries would thereby be removed from the annual scrutiny of the assembly. The Colonial Office was genuinely anxious to avoid imposing on a colony with a comparatively limited revenue an unnecessarily expensive and burdensome establishment which the assembly might not want to support indefinitely. The imperial list of civil and judicial officers whose positions, it was felt in London, warranted inclusion in the settlement was therefore considerably smaller than that recommended by the lieutenant governor and council. The members of the executive and legislative councils, whose views were usually supported by the lieutenant governor, had no desire to place local officials entirely at the mercy of the assembly and make their incomes dependent on annual votes. In the discussions of 1837, for example, Lieutenant Governor Campbell would have included in the civil list the salaries of both leading officers and such minor officials as the clerk of the crown and prothonotary, the harbour master at Sydney, the clerk of the executive council, the commissioners of crown lands, and the surveyors general of mainland Nova Scotia and Cape Breton.⁴⁴ Lord Glenelg, however, rejected the claims of these small fry, and his proposed terms of 1837 reduced from twenty-one to eleven the items in

⁴³PANS, *Journal of Assembly*, 27 March 1833, p. 420.

⁴⁴Campbell to Glenelg, 26 Aug. 1837, CO 217/163.

the lieutenant governor's civil list, and the total amount of the settlement from £9190 to £7965.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, the members of the assembly had their own independent ideas on economy, and these determined their views on which officials should be included in the civil list and granted permanent salaries and which should be left dependent on the vote of the legislature. The payments of £100 a year from casual revenues to the superintendent of mines and the harbour master at Sydney were obviously not the kind of salaries to be placed on a permanent civil list. The crucial consideration was that control over salaries would give the assembly a greater measure of supervision over the policies and administrative activities of the officials concerned. The surveyor general of mainland Nova Scotia received £150 a year from the casual revenues, and his counterpart in Cape Breton £100, but the assembly opposed in 1837 any permanent guarantee for these emoluments at a time when there was profound dissatisfaction with the current practice of selling crown lands at public auction and with the high costs of land administration which consumed virtually all the revenue from government sales. Closer scrutiny of the surveyor general's salary was a reflection of the assembly's desire and determination to assume control over the management of crown lands in the province.⁴⁶

Differences of opinion between assembly and Colonial Office concerning the practical applications of economy were also illustrated in the dispute over the appropriate level of salaries to be guaranteed to officials included in the civil list. The civil and judicial officers concerned were anxious to secure the adoption of substantial salaries since most of them considered their existing incomes inadequate. The imperial authorities, as Glenelg explained in 1837, were anxious to avoid exorbitant salaries.

I am not only willing to admit, but even anxious to assert, that in fixing the amount of Official Salaries in British North America great frugality should be observed. In countries recently settled it is of moment that moderate & simple habits of domestic expenditure should prevail, and should be respected, nor is there any exception to that rule which I should more strongly deprecate, than one which would enable, if not require, official men to distinguish themselves from other classes by a less strict economy and a more costly style of life.

At the same time, Glenelg believed that salaries should be "sufficient for the maintenance of the Officers in whose favour they are granted, in that station of society to which they must belong,"⁴⁷ and this was particularly true in the case of the lieutenant governor. In practice, however, the imperial authorities had no precise standards for fixing

⁴⁵Glenelg to Campbell, 31 Oct. 1837, vol. 75, PANS.

⁴⁶See Campbell to Glenelg, 1 May 1838, vol. 115, *ibid.*

⁴⁷Glenelg to Campbell, 31 Oct. 1837, vol. 75, *ibid.*

the level of salaries. The one principle on which they did insist was that the income of the present incumbents should not be suddenly reduced. While the Colonial Office was willing to consider reductions in the scale of emoluments whenever a vacancy occurred, crown revenues would not be surrendered until the assembly agreed to maintain the salaries of existing officials at their current rates. The members of the assembly, on the other hand, refused to transfer automatically the salaries at present paid from casual revenues to the proposed civil list because they believed that the colony was burdened with the undue expense, not only of some unnecessary appointments, but of many exorbitant salaries. In February 1837 the assembly resolved that, "the Territorial and Casual Revenues of this Province are disposed of, and distributed, by the Government, without responsibility to the People: a system having a tendency to create and perpetuate charges for the support of the Civil Establishment, beyond the exigencies and resources of the Colony."⁴⁸

The dispute over salaries was fought out most acutely in the case of the judicial officers in Nova Scotia. Here the Colonial Office was more willing than the assembly to admit the need for increased remuneration. It was argued that the chief justice and puisne judges should receive more than £850 and £480 a year respectively, exclusive of fees, and that a scale of remuneration should be established more in keeping with the importance of the duties performed. Moreover, compared with the emoluments which gentlemen of legal ability usually derived from private practice at the bar, the present salaries of the judges were not sufficiently attractive for the government always to command the services of the best men available.⁴⁹ The Colonial Office also looked favourably on an increase in the salary of the attorney general from £350 to £600.⁵⁰ The practical difficulty which precluded effective action for most of the 1830s was that the casual revenues were unable to assume increased charges, however justified, and the authorities were left with "no alternative but to leave the Judges to be provided for according to the justice & liberality of the Provincial Assembly."⁵¹ But while the legislature conceded the necessity for adequate and permanent salaries for the leading judicial officers, it was opposed to any increases in existing payments unless these formed part of a comprehensive settlement of the civil list question.⁵² The assembly meanwhile refused individual or piecemeal

⁴⁸PANS, *Journal of Assembly*, 24 Feb. 1837, pp. 76-7.

⁴⁹Goderich to Officer Administering the Government, 4 Dec. 1832, CO 218/31.

⁵⁰See Jeffery to Stanley, 15 April 1834, CO 217/156.

⁵¹Aberdeen to Campbell, 5 Feb. 1835, vol. 73, PANS.

⁵²Jeffery to Goderich, 21 March 1833, CO 217/155; PANS, *Journal of Assembly*, 27 March 1833, p. 421.

adjustments in judicial salaries where public funds were involved. It also rejected the suggestion of the British government in 1832 for a reduction from three to two in the number of puisne judges in the supreme court, an arrangement which the pending retirement of Chief Justice Blowers would have made possible, but which appeared to the legislature an indirect and covert way of raising the salaries of the remaining judicial officers.⁵³

The question of judges' salaries was further complicated by the controversial issue concerning the fees exacted by various members of the judiciary. Although the total amount of fees collected varied considerably from one official to another and from year to year, these charges formed an important supplement to the judges' official salaries. The chief justice, with a salary of £850 paid from casual revenues, received a further £350 from fees in most years, and the three puisne judges, with £480 guaranteed by a permanent act of the assembly, each received an average of £170 a year from fees.⁵⁴ The legislature strongly attacked the exaction of fees as oppressive and unconstitutional and attempted to abolish them without providing any compensation in the form of increased salaries.⁵⁵ The Colonial Office insisted on proper compensation, and a settlement of this issue was postponed until the late 1830s when a temporary growth in crown revenues enabled the government to raise judicial salaries and abolish fees. From February 1839 the judiciary and the law officers in Nova Scotia were all paid at a higher rate, the incomes of those who were provided for by local acts being supplemented from casual revenues.⁵⁶

Because of these disagreements over the selection of officials to be included in the civil list and the level of their salaries, protracted negotiations ensued and a final settlement of the issue was not reached until 1848. Other circumstances, however, contributed to this inordinate delay. The severe commercial embarrassments which Nova Scotians endured during these years made the assembly reluctant to settle for sums which the imperial authorities continued to regard as the minimum figures. At certain crucial moments in the negotiations, as in 1834, the attention of the legislature was preoccupied with current commercial difficulties.⁵⁷ Furthermore, neither the members

⁵³Goderich to Officer Administering the Government, 4 Dec. 1832, and Stanley to Acting Governor, 26 April 1833, CO 218/31.

⁵⁴Campbell to Glenelg, 26 Aug. 1837, CO 217/163.

⁵⁵See PANS, *Journal of Assembly*, 4 and 6 Dec. 1834, pp. 716, 719–20, 3 and 23 Feb., 15, 24, and 26 March 1836, pp. 907, 966–8, 1025, 1054, 1063–6; Campbell to Glenelg, 18 March 1836, CO 217/161.

⁵⁶Campbell to Glenelg, 21 April 1838, vol. 115, and Glenelg to Campbell, 27 Sept. 1838, vol. 76, PANS.

⁵⁷See for example, Jeffery to Stanley, 8 March 1834, CO 217/156.

of the councils nor the lieutenant governors were anxious to promote a settlement on the assembly's terms. Most of the civil and judicial officers considered themselves entitled to higher salaries, and they had no desire to hasten the day when they would be financially dependent on annual votes from the legislature. The members of the dominant party in the colony were opposed to any concessions that threatened to assist the progress of "democracy" and popular control and correspondingly undermine their exclusive hold over the administration of provincial affairs.⁵⁸

The dispute over the civil list was in fact only one of several related issues in the 1830s which kept the assembly at loggerheads with lieutenant governors and councils. Except in an emergency, the Whigs were unwilling to resolve disagreements amongst the various branches of a colonial government by the imposition of a constitutional arrangement devised in London. As long as the colonists could not agree on the exact form of self-government they wanted, the Colonial Office preferred to postpone a settlement. The urgent need for imperial intervention or conciliatory gestures, which turbulent conditions in the Canadas positively demanded, appeared to be entirely lacking in the case of Nova Scotia. While the colony was not the harmonious community that its officials tried to pretend, the apparent peacefulness and loyalty of the inhabitants contrasted sharply with the internal dissensions which wracked the Canadas, and this calm façade seriously hampered the progress of constitutional reform. In the absence of overwhelming political upheaval and the repercussions of colonial dissensions in parliament, the only stimulus for imperial activity in Nova Scotia was a financial one. If the Colonial Office had not been so successful in reducing Britain's financial commitment in the province, the negotiations over the civil list and other constitutional measures would have assumed a greater sense of urgency. In the case of Nova Scotia, therefore, the Whigs' search for economy had a paradoxical effect. Nevertheless, the importance of this policy should not be underestimated, since the transfer of expenditures from the parliamentary estimates to local revenues stimulated amongst the colonists a greater awareness of the deficiencies of self-government. In the long run economy for the mother country was intimately connected with the redress of colonial grievances. Once the inhabitants of Nova Scotia were made to shoulder the responsibility of financing their own civil and judicial establishments, they soon became more determined to give themselves the kind of government they wanted.

⁵⁸See Minutes of Executive Council, 7 May 1834, pp. 65-70, and Campbell to Normanby, 8 April 1839, vol. 115, PANS.

A Note on Newspaper Patronage in Canada during the late 1850s and early 1860s

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OF ALL THE FACTORS which may have conditioned the independence of the pre-Confederation Canadian press the fundamental one was that every newspaper was a business enterprise subject to economic pressures which only circulation, advertising, printing contracts, or direct subsidization could alleviate. The Canadian newspaper market was limited but highly competitive. By 1858 the province, with a population of about two million was served by no fewer than 20 daily newspapers, 18 tri-weeklies, 15 semi-weeklies, and 156 weeklies¹—too many, in the opinion of at least one editor, for all to survive.² The influence of these newspapers, owing partly to their position as the sole medium of mass communication and partly to the relatively greater emphasis given then to editorial opinion as opposed to the news headline, was such that their editors frequently found themselves catapulted into political careers while politicians often found it necessary to become proprietors or patrons of newspapers. But if the publicizing power peculiar to these pre-Confederation newspapers made their support invaluable to politicians it would seem that their financial instability, especially during periods of hard times, caused many of them to fall victim to the long purse.

John Dougall's *Montreal Witness*, whose moralizing advertising policy proscribed government advertisements, ads for quack medicines, and other tempting but compromising sources of revenue with

¹W. Meikle, *Canadian Newspaper Directory for 1858*, cited by Canadian Press Association, ed., *A History of Canadian Journalism* (Toronto, 1908), p. 8.

²*Sherbrooke Gazette*, Nov. 20, 1858. The available numbers of this hard-to-locate journal have been microfilmed by the Canadian Library Association.

a steadfastness which was indeed unique, was, for all its narrow Protestantism and Victorian prudishness, one of the few really independent journals of the period. But Dougall's integrity was as costly as it was rare. During January of 1857 the *Witness* was constrained to raise its price to two dollars per year, and, "the difficulty of collecting all over Canada being insuperable," to impose a "cash system" of paid-up subscriptions only.³ The immediate result was an alarming drop in the number of subscriptions from eight to five thousand. Campaigning relentlessly for the ten thousand subscriptions he claimed were necessary to operate successfully, Dougall built the circulation back up to 6500 by November. This was still a large circulation for a Canadian newspaper in 1857,⁴ bringing in a revenue of £3250. Yet Dougall cited some of his considerable expenses—paper £1900, printing £1400—and ruefully forecast an operating loss of £300 for the year.⁵ Dougall ultimately solved his problems by expansion. In 1860 the *Witness* was put on a daily basis and circulated successfully in Montreal through newsboys, just introduced in Montreal.⁶ By Confederation its circulation stood at 5000, which was advertised as greater than any other Montreal city newspaper, while a semi-weekly and a weekly edition distributed by mail throughout the country averaged 3000 and 4500 respectively.⁷ But Dougall's achievement was not typical, and one would be hard-pressed to find another such combination of independence, success, and pristine purity in the world of Canadian journalism during the fifties and sixties.

The mention of Dougall's *Witness* usually calls to mind its self-designated adversary, the *True Witness and Catholic Chronicle*. Apprised by Bishop Bourget of the need for an organ to refute the malicious attacks of the *Witness*, George Edward Clerk, an Eton graduate and Scottish convert, and John Gillies, a sympathetic Montreal printer, undertook to establish a Catholic journal in 1849 and were promised the support of the clergy.⁸ Clerk's dedication to the Church was complete. The entries in his diary reveal that an editorial policy was seldom undertaken without the prior sanction of the bishop.⁹ But the *True Witness*, in contrast to its archrival, never quite succeeded as a

³*Witness*, Jan. 10, 1857.

⁴The largest was George Brown's *Globe*, with an unrivalled circulation of 18,000 by 1856: *Globe*, March 21, 1856.

⁵*Witness*, March 7, Nov. 4, 1857.

⁶*Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1860.

⁷See the *Witness*' ad in *Eastern Townships Gazetteer and General Business Directory* (St. John's: Smith & Co., 1867).

⁸A. Coffey, "George Edward Clerk, Founder of the *True Witness*: A Pioneer of Catholic Action," Canadian Catholic Historical Association, *Report*, 1934-1935, pp. 55-7.

⁹Diary of George Edward Clerk. I am indebted to Miss Agnes Coffey of Montreal for the use of Clerk's diary.

business venture. The journal admitted to a "very limited circulation" (probably in the hundreds) and its financial difficulties were chronic. It collected accounts in the Montreal and Kingston districts but no wider coverage of the province is indicated. From Clerk's diary one discovers that the paper existed from hand to mouth, almost completely dependent upon sporadic handouts from wellwishers, periodic but inconsistent support from the clergy—donations from these sources ranged from \$60 to £200—and the uncommon dedication of its editor. When the paper announced its impending bankruptcy, during the depression of 1857, there was a brief flurry of activity on its behalf.¹⁰ Fund-raising banquets of "friends of the *True Witness*" were held in Montreal and Kingston, "Save the *True Witness*" committees were formed, and valiant resolutions were passed to rousing choruses of "three cheers for the *True Witness*," but the proprietors, though duly touched by such demonstrations of solidarity, insisted that these provided no solution to the basic problem: "We know that Mr. Clerk has the confidence of the great body of the Catholic people; but that is not enough. Their confidence is not worth a groat if they do not prove it by supporting his paper. We are in a position to state that, at present, the receipts are not sufficient even to pay expenses—a state of things which cannot possibly last long."¹¹

Clerk's diary reveals that clerical pressure was often used to induce parishioners to subscribe to the paper and that the priests would even undertake to collect delinquent accounts when conditions were particularly desperate. When, for a period of five weeks during the winter of 1860, incipient glaucoma prevented Clerk from reading or writing, his editorials were dictated to a priest supplied by the Bishop of Montreal. Though it failed in its attempt to build a united Catholic political front, the *True Witness* was still too valuable an organ for the Lower Canadian clergy to allow it to die. The struggling journal's want of support from the Catholic public is perhaps attributable to the reluctance of Irish Catholics to accept the leadership of the French-Canadian clergy. In any event, only an unexpected remittance of £752 from Clerk's father in Scotland averted the discontinuance of the *True Witness* in 1858.

To most newspaper proprietors political patronage represented the most secure form of economic salvation. As Professor P. B. Waite has observed, the dealings between politicians and journalists were secretive, and only occasionally are scraps of direct evidence discovered.¹²

¹⁰See *True Witness*, Jan. 15 and 22, 1858.

¹¹*Ibid.*, July 9, 1858.

¹²P. B. Waite, *The Life and Times of Confederation: 1864–1867* (Toronto, 1962), pp. 8–10. It should be noted that important research aimed at discovering the origins and affiliations of Quebec newspapers is in progress at Laval University. For a general

Certain passages in the extant letters of John A. Macdonald to Brown Chamberlin of the *Montreal Gazette*—letters which Macdonald asked Chamberlin to burn—are illuminating in this regard. In what would seem to be his initial response to a feeler from Chamberlin, Macdonald commenced his cultivation of the influential Montreal newspaperman: "I am exceedingly obliged to you for your friendly and important communication and am gratified by the feeling that dictated it. I am especially pleased at your estimation of myself and my position, and with the prospect of having such followers. I will have an added inducement to endeavour to make myself worthy of being a leader." Proceeding to supply Chamberlin with lengthy and "confidential" answers to questions about Lower Canadian representation in the cabinet, he deftly added a word or two of direction: "Your article in the *Gazette* was on the whole favourable, but I wish you had come out a little stronger. . . . We expect from our friends a generous confidence and hope that when you have anything to our disadvantage you will communicate with us, and hear our answer and explanations before committing yourself or your paper against us. In fact we want you to 'Be to our faults a little blind/And to our virtues always kind.'" Reference to the mundane but vital matter of patronage was reserved for the final paragraph. Unfortunately Macdonald felt compelled to obliterate five whole lines of this meaningful passage but enough remains to justify our suspicions concerning his liaison with the *Gazette*: "we are making arrangements about the Government patronage in the way of advertisements, which we will complete in a few days, and I will advise you thereof."¹³ Thus was the *Montreal Gazette* recruited by the Liberal-Conservatives. Following years of loyal service Chamberlin was duly rewarded. He was appointed Queen's Printer at Ottawa in 1870 and held the post until 1891.

The *Gazette's* defence of its editorial policy deserves attention for two reasons. It offers a rather sad commentary on the nineteenth-century conception of the freedom of the press, and it indicates that inside news was yet another form of patronage for which newspapers would compromise their independence. The *Gazette* denied the *Montreal Herald's* contention "that the Ministry have paid writers in their service" but did not deny its preference for the ministry. It was quite permissible for an "independent journalist" to serve a party out of

account of the development of French-language journalism in Quebec, see A. Beaulieu and J. Hamelin, "Aperçu du journalisme québécois d'expression française," *Recherches sociographiques*, VIII (1966), 305-48. Even more valuable is the reference handbook of Quebec journals: A. Beaulieu and J. Hamelin, *Les Journaux du Québec de 1764 à 1964* (Québec, 1965).

¹³Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Brown Chamberlin Papers, Macdonald to Chamberlin, Feb. 2, 1855.

"sincere convictions," and only fitting that government ministers should in return give the journalist "all the information they can, which is really the most important return they can make." A journal receiving and publishing information from ministers was judged a party organ "in that particular only—its independence is in no way compromised."¹⁴

That this sort of relationship did, in fact, compromise a journal's independence is clearly shown by the history of the *Pilot*, a Montreal paper owned by the Queen's Printer, Rollo Campbell. After repeated failures to convince anybody that it was "the most independent paper in this city," the *Pilot* came out in the open:

Now, supposing for the sake of argument, that the *Pilot* is what the *Globe* describes it to be—the "hired organ" of the Government, we ask in the name of common sense, why should it not? . . . If Mr. George Brown keeps up a newspaper, and hires men to advocate his particular political views, and defend them when attacked by his adversaries—why should not Mr. Macdonald, or Mr. Cartier, or Mr. anybody else? . . . We esteem it as a cause for honour rather than shame to be recognized as an organ, ready and able and willing to defend the Ministry against the baseless attacks of the *Globe* or any of the smaller fry who do as that paper tells them.¹⁵

Some of the arrangements which undoubtedly inspired such loyalty came to light during May of 1859 when a printing committee of parliament headed by George Benjamin published a report exposing certain abuses in the government's printing department. It revealed, among other things, that Rollo Campbell's accounts contained a number of charges that were about 100 per cent in advance of the highest going rates, and that these overcharges amounted during the previous session to over £2000. "What profitable workings," speculated the *Montreal Herald*, "if mining in the Rollo Campbell vein has been pursued with the same zeal and business energy for ten years past."¹⁶

Armed with evidence drawn from the report of the printing committee, George Brown rose in the assembly on April 30, 1860, to move a resolution for the abolition of the Queen's printership.¹⁷ He pointed out the impropriety of the Queen's printers drawing revenues of \$26,000 to \$27,000, even in a bad year, for work that should have cost \$8,000 or \$10,000 at the most. Why had the Queen's printers been selling the *Consolidated Statutes* for \$14.50 instead of \$4.00? Why were they charging 50 cents for printing composition and \$1.25 for press work instead of the normal rates of 28 and 15 cents respectively? Because, he concluded, and his personal knowledge of the printing business lent weight to his words, the Queen's printership was one of

¹⁴*Montreal Gazette*, July 17, 1858.

¹⁵*Pilot*, Jan. 3, 1860.

¹⁶See *Montreal Weekly Herald*, July 21, 1860.

¹⁷See *ibid.*, May 5, 1860.

the grossest jobs ever perpetrated in Canada. No defence could be made for the continuance of so injurious a monopoly. The old argument that large profits enabled the printers to keep bigger inventories on hand he ridiculed as a well-known absurdity. He was for a system of public tenders and free competition. Statutes would be just as authoritative issuing from a succession of different printers so long as they bore some official mark of identification.

Brown was circumvented as usual by Macdonald and his supporters. An amendment was passed naming a committee to inquire into the business of the Queen's Printer to ascertain whether the office ought to be abolished. Brown was the only man named to the committee who favoured abolition. George Benjamin, the chairman of the committee which had originally uncovered the abuses, was awarded a parliamentary grant of £500 and proceeded to vote to continue the current monopoly in the hands of the Queen's Printer.¹⁸ "Who," moaned the *Montreal Herald*, "shall keep watch on such watchmen?" Did not the Independence of Parliament Act prohibit members from accepting "pecuniary grants" which, "under the guise of remuneration for services, are so readily convertible into bribes?"

If we got back the thousands of dollars which the Printing Committee says were filched from us, we might afford to pay something to the person who detected the fraud. As it is, all that has happened is that we pay another £500 for the pleasure of knowing how we were cheated. . . . Can we not spend our money in detecting something whose detection can be made to pay expenses? If not, let us at least avoid throwing good money after bad as Benjamin's has gone after Campbell's.¹⁹

Despairing of any reform in the government's printing department the *Herald* observed that the name of Rollo Campbell still appeared in the public ledger "for sums, which, at the same rate of charge, give opportunity for a very large extent of further plunder."²⁰

Another questionable transaction involving a pro-government newspaper proprietor came to light during May of 1859. James Beaty, a wealthy leather merchant and owner of the *Toronto Leader*, had been allowed by the Hincks government, over the objections of certain municipalities involved, to purchase York roads valued at £75,000 eight years previously. Payment was to be made in twenty equal instalments with 5 per cent interest payable half-yearly on the unpaid balance. By 1859 Beaty had taken in £72,073 in tolls—within £3000 of the purchase price—had spent only £18,298 on maintenance, but had paid off just £27,142 of the principal and was behind on the

¹⁸See *ibid.*, May 5, 1860.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, May 5 and 12, 1860.

²⁰*Ibid.*, May 12 and July 21, 1860.

interest when the Cartier-Macdonald government quietly exempted him from any further obligation in the matter.²¹ "Another vein worth working," concluded the *Herald*: "But the *Leader* would probably go into opposition as it has twice before—each time for a few hours—unless some douceurs of this kind were thrown in the way of its proprietor."²²

The published reminiscences of Samuel Thompson, one-time proprietor of the *Toronto Daily Colonist*, though written with an expressed intention to "avoid everything of a controversial character; as well as to touch gently on those faults of public men which I felt obliged to notice," tend to corroborate the charges of wholesale corruption in the government printing department.²³ Thompson, a veteran journalist, describes how he purchased the *Colonist* from Hugh Scobie's widow in May of 1853 and set about operating it as an independent Conservative journal, investing heavily in its improvement and expansion, until the business panic of 1857 suddenly reduced him to a state of acute financial embarrassment.²⁴ At this crucial juncture Thompson says he rejected financial aid from George Brown and the Liberals in favour of running the *Colonist* as "the organ of the Macdonald-Cartier government, to which position would be attached the right of furnishing certain of the public departments with stationery, theretofore supplied by the Queen's Printer at fixed rates."²⁵ He records his shock on discovering at first hand the practices prevalent in the government printing offices—"something like that described in 'Gil Blas' as existing at the Court of Spain, by which, along with the stationery required for the departments, articles for ladies' toilet use, etc., were included, and had always theretofore been charged in the government accounts as a matter of course."²⁶ The attorney general, when informed of the abuses, asked for formal charges, but intimated that should Thompson lay them, "nearly every man in the public service would be likely to

²¹See *Montreal Transcript*, May 9, 1859; also *ibid.*, May 14, 1859.

²²*Weekly Herald*, April 14, 1860.

²³See S. Thompson, *Reminiscences of a Canadian Pioneer for the Last Fifty Years: An Autobiography* (Toronto: Hunter, Rose & Co., 1884), p. iii.

²⁴Thompson's career in journalism began in 1838 when he undertook the management of the *Toronto Palladium*. By 1860 he had published successively at Toronto the *Herald*, *Patriot*, *News of the Week*, *Daily Colonist*, and *Atlas*, and the *Advertiser* at Quebec. His estimate of 30,000 as the combined circulation of the *Colonist's* four editions in 1857 sounds exaggerated, but his lavish expenditure on the paper elicited from his more prudent successor the comment that the journal was being conducted on a scale "much too expensive for the city" (PAC, Charles Clarke Papers, Sheppard to Clarke, March 17, 1858). Thompson says that his losses as a result of scattered newspaper accounts rendered uncollectable by the depression of 1857 totalled over \$100,000, indicating that the *Colonist* was a business venture of some magnitude. See Thompson, *Reminiscences*, pp. 146-8, 296, and 302.

²⁵Thompson, *Reminiscences*, pp. 296-7.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 297.

become [his] personal enemy."²⁷ In another instance, Thompson claims that "certain sub-officers of the Legislature" attempted to withhold papers from him until guaranteed a percentage of his contract.²⁸ Because his accounts were subject to comparison with those containing fraudulent entries, he found himself accused of overcharging even though his rates were below those allowed the Queen's Printer.²⁹

Somewhat surprising is Thompson's disclosure that government patronage, in his case, proved to be a blight rather than a blessing to business:

This position of ministerial organist, besides being both onerous and unpleasant, was to me an actual money loss. My newspaper expenses amounted to over four hundred dollars per week, with a constantly decreasing subscription list. The profits on the government stationery were no greater than those realized by contractors who gave no additional quid pro quo; and I was only too glad, when the opportunity of competing for the Legislative printing presented itself in 1858, to close my costly newspaper business in Toronto. I sold the goodwill of the *Colonist* to Messrs. Sheppard & Morrison. . . .³⁰

If Thompson realized this at the time, he was strangely willing to accept similar deals from the government subsequent to his happy retirement from the *Colonist*. For although he says he refused the offer of a government position at \$1400 a year "as unsuited to my tastes and habits," his memoirs fail to mention how, within weeks, he was induced to start the *Toronto Atlas* for the ministry as a condition of being awarded the contract for the legislative printing at Quebec.³¹ In connection with the latter enterprise he founded yet another ill-fated journal, the *Advertiser*, which brought him close to bankruptcy when it lost the favour of George-Etienne Cartier in 1860.³² Profitable or not, government blandishments apparently exercised an irresistible attraction to sanguine or hard-pressed journalists like Samuel Thompson.

Another brief excerpt from the chequered history of the *Colonist* might serve to illustrate how government patrons were capable of dealing with editors less dedicated than Chamberlin, Campbell, Beatty, or Thompson. During the session of 1858 Thompson's successor, George Sheppard, committed the "crowning sin" of saying a good word for George Brown.³³ John A. Macdonald, "full of passion, wrote

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 297-8.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 298.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 298.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 299.

³¹He admits to publishing the *Atlas*, but furnishes none of the details which link it to government patronage: *ibid.*, p. 148.

³²It appears that Thompson, while resident at Quebec during part of 1859 and 1860, attempted to operate the *Atlas* and the *Advertiser* simultaneously.

³³Charles Clarke Papers, Sheppard to Clarke, July 18, 1858. See also J. M. S. Careless, *Brown of the Globe* (Toronto, 1959), I, 300-1.

an insolent letter" demanding a retraction but Sheppard and his partner refused. Sheppard had, in fact, developed strong apprehensions about the government's failure to come to grips with double majority and other problems, and on June 26, 1858, he broke dramatically away from the ministerial fold with his famous "Whither Are We Drifting?" editorial alleging that the country was running rapidly to ruin. Government supporters heaped contumely upon Sheppard for his desertion, and the *Quebec Herald* declared frankly that a party paper was paid to support its patrons through thick and thin.³⁴ On July 18 Sheppard wrote to his friend Charles Clarke: "Macdonald is now hunting us with the malignity of a fiend."³⁵ Within weeks he was out of work. The backers of the financially unstable *Colonist* had agreed to a merger with Macdonald's brand new organ, the *Atlas*. In an article entitled "Flunkeyism" the *Montreal Herald* could not resist pronouncing the following valedictory:

The *Colonist* after a momentary fit of opposition during the last session of Parliament, speedily relapsed into ministerialism. To supply its place, during its temporary absence, the *Atlas* was started. A few short months have passed, and to keep one Government organ alive it is necessary to suppress the other. So the poor *Colonist*, after all its chopping and changing, is dead, and is become a component part of the *Atlas*, which will enable the whole, at some early day, to be interred in one grave and lamented on the same tombstone.³⁶

But Macdonald, in explaining to Brown Chamberlin why government printing was withdrawn from the Montreal publisher, John Lovell, revealed what steps were being taken to ensure the success of the *Atlas*:

When the *Colonist* turned traitor during the session before last, our conservative supporters met and resolved to establish a conservative newspaper. Lovell agreed to start and carry it on and was promised lots of patronage to sustain him. . . . Before it was published Lovell came to our friends and drew back. This put them and the Government in a most ludicrous and damaging fix. In fact the nonappearance of the *Atlas* would have been ruin. We were therefore obliged to ask Thompson to start the paper. He did so in face of a certain loss and we, of course, had to sustain him with all the Government printing we could legally and properly give . . . [and] we cannot yet deprive Thompson of the patronage—that he may lose at any time by change of ministry. . . . he must have it until the account of profit and loss turns in his favour. . . . Lovell has but himself to thank for his position with us. The truth is Sheppard and Co. were frightened by the *Atlas* and succeeded in frightening and choking off Lovell. . . . Had he not broken his agreement he would have had *all the Government printing* and patronage at his own prices.³⁷

³⁴Cited by J. J. Talman, "George Sheppard—Journalist," Royal Society of Canada, *Transactions*, 3rd series, XLIV (1950), s. 2, p. 125.

³⁵Charles Clarke Papers, Sheppard to Clarke, July 18, 1858.

³⁶*Weekly Herald*, Nov. 20, 1858.

³⁷Brown Chamberlin Papers, Macdonald to Chamberlin, July 19, 1859.

For a time even the *Herald* revised its estimate of the *Atlas*' chances: "The indications of a valuable mine are good. They appear in entries in the public accounts, showing that several thousands of pounds were raised during the past twelve months, which, considering the newness of the machinery and the rawness of the hands, must be considered pretty good working."³⁸

But the denouement came swiftly. Thompson, at odds with competitors who were jealous of his contract and with government functionaries to whom he refused to award the expected gratuities, was experiencing great difficulties at Quebec. One of the first official responses to the printing committee's public disclosures of 1859 was a temporary curtailment of the amount of material to be printed, and the unfortunate Thompson was no sooner established than he suffered the loss of one-third of the work for which he had contracted: "Thus were one-half of all my expenditures—one-half of my thirty thousand dollars worth of type—one-half of my fifteen thousand dollars worth of presses and machinery—literally rendered useless, and reduced to the condition of second-hand material."³⁹ Too deeply involved to throw up the contract or sue the government, and unable either to collect from his debtors or to obtain new credit, Thompson went into insolvency after arranging for four associates to buy up, at the bailiff's sale of his office, enough of his equipment to enable the five partners, as a new company, to salvage what was left of the contract.⁴⁰ At this point Thompson, rather indiscreetly considering his vulnerability, allowed the *Advertiser* to be drawn into an editorial dispute with *Le Courrier du Canada* about the relative merits of French *versus* British institutions which aroused considerable hostility among the French Canadians at Quebec. Thompson attempted to justify his position to Cartier but made little headway: "I . . . pointed out that I had no idea of having offended any man's prejudices; and could not understand why my paper should be objectionable. He vouchsafed no argument; said simply that his friends were annoyed; and that I had better give up the paper. I declined to do so, and left him."⁴¹

Thoroughly disenchanted with the ministry, Thompson for a time sought support from Cartier's opponents, opening his columns to the newly forming Reform alliance of Louis-Victor Sicotte, John Sandfield Macdonald, and Antoine-Aimé Dorion.⁴² But he had succeeded in making himself the object of French Catholic indignation to such an

³⁸*Weekly Herald*, May 14, 1859.

³⁹Thompson, *Reminiscences*, p. 301.

⁴⁰The four partners were Robert Hunter, George M. Rose, John Moore, and François Lemieux, former employees of Thompson: *ibid.*, pp. 301–4.

⁴¹Thompson, *Reminiscences*, pp. 314–15.

⁴²*Ibid.*, pp. 315–16.

extent that, fearful of incendiarism or "mob-chastisement," he at length decided to get out. Selling his share of the business to his partners, and handing over the money to some of his creditors, Samuel Thompson left Quebec "with little more than means enough to pay my way to Toronto."⁴³ Almost simultaneously the *Montreal Herald* announced the discontinuance of Thompson's Toronto paper, the *Colonist* (the old name having been retained), reporting that its proprietor had "sunk a large property and involved himself in debt" attempting to sustain it, "while he has succeeded as little in pleasing the politicians, whom he not very wisely attempted to serve, as in filling his own pocket."⁴⁴

Thompson's successful rival for government favours at Quebec was S. B. Foote, an enterprising merchant who purchased the *Morning Chronicle* from Charles St. Michel in March of 1860. In his opening number the new proprietor, "at the risk of being egotistic," confided that the paper had been purchased privately, "without the aid, the patronage, or the concurrence of the Government," and that none was "more independent of any extraneous influences." Any preference for the ministry, therefore, would be only the result of strong conviction.⁴⁵ The *Herald* was dubious: "One gentleman, whose main business is in the grocery department, has recently gone into the Printing business in Quebec, and in return for puffs, gets jobs . . . and must be paid an extravagant price in order to make up the loss which usually arises on business conducted without professional aptitude." Why were competitive tenders not called for government printing contracts? It was scandalous that an experienced and well-equipped printer like John Lovell should be passed over in favour of a tea importer "with no other machinery than a grinding organ, from whence is constantly croaked out monotonous music to the tune of 'Praise those from whom all profits flow.'"⁴⁶

That the *Herald's* version of the nature of the relationship between the Cartier-Macdonald administration and its publicists was closer to the truth was further borne out by the exposés of governmental corruption which the Liberals never tired of parading following their accession to power in 1862. One of the first to suffer the effects of retribution was James Beaty, proprietor of the *Leader* and of the York roads. In November 1863 the Liberal press reported with gratification that the Toronto assizes had returned an unopposed judgment against Beaty's Toronto Roads Company for the \$400,000 "which Cartier and

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 316.

⁴⁴*Weekly Herald*, Sept. 22, 1860.

⁴⁵*Morning Chronicle*, March 16, 1860.

⁴⁶*Weekly Herald*, May 5, 1860.

J. A. Macdonald connived at his retaining for his services in supporting them in his newspaper."⁴⁷ S. B. Foote's particular arrangements with the previous government were made public in February 1864, when the commissioners appointed by the new Macdonald-Sicotte "retrenchment ministry" to investigate spending irregularities in the government departments published their report.⁴⁸

The details of the "Foote jobs" are illustrative of the loose administration which bred corruption in the government offices. A major flaw was the practice of allowing ministers to authorize expenditures for departmental "contingencies" without check by the legislature, even in branches of the public service over which they had no charge. Thus, in August 1861, John Ross, the minister of agriculture, instructed his acting secretary to prepare an order for stationery with regard to a proposed census book. The order was submitted to Ross but apparently never placed. Yet, when S. B. Foote presented the acting secretary with a bill for a much larger order than the one contemplated, that functionary passed it without question because it bore the signature, not of Ross, but of Philip M.M.S. Vankoughnet, the commissioner of crown lands. Another official, the accountant of contingencies, ostensibly appointed to check on departmental expenditures, seems to have functioned instead as a mere cashier, and the provincial auditors passed the account also without question even though there was no evidence that the order had ever been filled. In their testimony before the financial commission the various parties justified their behaviour on the ground that the order bore the signature of a minister, and the minister in question explained that he had been "acting for" the minister of agriculture in signing the order.

Another traditional abuse of which Foote availed himself to the utmost was the practice of allowing printing and stationery contractors to set their own prices. Between October 1861 and March 1862 Foote furnished the Department of Crown Lands with articles of stationery for which he was paid \$22,989.98. The commission was able to ascertain that Foote's production overhead had amounted to only \$7,305.51 and that the articles could have been obtained from a retail stationer for \$9,451.18. Departmental clerks had drawn Vankoughnet's attention to the excessive prices but the matter had been closed when the accounts were submitted to the scrutiny of Provincial Secretary Charles Alleyne. Thus the excessive charges were paid with the knowledge of

⁴⁷*Canadian Gleaner*, Nov. 20, 1863.

⁴⁸The document, entitled *Second Report of the Financial Departmental Commission*, was published by the Office of Routine and Records at Quebec in mid-February of 1864. (The commission's first report appeared in 1862.) All subsequent references, unless otherwise indicated, will be to the portion of the report dealing with patronage to newspapers and printers which is reproduced in the *Globe*, Feb. 17, 1864.

at least two ministers, to say nothing of the administrative personnel of the departments involved. The outlay of Vankoughnet's particular department for contingencies of printing and stationery soared from a scant \$4,468 in the year 1852 to \$33,243 in 1862—testimony to the jobbing acumen of Foote.

Yet another Foote job involved accounts with the postmaster general's department for a total of \$21,021.66 for articles and work valued in the trade at only \$7,822.56. Departmental subordinates were aware of the abuse but the minister in question, Sydney Smith, testified that while he was aware of rumours that overcharging was going on he was ignorant of this particular manifestation of it.⁴⁹ A glance at the items supplied by Foote and his charges for them is illuminating: foolscap \$12 per ream, letter paper \$3, note paper \$5, blotting paper \$12, packing paper \$8, large white envelopes \$25 per 1000, large buff envelopes \$20 per 1000, letter envelopes \$25 per 1000, note envelopes \$8 per 1000, pen knives \$50 per dozen, cards \$12 per 1000, pens \$5 per gross, inkstands \$5 each, "and other things in proportion." In one particularly lucrative transaction with the Crown Lands Department, Foote charged \$1000 for 1000 copies of a pamphlet, a job which the financial commission's two consultants said should have cost the government only \$174.94. Foote's profits on overcharges for the three 1861 jobs alone were estimated to be \$35,230.37, and Robert Sellar of the *Huntingdon Canadian Gleaner* judged Foote's earnings from public funds during his three years in the newspaper business to be in the neighbourhood of \$80,000.⁵⁰

The peculations of other newspaper proprietors named in the 1864 report, though petty in comparison with Foote's, might be summarized to complete the catalogue of lax and dishonest practices which characterized the liaison between government and press in the Cartier-Macdonald era. The examination of newspaper accounts and books at the government audit office revealed, among other things, an incomplete record of cash "advances" to certain newspapers, in several cases without evidence of any return whatever. Cartier's *Minerve* had received \$360 of which there was no trace on the government ledgers. The *London Prototype*, another paper owned by S. B. Foote, had collected an account of \$295 twice, and the proprietor of the *Hamilton Spectator*, William Gillespy, had been advanced considerable sums of money—\$2000 in 1859, \$12,000 in 1861, \$1400 in 1862—for which little could be shown as given in return.

⁴⁹The *Globe* was reluctant to accept Smith's alibi: Feb. 17, 1864.

⁵⁰*Canadian Gleaner*, Feb. 19, 1864. On Jan. 21, 1863, the *Chronicle* had been taken over by a brother, John B. Foote. As P. B. Waite has noted, the paper remained an undeviating supporter of John A. Macdonald: Waite, *Life and Times of Confederation*, pp. 120, 136.

On January 3, 1862, Messrs. Labelle, Chapleau & Co., proprietors of *Le Colonisateur*, a little Montreal journal founded on premises belonging to George-Etienne Cartier, forwarded a copy of their opening number to Provincial Secretary Alleyn with the following note: "We have the honour to send herewith the first number of the *Colonisateur*. We shall be infinitely obliged to you if you will send us, between this and Tuesday, the advertisements and the advance which you and the Hon. Mr. Cartier had the kindness to promise us." The immediate response to this overture was a cash advance of \$200 accompanied by an advertising contract at exorbitant rates. In April another \$353 was advanced without deducting the \$200 already on account, and a third advance of \$115.50 from the Crown Lands Department was forwarded in August. On the fall of Cartier in 1862 *Le Colonisateur* vanished along with its debts. Overcharging on advertising was another prevalent custom. Account books furnished by the *Spectator* yielded evidence of outrageous overcharging: \$1,388.80 in ads for the Customs Department, \$488 for a single ad regarding regulations at Sault Ste Marie, \$912 for another regarding regulations at Gaspé. The *Toronto Freeman*, a Roman Catholic paper converted to Liberal-Conservatism, collected \$600 for advertising a quarantine notice of interest only to seamen coming up to Quebec, and the *Peterborough Review* was also named in connection with unduly expensive advertising.

Not the least significant feature of the financial commissioners' report was a small table purporting to compare various departmental expenditures for the year 1852 with those of 1862. If in the least accurate, the figures attest to the growing importance attached by Canadian politicians to newspaper support. The annual amount of public money spent on newspapers and advertising was shown to have risen from \$2812 in 1852 to \$20,756 in 1862, while the outlay for printing and stationery in those years had increased from \$15,639 to \$91,428.⁵¹ A few calculations based on the figures given for total departmental expenditures for contingencies (\$155,329 in 1852 and \$536,209 in 1862) indicate that, even without the inclusion of related items such as "Maintenance of Office" or "Sundries," the expenses pertaining to newspapers and printers accounted for roughly 12 per cent in 1852 and for 21 per cent in 1862 of the total spending of the various departments—an increase over the decade of 9 per cent in the proportionate

⁵¹The information from the table is as follows: permanent staff, \$102,223 in 1852 to \$344,258 in 1862; extra clerks and services, \$11,506 to \$26,985; printing and stationery, \$15,639 to \$91,428; newspapers and advertising, \$2,812 to \$20,756; postages, \$10,480 to \$8,606 (the only reduction); telegraphs, \$97 to \$9,068; maintenance of office, \$9,372 to \$20,430; sundries, \$3,197 to \$13,674. Total public expenditure in the departments, \$155,329 in 1852 to \$536,208 in 1862.

spending on newspaper patronage by a government notorious for its reckless increase of expenditure in other areas as well.

As to the reliability of the financial commissioners' report, a few points should be noted. It would appear that the principal author of the document was none other than George Sheppard.⁵² Considering Sheppard's treatment at the hands of John A. Macdonald it would be strange indeed for him not to have harboured, at least inwardly, some sense of gratification at this opportunity for official revenge. Another point, also militating against Sheppard's impartiality, was the nature of his own connection with the government of the day. When Josiah Blackburn of the London *Free Press* leased the *Quebec Mercury* from George Thomas Cary in 1862 to operate as a Sandfield Macdonald organ during the latter's tenure of office, he engaged George Sheppard as his editor⁵³—a post held by Sheppard throughout the Commission investigations. Blackburn also turns up significantly as the printer of the report.⁵⁴ The text of the document is undeniably partisan in tone, and its publication on the eve of the parliamentary session of 1864 was surely politically motivated. Still, the case against the implicated newspapers was formidable, and the *Peterborough Review*, rather than attempt to deny the charges, sought to defend itself by claiming that the current set of ministerial papers were behaving no better than their predecessors.⁵⁵ The *Gazette* also wondered why no examination was being made of the "arrangements" of papers like the *Mercury*, *La Tribune*, and Jean-Baptiste-Eric Dorion's *Défricheur*, but could not deny the evidence of "irregularities and overcharges to be greatly condemned."⁵⁶ Not having been named in the report, the *Gazette* even permitted itself a mild rebuke of the Hamilton *Spectator* for its part in the affair. "Out of their own mouths they are condemned," gloated the *Ottawa Union*.⁵⁷ If there is a moral to be drawn from the piece, perhaps it is best expressed in the rhetorical question once put by David Kinnear and Edward Goff Penny in the *Herald*, whose own integrity at the time probably owed less to inherent virtue than to the fact that its Rouge backers were in no position to be the dispensers of "government pap": "When reading the warm eulogies passed by the Government scribes on their patrons and the ever ready defense

⁵²According to the *Montreal Gazette*, Feb. 13, 1864. At first the *Gazette* charged that Sheppard and the report's printer, Josiah Blackburn, were partners. A denial from the *Mercury* was accepted, and the *Gazette* concluded that Sheppard was merely working for wages under Blackburn: *Gazette*, Feb. 18, 1864.

⁵³Talman, "Sheppard," p. 131.

⁵⁴*Gazette*, Feb. 13, 1864.

⁵⁵Cited by *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1864.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1864.

⁵⁷*Ottawa Union*, Feb. 18, 1864.

for the worst acts of the men in power, we are often irresistibly reminded of the question which the devil put to Job: 'Do these men serve the Government for Nought?' Clearly, the *Herald* concluded, "to set down the constancy of affection of the ministerial journalists to any sincerity of conviction is to entertain a faith, which, in the words of an act of Edward the 6th's Parliament, about chantries, is but a 'fond and foolish thing.'" ⁵⁸ As to the system of government under which such abusive misappropriations of public funds had occurred, the *Globe* offered a reflection as simple as it was profound: "Adopt as effectual remedies as you can, but, after all, the great remedy is to keep honest men in office." ⁵⁹

⁵⁸*Weekly Herald*, May 14, 1859.

⁵⁹*Globe*, Feb. 16, 1864.

Canada

Canada's First Bank: A History of the Bank of Montreal. Volume One. By MERRILL DENISON. Toronto-Montreal: McClelland & Stewart. 1966. Pp. xx, 471, illus. \$7.50.

MR. DENISON'S FIRST VOLUME of the history of the Bank of Montreal covers the years from 1817 to 1841 and adds another important book to those that have already appeared in this vintage period for Canadian economic history. It is therefore a very welcome addition to the field and the more special area of business history to which the author has made a number of major contributions in years past.

Within twenty years of its establishment in 1817, the Bank of Montreal had become much more than just a successful banking business; it had emerged as the major financial instrument of the city's chief traders and entrepreneurs and indirectly the principal instrument of their individual and collective economic activity. The author examines the importance of American example and participation in the formation of the Bank of Montreal and in its early development. Not only was most of the initial share capital supplied from Boston and New York, but the model of the first Bank of the United States was closely followed in the charter and regulations of the Bank of Montreal. Although the shares were soon repatriated, and in respect of ownership thus Canadianized, the bank's initial reliance upon American capital, experience, and entrepreneurial élan is an important part of its history. In the formation of other banks as well as railroads and industries in Montreal, Boston and New York continued over at least the next thirty years to provide much of the key resources for the creation of these instruments of the city's economic expansion.

Denison probes deeply into the growth of the bank and he records its development from a closed club controlled by and serving mainly the old mercantile élite to a more broadly based, professionally managed, and sounder institution serving a wider segment of the business community emerging in Montreal during the 1820s. In the development of this theme, Denison provides valuable studies of the old and new entrepreneurs and shows some of their family and business links. The growth of the bank and its changing personnel are related to the general economic environment and the specific problems that faced the banks in both Upper and Lower Canada: the shortage and wide variety of specie, the attempts of imperial authorities to regulate banking and currency, and the political controversies about the banks.

The author relied heavily on the numerous pioneering articles on Canadian banking and currency by Adam Shortt. But he has added much valuable detail and insight based on research into the bank's records, Montreal newspapers, and published government documents. Unfortunately there are no footnotes to the material

used, a very serious shortcoming which greatly detracts from the usefulness of the book. The addition of another few pages for notes in an already large, elaborate, and profusely illustrated book is not expecting too much. This is not the first time that the authors and sponsors of a Canadian company history have ignored or disregarded the expectations of students of economic history; hopefully it will be the last.

G. TULCHINSKY

Queen's University

Men and Meridians: The History of Surveying and Mapping in Canada. I. Prior to 1867. By DON W. THOMSON. Ottawa: The Queen's Printer. 1966. Pp. viii, 345, maps, illus. \$8.00.

IN 1962, WHEN A DISTINGUISHED LAND SURVEYOR of the province of Alberta who was retiring from the presidency of the Canadian Institute of Surveying proposed to the federal Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys that a detailed history of the profession be commissioned, he obtained ministerial sanction. Mr. Thomson, a native of Edmonton and a graduate in law from the University of Alberta who had been from 1950 to 1957 private secretary to the then minister and later author and information officer, was invited to write it. The first of a three-volume work, this book is described on the jacket as "comprehensive" and "non-technical."

The heavily documented book commences with four short chapters recounting the general history of surveying and mapping in the world from early times. These are followed by a fifth chapter dealing with the discovery of the new world and the first attempts to depict its form on maps. Champlain and his work fittingly form the subject of one chapter, and three more deal with the surveyors of New France. Chapter 10 is entitled "The Age of the Early Engineers; Reduction of Louisbourg." Following an approach already used in the introduction, which emphasizes the conquest, this chapter embraces the work of both the French surveyors, hydrographers, mappers, and fortress engineers and the first British surveyors and hydrographers who will henceforth replace them. The work of the latter—Holland, Desbarres, and Cook—is described in the next chapter. The reader is now whisked back to the sixteenth century to meet the "Early Probers of Canada's Seas and Great Lakes." The author next depicts the mappers and other scientific investigators of Canada's western interior. Two further chapters are entitled "Upper Canada Surveys" and "Lower Canada Surveyors"; they extend into the days of Canada West and Canada East. Between them is a chapter on the international boundary. The work terminates with "Early B.C. Surveys and the Royal Engineers" and "The Geological Survey of Canada: The First Quarter-Century."

Despite a somewhat cumbersome organization of his material, Mr. Thomson has done a notable piece of work in gathering together the information he presents, so far as it concerns Canada. It could be asked whether the section on the general history of the profession was really necessary. He has ferreted out from documents and secondary sources many an interesting aspect of the lives and works of the surveyors and mappers who helped shape this nation. He is to be commended for his energy and determination; as this review goes to press, a second volume of the work has appeared.

The printing, on coated stock, is superb. Lavish use is made of colour and not solely for the old maps: five of the Confederation Life series of paintings reconstructing Canadian history are reproduced, although this popular approach adds

little to the work. The book is particularly valuable for the magnificently reproduced old maps. There is, however, a shortage of outline maps to make the geographical aspects of the text more intelligible. The photographs of Sir William Logan and Robert Bell are of old men; it would have been preferable to present them in their prime. The typographical design is good. One odd point—accents on capital letters in French words appear to have been added by hand.

The fairly common and useful practice of an author's submitting a manuscript in Canadian history to fellow historians before publication does not appear to have been followed for this work. And in that part of the bibliography dealing with the provinces one notes the absence of works by Margaret A. Ormsby or Gerald M. Craig. Marcel Trudel is listed among those who have helped the author, but his writings are not cited. W. L. Morton's work is mentioned, but it is ascribed to A. S. Morton. Still more important is the question of simple editing. Here and there in this book we find awkward phraseology, or words like "fulsome" or "ceremoniously" used in a manner that the author could not have intended. Here and there occur phrases like "'Bona Vista' were Italian words that sprang easily to Cabot's lips . . ."; or "Mitchel, as his diary entries reveal, was illiterate." Major Canadian publishers employ very competent editors. Theirs is a function that does not seem to have been available for this publication of the Government of Canada.

COURTNEY C. J. BOND

Ottawa

The Political History of Newfoundland, 1832-1864. By GERTRUDE E. GUNN.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1966. Pp. viii, 249, map, appendixes. \$4.75.

SUCH SCHOLARLY ATTENTION as has formerly been devoted to the long and interesting history of Newfoundland has focused primarily on the early period when, as a result of its strategic position and the economic importance of the fishery, the island played a key role in imperial rivalries. The backwardness of higher education in Newfoundland coupled with the island's long refusal to throw in its political destiny with the rest of Canada resulted in almost complete neglect of the more recent past. One cannot but enthusiastically welcome, therefore, this pioneering work by Dr. Gertrude Gunn dealing with the most crucial period in the island's political and constitutional development during the nineteenth century. Beginning where A. H. McLintock (*The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Newfoundland, 1783-1832*, London, 1941) left off and working closely from Colonial Office sources, the author examines the factors which led to the inauguration of representative government in 1832 and gives a detailed study of the numerous conflicts which quickly ensued between the assembly on the one hand and the governor and council on the other—conflicts which had strong religious as well as political overtones since the assembly soon became predominantly Irish Roman Catholic while the council was overwhelmingly Protestant. This disharmony, coupled with increasing electoral violence, led within a decade to constitutional review and the belated establishment of an amalgamated legislature, a system which resulted in much political bargaining and heavy expenditure and was abandoned in 1848. With the reversion to the earlier constitution the Liberals began a sustained agitation for responsible government. Despite opposition from the council and Protestant Tory members of the assembly who feared Roman Catholic ascendancy, the British government finally extended the system to the colony in 1855. However, a legacy of bitterness remained and, as the author shows, culminated in extensive violence

in 1861 following the ousting of the Liberals and their replacement by the Protestant Tory opposition.

Dr. Gunn treats her subject in a critical and analytical manner though she tends, probably because of her heavy reliance on the governors' correspondence, to be sympathetic towards the point of view of the establishment. She seems to regard the Liberal reformers as opportunistic, irresponsible extremists and, while this was often true, she fails to adequately consider the *milieu* in which they operated or to give them the credit they deserve for the constitutional advances of the period. Much the same can be said of her treatment of the Roman Catholic bishops, Fleming and Mullock. While it is true that their blatantly political activities deserve criticism, it seems strange that no mention is made of the role of the Church of England hierarchy. There is not a single reference to Bishop Field (1844-1876) who was closely identified with Hoyles and the other Conservative leaders in their opposition to responsible government and who helped to exacerbate religious feeling in 1861 by publicly supporting Governor Bannerman's summary dismissal of Kent's Liberal government. My own research also leads me to disagree with much of the author's interpretation of that particular crisis, especially the way in which she minimizes the collusion between Bannerman and the Conservative leaders and vindicates him for determination and good sense. A reading of the assembly's debates (printed officially in a number of local newspapers) before and after the government's dismissal, strongly suggests that Bannerman merely used Kent's language in the house as a pretext for getting rid of a ministry which, as his letters so clearly indicate, he utterly detested. Finally, while the rational observer might agree with the author's conclusion that much of the political strife in Newfoundland during this period and subsequently "stemmed from consecutive colonial policies inappropriate in their timing to the place" (p. 188), it must be remembered that politics is often more emotional than rational. Once a vocal group in the colony demanded constitutional systems similar to those in the neighbouring colonies, prolonged resistance by Britain would undoubtedly have resulted in far more serious strife.

E. C. MOULTON

University of Manitoba

The Bishop Who Ate His Boots: A Biography of Isaac O. Stringer. By FRANK A. PEAKE. Toronto: Anglican Church of Canada. 1967. Pp. x, 190. \$4.50.

A MORE INTERPRETATIVE TITLE for this book might well be "The Last of the Romantics." The real drive behind the missionary development in which Isaac Stringer played such a prominent role was the Romantic movement of the last century. It was a spirit of adventure and self-sacrifice that brought the Oblates of Mary, a nineteenth-century foundation to the Canadian northwest, to win from Pius IX the encomium, "the martyrs of the North." The Church Missionary Society, founded in England at the opening of the nineteenth century, also shared in the Romanticism of the age, best exemplified in the career of Bishop Bompas, the apostle of the north, who "set his face steadfastly towards the frozen north as far as possible from the restraints of civilization." It was the same spirit of religious adventure that led a farm boy from Ontario to the remote Arctic island of Herschel and to savour during his career such contrasts as the simplicity of an Eskimo igloo and the banquet table of King George V.

Despite the unfailing enthusiasm of Bishop Stringer for the church's missions in

the north, one senses as we follow this detailed account of the "journeyings often" of the successor of Bishop Bompas that the drive behind these missions is petering out: so much of the bishop's time is squandered in laying before missionary societies the precarious position of the northern missions! It is an ironic closing to the career of an idealistic farm boy who ultimately became an archbishop that he should have exhausted his failing bodily strength in a gruelling speaking tour, not through the perilous north but through Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes on behalf of a restoration fund to replace church endowments that had been lost through dishonest land speculation in western Canada.

The detailed chronicle of rather trivial events in Isaac Stringer's career makes a somewhat dull book at times—there is too much chronicle and too little interpretation. But Professor Peake has very tactfully depicted an activist bishop who spent little time in his study and was little concerned with biblical criticism, to say nothing of the impact of the winds of theological change originating from Darwin, Marx, and Freud. A final revealing chapter entitled, "The Lord's Messenger," which outlines the bishop's courses of instructions makes clear that during his ministerial career the Ontario farm boy never deviated much from the orthodox instruction of his youthful days, except perhaps for a very slight tendency to indulge in British Israelism. Professor Peake has charitably concluded this analysis with the comment, "an Israelite indeed in whom is no guile."

H. H. WALSH

McGill University

Canada's North. By R. A. J. PHILLIPS. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. 1967. Pp. xiv, 306, maps, illus. \$7.95.

MR. PHILLIPS' AVOWED PURPOSE in this book is to acquaint Canadians with the northern third of their country—at least to acquaint those who do not wish to treat the Canadian north in a "continuing state of absence of mind." The author has attempted to look at Canada's territories north of 60 degrees latitude as a distinct entity, yet part and parcel of an emerging dominion. He has provided a readable short history of the north from time immemorial to the present day and has designed the book for a wide audience. In doing so, he has produced a book whose scope is beyond his talents. The final product can be criticized for being too sketchy, as the author himself admits, and for lacking even a select bibliography. On the whole, the prose is simple yet effective, lapsing into a naïve rhetoric only on rare occasion.

Although all aspects of the north are examined—the geography, the coming of man, the explorers, the early economy, and the question of sovereignty—Mr. Phillips comes into his own in the second half of the account which deals primarily with the modern north, its present stature and ever present problems. As former chief of the Arctic division and director of northern administration in the old Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, he demonstrates a particular appreciation of the north's limitations in the field of transportation and communications; he speaks with considerable authority regarding resources; he devotes a poignant chapter to the "social legacy" of civilization's advance into the northern reaches. Actually, the entire second half is written in a straightforward manner, making it first-rate reading. This cannot be said of the first six or seven chapters. Owing to the author's background, the book lacks balance, unfortunately leaving the impression that these chapters were an afterthought tacked on to provide a lengthy introduction which in places can only be described as a dressed-up chronicle.

At times Mr. Phillips has difficulty in assessing just what was or was not important. Little or no attention has been paid to the Arctic expedition of 1913–1918, a prime example of the Canadian government's willingness to devote much time, energy, patience, and money to the *exploration* of its most northern frontiers. Mr. Phillips implies that the sole preoccupation of Canadian expeditions to the north has been to cement Canadian pretensions there and to assert her sovereignty. To an extent this is true, but what of R. M. Anderson's southern section of the 1913–1918 expedition for instance? It was confined to the exploration and especially the scientific study of a portion of the northern coastline, not to flag raising. Also, the author has given too much weight to the Soviet sectoral decree of 1926 which he considers "a tacit Soviet recognition of all Canadian claims to lands on its side of the globe" (p. 104). Surely, he cannot believe this. For one thing, the issue has been long forgotten. For another, Mr. Phillips must be aware that sectorism is merely an idea which has no special status in international law; it has never been recognized by any bilateral or multilateral treaty. The Soviet declaration of 1926 was communicated to the interested governments but no express declarations of acquiescence were made. Realizing this, the U.S.S.R. has employed other means to make her claims valid, as has the Canadian government.

The book has, in a limited fashion, fulfilled its purpose, but Canada's north still awaits its historians.

RICHARD J. DIUBALDO

National Historic Sites Service
Ottawa

A History of Journalism in Canada. By W. H. KESTERTON. Carleton Library, 36. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 1967. Pp. x, 307. \$3.65 paper.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF RAMSAY COOK'S STUDY OF DAFOE, histories and reminiscences of journalism and journalists in Canada have not been very satisfactory. Our great journalists and their biographers too often have given us only anecdotal accounts, stories of gory crimes, and similar fluff. Some of these memoirs and studies at least have the virtue of being interesting accounts, but most do not, and it sometimes seems as if newspapermen are repenting for their earlier sins of commission when they take pen to write their autobiographies. The result of this has been a dearth of solid material on the press, although John Porter's *Vertical Mosaic* has recently provided us with an examination of the ownership and organization of Canada's mass media empires.

Professor Kesterton's book is an attempt to remedy this lack of solid information. And certainly he has collected an encyclopaedic amount of detail on the history of journalism, on technical developments, and on the way that newspapers have passed through amalgamations and consolidations from the eighteenth century to the present. He provides useful sketches on the law of libel in Canada and on the development of union organization, and he gives us a handy guide to the editorial stands taken by the major newspapers on some of the key issues in our history.

Too often, however, this information is laid in front of the reader like yesterday's dinner on a cold, cold plate. A brief and sometimes inaccurate political chronology is sandwiched between long lists of names and periodical titles. The references are uninformative and do not really reflect the blurb's claim that Professor Kesterton has examined "all the records in the national capital and the ten provincial capitals. . . ." Explanatory material is too brief, and sometimes the reader cannot escape the

impression that he is reading the author's lecture notes. Most important, perhaps, Professor Kesterton has somehow managed to confuse the question of masthead titles and to get some of them wrong. The *Montreal Star* should be listed with the whole title italicized and not, as the author has it, as the *Montreal Star*. And since 1867 it has been the *Montreal Gazette*, not the *Montreal Gazette*. This may sound like quibbling, but anyone who is attempting to track down the proper citation for a newspaper title would be well advised to use this book with caution. These errors severely weaken the volume's usefulness for reference purposes, and it need hardly be said that the definitive history of journalism in Canada remains to be written.

J. L. GRANATSTEIN

York University

The Judicial Committee and the British North America Act: An Analysis of the Interpretative Scheme for the Distribution of Legislative Powers. By G. P. BROWNE. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1967. Pp. xviii, 246. \$7.50.

MR. BROWNE'S BOOK provides the most complete and coherent examination of the Judicial Committee's scheme for interpreting the division of legislative powers in the B.N.A. Act. Of course, Mr. Browne has had the advantage of having at his disposal the complete record of the Judicial Committee's course of judicial review. But he also eschews the case-by-case approach followed by earlier legal treatises such as Lefroy's, Clement's, and Laskin's and presents the reader with an over-all view of the main problems involved in applying the B.N.A. Act and their solutions.

Even so, it must be emphasized that this is a thoroughly legal analysis. It is concerned exclusively with the internal logic of the judicial decisions themselves; there is no consideration of the larger historical and political questions concerning the social forces which generated those decisions and their impact on the evolution of Canadian federalism. This is not a criticism of the book but an acknowledgment of its tightly drawn jurisprudential terms of reference. And lest the historian or social scientist too quickly conclude that he has little to learn from such a limited perspective, we should remind ourselves that criticism of the Judicial Committee's interpretation of the Canadian constitution has frequently focused on alleged mistakes of a logical and legal order.

It is the sharpest and certainly, for English-speaking Canada, most influential of these criticisms, the *O'Connor Report*, which serves as the prime target of Mr. Browne's analysis. The *cause célèbre* of that critique was the Local Prohibition case of 1896 in which their Lordships, contrary to the "clearly expressed intentions" of the framers of the Act, reduced the federal parliament's general power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada to a mere supplement of those specific powers listed in section 91 which, as the Act stated, were "for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of" the general power. This decision crystallized what Mr. Browne calls the "three-compartment" view of the division of legislative powers. According to this theory, the two lists of enumerated powers in sections 91 and 92 constitute the two principal compartments (with the federal enumerations taking precedence over the provincial enumerations in cases of overlap), while the peace, order, and good government clause constitutes a third residuary compartment to which legislation might be consigned only when there is no possibility of bringing it under the specific heads of sections 91 and 92. While the three-compartment view assigns a higher status to the federal heads of power than to the provincial, nevertheless the broad language of the thirteenth

head of section 92, "Property and Civil Rights," gave the provinces the advantage in contests between the two sets of specific powers, and that section became the most effective residuary clause in the division of powers.

Although the most popular vein of centralist criticism has simply condemned this approach of the Judicial Committee's as favouring the provinces, most professional opinion has also insisted that not only was it bad political economy but it was also bad law. The conventional wisdom of English-Canadian writing on constitutional law, inspired by the writings of O'Connor, V. C. MacDonald, and Bora Laskin, among others, has favoured a two-compartment way of understanding the relationship between sections 91 and 92 of the B.N.A. Act. According to this view the enumerations of section 91 are simply to be treated as illustrations of a general grant of power to the central legislature and this general power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada must take precedence over all the specific powers which the second compartment, section 92, assigns to the provinces. If the Privy Council had taken this approach, judicial review, instead of being continually involved in the rather nitpicking exercise of defining the precise ambit of the various enumerated powers, would have found its central preoccupation to be the determination of the more fundamental question of whether legislation was inherently national or local in scope.

Mr. Browne makes his most important contribution to Canadian constitutional law in effectively defending the Judicial Committee's three-compartment view and undermining the two-compartment theory of its critics. His attack is carried out on a number of fronts. He convinces me that, in terms of the literal meaning of the text and the rules of statutory interpretation, the Judicial Committee's three-compartment view is the most plausible way of understanding the relationship of the peace, order, and good government clause to the other parts of sections 91 and 92. He demonstrates that O'Connor is incorrect in contending that Lord Watson's enunciation of the three-compartment view in the *Tennant* case of 1894 and the *Local Prohibition* case of 1896 constituted a sharp break from the Privy Council's earlier decisions. On a more general level of analysis, with great clarity and cogency, he argues that only by adopting the three-compartment approach could the Judicial Committee have remained true to the governing assumptions of its jurisprudence, in particular the Rule of Precedent and the strategy of Judicial Self-restraint.

In advancing this latter argument Mr. Browne raises the largest and most controversial issues. Many of the Judicial Committee's critics would be willing to admit that adoption of the two-compartment view by the Privy Council would have forced that tribunal into a much more overt policy-making role in which it could have relied much less than it did on previously decided cases, but they would contend that such a posture would have entailed jurisprudential assumptions more appropriate for the task of interpreting a nation's constitution. Mr. Browne is certainly not unaware of this viewpoint, but he tends to dismiss it too easily. In his preface he admits to only one underlying precept as guiding his own understanding of the judicial process—"The feeling, perhaps, that the law should not be bent in the interests of either policy or history, and can be interpreted in the light of neither." That some courts, notably the Supreme Court of the United States, have brought policy considerations to bear on their decision-making is undeniable, and I think that it can be shown that even the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, self-restrained as, on the whole, it undeniably was, was in some significant respects not always able to deduce its conclusions exclusively from the legal materials before it.

Within the context of the three-compartment approach, the court was left with

some latitude in determining the ambit of such abstract legal norms as the federal legislature's "Trade and Commerce" power and the provinces' jurisdiction over "Property and Civil Rights." In giving an extremely restrictive construction of the former and a more expansive interpretation of the latter, the Judicial Committee would appear to have been influenced by more than legal, logical, and grammatical considerations. While Mr. Browne acknowledges this area of discretion, he does not seem to be aware of the important and unavoidable extra-legal considerations inherent in another phase of the Judicial Committee's interpretative scheme—what he calls the Dimensions and Emergency doctrines. The Dimensions doctrine refers to the Judicial Committee's belief that in exceptional circumstances "some matters, in their origin local and provincial, might attain such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Dominion" and could therefore be brought under the federal peace, order, and good government power. Browne rightly argues that the Committee's tendency in later cases to reduce the exceptional circumstances which could justify invocation of the Dimensions doctrine to emergency situations such as total war was, in a broad sense, consistent with the major premises of its jurisprudence. But what his own legalistic form of analysis ignores is that even within the narrow confines of an emergency version of the Dimensions doctrine, the court would still have to decide whether or not a national emergency exists. And in making this decision no court would be guided by purely legal principles.

But the extreme nature of Mr. Browne's commitment to a purely legalistic way of understanding the Judicial Committee's work may have been necessary to offset the equally unbalanced perspective of the majority of the Judicial Committee's critics, who too often explained its constitutional decisions as the result of a simple bias for provincial rights. Mr. Browne makes the strongest possible case both for understanding these judicial decisions in terms of the evolution of a consistent set of legal rules and precedents and for appreciating the stability and congruity which such a pattern provides. Besides this redressing of the balance in our understanding of the Judicial Committee's constitutional jurisprudence, his volume provides the most convenient and comprehensive statement of the leading precepts and problems in Canadian constitutional law. All of this detail is gathered together in an Appendix in the form of an analytical table which lists all of the Judicial Committee's major judgments and indicates the issues involved in each. For all of this we are very much in Mr. Browne's debt.

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Community in Crisis: French-Canadian Nationalism in Perspective. By RICHARD JONES. Toronto/Montreal: McClelland & Stewart. 1967. Pp. 192. \$5.00 cloth; \$2.50 paper.

THIS IS AN ABLY WRITTEN AND IMPORTANT BOOK. Richard Jones is an English-speaking scholar who teaches history at the Collège de Ste Anne in the province of Quebec. In his research he has interviewed many of the political and intellectual leaders of contemporary Quebec, and is thoroughly familiar with the extensive body of scholarly and other writings on recent French-Canadian nationalism. For English-speaking students of Quebec affairs his analysis of both the ideological and institutional aspects of provincial development supplements the recent writings of Ramsay Cook with their emphasis on intellectual currents, the institutional analyses of Hubert Guindon, and the journalistic accounts of Desbarats, Myers, and Sloan.

Jones considers three sets of interrelated factors: (a) the self-identification of contemporary French Canadians as members of a "colonized minority," (b) the evolving ideologies of French-Canadian nationalism, and (c) the institutional manifestations of change in Quebec during this decade.

In his introductory chapter "Self Image and the Nationalist," the author asserts that "the colonial condition impresses upon the French Canadian the fact that he is a minority—historically, politically, economically, culturally" (p. 36). But in this decade there has been not only a renewed awareness of this circumstance but a conviction that it need not continue, a conviction based largely on a perception of the decolonizing process that is going on elsewhere in the world. New ideologies of French-Canadian nationalism have developed in this decade because the traditional myths of messianism, agriculturalism, and anti-statism—the categories are those developed by Michel Brunet—no longer satisfy the prime functions of an ideology designed to explain the circumstances of a particular group or to give it unifying symbols with which to identify. The new currents of thought emphasize the necessity of strong leadership from the Quebec government in building a new society and more particularly in altering its status of economic dependence.

In his examination of the institutional changes which have taken place within Quebec during this decade, Jones accepts the analysis of Albert Breton and Hubert Guindon that a bureaucratic revolution has taken place, a "social" rather than a "national" revolution. The nationalism of contemporary Quebec is thus oriented largely to the interests and attitudes of the emergent bureaucratic élites and has done little for either impoverished rural communities or the lower strata of urban workers. Because of this failure, the French-Canadian community in Quebec has not been completely mobilized in pursuit of nationalist goals.

Jones writes with clarity and confidence when he deals with French-Canadian nationalism. I find him less convincing when he analyzes English-Canadian responses to the new circumstances of cultural dualism and I believe his chapter "The Alternative to Separation: A New Federalism" is the least satisfactory of the book. In his measured sympathy for the new Quebec he has a tendency to regard English Canada as being hell-bent for centralization and assimilation. The situation is more complex. It can surely be demonstrated that there is a much fuller recognition than ever before of the "French fact" in Canadian affairs—the vastly enhanced position of the French language in institutions of the federal government, a wider range of provincial financial and administrative autonomy, steps toward bettering the situations of French-language educational institutions in Ontario and New Brunswick, for example. It is of course problematical whether such developments as these and others which are in the making will provide a basis through which the "two founding races" can continue to live within the framework of a common federal system. However, to ignore such developments is to suggest that Canadian institutions are much more unresponsive to the new demands of cultural duality than has actually been the case.

In his concluding chapter the author attempts a reasoned defence of a bicultural federation along the lines of Lord Acton's postulate of the multi-cultural state as a superior form of political organization. This kind of justification applied to Canadian circumstances has already been made by Pierre-Elliott Trudeau and Ramsay Cook. Jones' argument proceeds at the philosophical and empirical levels. He accepts Maritain's distinction between the nation as a fact which "precedes the determination of human intelligence and will" and the state as a "work of reason." According to this analysis the nation-state which subordinates the rational political order to the exclusive claims of nationality is a perversion. I do not find the distinction

between nation and state helpful. It erects a purely *analytical* dichotomy as a denial of the *empirical* proposition made by nationalists—and in Canadian terms most forcefully by Michel Brunet—that the relations between nations within a common political system are inevitably those of dominance and submission. Jones is on firmer ground when he suggests that there are other dimensions of human differentiation than those of nationality and that in many circumstances these can and should override national differences. I would argue, and Jones is in agreement here, that Canadian political institutions can be made to work only if cleavages other than those between the English- and French-speaking communities as such are sustained.

This book is modest and tentative in its conclusions about the Canadian future. "For the French Canadians, the painful blow of the conquest must somehow be dulled" (p. 158). The various social grievances within the province must in part at least be met—the grievances not only of the new middle classes but of farm and urban workers. The last paragraph sums up eloquently the sane and tolerant spirit in which this extraordinarily timely book was written.

I am no prophet. I can give no sure answers to the "Do you think that . . . ?" questions. I do not know what the final equilibrium between majority and minority will be. Perhaps a healthier economy in Quebec will eventually appease the political demands of the nationalists. Perhaps the proverbial flexibility of Anglo-Canadians will produce some imaginative changes that will foster a real biculturalism on a national scale. Or perhaps all that the crystal ball shows is a little satellite beside a bigger one. Maybe the future promises hope, or perhaps there is more cause to intone a funeral dirge. Fortunately, we cannot know what will happen. We should therefore at least act on the assumption that we have a battle to fight that is worth the effort. The chance to assist in fostering a meaningful cooperation on the Canadian scene must not be allowed to slip by.

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United States

Spain in America. By CHARLES GIBSON. New York: Harper & Row. 1966. Pp. xiv, 239. \$6.95 (US).

THE TOPICS COVERED in Professor Gibson's historical survey of colonial Spanish America are the familiar ones. Successive chapters accordingly deal with the European background to the conquest, the conquest, the *encomienda*, the church, the state, the evolution of colonial economy and society, Spanish-Indian relations, and the "Imperial Readjustments" of the eighteenth century. The only major departure from the topic outlines used in comparable studies is the inclusion of a chapter on the Spanish "borderlands," that is, the mission and presidio frontiers of the American southwest, and Louisiana and Florida.

It should be stressed, however, that although Gibson covers familiar ground, his study is far from being a conventional treatment of the subject. Indeed, *Spain in America* is replete with perceptive insight, from the author's observations on the crucial role played by the Catholic church in the colonial economy as landholder and creditor, to his contention that the rationalization of empire was the key objective of the eighteenth-century Bourbon reformists. On the latter point, Richard Morse, a noted Latin American historian, has gone as far as to argue that the many

attempts at rational institutional reorganization after 1700 mark the beginning of what may be properly termed the "colonial" period of Spanish American history.

While Gibson is concerned mainly with Spanish activities in the new world, he does not neglect the important role played by Indian peoples in the period of the conquest and its aftermath. Students familiar with the author's highly authoritative study, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule*, will already be well aware that the conquest was facilitated as much through native collaboration as by the *conquistadores'* superiority in horses and firearms. The role of Indian peoples during the decades following the conquest did not diminish as rapidly as has often been supposed, for the colonists continued to depend on Indian intermediaries (*caciques*) for the collection of *encomienda* tribute and labour services. Government at the local level, moreover, was frequently placed in the hands of Indian municipal councils (*cabildos*). Even the drastic reduction in the indigenous population, a consequence of the introduction of European diseases, had its influence on the basic outline of colonial policies and institutions. Gibson ably underscores this point in his observation that the successive systems of aboriginal labour utilization—the *encomienda*, *repartimiento*, and debt peonage—were in essence little more than "sequential responses to numerical population change."

In general, Gibson's work merits high praise for narrative style, cogent argument, and balanced judgment on many controversial issues. One might have wished, however, that the variously termed "forgotten century" or "century of depression," roughly 1600 to 1700, had received more adequate treatment. Perhaps the inclusion of a separate chapter would have been warranted in the case of a period that witnessed the development of rural latifundia as the dominant system of land tenure, as well as the emergence of debt bondage, "the most durable of all colonial labour forms."

T. BRADY

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Church and State in French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 1732. By CHARLES EDWARDS O'NEILL. New Haven and London: Yale University Press [Montreal: McGill University Press]. 1966. Pp. xii, 315. \$10.00.

LES ÉTUDES SPÉCIALES sur la Louisiane du régime français se font rares, et plus encore sur son histoire religieuse; même s'il limite son champ aux relations entre l'Eglise et l'Etat, des débuts à 1732, l'ouvrage d'O'Neill vient combler un vide important.

C'est ici la pré-histoire de la Louisiane, l'époque où la France n'arrive pas à donner du corps à sa colonie du Mississippi, colonie faite encore de maigres établissements dispersés où hommes d'Etat et hommes d'Eglise consacrent le meilleur de leur temps à de petites discussions personnelles, comme à encombrer l'administration métropolitaine de mémoires écrits les uns contre les autres. L'histoire événementielle qui, ailleurs, nous aiderait à voir clair, demeure ici un casse-tête, malgré l'habileté de l'auteur à la raconter; un tableau chronologique, à la fin du livre, eût été fort utile, car, dans ce dédale des événements politico-religieux, on se perd le plus facilement du monde: transformation constante du status de la colonie, déménagement incessant des postes, nomination et rappel, puis de nouveau retour de tel commandant, formation, désagrégation puis resurgence de tel clan, arrivée, renvoi puis rentrée de tel groupe de missionnaires, disputes continues (malgré les mutations d'officiers supérieurs) entre le pouvoir civil et les missionnaires, disputes

continuelles de juridiction entre les missionnaires eux-mêmes. La nouvelle société n'arrive pas à mettre ses cadres en place. Pendant un demi-siècle, l'histoire de la Louisiane est une bousculade homérique: le pays du Saint-Laurent, malgré ce qu'on raconte de notre dix-septième siècle, n'a jamais connu pareille bagarre; si nous cherchons (toujours en Nouvelle-France) un point de comparaison, c'est dans l'Acadie de Menou d'Aulnay et de La Tour qu'on peut le trouver. C'est à partir de 1732 seulement que la colonie atteint enfin à l'ordre et à la stabilité.

Cela, nous le savions par des études générales, mais jamais encore il ne nous avait été donné de pénétrer au cœur de la situation. L'auteur a mis de la clarté dans ce que la bousculade des événements rend extrêmement difficile à clarifier; il a bien établi l'ordre de naissance de certains problèmes: arrivée de missionnaires séculiers d'abord, puis recrue des Jésuites qu'appuient Iberville et Bienville; apparition brève de Carmes déchaussés; et, en plus du retour des Jésuites, entrée des Capucins, l'un de ceux-ci devenant le vicaire-général de l'évêque de Québec. Ce sera alors une lutte entêtée des Capucins pour soumettre les Jésuites à leur juridiction; cette lutte touche le haut drame, lorsque viennent les Ursulines de Rouen, conduites par les Jésuites: les Capucins revendiquent la direction spirituelle des religieuses, cependant que la supérieure menace de passer aux Antilles avec sa communauté, si on ne lui donne pas un directeur jésuite; disputes qui ne sont pas en champ clos, loin de là: on débat ces problèmes à Paris avec autant d'animosité qu'à la Nouvelle-Orléans.

Enfin, l'auteur nous apprend beaucoup sur Mgr de Mornay, le moins connu des évêques de la Nouvelle-France. On sait généralement que cet évêque capucin, nommé coadjuteur en 1713, puis devenu en 1727 successeur de Mgr de Saint-Vallier, n'est jamais venu en Nouvelle-France, et l'on ne savait pas grand'chose de son activité épiscopale. Or O'Neill nous montre un Mornay très actif en ce qui concerne la Louisiane: coadjuteur de Saint-Vallier, il se charge exclusivement du Mississippi; devenu évêque, il s'en occupe encore de très près, laissant pour ainsi dire à son coadjuteur Dosquet le Canada et l'Acadie; mais le capucin Mornay travaille d'abord pour les capucins qu'il fait entrer en Louisiane et il les appuie au détriment des Jésuites, bien mieux équipés; il osera même interdire la Louisiane à un jésuite qui y revient comme supérieur, avec la protection du ministre Maurepas; ce geste partisan met fin à la carrière épiscopale de Mornay: le vieil évêque de 70 ans est amené à se démettre de son siège.

Pour mieux saisir la situation politico-religieuse décrite par O'Neill, il eût fallu d'abord une histoire religieuse de la Louisiane (qui n'est pas encore écrite), et il eût fallu aussi que l'auteur nous rappelle de temps à autre l'état général des affaires; il aurait dû, dans ce fouillis d'événements, faire plus souvent le point: éléments religieux de la colonie, lieux desservis par les missionnaires, ressources de l'Eglise (c'est par hasard que nous apprenons que, dans la Basse-Louisiane, la partie la plus peuplée, il n'y a pas encore d'église en 1725), synthèse des problèmes qui se posent à l'Etat. De même, puisque la Louisiane est une partie de cette Nouvelle-France qui a Québec pour capitale, il aurait fallu davantage qu'une occasionnelle comparaison entre la colonie du Mississippi et celle du Saint-Laurent. Et nous regrettons que l'auteur (ou l'éditeur) n'ait pas jugé bon d'insérer une seule carte dans un livre qui nous parle, à toute page, de tant de lieux dispersés: quand on nous décrit le progrès accompli dans la pénétration du hinterland, le champ d'opération de tel groupe de missionnaires, l'importance stratégique de telle tribu, comment voulez-vous qu'un lecteur (même universitaire) puisse s'y retrouver sans carte, dans un pays qui s'étend des Grands Lacs jusqu'au golfe du Mexique? Et encore, comment, sans une carte, soupçonner l'étendue de cette solitude qui sépare la Basse-Louisiane (ou région de la Nouvelle-Orléans) et la Haute-Louisiane ou pays des Illinois?

Une longue bibliographie et, plus encore, l'emploi qu'il en fait, prouve que l'auteur n'a rien négligé ni des archives canadiennes, ni de celles de France ou de Rome pour mener à bien son étude. Dans cette bibliographie, les études canadiennes-françaises comptent peu: il n'y a pas oublié de l'auteur, mais pauvreté des études; à part *l'Iberville* et *Le grand Marquis* de Guy Frégault, l'historiographie canadienne-française ne s'est pas intéressée à la Louisiane d'ancien régime (pour tant partie importante de la Nouvelle-France). La Nouvelle-France heureusement n'est pas chasse-gardée, et nous nous réjouissons qu'un historien de langue anglaise ait apporté cette contribution à la connaissance de la société française d'Amérique.

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The British Empire Before the American Revolution. XIII. The Triumphant Empire. By LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1967. Pp. xlii, 454, xxvi, maps. \$10.00 (US).

THE PENULTIMATE VOLUME of this great series is an omnium gatherum in three parts: "The Empire Beyond the Storm, 1770-1776"; "A Summary of the Series"; "Historiography." Part I is in token of the old obligation to maintain the perspective of empire; Part II is the core; Part III caters to the narcissism of a profession that increasingly pursues the study of its own practitioners.

To take the peripheries first: Part I studies those areas that have been lost to sight in Volumes XI and XII. Quebec, for example, receives a fur trade-Carleton-constitutional approach adequate to imperial history and all unmindful of the anguish of conquered peoples. It is not surprising that H. A. Innis is one of the two Canadian historians—the other is J. B. Brebner—to receive consideration in Part III, a protracted review of those authors who have affected our understanding of the events through which this series has passed. The sixty-two essays on historians from George Bubb Doddington to J. Steven Watson, from Thomas Hutchinson to R. E. Brown, are so informative and so clearly relevant to a study of this dimension that historiographical labours are thoroughly justified on this occasion.

Professor Gipson's original plan for his series dates back to 1924, so he has averaged eighteen months of writing for each year between 1748 and 1776. His scholarly pilgrimage has taken him throughout the British empire, but his destination has always been the American Revolution. In Part II, his "Summary," he depicts an empire of unparalleled extent, diversity, and richness, maintaining a unique degree of individual freedom within its bounds; the whole superintended by a mother country that preserved a *pax Britannica* by design, not accident. In 1763 this empire emerged victorious from the "first modern imperialistic war," and Britain, with an unprecedented generosity, paid a large share of the costs incurred by the colonials in defending themselves. While Britain was left to pay for the war, her American colonies were soon quit of their burden of debt. The imperial government felt that the colonies "could and justly should" share the continuing costs of continental defence. The strong opposition to this policy may have indicated a basic divergence between British and American society, or may simply have been due to the contrariness of men who no longer feared for their lives at the hands of the French. In any event, there followed a crash programme in political self-education—Professor Bailyn's Introduction to the first volume of *Pamphlets of the American Revolution* has impressed Gipson considerably, the more so since it confirms his own preference for a political-constitutional analysis of colonial grievances. The original aim of the revolutionary war that began in 1775 was to give the American

colonies "an autonomous position within the Empire—a status to which their leaders felt they had a right both by the common law and the law of nature." But Americans had by then been conditioned to accept a drastic escalation of the contest.

There are, as Professor Gipson notes, two basic approaches to American colonial history. His own, the London-centred imperial approach, sees these colonies as "part of the history of the rise and decline of the British Empire." On the other hand, there is the national approach, which "assumes the existence of the United States of America and then probes into the past in order to uncover the beginnings and development of a group of Thirteen English Colonies destined to become the nucleus of a new nation." From the imperial viewpoint, Gipson's work cannot be bettered: his selection of narrative, his attribution of motive, his judgment of the issues is impeccable. But for the historian who is out to prove something about the United States the very balance and serenity of this work is a challenge.

In his "Note on Recent Literature on the Causes of the American Revolution," Gipson shows how the tide of colonial history is flowing with the "national" approach. Can he rescue early American history from its parochialism? It would be a tragedy if his immense erudition and academic prestige should place him above criticism, beyond the rough and tumble of the rapidly expanding field of American colonial history. Certainly, London-centred studies are rare in a world where Britain now struggles from one balance-of-payments crisis to the next. The British empire disappeared while Gipson was writing about it, and an American empire has taken its place. When American historians become aware of that transition—and even they must have noticed some of its recent manifestations—they may well shed their current egocentricity and take up the problems of imperial responsibility rather than colonial licence.

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The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 1843–1849. By FREDERICK MERK. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. [Toronto: Random House of Canada]. 1966. Pp. xiv, 290, ix. \$6.95.

THIS BOOK is a companion piece to the author's 1963 volume, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History*, and deals with essentially the same subject matter, the arguments used to whip up support for extending the boundaries of the United States in the 1840s. Having given extensive attention to the ideology of manifest destiny, Professor Merk now shows how President Polk and other expansionists revived President Monroe's almost forgotten statements of 1823 and turned them inside out to fit their own purposes. A few years later the phrase Monroe doctrine was coined, henceforth to serve as a handy tool in the fashioning of American hemisphere policies.

It has long been known that Monroe's message was brought back to life in the 1840s, but the connection between Polk's "reassertion" and the campaign for expansionism is brought out more precisely and more fully by Professor Merk than by earlier writers. In 1823 Monroe's "principle" had been essentially defensive in intent but in the 1840s it provided arguments for the annexation of Texas, the occupation of "All Oregon," the extension of the Texas boundary to the Rio Grande, and the acquisition of California, Yucatan, and Cuba. In each instance, it was asserted, action must be taken before British influence became dominant, to the detriment of the security of the United States.

Although Professor Merk's method is to allow the period to speak for itself, it is clear that he is repelled by this distorted use of Monroe's message, as the following sentence indicates: "Seldom has error been relied on so consistently and in such high places in American party battles, and seldom has truth, as confirmed later by historical investigation, formed so large a part of the argument of the opposition." Without quarrelling with this assessment, one might note two points. Monroe's message, although defensive in intent, had been carefully worded in order not to be an obstacle to later expansion. And second, while hindsight reveals that British policy did not pose a real threat to the security of the United States, the fears of Americans in the 1840s may have been genuinely felt.

The misuse of the Monroe Doctrine thus figures prominently in the propaganda for expansionism in the Polk era. Yet the words of G. P. Garrison, written more than sixty years ago, still echo in American ears: "... there are few in this day, even of those who condemn the methods of Polk, that would be willing to see his work undone."

G. M. CRAIG

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New Frontiers of the American Reconstruction. Edited by HAROLD M. HYMAN. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1966. Pp. viii, 156. \$4.95 (US).

THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA, those years in the 1860s and 1870s when the Confederate States were being restored to a Union shattered by the Civil War, has traditionally been interpreted as a "tragic era" when wild-eyed "radicals," traitorous "scalawags," and ignorant Negroes plunged the south into unprecedented debauchery and corruption. In recent years, however, "revisionist" historians like Kenneth M. Stampp have gone as far as to declare that if it was worth four years of civil war to save the Union, it was worth a few years of Radical Reconstruction to provide the Negro with the ultimate promise of civil and political equality. Yet a reading of this collection of papers, which were contributed to a Reconstruction centennial conference at the University of Illinois in April 1965 by several of the "revisionists" responsible for the interpretation of Reconstruction generally accepted by historians in the 1960s, suggests that the much-abused Radical Republicans were a pretty conservative lot when it came to constitutional and racial issues.

Papers by constitutional historians Harold M. Hyman and Alfred H. Kelly and social historians C. Vann Woodward and Russel B. Nye make up the heart of this book. In their analyses of the often neglected constitutional developments during the war years, Hyman and Kelly not only provide a framework for congressional Reconstruction which places the Radicals in a new perspective, but they strip away the tattered remnants of Andrew Johnson's reputation as the defender of the constitution against the revolutionary Jacobins. Although they differ on whether a wartime constitution was born after 1861, or whether Abraham Lincoln, that old Henry Clay Whig, merely resuscitated the Hamiltonian-Marshall constitution from thirty years of dust and disuse, both Hyman and Kelly agree that the Radical Republicans were rather conservative constitutional legitimists who acted in the spirit of Civil War constitutional development when they employed the war-strengthened national government for the construction of a greater postwar society. Eventually this doctrine of constitutional continuity contributed to the failure of Radical Reconstruction, as did the fact, Woodward reminds us, that on the issue of Negro equality the Republican party remained "divided, hesitant, and unsure of

its purpose" (p. 130). For, as Nye emphasizes, the politics of Reconstruction existed within a framework of racial theories which had not changed since the eighteenth century, theories which were "tacitly accepted by both parties and by the general public" (p. 151). Moreover, according to Nye, the reform movement of the postwar era of big business and Social Darwinism differed in spirit from the reform movement of the age of Jackson; Radical Reconstruction must be studied within the context of the reform tradition represented by Godkin, not Garrison. Indeed, concludes Woodward, it is possible to interpret congressional legislation from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to the Enforcement Act of 1871 in such a way that "one is left to wonder how much radical Reconstruction was really concerned with the South and how much with the party needs of the Republicans in the North" (p. 147).

The other four papers are less provocative. Harry Bernstein's "South America Looks at North American Reconstruction," and W. L. Morton's "Canada and Reconstruction, 1863-79," are basically concerned with the impact the reconstructed United States had on her neighbours; unlike the writings of E. D. Adams and Robin Winks on the war years, there is little in these two papers which will be of interest to Civil War historians. John Hope Franklin's "Reconstruction and the Negro" is a summary of what he and other "revisionists" have written on the subject since the days of the young W. E. B. DuBois. Of greater interest is August Meier's short paper in which he suggests numerous areas of this period of Negro history where fruitful research might be undertaken. Indeed, if only a fraction of the ideas and suggestions contained in this important volume are followed up, then the centennial of the Reconstruction era will be marked by the settlement of many of the controversies which remain the legacy of the most controversial period in United States history.

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Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II.

By ROBERT A. DIVINE. New York: Atheneum [Toronto: McClelland & Stewart]. 1967. Pp. x, 371. \$10.50.

AS PEACE MOVEMENTS like SANE and the CND become more widespread and noisy, it is worth paying some attention to their ancestors. In his book, *Second Chance*, Professor Robert Divine recounts the history of one of the few such movements that could be said to have achieved its purpose: the group that moved from support of American membership in the League of Nations to a campaign for a worldwide collective security organization to keep the peace after World War II. Divine gives what seems likely to be the definitive account of the publicist and educational activities of the devoted and disappointed internationalist followers of Woodrow Wilson. But peace movements are basically pressure groups attempting to mobilize public opinion to change governmental policies. Divine's book is finally disappointing because it implicitly accepts the internationalists' own beliefs about how mass opinion can be influenced. Like them, he assumes that the mass public was taught that a "second chance" for collective security was desirable. Lectures, press campaigns, essay contests, books, and articles in the quality press are assumed to have been the means of education and conversion. Once the people were convinced, the people's representatives responded to public opinion as demonstrated in votes and polls.

Yet an impressive series of recent studies has pretty much discredited such a naïve democratic model of public opinion. The American public, at any rate, seems to take its foreign policy cues mainly from the executive branch of the government. This is particularly true in the case of as visible, aggressive, even charismatic a leader as Franklin Roosevelt, who was president during most of the period Divine considers.

It is even more difficult to bring about drastic permanent changes in the popular attitudes underlying opinions about foreign policy. Roosevelt himself found it hard to produce that dramatic shift in American attitudes that has caused today's persistent commitment to the United Nations. The results of the war and of the depression, exploited actively by the government, were chiefly responsible. Yet Divine disregards the effects of social or political events and explicitly rules out any consideration of the "policy and diplomacy of the United States government." He thus cuts himself off from any discussion of the main causes and main actors in the change of attitudes his book documents. The internationalist lobby at most helped articulate the change, providing it with its chief rationales.

In 1948, three years after the American accession to the United Nations with which Divine's book ends, the Marshall Plan was enacted by the American Congress. We know from participants that the State Department worked laboriously with and for the President to persuade both the public and the Congress of the need for America to become involved in Europe. This episode is in fact often taken as the turning point for internationalism in America. It would seem that the earlier change of heart Divine chronicles was far from complete. And surely it was less simply arrived at than the jubilant internationalists thought.

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The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery. III. The Voyage of the Resolution and Discovery, 1776-1780. Two volumes. Edited by J. C. BEAGLEHOLE. Cambridge: For the Hakluyt Society at the University Press. 1967. Pp. ccxxiv, 1647, maps, illus. £ 15 15s.

OF COOK'S THREE GREAT VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY, the third was the longest and the most voluminously recorded. When he sailed, Cook himself was already famous, acclaimed as the leading navigator and discoverer of his time, fully conscious of the importance of his task and of the extent of public interest in it. Determined to avoid a repetition of the exacting literary labour which had followed the second voyage, he kept a journal from the start, and re-drafted and revised it as he went along, so as to have a record which could later be sent to the printer with a minimum of alteration. He had able officers, some of them curious, observant, and highly literate, and these men too kept journals, logs, or notes. There is no difficulty, therefore, in establishing a first-hand narrative of this voyage (unlike its predecessors). It is all there, in publishable form, in Cook's own hand, at least to a date shortly before his death. It was in fact published, as edited, emended, added to, and drastically tidied up by Canon Douglas in 1784; and the Douglas version has unaccountably held the field until now. After Cook's death the story has to be pieced together from

a number of sources, chiefly the journal of Clerke, who succeeded Cook in the command. Gore, who succeeded after Clerke's death, was not much of a writer, and to complete the narrative Professor Beaglehole has to call in Lieutenant King who kept his own journal on the voyage and added a third printed volume to Douglas' two after his return. Professor Beaglehole's bulky first part is chiefly occupied by this narrative, of which about three-quarters is actual Cook. The second part contains, in full, the journals of the surgeons Anderson and Samwell, valuable especially for their scientific observations and for the light which they throw upon Cook, and extracts from the journals of six other officers. Curiously, it is to these other journals we must turn to find the kind of routine item commonly entered in a ship's log; for Cook included few of these details in his journal, and the *Resolution's* log has disappeared.

Cook's Journals is the biggest, the most ambitious project which the Hakluyt Society has ever undertaken. The final volume is still to come. The present volume has the same virtues as its predecessors: scholarly and imaginative editing; vigorous and self-denying discipline in annotation; remarkably accurate printing; and solid, satisfying elegance in production. It differs from the other volumes, however, in ways dictated by the nature of its subject. The first voyage had been an astonishing achievement; the second a triumphant climax. The third was different in its geographical scope; its principal discoveries were in the north, not the south Pacific. It was preordained to failure in its main stated object; for though there is a northwest passage, it is always choked with ice. The voyage has been much less carefully studied than the other two. One is tempted to think of it as something of an anti-climax; but Professor Beaglehole, in a splendidly persuasive introduction, shows that it was of the same order of greatness as its predecessors. He also emphasizes the character of tragic drama which pervaded it. The problems of this voyage are not simply problems of historical geography; they are problems of human personality. There is a splendid gallery of character sketches of Cook's officers. As for the commanding officer himself—a most complex character—Professor Beaglehole argues that the baffling and untoward incidents of the voyage, culminating in the calamity of Cook's death in a scuffle on a Hawaiian beach, were directly connected with the strain of mind Cook had already gone through. He has hard things to say about the genial dinner party at which Sandwich and Palliser—both perceptive men, and Cook's good friends—entrapped him into volunteering for the command. He was very willing to be entrapped; but Sandwich as head of the Navy, says Professor Beaglehole, should have perceived his duty to impose a period of rest, such as Cook's Greenwich appointment would have given him. Cook, despite the sober reticence of his written records, was a man of passionate temper, which he sometimes had difficulty in controlling. It is hard to imagine the rock-like figure of Dance's portrait dancing with rage upon the deck; yet Midshipman Trevenen, who adored him, is our witness, among others, that he not infrequently did so. Very probably, the years of exacting service, of lonely command, of brief periods ashore filled with troublesome business, led to mounting exasperation with occasionally negligent officers, with thick-headed sailors, with thieving Polynesians. Very probably, the Cook of the second voyage might have shown more patience over the stolen goat at Moorea or the stolen cutter at Kealakekua Bay.

Professor Beaglehole examines in detail the circumstances of Cook's death and prints all the surviving evidence. The initial error of judgment is emphasized: if the situation was dangerous enough to require—contrary to Cook's normal policy—a party of marines and muskets loaded with ball, then it called for a larger party; nine men were enough to alarm and annoy, but not enough to fight off a threatening crowd. The inglorious performance of the marines is attributed also to inadequate

training (surprisingly: they had been three years in the ship; what had Lieutenant Molesworth Phillips been doing all that time?). The wretched Williamson, commanding the launch, is examined; his conduct is pronounced foolish and unheroic, but not criminal and not decisive. It all comes back to Cook. Professor Beaglehole thinks that judgment and self-control, stretched beyond endurance by years of strain, at that time, of all times, deserted him.

Professor Beaglehole has lived with Cook for years. No man not Cook's contemporary can know Cook better. It is unlikely that fresh evidence of any significance will come to light (except perhaps Molesworth Phillips' journal?). Save in matters of detail, the final word on Cook and his voyage has probably been written. Students of discovery, and of maritime history generally, can only be grateful to the Hakluyt Society and to Professor Beaglehole, for an immense task impeccably performed.

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The English Court in the Reign of George I. By JOHN M. BEATTIE. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1967. Pp. xii, 306. \$9.35.

DR. BEATTIE'S *The English Court in the Reign of George I* gives an admirable account of an important subject which has been unduly neglected. Although Macaulay, in one of his most celebrated essays, accused Horace Walpole of being a gentleman usher at heart, Walpole in the main succeeded in imposing upon later historians his assertion that the Hanoverian court was a political backwater which no longer gave tone and uniformity to English social life. The brilliance and dominant influence of the court of Charles II on every aspect of the national life came to be contrasted with the drab and uninfluential court of the early Hanoverian kings. It was not merely that many Jacobites—a numerous section in 1714—kept themselves to themselves and stayed away from court. Under sovereigns who did not like poetry and painting the Whig dukes were taking over the literary and artistic patronage previously exercised by the sovereign. Similarly aspiring architects no longer depended upon the court as the chief source of professional employment. But “for a gentleman seeking honourable employment” the royal household was still “the most obvious place.” Court offices automatically conferred social distinction and nearly all of them also brought substantial rewards in salaries, perquisites, fees, etc. Mr. Beattie includes as an appendix to chapter 6 a table showing the emoluments of selected court offices ranging from the lord chamberlain himself to the sergeant porter at St. James's. Not only was George I's court less distinguished and influential than that of his Stuart predecessors, it was smaller. Whole departments had been abolished by Stuart sovereigns to save money. William III eliminated others. Anne and George I left “sporting” and other posts on the establishment but neglected to fill them. The king's household was thus reduced from 1450 to 950 persons.

Mr. Beattie first examines the structure of the four main departments into which the household was divided, the Chamber with associated departments under the lord chamberlain; the Bedchamber, headed by the first gentleman of the bedchamber, often called the groom of the stole; the Household Below Stairs under the lord steward; and the Stables under the master of the horse. Whereas the lord chamberlain's department was loosely organized and contained several semi-autonomous subdepartments, such as the Great Wardrobe and the Jewel Office, the Household Below Stairs was closely supervised by the Board of Green Cloth. In chapter 4 Mr. Beattie discusses financial problems concerning the court. Even although

George I was "given a more generous and a more certain Civil List provision" than William III and Anne, he was as troubled as they had been with an insolvent civil list. Substantial deficits continued to accumulate averaging well over £ 100,000 a year throughout the reign. The civil list grant was still too low, the king thought, but Parliament preferred to believe that royal expenditure was unnecessarily high. Too many court officials were paid a commission on the business passing through their hands to make the economies which the Treasury sought to impose in 1718 effective, and George I died owing a debt of at least half a million on his civil list. Mr. Beattie completes his study of the court organization with a judicious chapter on the appointment, promotion, and tenure of court servants. Naturally the king appointed the principal officers of his court but candidates for minor offices found it paid them to secure the backing of an influential courtier. Changes in the more important offices, normally held during pleasure, were frequent, partly because of the political involvements of holders of these offices, but humbler courtiers and servants, although their offices were also theoretically held "during pleasure," had in practice much greater security of tenure and were rarely dismissed unless the king died and his successor was determined to find a place in the new court for one of his own servants.

So far Mr. Beattie's book while full of meat for the specialist, if indeed there are any specialists in the history of the Hanoverian court, would be unlikely to attract a wider audience. The final chapter however deals with the court in politics—one of the basic themes in eighteenth-century history to historians imbued with Namierite ideas. Professor Plumb, who supervised the thesis of which the work under review is a recension, has already summarized and commented on Mr. Beattie's main conclusions in his *Growth of Political Stability in England* (Macmillan, 1967) and the chapter itself was published little modified in the *English Historical Review*. While it is unnecessary to summarize these conclusions here, attention may be called to some of the more important. Mr. Beattie emphasizes the personal role of George I in English government and politics.

Nothing could be further from the truth than that George I abdicated his power to the Whig ministers in 1714. Throughout the reign his opinion was decisive in the important affairs of government: the formulation of foreign policy, the appointment and dismissal of ministers and the distribution of the patronage of the Crown. Of course it was obvious by 1714 that Parliament could not be ignored. Its co-operation was essential to the functioning of the government and no set of ministers could last if they could not lead Parliament and get the king's business done. But ministries were much more imposed on Parliament by the king than on the king by Parliament; and provided that he chose politicians who could function effectively in the major departments of the administration and in Parliament, the king determined the composition of the government and its policy.

This revisionist attitude towards George I, who used to be regarded both in Hanover and in Britain as perhaps the stupidest of the Georges, is in accordance with the view, taken by Professor Braubach in his monumental life of Prince Eugène, that George I was one of the most intelligent and efficient German princes of his generation and that if the British had to be burdened with a German ruler they would probably have fared worse under almost any other candidate.

Another interesting point is the relationship between court and political office where a two-way traffic had been established. Henry Pelham, Newcastle, and Carteret all moved from their original places in George I's court into politics. There are also examples of holders of political office who accepted court office and gave up a career in politics while others contrived to have a foot in both camps at the same time. Indeed there are even examples of men who served as ambassadors and

colonial governors while they were also gentlemen of the bedchamber. Mr. Beattie also makes it quite clear that court offices were not distributed with a view primarily to strengthening the Court and Treasury party in the two houses of Parliament. He calculates that the number of "courtiers" in the lower house rose during the reign from 9 to 24. Except in 1761, when special factors operated, the number of "courtiers" in the Commons remained fairly constant. Out of a total Court and Treasury party numbering around 100 the courtiers seem rarely to have supplied as much as a quarter. Mr. Beattie's discussion of this and other problems is broadly based and avoids the weakness of many doctoral theses—the total concentration upon a narrow chronological cross-section and the ignoring of developments before and after the selected period, without a knowledge of which the significance of changes (or lack of them) within the chosen period cannot be established or assessed. This breadth of treatment as much as the thoroughness of his investigation of a complicated and intricate theme inspires confidence and makes one look forward eagerly to his next inquiry into the still numerous dark places of eighteenth-century administrative history.

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Orangeism in Ireland and Britain, 1795–1836. By HEREWARD SENIOR. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1966. Pp. x, 314. \$10.00.

PROFESSOR SENIOR'S STUDY covers the first forty years of the Orange movement in Ireland and Britain. The author traces the history of the movement from the foundation of the first lodge in 1795 by Protestant tenants following the "battle of the Diamond" at Dan Winter's inn near Loughall, county Armagh, to the dissolution of the Grand Lodge by the Grand Master, His Majesty's brother, the Duke of Cumberland, in 1836. The author's bibliography of manuscripts, contemporary printed materials, and secondary sources is highly impressive, and the title of the work more or less reflects the nature and scope of its contents. Approximately one-third of the work is devoted to the foundation and expansion of Orangeism in Ireland during the period 1795 to 1798. Included in the remaining two-thirds of the work on the period 1799 to 1836 are two chapters principally concerned with the movement in Britain. The author has added three appendices containing extracts from the rules of the Orange Society in 1798, a list of army regiments holding Orange warrants in 1830, and a list of Orange districts and memberships in Great Britain in 1836.

The story of Orangeism that Professor Senior relates is a fascinating one. Building upon older and somewhat more gentlemanly traditions of the "Protestant Ascendancy" in Ireland and driven by habits of violence acquired by two generations of sectarian conflict, the poorer Protestants of Ulster's border counties organized themselves to defend their position as "plebian aristocrats" in rural Ireland. Of all the classes in late eighteenth-century Ireland, it was the Protestant peasantry that feared any advancement of Irish Catholics from the place where the Irish Parliaments of William III, Anne, and George I had left them. Above all else, the privileges which these "plebian aristocrats" organized to preserve were the exclusive legal right of Protestants alone to possess firearms and the extra-legal right of Protestant tenants and husbandmen to use violence against the economic competition of Catholic tenants and husbandmen. The first generation of Orangemen preserved these privileges by exercising them. Although real or imagined economic competition from Catholics contributed to the spread of the Orange institution

throughout Ireland in the late 1790s, the immediate cause of the Orange movement as well as the force that sustained it during the early years was the breakdown of the landlord-magistrate system of local government and the consequent inability of the Dublin government to suppress faction and maintain law and order. When the threat of foreign invasion made toleration of continuing internal disorders unendurable, the government of Ireland in effect accepted offers of assistance from Orange lodges whose members filled the ranks of the yeomanry and served with both courage and brutality during the rebellion of 1798.

After the rebellion the Cornwallis government tried to disentangle itself from its alliance with the Orangemen and tried to arrest the spirit of vengeance and repression which the events of 1798 had inspired. Cornwallis managed to check the worst excesses as did Hardwicke and Wellesley after him but Orangemen had become so involved in government service that their influence in Castle politics and policies could not be eliminated. In the person of William Saurin, Attorney General for Ireland 1807 to 1822, Orange principles had the strongest possible representation in government councils. If some of the principals in the Irish government were Orange, as a rule the chief governors were not. Viceroy after viceroy had cause to fear and detest them. Orange resistance to the act of legislative union was perhaps the most formidable opposition to that measure that Cornwallis and Castlereagh had to face. Though the leadership of the movement was in large part captured by the gentry and aristocracy, Orangemen were not easily controlled by any one—their own aristocratic leaders not excepted. The rank-and-file Orangemen resisted aristocratic efforts to transform Orangeism into a conservative political movement. Parliamentary reform was as important to disenfranchised Orangemen as it was to any other of His Majesty's disenfranchised subjects, and within the Orange movement the slogan "No Innovation" never enjoyed anything approaching a parity with that of "No Popery." From the perspective of Dublin Castle the Orange movement was after all a popular movement and it incurred much the same degree and intensity of official suspicion as other popular Irish movements in the early nineteenth century.

The Orange movement in England and Scotland during the period of Professor Senior's study was a fragile hothouse transplant that survived a change of environment but did not bloom. In England Orangeism was limited to some army regiments and a few urban centres. The movement there enjoyed virtually no patronage from the upper classes. After the enactment of the Catholic Relief Act of 1829, the fantastic Colonel William Blennerhasset Fairman wrote and spoke about counter-revolution and the need for a coup d'état but the seriousness of such writing and speaking is extremely doubtful. Apart from providing a justification for a parliamentary investigation of the movement and for the dissolution of the Grand Lodge, the dimensions of the Fairman plot appear to have been limited to those of Colonel William Blennerhasset Fairman's brain.

Professor Senior's book is well written and in the opinion of this reviewer a very interesting one. For serious students of Anglo-Irish history and politics, this book is indispensable. For readers with more general interests *Orangeism in Ireland and Britain* provides a useful case history of what can happen when well affected, loyal men and women from the lower economic and educational levels of society become convinced that the government of the country is no longer able or willing to protect and preserve them from the ambitions and challenges of their immediate social and economic inferiors.

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Europe

L'Histoire sociale: sources et méthodes. Colloque de l'Ecole normale supérieure de Saint-Cloud. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 1967. Pp. 298. F. 15.

MÊME SI, depuis Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre et Georges Lefebvre, l'histoire sociale occupe une place toujours plus importante dans l'historiographie française, aucun exposé méthodologique exhaustif n'a vu le jour.¹ Depuis *Combats pour l'histoire*, *Métier d'historien* et *Eventail de l'histoire vivante*, rien au total de suffisamment systématique sur la question. Peut-être s'agit-il d'un domaine qui a plus d'avenir que de passé? A cet égard le colloque de Saint-Cloud comble temporairement cette lacune. Car ce colloque propose une sorte d'inventaire actuel des préoccupations et des méthodes propres à l'historien social. Ces discussions autour de quinze communications, auxquelles participèrent plus de soixante historiens, portent sur quatre thèmes principaux: buts et problèmes, les sources, l'organisation du travail, ses rapports avec les autres sciences de l'homme.

Dans son propos d'introduction, Ernest Labrousse déclare au sujet de cette tradition encore récente mais vigoureusement engagée: "La vérité, c'est qu'une nouvelle histoire sociale commence, en liaison avec une histoire économique renouée et une sociologie en plein essor. Et que l'objet de cette histoire, au-delà de l'étude des groupes sociaux et de leurs rapports, est l'étude des rapports entre l'économie, le social et le mental" (p. 4). Envisagée dans cette perspective, l'histoire sociale ne serait plus seulement l'analyse des mouvements sociaux mais, tout aussi spécifiquement, celle des structures, donc des résistances: "La résistance de la mentalité en place est un des grands facteurs de l'histoire lente. Elle bloque ou suspend les prises de conscience. Elle est la chance prodiguée des contre-révolutions" (p. 5).

Dans la première partie, deux communications, celle de Soboul ("Description et mesure en histoire sociale") et celle de Crubellier ("L'événement en histoire sociale"), soulèvent les problèmes de base. L'historien social, pas plus qu'il n'est un fournisseur d'anecdotes, n'est un narrateur de *faits uniques*. Au contraire il est essentiellement intéressé par la connaissance des structures sociales avec tout ce que cela comporte. Les arrière-plans économiques, démographiques, politiques, religieux et idéologiques, mentaux, font partie intégrante de l'explication. L'identification des groupes, des classes, des *ordres*, voire des castes débouche nécessairement sur la reconstitution des hiérarchies et sur la mise en lumière d'un type de structure. Autre problème majeur auquel est confronté l'historien social: le changement social et les sources multiples de la transformation. Soboul ajoute alors: "Ressortit à l'histoire sociale tout ce qui touche aux relations professionnelles, à la formation des esprits et des consciences, à la sensibilité collective, en un mot tout ce qui tient à la psychologie sociale" (p. 21). Comment approcher cette réalité sociale toujours si complexe? Sans doute l'approche quantitative s'impose-t-elle, mais il ne faut pas oublier que c'est par le qualitatif et la description, que le quantitatif s'enrichit et s'humanise. Dans l'explication ces trois éléments sont solidaires.

La seconde partie est entièrement consacrée aux sources françaises de l'histoire sociale du XVI^e siècle au XX^e siècle. Toutes ces communications intéressent sans doute plus directement l'historien français, mais tout comme les discussions, elles ont une valeur pour tous les historiens sociaux. Car il ne suffit pas de poser des questions pertinentes ou d'élaborer de beaux modèles, il faut trouver en plus une

¹*Vingt-cinq ans de recherche historique en France (1940-1965)* (Paris, 1965, 2 vol.).

certaine résonnance dans les documents. A propos de l'approche quantitative, il faut certes compter, savoir ce que l'on va compter, mais en plus connaître ce que l'on peut compter. Cet inventaire des sources possède un intérêt supplémentaire: il accorde une signification spéciale aux séries de documents qui ont été les plus négligées dans le passé. Parmi celles-ci, signalons les archives d'entreprises, les minutes des notaires, les registres de l'Etat civil, les archives judiciaires, les dossiers de la police, les archives de la fiscalité. En somme cet inventaire critique a l'immense mérite de soulever les problèmes les plus concrets qui se posent à l'historien social. Il traduit à la fois une expérience de recherche déjà longue et explore les zones entre la théorie et les voies de l'empirisme. Ces pages sont à lire par les économistes, les sociologues et les démographes, surtout par ceux qui croient que la recherche scientifique est avant tout un exercice consistant à bâtir un modèle théorique.

Dans la troisième partie, qui traite de *l'organisation du travail*, quatre communications couvrent différents aspects de la recherche: machines et programmes, codification socio-professionnelle, méthode des sondages, travail d'équipe. Confrontés avec les documentations massives, celles qui sont souvent les plus riches en contenu social, les historiens français aujourd'hui sensibilisés aux techniques et aux méthodes des autres disciplines cherchent à transformer leurs façons de travailler. La méthode artisanale, la plus ancienne, ne s'en trouve pas reléguée aux oubliettes. De même le contact de l'historien avec le document n'est pas aboli par la mécanisation, par le travail d'équipe ou par l'utilisation des sondages. L'historien social sait qu'on ne s'improvise pas directeur de recherches et que la mécanisation de certaines phases du travail n'est pas une fin. Ce sont les exigences d'un métier en voie d'évolution qui nécessitent un éventail plus varié de techniques. En somme, l'histoire marque le pas avec les autres sciences de l'homme, mais selon ses propres voies. Les discussions qui entourent le texte sur la codification socio-professionnelle illustrent toutes les complexités des démarches qui conduisent à la connaissance des structures sociales du passé. "Le tableau socio-professionnel," dit Labrousse, "est un élément de connaissance de la hiérarchie sociale, dans un monde tel qu'il est et tel qu'il se voit" (p. 181). Cette définition fonctionnelle débouche sur la mobilisation de toutes les variables qui entrent dans une codification socio-professionnelle, depuis les échelles de revenus et de fortunes jusqu'à la profession, l'état et la qualité, tenant compte des temps, des lieux et des états de conscience. Il est certain que l'approche par les revenus ou la fortune n'a pas la même valeur dans une société bourgeoise que dans une société dominée par les ordres ou par les définitions juridiques.

Les cinq dernières communications analysent les rapports entre l'histoire et les disciplines voisines: la géographie humaine, la démographie, l'économie, la littérature et l'histoire religieuse. Le géographe André Blanc fait état d'une crise de la géographie, dont le résultat le plus net semble devoir être une nouvelle association avec l'histoire sociale, association qui promet d'être plus féconde que l'ancienne. Pour sa part, Pierre Goubert établit les développements récents dans le domaine de la démographie historique et ses rapports avec une vue complexe de la transformation des structures sociales. Ainsi le phénomène du contrôle des naissances qui apparaît dans certaines campagnes françaises au XVIII^e siècle, réfère-t-il à une vue différenciée des groupes sociaux et aux croyances religieuses? Car, au fond, ce qui préoccupe maintenant les historiens français, ce n'est pas tellement l'avenir de la démographie historique en elle-même, qui paraît assuré, mais l'instauration, dit Goubert, d'une "démographie sociale différentielle" (p. 223). Ceci est important pour la natalité comme pour la moralité. A cet exposé sur la démographie historique se lie tout naturellement une analyse des relations entre l'économie, "la toile de fond de la scène sociale," et le social, par Jean Bouvier. Ce dernier discute le

problème du déterminisme lui substituant l'idée d'inter-dépendance. Cette conception ne nie pas les implications profondes de l'économique sur le social: "la complexité sociale ne doit pas nous cacher que les différences économiques sont le bâti sur lequel prennent corps les diverses classes" (p. 244); mais elle tend à mettre l'accent sur des ensembles de rapports fort variés, parfois très simples par le jeu de la répartition de la propriété, de la ventilation des revenus ou du contrôle des moyens de production, parfois très complexes. Même si Jean Bouvier affirme que la connaissance économique est préalable à toute connaissance sociale, il n'en nie pas pour autant les autres influences: "L'histoire sociale dans son déroulement relève sans doute d'une sorte d'activité chimique: économie et démographie, idéologies et mentalités, événements quotidiens et grands accidents, mutations brusques, ou mutations lentes, et permanences séculaires..." (p. 239).

Les deux derniers textes traitent de deux domaines forts importants pour l'historien social: l'histoire littéraire et l'histoire religieuse. Entre le développement social et les expériences religieuses et littéraires, les liens sont évidents et les influences réciproques. Dans sa perspective, l'historien social montre tout autant d'intérêt pour les écrivains médiocres que pour les grands maîtres de la littérature, les premiers étant souvent plus représentatifs que les seconds. L'historien social concentre aussi son attention sur les littératures populaires. Des visions du monde s'en dégagent qui éclairent la psychologie de la masse. Quant à l'histoire religieuse, Marcilhacy en résume assez bien la résonance sociale: "Des rapports étroits existent, à coup sûr, entre l'histoire sociale et l'histoire religieuse. Toute religion s'incarne dans une société. Suivant la place que cette société accorde à la religion, selon les groupes sociaux qui forment le gros de ses fidèles, la physionomie même de cette religion s'en trouvera modifiée, et son enseignement, la présentation de son message, seront infléchis dans un sens ou dans un autre" (p. 281). Il aurait pu ajouter: selon les élites qui dirigent cette société. Au fond tout ce que ces rapports suggèrent, c'est que la prise de vue sociale se situe au carrefour de multiples disciplines ayant, au même titre que les réalités qu'elles approchent, une vocation d'inter-dépendance.

Ce petit livre, qui répond à un besoin en France, a un intérêt capital pour les historiens canadiens, eux dont le passé est tellement associé à la tradition de l'histoire politique. Une historiographie plus diversifiée, donc plus équilibrée, ne serait certes pas un malheur.

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The Le Mans Forgeries: A Chapter from the History of Church Property in the Ninth Century. By WALTER GOFFART. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: Saunders]. 1966. Pp. xvi, 382. \$8.00.

RARELY HAS A SCHOLARLY WORK provided this reviewer greater satisfaction. Professor Goffart displays an impressive talent composed of a thorough mastery of the sources, a perceptive grasp of past scholarship, a talent for sustaining an argument, a sense of perspective in placing a particular problem in a larger historical context, an admirable restraint in presenting a revisionist position, and sufficient intellectual humility to allow his labour to open new vistas rather than to close a subject "definitively." A brief review cannot very effectively demonstrate the level of excellence which the author achieves, but it might invite a larger audience to savour a superb exemplification of the historian's craft.

After an introductory chapter, Goffart describes the subject of his inquiry: a

collection of documents consisting of a biography of Bishop Aldric (+857) (*Gesta Aldrici*), a history of the bishops of Le Mans (*Actus pontificum Cenomanensium*), twelve poems, and three saints' lives. One's initial impression is that these pieces are fairly mine-run, ninth-century literary specimens of little more than antiquarian interest. Goffart dispels any such notion in his next chapter devoted to a survey of past scholarship on the Le Mans forgeries. One wonders how anything more could be said on a subject already examined by Mabillon, Rivet, Roth, Sickel, Simson, Fournier, Waitz, Havet, Duchesne, Busson, and Lot. Goffart's incisive critique measures their positive accomplishments, but at the same time shows appalling limitations in their scholarship. He leaves the reader excitedly anticipating a new appraisal of the forgeries as a substitute for the "doctrine" they have canonized.

Two solid chapters follow devoted to the date and to the author and order of composition of the forgeries. Goffart convicts the forger of consciously trying to mislead his readers into believing that his work was composed around 840. Eschewing all internal leads planted by a "thoroughly dishonest writer," Goffart skilfully employs other sources, corroborated by fresh insights into the Le Mans forgeries, to make a convincing case that the forgeries were composed between 855 and 863. His search for an author produces no identifiable culprit. But in what impresses this reviewer as a brilliant piece of source criticism, he does dissect the forgeries to show the complex stages of their composition. This analysis of "the forger at work" provides an understanding of the nature of the forged corpus far advanced beyond the level of previous scholarship and a gripping insight into the ninth-century mentality.

The chapter of the book devoted to the purpose and effect of the forgeries will probably be of greatest interest to medievalists. Skilfully and persuasively, Goffart builds a case to show that the forger was attempting to formulate a basis upon which the bishop of Le Mans could expand his rights to church property. His literary effort constituted one part of a general ecclesiastical reaction beginning in the reign of Louis the Pious against the earlier Carolingian effort to convert church property into a royal ecclesiastical estate, part of which was entrusted to bishops and abbots for the essential needs of the church and the rest of which was at the disposal of the king. In essence, the forger projected the idea that the cathedral was an absolutely independent proprietor by right of ancient title to property. To support this concept, markedly different from the current view that made possession the basis of right to property, he invented a "proprietary history of the diocese" with supporting charters. By way of buttressing this basic position, he grafted onto his forgeries the idea that all lands recently granted to Le Mans by the king represented restorations rather than gifts. His intended audience was not the monarch but the independent churches and monasteries and lay lords who possessed church lands, usually by royal grant. They were invited to regularize the status of their holdings by recognizing the bishop as absolute owner and by paying a rent to him. Their alternative was to turn to the king, but this was a treacherous step because royal involvement often upset existing property arrangements and, more significantly, the king's ability to establish a viable proprietary right over church property was extremely sketchy. As Goffart unfolds the forger's concepts and describes their frustration by the Monastery of St. Calais, he opens exciting prospects into the world of feudalism, *Eigenkirche*, and localism emerging in the ninth century.

This brief summary hardly does justice to Goffart's study. In the judgment of this reviewer, he has resolved the problem of the Le Mans forgeries. More significantly, he has suggested a new positive angle of attack on later Carolingian history which will unquestionably help to counteract the long-established habit of approaching the ninth century as an era when stupidity, selfishness, and violence undid the

noble dreams of the earlier Carolingians. When the mentality exposed by Goffart's study is better comprehended by historians of the Carolingian age, many enigmatic aspects of ninth-century history will be clarified. Who would believe that forgeries might offer the most significant clues to understanding an era unless he knew of Pseudo-Isidore and now the Le Mans forger, both of whom probably did their best work in the same decade?

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The Cambridge Economic History of Europe. I. The Agrarian Life of the Middle Ages. Edited by M. M. POSTAN. Second edition. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1966. Pp. xvi, 871, maps, illus. \$12.75.

THIS WORK IS A WELCOME REPRINTING, with substantial revisions, of the well-known and much used initial volume of the *Cambridge Economic History*, which first appeared in 1941. Nearly half of the new edition (about 300 of the 740 pages of text) has been entirely rewritten, with new chapters or sections by Philip Jones on Italy, Robert E. F. Smith on Russia, M. M. Postan on England, and L. Genicot on the transition from medieval to modern times. A smaller portion (about 170 pages) has been revised by its original authors, and the remaining pages (some 275) are reprinted as they appeared in the original edition. The editor, with the help of some fifteen scholars, has brought up to date the bibliographies for all the chapters, whether new or unchanged.

The text, as it stands, is the product of nearly thirty years of research. Inevitably, the contributions reflect the changing interests, methods, and levels of information experienced in medieval scholarship in the course of more than a generation. The first, and unchanged, chapter by R. Koebner on the settlement of Europe is largely institutional and juridical in its approach. Koebner explicitly discounts the reality and importance of demographic movements in the history of settlement—as if to suggest that juridical concepts, rather than people, levelled the forests. Marc Bloch's essay on the rise of seigniorial institutions remains a masterpiece of historical argument. But this reviewer must confess that he has long considered Bloch's principal point unconvincing. Bloch discerns in the "chief" of the primitive Indo-European village community the archetype of the manorial lord. This assumes that in Italy, Gaul, and widely across the European continent chiefs and their dependents survived several centuries of Roman government and Roman civilizing influences. But the real weakness of Bloch's chapter—and really all the sections touching on seigniorial institutions—is this: they were written at a time when little was known concerning the existence and importance of the "vulgar law" of the late empire. This was a law built not by imperial fiat but by popular custom. It seems to have been of fundamental importance in defining the relationships and rights of dependents and lords under the early manorial system. Vulgar law goes unmentioned in these early chapters, and this omission reveals their age and curtails their value.

The quality of the volume is, however, more fairly measured by the new contributions. Writing on medieval Russia, Smith seems embarrassed by a dearth of information; his chapter gives much data on weather and physical environment easily available elsewhere, and this gives the impression of padding. On the other hand, there is no mistaking the excellence of the new essays by Jones, Postan, and Genicot. These contributions are not, to be sure, confident summations of established facts. Postan avers that the agrarian history of England is not yet ready to be written, and Genicot's chapter had to be revised twice before publication, to keep

it abreast of the recent rapid changes in scholarly opinion. Each of these three new authors is working in a difficult field, and each handles his assigned topic in masterly fashion. In surveying Italian agrarian history, Jones writes on a subject in which there have been no prior attempted syntheses. The present reviewer would disagree with some interpretations—too minor to belabour here—but he can only admire the erudition and grace with which Jones presents his argument. Postan emphasizes in this volume, as he has elsewhere, the decisive importance of the demographic factor in English agrarian history, taking a tack quite diverse from that which guided Koebner a generation earlier. His point is that England was an overpopulated land on the eve of the Black Death, and he makes his case with wit and wisdom. His argument seems slightly weakened by assertions concerning what “had to be” and what was “destined”; the inevitability of past events seems, to this reviewer, quite beyond the power of historians to determine. Genicot’s final chapter on the late medieval agricultural crisis may well be the best short treatment of that tangled topic at present in print in any language.

The book unfortunately shows numerous printing errors hardly to be expected in a Cambridge publication. The page numbers in the Table of Contents do not always correspond with the pages in the text, even the margin is askew on p. xii, and the bibliography shows numerous mistakes. The same book can be cited twice with two different publication dates. A rigorous editorial review of the bibliographies was clearly needed and wanting. Still, for all its uneven character and small errors, this new edition retains its importance. It is unfortunate, of course, that the entire work could not have been revised or rewritten. But half a loaf is better than none. And the excellence of the new contributions will make this a work studied and appreciated, deservedly, for many years to come.

DAVID HERLIHY

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Strasbourg and the Reform: A Study in the Process of Change. By MIRIAM USHER CHRISMAN. New Haven and London: Yale University Press [Montreal: McGill University Press]. 1967. Pp. xii, 351. \$8.75.

MRS. CHRISMAN has given us, for the first time in English, a well-organized and clearly written account of the Strassburg Reformation (1480–1548) incorporating the best French and German scholarship on the subject. For this alone we are in her debt. We are even more beholden to her, however, for having demonstrated, on the basis of solid documentary evidence, that though the Reformation in Strassburg was put into effect by a series of governmental decrees, the pressure for Reformation came, not from the magistracy itself but from the preachers and from well-organized pressure groups among the citizenry. It was, in fact, a magisterial reformation that had to be forced upon a timid and hesitant magistracy by pressure from below. We know from the work of Franz Lau and Bernd Moeller that this was the general pattern of the Reformation in the German cities. Previously, however, it was thought that the Reformation in Strassburg, like that in Nürnberg, formed an exception to this rule because it was allegedly carried through under the active leadership of the magistracy. Now, thanks to Mrs. Chrisman, we know better.

Unfortunately, despite these very substantial contributions, the book suffers from a not inconsiderable number of shortcomings. Most obvious, though least serious, is the overdose of foreign terminology which the author administers to her readers. First of all, the use of the term “Reform” as the equivalent of “Reforma-

tion" is good French but bad English. Second, her insistence upon leaving in German a large number of technical terms for which satisfactory English equivalents already exist or could easily be invented (e.g., *Rat*, *Magistrat*, *Bürgerschaft* instead of council, magistracy, and citizenry), is pedantic, confusing, and an offence against good English style. Similarly, Mrs. Chrisman generally insists on using the modern, gallicized form of Alsatian place-names. There would be no ground for objection to this if she had given the original German form in brackets with the first reference or, better yet, provided a table of equivalents among the appendices. While the use of "Strasbourg" for "Strassburg" will confuse no one, a good many readers may not know that "Saverne" and "Sélestat" are the same as the "Zabern" and "Schlettstadt" referred to by other authors.

Much more serious is the fact that when the author attempts to conceptualize or generalize about her topic, she is frequently vague and confused. In her chapter on the intellectual milieu before the Reformation, for example, there is a good deal of talk about "humanism," "Christian humanism," "medieval ideology," and so on. Precisely what is meant by these terms, however, is not at all clear. "Humanism" evidently has something to do with "a new relationship between man and his society," while "medieval" seems to be the equivalent of "pious, devout, and honest." Similarly, we are told that the Strassburg humanists "looked backward in time." Well, so did the Italian humanists and all the reformers, Protestant, Radical, and Catholic. Such definitions and generalizations leave us no wiser than we were before. The same lack of clarity and precision seems to me to characterize Mrs. Chrisman's summaries of the theological views of Bucer and the Anabaptists and her treatment of the attempt of the Strassburg reformers to win the bishop of Strassburg over to the Reformation.

From the realm of vague conception we move on to that of downright misconception. In her discussion of the reformers' arguments in favour of a new school system in Strassburg, Mrs. Chrisman asserts that the "concept of the common good [*der gemein nutz*]" was a new and original contribution of the Strasbourg reformers and probably originated with Bucer himself." This is simply not true, and E.-W. Kohls, whose *Schule bei Martin Bucer* she cites in support of her allegation, does not say this. As Kohls himself points out, the conception of the common good or common weal was, in one form or another, a commonplace of medieval political and constitutional thought at least from the time of Thomas Aquinas. It was used in Strassburg by Jakob Wimpfeling as early as 1502, long before Martin Bucer was ever heard of there. Moreover, the idea of the common weal was an integral part of the Christian humanists' conception of the "Christian magistracy." Popularized by Erasmus, this conception entered the thought of a good many Protestant reformers (including Bucer but not Luther), becoming a basic element in the theoretical justification of the state church. As early as 1524, for example, Johannes Brenz, the Lutheran reformer of Schwäbisch Hall, was arguing that a Christian magistrate must promote the common weal by taking action in behalf of the Reformation.

The fact that Mrs. Chrisman scarcely mentions any of this shows that her analysis suffers as much from what she does not say as it does from what she says vaguely or inaccurately. To put it another way, she frequently fails to place the events she is describing in proper historical perspective. For someone interested in the "process of change" during the Reformation, for example, she has surprisingly little to say about certain pre-Reformation developments which contributed to that process. Thus, while she describes Bucer's recommendations with respect to church order well enough, she makes no attempt to place those recommendations in the

context of the development of the concepts of the common weal and Christian magistracy, to which they are clearly related. Similarly, she fails to see the significance of some of the facts she reports concerning relations between church and city before the Reformation. The rulers of many German cities and territories had by the eve of the Reformation secured a considerable degree of control over the clergy and over ecclesiastical affairs through such means as the acquisition of patronage rights (advowsons). It is clear from Mrs. Chrisman's account that no comparable development took place in Strassburg, but she neither draws her readers' attention to this contrast nor sees that she has put her finger on one of the major reasons for the fact that the course of the Reformation in Strassburg was more difficult than in some other places, such as Nürnberg. This leads to one final observation. For someone interested in the Reformation in an important imperial city, the author has very little to say about the general characteristics of the Reformation in the German cities. Above all, she herself fails to point out the significance of her findings in relation to those of Moeller and Lau referred to in the first paragraph of this review.

In conclusion, scholars will welcome this book for the useful information it contains. For judgment concerning the import of that information, however, they will have to rely on themselves, not on Mrs. Chrisman.

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Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
BY MARION MAGEE AND ANN LIDDELL

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later review; *TBR* following an entry indicates a review already in preparation.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

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II. HISTORY OF CANADA

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Notes and Comments

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CARLETON UNIVERSITY IN CO-OPERATION with the Public Archives of Canada and the Archives Section of the Canadian Historical Association announces a course in archival principles and administration to be held from July 2 to August 2, 1968. This course, given in 1959 and again in 1964, is designed to cover basic archival techniques and also to give special attention to archival problems peculiar to this country. Co-ordinator of the course will be Mr. D. J. Wurtele, formerly of the Public Archives of Canada. Authorities in the fields of archives and records management will share instruction in the course, including specialists from the Public Archives of Canada, and from provincial, municipal, business, church, and university archives.

The course will include both formal and practical work, with an opportunity for students to concentrate their studies in either the field of archives or of records management. A document, endorsed by the three sponsoring bodies, will be awarded to students who successfully complete the work of the course. Tuition fees will be \$100 per student. Living accommodation and meals, at additional cost, will be available in the men's and women's residences of Carleton University.

Application forms and further information can be obtained by writing to Archives Course, Department of History, Carleton University, Ottawa.

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The French Presence in Huronia: The Structure of Franco-Huron Relations in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century*

BRUCE G. TRIGGER

FEW STUDIES OF CANADIAN HISTORY in the first half of the seventeenth century credit sufficiently the decisive role played at that time by the country's native peoples. The success of European colonizers, traders, and missionaries depended to a greater degree than most of them cared to admit on their ability to understand and accommodate themselves not only to native customs but also to a network of political and economic relationships that was not of their own making. Traders and missionaries often were forced to treat Algonkians and Iroquoians as their equals and sometimes they had to acknowledge that the Indians had the upper hand. If the Europeans were astonished and revolted by many of the customs of these Indians (often, however, no more barbarous than their own), they also admired their political and economic sagacity.¹ Indeed, one Jesuit was of the opinion that the Huron were more intelligent than the rural inhabitants of his own country.² If the missionary or fur trader felt compelled to understand

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¹See, e.g., Samuel de Champlain's comment on the sagacity of the Indians in trade (H. P. Biggar, ed., *The Works of Samuel de Champlain* (6 vols.; Toronto, 1922-36), II, 171), and Jean de Brébeuf, Gabriel Lalemant, and Francesco Bressani on the efficacy of Huron law (R. G. Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents* (73 vols.; Cleveland, 1896-1901), X, 215; XXVIII, 49-51; XXXVIII, 277).

²Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XVIII, 21. A similar statement is made by Paul Ragueneau (XXIX, 281).

the customs of the Indians, the modern historian should feel no less obliged to do so.

In order to appreciate the role that the Indians played in the history of Canada in the first half of the seventeenth century, it is necessary to study their customs and behaviour and the things they valued. Because their way of life differed from that of the Europeans, the fur traders and missionaries who interacted with them frequently became amateur anthropologists, and some of them became very good ones. For some tribes the documentation amassed by these early contacts is extensive and of high quality. For no tribe is this truer than for the Huron.³ From the detailed picture of Huronia that emerges from these studies, it is possible to ascertain the motives that prompted the behaviour of particular Indians, or groups of Indians, in a manner no less detailed than our explanations of those which governed the behaviour of their European contemporaries. I might add, parenthetically, that historians are not alone to blame for the failure to utilize anthropological insights in the study of early Canadian history. Iroquoian ethnologists and archaeologists have tended to avoid historical or historiographic problems. Only a few individuals, such as George T. Hunt, have attempted to work in the no man's land between history and anthropology.

Two explanations have been used by anthropologists and historians to justify the existing cleavage between their respective studies. One of these maintains that when the Europeans arrived in eastern North America, the native tribes were engaged in a struggle, the origins and significance of which are lost in the mists of time and therefore wholly the concern of ethnohistorians. Because of this, there is no reason for the historian to try to work out in detail the causes of the conflicts and alliances that existed at that time.⁴ Very often, however, the struggle between different groups is painted in crude, almost racist, terms (and in complete contradiction to the facts) as one between Algonkian- and Iroquoian-speaking peoples, the former being an indigenous population, mainly hunters, the latter a series of invading

³Invariably, however, these early witnesses of Indian culture were interested in rather limited aspects of Indian life and tended to interpret Indian culture in terms of their own. Because of this, a valid assessment of these early records requires a comparative knowledge of Indian culture in later times. The groundwork for our understanding of seventeenth-century Huron culture is thus the work of several generations of ethnologists and ethnohistorians in Canada and the United States. The best résumé of Huron culture is Elisabeth Tooker, *An Ethnography of the Huron Indians, 1615-1649* (Washington, 1964). For a shorter and less complete synopsis see W. V. Kinnietz, *The Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760* (Ann Arbor, 1940).

⁴F. Parkman, *The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century* (Centenary Edition, Boston, 1927), pp. 3, 4, 435, 436; G. E. Ellis, "Indians of North America," in J. Winsor, ed. *Narrative and Critical History of America* (8 vols.; Boston and New York, 1884-89), I, 283.

tribes growing corn and living in large villages. It should be noted that such a simplistic explanation of European history, even for the earliest periods, would now be laughed out of court by any competent historian. The alternative hypothesis suggests that European contact altered the life of the Indian, and above all the relationships among the different tribes, so quickly and completely that a knowledge of aboriginal conditions is not necessary to understand events after 1600.⁵ From an *a priori* point of view, this theory seems most unlikely. Old relationships have a habit of influencing events, even when economic and political conditions are being rapidly altered. Future studies must describe in detail how aboriginal cultures were disrupted or altered by their contact with the Europeans, rather than assume that interaction between Indians and Europeans can be explained as a set of relationships that has little or no reference to the native culture.

We will begin by considering developments in Huronia prior to the start of the fur trade.

THE HURON

When the Huron tribes were described for the first time in 1615,⁶ they were living in the Penetanguishene Peninsula and the part of Simcoe County that runs along Matchedash Bay between Wasaga Beach and Lake Simcoe. The Huron probably numbered twenty to thirty thousand, and, according to the most reliable of the descriptions from the Jesuit missionaries,⁷ they were divided into four tribes that formed a confederacy similar in its structure to the league of the Iroquois.⁸ The Attignauquantan or Bear tribe, which included about half of the people in the confederacy lived on the western extremity of Huronia. Next to them lived the Attingueenoughnahak, or Cord tribe, and the Tahontaenrat or Deer tribe. Farthest east, near Lake Simcoe, were the Ahrendarrhonon or Rock nation. The Tionnontate, or Petun, who spoke the same language as the Huron and were very similar to them, inhabited the country west of Huronia near the Blue Mountain. The Petun, however, were not members of the Huron confederacy and prior to the arrival of the French, they and the Huron had been at war. Another Iroquoian confederacy, the Neutral, lived farther south between the Grand River and the Niagara frontier.

⁵G. T. Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Relations* (Madison, 1940), pp. 4, 19.

⁶Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, III, 49-51; IV, 238-44.

⁷Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XVI, 227.

⁸L. H. Morgan, *League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee, or Iroquois* (Rochester, 1851; reprinted New Haven, 1954). For a briefer description, see Morgan's *Houses and House-life of the Indian Aborigines* (Washington, 1881; reprinted with original pagination Chicago, 1965), pp. 23-41.

Except for a few Algonkian bands that lived west of the Petun, there do not appear to have been any other Indians living in southern Ontario, except in the Ottawa Valley. The uninhabited portions of the province were the hunting territories of the Huron, Neutral, and Petun and also served as a buffer zone between these tribes and the Iroquois who lived south of Lake Ontario.

The Huron, like other Iroquoian tribes, grew corn, beans, and squash. These crops were planted and looked after by the women, who also gathered the firewood used for cooking and heating the houses. Contrary to popular notions the men also made an important contribution to the tribal economy, inasmuch as it was they who cleared the fields for planting (no small task when only stone axes were available) and who caught the fish which were an important source of nutrition. Because of the high population density, the areas close to Huronia appear to have been depleted of game and expeditions in search of deer had to travel far to the south and east.⁹ In general, hunting appears to have been of little economic importance among the Huron.

Huron villages had up to several thousand inhabitants and the main ones were protected by palisades made of posts woven together with smaller branches. Inside large villages there were fifty or more long-houses, often 100 feet or more in length, made of bark attached to a light wooden frame. These houses were inhabited by eight to ten very closely related families. Families that traced themselves back to a common female ancestor formed a clan which was a political unit having its own civil chief and war leader. Each tribe in turn was made up of a number of such clans and the clan leaders served on the tribal and confederal councils.¹⁰

The events that led to the formation of the Huron confederacy are not well understood. The Huron themselves said that it began around AD 1400 with the union of the Bear and Cord tribes and grew thereafter through the addition of further lineages and tribes. Archaeologically it appears that, although one or more of the Huron tribes was indigenous to Simcoe County, other groups moved into historic Huronia from as far away as the Trent Valley, the Toronto region, and Huron and Grey counties to the west.¹¹ Two tribes, the Rock and the

⁹Meat remained largely a festive dish, commonest in winter and spring (G. M. Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons* (Toronto, 1939), p. 82; Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XVII, 141-3).

¹⁰Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XVI, 227-9. See also Elisabeth Tooker, "The Iroquois Defeat of the Huron: A Review of Causes," *Pennsylvania Archaeologist*, XXXIII (1963), 115-23, especially 119, 120.

¹¹J. V. Wright, *The Ontario Iroquois Tradition* (Ottawa, 1966), 68-83. For information concerning the movements from the west I am indebted to a personal communication from Dr. Wright.

Deer, had been admitted to the confederacy not long before the arrival of the French.

Historians frequently have asserted that it was fear of the Iroquois that prompted the Huron to seek refuge in this remote and sheltered portion of Ontario.¹² While this may be why some groups moved into Huronia, it is clear that in prehistoric times the Huron outnumbered the Iroquois and probably were not at any military disadvantage. For this reason ethnologists have begun to seek other explanations to account for the heavy concentration of population in Huronia in historic times. An abundance of light, easily workable soil may be part of the answer. Since the Huron lacked the tools to work heavier soils, this advantage may have outweighed the tendency towards drought and the absence of certain trace minerals in the soil which now trouble farmers in that area.¹³ Huronia also lay at the south end of the main canoe route that ran along the shores of Georgian Bay. North of there the soil was poor and the growing season short, so that none of the tribes depended on agriculture. They engaged mainly in hunting and fishing and tribes from at least as far away as Lake Nipissing traded surplus skins, dried fish, and meat with the Huron in return for corn which they ate in the winter when other food was scarce.¹⁴

As early as 1615 the French noted that Huronia was the centre of a well-developed system of trade. Hunt, however, seems to have seriously overestimated both the extent of this network and the degree to which the Huron were dependent on it.¹⁵ The main trade appears to have been with the hunting peoples to the north who happened to be Algonkian-speaking. The other Iroquoian tribes had economies similar to that of the Huron, so that with the exception of a few items, such as black squirrel skins, which came from the Neutral country, and tobacco from the Petun, trade with the other Iroquoian tribes was of little importance. Trade with the north, however, brought in supplies of dried meat, fish, skins, clothing, native copper, and "luxury items" such as charms which were obtained in exchange for corn, tobacco, fishing nets, Indian hemp, wampum, and squirrel skins.¹⁶ Although manufactured goods, as well as natural products, flowed in both directions, the most important item the Huron had for export

¹²See, for example, D. Jenness, *The Indians of Canada* (5th ed.; Ottawa, 1960), p. 280.

¹³B. G. Trigger, "The Historic Location of the Hurons," *Ontario History*, LIV (1962), 137-48. For physiographic conditions, see L. J. Chapman and D. F. Putnam, *The Physiography of Southern Ontario* (2nd ed.; Toronto, 1966), pp. 299-312.

¹⁴Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, III, 52, 53. On the importance of corn meal among the northern hunters see Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, p. 268.

¹⁵Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 53-65.

¹⁶For the reference to squirrel skins see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, VII, 13; to nets, VI, 309.

undoubtedly was corn. In 1635 Father Le Jeune described Huronia as the "granary of most of the Algonkians."¹⁷

Whole bands of northerners spent the winters living outside Huron villages, trading furs and dried meat with their hosts in return for corn. The Huron assumed a dominant position in these trading relationships and the Jesuits record that when the Algonkians had dealings with them, they did so in the Huron language since the latter did not bother to learn Algonkian.¹⁸ The social implications of such linguistic behaviour cannot be lost on anyone living in present-day Quebec. In the French accounts the Algonkians appear to have been better friends of the Rock tribe than they were of the Bear.¹⁹

Considerable quantities of European trade goods that are believed to date between 1550 and 1575 have been found in Seneca sites in New York State.²⁰ Since both archaeological and historical evidence suggests that there was contact between the Huron and the tribes that lived along the St. Lawrence River in the sixteenth century,²¹ it is possible that trade goods were arriving in Huronia in limited quantities at this time as well. In any such trade the Algonkin tribes along the Ottawa River would almost certainly have been intermediaries. It is thus necessary to consider the possibility that trade between the Huron and the northern Algonkians originally developed as a result of the Huron desire to obtain European trade goods.

There are a number of reasons for doubting that trade with the northern tribes had a recent origin. For one thing, the rules governing trade were exceedingly elaborate. A particular trade route was recognized as the property of the Huron tribe or family that had pioneered it, and other people were authorized to trade along this route only if they had obtained permission from the group to which it belonged.²² Thus, since the Rock were the first Huron tribe to establish relations with the French on the St. Lawrence, they alone were entitled by Huron law to trade with them.²³ Because of the importance of this trade, however, the Rock soon "shared" it with the more numerous

¹⁷*Ibid.*, VIII, 15.

¹⁸Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, p. 86.

¹⁹For a hostile statement about the Bear by the Algonkins, see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, X, 145.

²⁰C. F. Wray and H. L. Schoff, "A Preliminary Report on the Seneca Sequence in Western New York State, 1550-1687," *Pennsylvania Archaeologist*, XXIII (1953), 53-63.

²¹Colonel James F. Pendergast (personal communication) reports finding considerable evidence of Huron influence in late Iroquoian sites along the St. Lawrence River. These probably date from the sixteenth century or only a little earlier. For the historical evidence of contacts between the St. Lawrence Iroquoians and the interior of Ontario, see H. P. Biggar, ed., *The Voyages of Jacques Cartier* (Ottawa, 1924), 170-1, 200-2.

²²Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, X, 225.

²³*Ibid.*, XX, 19.

and influential Bear, and with the other tribes of Huronia.²⁴ The control of trade was vested in a small number of chiefs, and other men had to have their permission before they were allowed to engage in it.²⁵ An even more important indication of the antiquity of Huron contact with the north is the archaeological evidence of the Huron influence on the native cultures of that region, which can be dated as early as AD 900 and is especially evident in pottery styles.²⁶ Taken together, these two lines of evidence provide considerable support for the hypothesis of an early trade.

In the historic period the Huron men left their villages to visit other tribes in the summers, while their women were working in the fields. Profit was not the only reason for undertaking long voyages. The Jesuits report that many travelled into distant regions to gamble or to see new sights—in short for adventure. Trading expeditions, like war, were a challenge for young men.²⁷ Trading between different tribes was not always a safe and uncomplicated business and, for all they had to gain from trade during the historic period, the Huron frequently were hesitant to initiate trade with tribes of whom they had only slight acquaintance.

The dangers that beset intertribal contacts were largely products of another institution, as old, if not older than trade—the blood feud. If a man was slain by someone who was not his kinsman, his family, clan, or tribe (depending on how far removed the murderer was) felt obliged to avenge his death by slaying the killer or one of the killer's relatives. Such action could be averted only by reparations in the form of gifts paid by the group to which the murderer belonged to that of the murdered man. When an act of blood revenge actually was carried out, the injured group usually regarded it as a fresh injury; thus any killing, even an accidental one, might generate feuds that would go on for generations. This was especially true of intertribal feuds.²⁸

The Huron and Five Nations had both suppressed blood feuds within their respective confederacies, but only with great difficulty. When quarrels arose between individuals from tribes not so united,

²⁴*Ibid.* In 1640 Lalemant reported that the Rock still considered themselves the special allies of the French and were inclined to protect them. This attitude changed after the Jesuits became more active in the interior of Huronia.

²⁵Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, p. 99. Sagard says that a special council decided each year the number of men who could go out from each village. For more on the control of trade by old and influential men, see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XIV, 39.

²⁶J. V. Wright, "A Regional Examination of Ojibwa Culture History," *Anthropologica*, N.S., VII (1965), 189–227.

²⁷Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, V, 241.

²⁸The Huron claimed that their feud with the Iroquois had been going on fifty years prior to 1615 (Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, V, 78).

they frequently gave rise to bloodshed and war. The chances of war were also increased because skill in raiding was a source of prestige for young men who therefore desired to pursue this activity.²⁹ If it were possible, prisoners captured in war were taken back to their captors' villages to be tortured to death, partly as an act of revenge, but also as a sacrifice to the sun or "god of war."³⁰ These three motives—revenge, individual prestige, and sacrifice—were common to all the Iroquoian-speaking peoples of the northeast and to many of their neighbours and generated and sustained intertribal wars over long periods of time. Indeed, where no close political ties existed, such as those within the Huron confederacy, and where there were no mutually profitable trading relationships, war between tribes appears to have been the rule. The Huron were almost invariably at war with one or more of the Five Nations, and prior to the development of the fur trade (when they started to carry French goods to the south and west) they appear to have been at war with the Neutral and Petun as well.³¹

On the other hand, when a trading relationship developed between the Huron and some neighbouring tribe, every effort was made to control feuds that might lead to war between them. The payment that was made to settle a blood feud with the Algonkians was greater than that made to settle a feud inside the confederacy,³² and the dearest payment on record was made to the French in 1648 to compensate them for a Jesuit *donné* murdered by some Huron chiefs.³³

A second method of promoting stable relations between tribes that wished to be trading partners appears to have been the exchange of a few people both as a token of friendship and to assure each group that the other intended to behave properly. Very often, these hostages appear to have been children. Although this custom is never explicitly described by the early French writers, the evidence for its existence is clear-cut. Huron, whose sons or nephews (sister's sons and therefore close relatives) were sent to the Jesuit seminary in Quebec, boasted that they were relatives of the French and for this reason hoped for

²⁹Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXIII, 91.

³⁰Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, pp. 159–61. For comparative discussions of Iroquoian warfare see Nathaniel Knowles, "The Torture of Captives by the Indians of Eastern North America," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, LXXXII (1940), 151–225; R. L. Rands and C. L. Riley, "Diffusion and Discontinuous Distribution," *American Anthropologist*, LVIII (1958), 274–97.

³¹For the wars with the Petun, see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XX, 43. Even at the time of Sagard's visit, there was a threat of war with the Neutral (Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, pp. 151, 156, 157).

³²Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXXIII, 243.

³³*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 239–49.

preferential treatment when they went to trade on the St. Lawrence.³⁴ Others said they had "relatives" among the Neutral and Petun and one man is reported as leaving his daughter with these relatives.³⁵ The priests and lay visitors who came to Huronia in early times were treated as kinsmen by the Huron, and families and individuals were anxious to have them live with them,³⁶ no doubt because the Huron regarded these visitors as pledges of good faith whose association with a particular family would establish good relations between that family and the French officials and traders downriver. The presentation of young children to Jacques Cartier at a number of villages along the St. Lawrence suggests, moreover, that this custom may have been an old one.³⁷

The Huron thus not only traded with other tribes prior to the start of the fur trade, but also, in common with other tribes in the northeast, had developed a code or set of conventions that governed the manner in which this trade was conducted. Being a product of Indian culture, this code was designed to deal with specifically Indian problems. We will now turn to the French attempts to adapt themselves to the native trading patterns after Champlain's first encounter with the Indians in 1608.

EARLY FRANCO-HURON RELATIONS

In 1608, the year Champlain established a trading post at Quebec, he was visited by the representatives of some Algonkin tribes from the Ottawa Valley and, in order to win their respect for him as a warrior and to secure their goodwill, he agreed to accompany them the following year on a raid against their chief enemy, the Iroquois.³⁸ The regions to the north gave promise of more pelts and ones of better

³⁴*Ibid.*, XIII, 125. The Bear tribe wanted the French to participate in their Feast of the Dead so that they could thereby claim them as relatives (X, 311).

³⁵*Ibid.*, XXVII, 25; XX, 59.

³⁶Chretien Le Clercq, *First Establishment of the Faith in New France*, trans. J. G. Shea (2 vols.; New York, 1881), I, 97; Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, p. 71.

³⁷Biggar, ed., *Voyages of Cartier*, pp. 132-3, 143. The custom of giving children to Cartier may have arisen, on the other hand, as a result of the Indians observing Cartier's predilection for kidnapping Indians. In 1534 he had seized the two sons of Donnacona, the chief of Stadacona.

³⁸The fact that the Huron and Algonkians both were at war with the Five Nations naturally pitted the French against these latter tribes. Presumably Champlain's decision to side with the Huron and Algonkians was based on his conviction that it was impossible to maintain satisfactory relations with both sides, as well as on the economic factors mentioned in the text. For a discussion of the origins of the hostility between the Algonkians and Five Nations, see B. G. Trigger, "Trade and Tribal Warfare on the St. Lawrence in the Sixteenth Century," *Ethnohistory*, IX (1962), 240-56.

quality than did the Iroquois country to the south and fighting with a tribe alongside its enemies was an effective way of confirming an alliance.³⁹ Thus Champlain's actions seem to have been almost inevitable. At the same time he probably also hoped to drive Iroquois raiders from the St. Lawrence Valley and to open the river as a valuable trade artery.⁴⁰

When the Ottawa River Algonkin returned the next year, they were accompanied by a party of Huron warriors from the Rock tribe. In later times the Huron informed the Jesuits that they had first heard of the French from the Algonkians early in the seventeenth century, and as a result of this had decided to go downriver to meet these newcomers for themselves.⁴¹ Very likely Champlain's account and the Huron one refer to the same event. Some of the Ottawa River Algonkin, who were already probably in the habit of wintering in Huronia, may have tried to recruit Huron warriors for their forthcoming expedition against the Iroquois and the Huron, prompted by curiosity and a desire for adventure, may have agreed to accompany them to Quebec.

Champlain was keenly interested at this time both in exploring the interior and in making contacts with the people who lived there. Learning of the size of the Huron confederacy and their good relations with the hunting (and potentially trapping) peoples to the north, Champlain realized their importance for the development of the fur trade and set out to win their friendship. The Huron, on the contrary, were at first extremely hesitant in their dealings with the French,⁴² in part because they had no treaty with them and also because they regarded the French as allies of the Algonkin, who might become hostile if they saw the Hurons trying to establish an independent relationship with them.

The ambiguity of the Huron position can be seen in the exchange of children that was arranged in 1610. At that time the Huron gave Champlain custody of a boy, who was to go to France with him, and in exchange they received a young Frenchman. When the Huron departed, however, the French boy (probably Etienne Brûlé) did not leave with them, but stayed with Iroquet, an Algonkin chief from the lower Ottawa.⁴³ Iroquet, however, seems to have been one of the

³⁹For Champlain's own comment on Indian expectations in this regard, see Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, II, 70, 71, 110.

⁴⁰H. A. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada* (2nd ed.; Toronto, 1956), pp. 23-6.

⁴¹Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XV, 229. The first Huron chief to have dealings with the French was Atironta of the Rock tribe.

⁴²Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, II, 188, 189, 193. For a more general reference see II, 254.

⁴³*Ibid.*, II, 141; IV, 118, 119. This interpretation is reinforced by Champlain's statement that the boy was brought back by 200 Huron on June 13, 1611 (II, 186; IV, 136).

Algonkin who was in the habit of wintering in Huronia. Thus a three-sided exchange seems to have been arranged in which the Huron laid the basis for a friendly relationship with the French, but one that was subordinate to, and dependent upon, their relationship with the Algonkin.

As trade with the French increased, the Huron began to appreciate French goods and to want more of them. Metal awls and needles were superior to native bone ones, and iron arrowheads could penetrate the traditional shields and body armour of their enemies. Metal kettles were easier to cook in than clay pots and metal knives were much more efficient than stone ones. Clearing fields and cutting wood was easier when stone axes were replaced by iron hatchets. Luxury items, such as cloth and European beads, were soon sought after as well.⁴⁴

The growing demand for these products in a population that numbered between twenty and thirty thousand no doubt made the Huron anxious to establish closer relations with the French, without, if possible, having to recognize the Ottawa River Algonkin as middlemen or to pay them tolls to pass through their lands.⁴⁵ Since the principal item that the French wanted was beaver pelts,⁴⁶ the Huron probably also began to expand their trade with the north at this time in order to secure these furs in larger quantities. In return for these furs, they carried not only corn and tobacco but also French trade goods to their northern trading partners. The tribes north of Lake Huron seem to have continued to trade exclusively with the Huron rather than seeking to obtain goods from the French. No doubt this was in part because Huronia was nearby and reaching it did not require a long and hazardous journey down the Ottawa River. Such a journey would have been time-consuming, if not impossible, for a small tribe. More importantly, however, they wanted corn for winter consumption which the Huron, but not the French, were able to provide. Although there is no documentary evidence to support this suggestion, it seems likely that increasing supplies of corn permitted these hunters to devote more time to trapping and relieved them of some of their day-to-day worries about survival.⁴⁷ Thus the growth of

⁴⁴For comments on the Indians' desire for European manufactured goods, see Innis, *Fur Trade*, pp. 16-19; Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 4, 5.

⁴⁵For examples of Algonkin harassment of Huron trade along the Ottawa River and various Algonkin attempts to imperil French-Huron relations (particularly by the Algonkin from Allumette Island) see Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, V, 102; Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, p. 262; Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, V, 239; VII, 213; VIII, 83, 99; IX, 271; X, 77; XIV, 53. The Montagnais also tried to intimidate the Huron, mainly to get free corn (Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, pp. 265-8).

⁴⁶Innis, *Fur Trade*, pp. 3-6, 11-15.

⁴⁷This is essentially the kind of relationship that existed between trading companies and Indian trappers in the north in more recent times.

the fur trade may have led the northern groups to concentrate on trapping and the Huron to devote more of their energy to producing agricultural surpluses to trade with the north.⁴⁸ On at least one occasion, the Huron were providing even the French at Quebec with needed supplies of food.⁴⁹ In the 1640s their close friends and trading partners, the Nipissing, were travelling as far north as James Bay each year in order to collect the furs which they passed on to the Huron.⁵⁰

In spite of the Huron desire for French goods and their ability to gather furs from the interior, the development of direct trade between Huronia and the St. Lawrence required the formation of a partnership that was expressed in terms the Indians could understand. Without continual assurances of goodwill passing between Huron and French leaders and without the exchange of gifts and people, no Huron would have travelled to Quebec without fear and trepidation. Even after many years of trade, Hurons going to Quebec felt safer if they were travelling with a Frenchman whom they knew and who could be trusted to protect their interests while they were trading.⁵¹ Champlain understood clearly that treaties of friendship were necessary for successful trading partnerships with the Indians. For this reason he had been willing to support the Algonkin and Montagnais in their wars with the Mohawk and, since it was impossible to be friendly with both sides, had maintained his alliance with these northern tribes in spite of Iroquois overtures for peace.⁵² The cementing of a treaty with the various Huron tribes was clearly the main reason he visited Huronia in 1615, a visit made in the face of considerable opposition from the Ottawa River Algonkin.⁵³

Quite properly in Huron eyes, Champlain spent most of his time in Huronia with the Rock tribe. This had been the first of the Huron tribes to contact him on the St. Lawrence and therefore had a special relationship with the French according to Huron law. When he accompanied a Huron war party on a traditional, and what appeared

⁴⁸Champlain reports that the Huron produced large food surpluses which he says were meant to carry them over years of poor crops (Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, III, 155-6). At least a part of these surpluses was used for trade.

⁴⁹Le Clercq, *Establishment*, I, 298.

⁵⁰Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXXV, 201. There is good evidence, however, that the Nipissing were travelling north even earlier (Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, II, 255-6).

⁵¹Le Clercq, *Establishment*, I, 211; Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, p. 244.

⁵²Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, V, 73-80; Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, p. 69.

⁵³The Huron had invited Champlain to visit their country as early as 1609 (Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, II, 105). His attempt to travel up the Ottawa River in 1613 was brought to an end by the opposition of the Algonkin, among other things. Marcel Trudel (*Histoire de la Nouvelle-France. II. Le Comptoir, 1604-1627* (Montreal, 1966), 198-201) may be correct when he suggests that the Algonkin stirred up trouble between Champlain and Vignau in order to protect their trading interests in the interior.

to him as an ill-fated raid against the central Iroquois, Champlain was resorting to a now-familiar technique for winning the friendship of particular tribes.⁵⁴ What Champlain apparently still did not realize was that the aim of these expeditions was adventure and taking prisoners, rather than the destruction of enemy villages.⁵⁵ The Huron were undoubtedly far more pleased with the results of the expedition than Champlain was.

From 1615 on, a number of Frenchmen were living in Huronia; their main purpose in being there was to encourage the Huron to trade.⁵⁶ Many of these young men, like the *coureurs de bois* of later times, enjoyed their life among the Indians and, to the horror of the Catholic clergy, made love to Huron women and probably married them according to local custom. The rough and tumble ways of individuals like Etienne Brûlé endeared them to their Huron hosts and this, in turn, allowed them to inspire confidence in the Indians who came to trade. It has been suggested that the main reason these men remained in Huronia was to persuade the Huron to trade in New France rather than to take their furs south to the Dutch who had begun to trade in the Hudson Valley after 1609.⁵⁷ This explanation seems unlikely, however. Until 1629 most of the Dutch trade appears to have been confined to the Mahican.⁵⁸ Although the Dutch were apparently anxious to trade with the "French Indians" as early as 1633, the Mohawk were not willing to allow them to do so unless they were in some way able to profit from the trade themselves.⁵⁹ This the Huron, who had a long-standing feud with the Iroquois, were unwilling to let them do.

The main job of the early *coureurs de bois* appears to have been to

⁵⁴Although Champlain visited all the major Huron villages, he returned repeatedly to Cahiague, a Rock village. He also spent more time there than anywhere else. Lalemant reports that in 1640 his reputation was still very much alive among the Rock (Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XX, 19).

⁵⁵Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, III, 66, 69, 73; IV, 254-66; also Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, p. 20.

⁵⁶Since most of the available data about this period was recorded by priests, we have little information about these men, and practically none from a friendly source. For what there is see, Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, V, 101, 108, 129, 131, 132, 207; Le Clercq, *Establishment*, I, 205; Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, pp. 194-5; Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, V, 133; VI, 83; XIV, 17, 19; XVII, 45; XX, 19; XXV, 85.

⁵⁷A. W. Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century* (Ithaca, 1960), p. 30.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 46. Intermittent hostilities between the Mahican and Mohawk kept the latter from Fort Orange prior to the stunning defeat of the Mahican in 1628 or 1629 (p. 48).

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 52-4; Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, VIII, 59-61; Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, p. 34. In 1638 the Huron told the Jesuits that "Englishmen" had come as far as Montreal telling the Indians that the Jesuits were the cause of sickness in Huronia (and no doubt attempting to trade with them or divert trade to the south) (Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XV, 31).

live in Huronia as visible evidence of French goodwill and as exchanges for the Huron youths who were sent to live with the French.⁶⁰ In this capacity they were able to encourage the Indians to engage in trade. Each year some of them travelled downriver with the Huron to see that the Algonkin did not prevent the passage of their canoes or scare the Huron off with stories of disasters or plots against them in Quebec.⁶¹ They also acted as interpreters for the Huron and aided them in their dealings with the traders.⁶² Except for the years when the Mohawk blockaded the Ottawa River, the Huron sent an annual "fleet" or series of fleets to Quebec bearing the furs they had collected.⁶³ It is unfortunate that the records do not supply more information on these fleets, particularly about who organized them and what was their tribal composition. The fleets left Huronia in the spring and returned several months later. When the St. Lawrence was blocked by the Iroquois, the Hurons made their way to Quebec over the smaller waterways that led through the Laurentians.⁶⁴

The Recollet and Jesuit missionaries who worked in Huronia between 1615 and 1629 were accepted by the Huron as part of the Franco-Huron trading alliance and as individuals whose goodwill was potentially advantageous in dealing with the traders and authorities in Quebec. That they lacked interest except as shamans is evident from Gabriel Sagard's statement that it was hard to work among any tribe that was not engaged in trade (i.e. bound by the Franco-Huron alliance).⁶⁵ The priests appear to have restricted their missionary activities to caring for the needs of the French traders in Huronia and trying to make some converts among the Indians. Their preaching, as far as it was understood, did not appear to present a challenge or affront to the Huron way of life, although the customs of the priests were strange to the Indians, who found these men austere and far less

⁶⁰See, e.g., Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, V, 101, 207.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, V, 108. On the usefulness of having Frenchmen accompany the fleet see Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, p. 262. Sagard reports that in the 1620s the Iroquois refrained from attacking Huron flotillas when they knew Frenchmen were travelling with the Indians (p. 261).

⁶²These were at least the functions that the Huron expected Frenchmen who had lived in Huronia would perform. The *coureurs de bois* are frequently referred to as interpreters (Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, III, 168-72).

⁶³Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, pp. 249-56.

⁶⁴This route apparently had been used in prehistoric times as well (Biggar, ed., *Voyages of Cartier*, pp. 200-1, as interpreted by Innis, *Fur Trade*, p. 22).

⁶⁵Edwin Tross, éd., *Histoire du Canada et voyages que les Frères mineurs Recollets y ont faits pour la conversion des infidèles depuis l'an 1615 . . .*, by G. Sagard (4 vols.; Paris, 1866), I, 42. This statement refers to the visit Le Caron made with Champlain. On the Huron desire to have the priests act as go-betweens in their trade with the French see Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, 244; Le Clercq, *Establishment*, I, 211.

appealing than the easy-going *coureurs de bois*.⁶⁶ For obvious reasons, relations between the priests and local traders were not good and Sagard claims that among other things the latter often refused to help the missionaries learn native languages.⁶⁷ The most serious charge that the priests levelled at these traders was that their behaviour sowed confusion and doubt among the Huron and impeded the spread of the Christian faith among them.⁶⁸ These early experiences convinced the Jesuits that to run a mission in Huronia properly the priests must control those Europeans who were allowed to enter the country.

In the early part of the seventeenth century the colony of New France was nothing more than a trading post and its day-to-day existence depended upon securing an annual supply of furs.⁶⁹ Not understanding the long-standing hostility between the Huron and the Iroquois, the French were apprehensive of any move that seemed likely to divert furs from the St. Lawrence to the Hudson Valley. The French made peace with the Mohawk in 1624 and French traders did business with them, an arrangement that no doubt pleased the Mohawk as it made them for a time less dependent on the Dutch and therefore gave them more bargaining power in their dealings with Albany.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the French became extremely alarmed about a peace treaty that the Huron negotiated with the Seneca in 1623. This appears to have been one of the periodic treaties that the Huron and Iroquois negotiated in order to get back members of their respective tribes who had been taken prisoner, but not yet killed, by the enemy.⁷¹ As such, it was probably perfectly harmless to French interest. Nevertheless the situation was judged sufficiently serious for a delegation of eleven

⁶⁶The Indians often were reluctant to take missionaries back to Huronia with them (Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, IV, 221). Some priests, however, became personally popular with the Huron. The popularity of Father Brébeuf during his initial stay in Huronia is evident from the welcome he received when he returned in 1634.

⁶⁷This claim appears in the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*. I. 1000 to 1700 (Toronto, 1966), 133. It appears to be based on Sagard's comments on the behaviour of an interpreter named Nicolas Marsolet. Although Marsolet refused to teach the Montagnais language to the Recollets, he later agreed to instruct the Jesuits (Tross, éd., *Histoire du Canada*, II, 333).

⁶⁸It is perhaps significant that the main complaint was about the sexual behaviour of these men rather than the sale of alcohol to the Indians (cf. André Vachon, "L'Eau-de-vie dans la société indienne," Canadian Historical Association, *Report*, 1960, pp. 22-32). Alcohol does not appear to have been a serious problem in Huronia, no doubt because the Huron did not at this time feel their culture threatened by European contacts. The Jesuits' distaste for these men is reiterated in the Jesuit *Relations*, particularly when they are compared with the *donnés* and other men who served in Huronia under Jesuit supervision after 1634. See Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, VI, 83; XIV, 19; XV, 85; XVII, 45.

⁶⁹Trudel, *Histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, II, 405-34.

⁷⁰Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, p. 52; Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 69-70.

⁷¹Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXXIII, 121.

Frenchmen, including three clerics, to be sent to the Huron country.⁷² Various writers have followed Jean Charlevoix in saying that this delegation was instructed to disrupt the new treaty. Charlevoix, however, wrote long after the event took place and is not an unbiased witness.⁷³ It seems more likely that the expedition had as its main purpose simply the reaffirming of the alliances made between Champlain and the various Huron chiefs in 1615. In actual fact the Huron probably had no thought of trading with the Iroquois at this time. To the chagrin of the Dutch, the Mohawk were firm in their refusal to allow the northern tribes to pass through their country to trade on the Hudson. The Huron undoubtedly felt that direct trade with the French, even if they were farther from Huronia than the Dutch,⁷⁴ was preferable to trade *via* the Mohawk with the Europeans in New York State.

The very great importance that the Huron attached to their trade with the French even at this time is shown by their efforts to prevent potential rivals, such as the Petun or Neutral, from concluding any sort of formal alliance with the French. Neither group seems to have constituted much of a threat, since the Petun had to pass through Huron territory in order to paddle north along the shore of Georgian Bay⁷⁵ and the Neutral, who do not seem to have had adequate boats, would have had to travel down the St. Lawrence River to Quebec—en route the Mohawk would have either stolen their furs or forced them to divert most of the trade to the south.⁷⁶ The Huron do not seem to have minded well-known *coureurs de bois* occasionally visiting the Neutral or other tribes with whom they traded, but when, on his visit to the Neutral in 1626, Father de La Roche Daillon proposed an

⁷²Le Clercq, *Establishment*, I, 204; Tross, éd., *Histoire du Canada*.

⁷³There is nothing in Sagard or Le Clercq that implies that the priests were instructed to disrupt this treaty, as Hunt implies. Trudel (*Histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, II, 370) says that it was necessary to send Father Le Caron and the other Frenchmen to Huronia to prevent a commercial treaty between the Huron and the Iroquois. It is my opinion that the prospect of this treaty was a figment of the imagination of the French in Quebec and never a real possibility (see text below).

⁷⁴On the Mohawk refusal to let the French Indians pass through their country to trade with the Dutch see Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, pp. 52–3; Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, p. 34. Trudel's (*Histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, II, 364–6) suggestion that the Huron were about to trade with the Dutch and that the French who stayed in Huronia did so to prevent this seems unlikely in view of the traditional enmity between the Huron and the Iroquois. To reach Albany the latter would have had to travel through the tribal territory of the three eastern Iroquois tribes. Mohawk opposition to this seems to have effectively discouraged the Huron from attempting such trade.

⁷⁵Sagard says that the Huron did not permit other tribes to pass through their territory without special permission (Wrong, ed., *Sagard's Long Journey*, p. 99). The Jesuits say categorically that the Huron did not permit the Petun to trade with the French (Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXI, 177).

⁷⁶For a reference about canoes see Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, p. 51.

alliance between them and the French, the Huron spread rumours about the French that brought an end to the proposed treaty.⁷⁷ The ease with which the Huron did this, and repeated the manoeuvre in 1640-41,⁷⁸ is an indication both of the insecurity that tribes felt in the absence of a proper treaty with foreigners and of the importance that the Huron placed on their privileged relationship with the French. These observations reinforce our conclusion that coureurs de bois did not live in Huronia simply to dissuade the Huron from going to trade with either the Mohawk or the Dutch, but instead were a vital link in the Franco-Huron alliance and necessary intermediaries between the Huron and the French fur traders in Quebec. Such were the services for which Brûlé received a hundred pistoles each year from his employers.⁷⁹

Franco-Huron trade increased in the years prior to 1629. Undoubtedly the Huron were growing increasingly reliant on European goods, but it is unlikely that they were ever completely dependent on trade during this period. There is no evidence that the British occupation of Quebec led them to trade with New Holland or with the Iroquois. Several renegade Frenchmen, including Brûlé, remained in Huronia and probably encouraged the Huron to trade with the British.⁸⁰ It was during this period that Brûlé was murdered by the Huron living in Toaniché. Since he was given a proper burial it is unlikely that he was tortured to death and eaten as Sagard reports.⁸¹ More likely, he was killed in a brawl with the Huron among whom he lived. That he was killed during the British occupation of New France does not, however, seem to be without significance. Until the French withdrawal he had been protected not only by his popularity but more importantly by the Franco-Huron alliance. Once the French had departed, he was on his own.

THE JESUITS TAKE CONTROL

The Compagnie des Cent-Associés, which took effective control of the affairs of New France after the colony was retroceded to France in 1632, was different from earlier trading companies in that its members were more interested in missionary work than their predecessors had

⁷⁷Le Clercq, *Establishment*, I, 267. The Huron spread evil rumours about the Jesuits among the Petun when the Jesuits tried to do mission work there in 1640 (Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XX, 47-51).

⁷⁸Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXI, 207-15. At first the priests pretended to be traders. This pretence, however, failed.

⁷⁹Biggar, ed., *Works of Champlain*, V, 131.

⁸⁰The French later describe him as a traitor (Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, V, 241).

⁸¹Tross, éd., *Histoire du Canada*, II, 431. For a description of his proposed reburial see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, X, 307-9.

been. At this time the Society of Jesus also managed to obtain the *de facto* monopoly over missionary activities in New France that it was to hold for many years.⁸² The Jesuits brought about a number of changes in policy with regard to Huronia. In particular, they were much more anxious to evangelize the Huron *as a people*, than the Recollets had been.⁸³ As their prime goal they sought to lead the entire confederacy toward the Christian religion, rather than to convert individuals. Moreover, as a result of the strong influence they wielded at the French court, they were in a better position to command the support of officials and fur traders.⁸⁴ For the first while after they returned to the Huron country, the Jesuits continued many of the mission practices that had been current prior to 1629, such as sending Indian children to their seminary at Quebec.⁸⁵ As their knowledge of the Huron language and of the country improved (in both cases as a result of systematic study) they gradually began to modify their work along lines that were more in keeping with their general policy.⁸⁶

A major *bête noire* of the missionaries prior to 1629 was the French traders who lived in Huronia and set a bad example for the natives. In order to assure unity of purpose for their work, the duties that formerly had been carried out by these *coureurs de bois* were taken over by lay brothers, workmen, and *donnés* directly subject to Jesuit supervision.⁸⁷ Later accusations that the Jesuits were engaged in the fur trade seem to have sprung largely from this action. The oft-repeated claim that priests were vital to the fur trade in Huronia is obviously without foundation. The *coureurs de bois*, who had lived in Huronia for many years, not only had functioned effectively during this period without missionary support but also appear to have been substantially more popular and more effective in their dealings with

⁸²G. Lanctot, *A History of Canada*, I (Toronto, 1963), 148-9.

⁸³It appears that one reason the Recollets received little support from the trading companies was that their policy of settling migratory Indians and of wanting Huron converts to settle in Quebec conflicted with the traders' own interests (Le Clercq, *Establishment*, I, 111).

⁸⁴The support of Governor Montmagny appears to have been particularly effective (Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXI, 143; XXII, 309, 311).

⁸⁵Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, X, 33; XI, 97, 109, 111, 113; XIII, 9; XIV, 125, 161, 231, 235, 255. On the discontinuation of the seminary, see XXIV, 103. During the first two years the Jesuits were back in Huronia they were struggling to orient themselves and to understand the nature of Huron society better. At first they tended to be rather patronizing. They gave advice on military matters (X, 53) and, failing to understand the nature of Huron politics, felt that their intervention was needed to mediate disputes among the different tribes (IX, 273; XIV, 17, 21). Later, when they realized how the Huron did things and that intervention was unnecessary, these efforts ceased.

⁸⁶One example is the decision to seek to baptize older men—and especially influential ones (Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XV, 109).

⁸⁷For Jesuit policy regarding lay assistants in Huronia, see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXI, 293-303. See also VI, 81, 83; XV, 157; XVII, 45; XX, 99; XXV, 85; XXVII, 91.

the Huron than the priests had been. The Jesuits wished to be rid of this group principally to assure that the French living in Huronia would not be working at cross-purposes. The trading companies apparently were willing to allow the Jesuits to have their own way in this matter, but in return it was necessary that the laymen attached to the Jesuit mission discharge at least the most vital functions of organizing the annual trade which the *coureurs de bois* had done heretofore.⁸⁸ The reasons that the Jesuits had for wanting to be rid of the *coureurs de bois* were clearly religious, not economic.

The Jesuits' connections with the fur trade did not arise, however, simply from their desire to be rid of the *coureurs de bois*; they also depended on it not only to get into Huronia but also for their personal safety so long as they remained there. The Huron were obviously not at all interested in what the Jesuits had to teach, and on several occasions after 1634 they made it clear that they preferred the former *coureurs de bois* to the Jesuits and their assistants.⁸⁹ In 1633, and again in 1634, they offered a whole series of excuses, including the hostility of the Algonkin from Allumette Island, as reasons for not taking the Jesuits home with them.⁹⁰ Moreover, fearing revenge for the death of Brûlé, they were unwilling to allow their children to remain as seminarians at Quebec.⁹¹ In 1634 Champlain made the official French position clear when he informed the Huron that he regarded the Jesuits' presence in their country as a vital part of a renewed Franco-Huron alliance, at the same time expressing the hope that they would someday agree to become Christians.⁹² Since the Huron wanted to renew their former trading relationship with the French, they agreed to accept the priests as a token of this alliance. Henceforth they were bound by treaty to allow the Jesuits to live among them and to protect the priests from harm. The thought of having these individuals who were so respected by the French in Huronia and under their control

⁸⁸Parkman, *Jesuits in North America*, pp. 465-7. Concerning early charges of Jesuit participation in the fur trade and a declaration by the directors of the Company of New France concerning their innocence, see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXV, 75.

⁸⁹Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XIV, 17-19. For a clear statement that the Jesuits were aware that their presence in Huronia depended on the traders' ability to coerce the Huron to let them stay, see XXXIV, 205. Soon after the Jesuits returned to Huronia, Brébeuf wrote that they won the esteem of the Indians by giving them arrowheads and helping them to defend their forts (XXXIV, 53). He hoped that the confidence won by these actions would permit the Jesuits eventually to "advance the glory of God."

⁹⁰The main reason seems to have been that the French had detained a Huron who was implicated in killing a Frenchman in Huronia (*ibid.*, VI, 19). It is interesting to note that the Huron also made it clear they wanted Frenchmen with guns instead of, or at least alongside, the priests (VII, 217).

⁹¹*Ibid.*, IX, 287.

⁹²*Ibid.*, VII, 47. The officials in Quebec continued to exhort the Huron to become Christians (XVII, 171).

must also have given the Huron confidence in their dealings with the French who remained in Quebec.

Although the Jesuits travelled to Huronia in 1635 in canoes that belonged to members of the Cord and Rock tribes, they were put ashore rather unceremoniously in the territory of the Bear tribe, where Brébeuf had worked previously and where Brûlé had been murdered.⁹³ It is not clear whether the Jesuits had wanted to go to this region or were left there by their Rock and Cord hosts who did not want to take them to their own villages. It is possible that the Bear, who were the most powerful of the Huron tribes, exerted their influence to have the Jesuits left among them. In this regard it is perhaps not without meaning that the Jesuits previously had discussed with the Indians the possibility of their settling in Ossossané, the chief town of the Bear nation.⁹⁴ Brébeuf was welcomed by the villagers of Ihonitiria, among whom he had lived before, and the Jesuits decided to settle in that village both because it was close to the canoe route to New France and also in order to persuade the villagers that they bore them no ill will for having murdered Brûlé. The latter, the Jesuits said, was regarded by the French as a traitor and debauched renegade.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, his murder haunted the Huron, and even some neighbouring tribes,⁹⁶ who feared that it might lead to war with the French. Such fears may have been responsible for the dispute that the Jesuits observed between certain villages of the Bear tribe shortly after their arrival in Huronia.⁹⁷

It would appear that according to native custom the Jesuits coming to Huronia had a right to expect they would receive free food and lodgings. This would have been in return for similar care given by the French to the young seminarists in Quebec.⁹⁸ In Huron eyes the latter had been exchanged as tokens of good faith in return for the Jesuits

⁹³*Ibid.*, VIII, 71, 91, 99.

⁹⁴That was in July 1633 (*ibid.*, V, 259). The people of Ossossané continued to press the Jesuits to move there.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, VIII, 99, 103-5. They also stayed at Ihonitiria because they felt it better to start work in a small village rather than a large and important one (VIII, 103). Ossossané was also unsatisfactory as its inhabitants were planning to relocate the village the next spring (VIII, 101).

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, V, 239, VIII, 99; X, 309; XIV, 99-103.

⁹⁷For an account of this dispute and the Jesuits attempts to resolve it, see *ibid.*, X, 279-81, 307; XIV, 21. No mention is made of the dispute after 1637, so presumably it was patched up. Brébeuf mentions elsewhere that, as a result of Brûlé's murder, other Huron were threatening the people of Toanché (the village where he was killed) with death (VIII, 99). The bad relations between Ossossané and the village of Ihonitiria (which was inhabited by Toanchéans) were exacerbated in 1633 when the latter became angry at the efforts of the chiefs of Ossossané to persuade all the Jesuits to settle in their village (V, 263).

⁹⁸Presents were also given to the Huron both as tokens of goodwill and to ensure the good treatment of the Jesuits.

and their assistants.⁹⁹ In fact, the Huron provided food and shelter for the Jesuits only rarely. The missionaries had to purchase or provide these things for themselves and found the Huron demanding payment of some sort for most of their services.¹⁰⁰

For a time after their return to Huronia the Jesuits were the objects of friendly public interest and their presence and goodwill were sought after, in part because individual Hurons sought to obtain favours in Quebec through their commendation, in part because the services people performed for the Jesuits, and even attendance at religious instruction, were rewarded with presents of trade goods and tobacco. The latter, although a native product, was scarce in Huronia at the time.¹⁰¹ Since all of the priests (except perhaps Brébeuf) were struggling to learn the Huron language, most of the missionary activities during the first few years were confined to the Bear country. Only a few trips were made into more distant areas of Huronia.¹⁰²

THE EPIDEMICS OF 1635 TO 1640

The first serious trial for the Jesuits, and for the Franco-Huron alliance, occurred between the years 1635 and 1640. An unspecified disease, either measles or smallpox, was present in Quebec the year the Jesuits returned to Huronia and it followed the Huron fleet upriver. This was the beginning of a series of epidemics which swept away more than half the Huron population in the next six years.¹⁰³ These new maladies were especially fatal to children and old people. Because they were fatal to the latter group, many of the most skilful Huron leaders and craftsmen, as well as the people most familiar with native religious lore, perished.¹⁰⁴ The loss of children may well have meant that the proportion of men of fighting age in the Huron population was below normal by the end of the next decade.

⁹⁹For a discussion of the financial help the Jesuits expected to receive from the trading company see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, VI, 81-3. The financial support of the mission is discussed in Parkman, *Jesuits in North America*, pp. 465-7.

¹⁰⁰Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, X, 249; XIII, 141; XVII, 95; XVIII, 19, 97.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, X, 301.

¹⁰²One of these trips was to visit the father of a young convert named Amantacha who lived at St. Joseph (*ibid.*, VIII, 139). A careful tabulation by Miss Clark of the places the Jesuits mention visiting each year and the amount of attention given to each village in Huronia shows clearly that prior to 1640 their activities were confined to the Bear nation and particularly to the Penetang Peninsula. After that time their mission work spread into all parts of Huronia.

¹⁰³To less than twelve thousand.

¹⁰⁴Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XIX, 123, 127; VIII, 145-7. The high mortality rate among children is an over-all impression gained from reading the relations of the years 1636-40. It also corresponds with what is known about similar epidemics among other Indian groups.

The Jesuits, who wished to save the souls of dying children, frequently baptized them, both with and without their parents' permission. The Huron, being unclear about the Jesuits' intention in doing this, observed that children tended to die soon after baptism and came to suspect that the Jesuits were practising a deadly form of witchcraft.¹⁰⁵ The rumour revived that the Jesuits had been sent to Huronia to seek revenge for Brûlé's murder,¹⁰⁶ a rumour which gained credence from pictures of the torments of hell that the Jesuits displayed in their chapel and from the ritual of the mass (which the Huron understood had something to do with eating a corpse).¹⁰⁷ According to Huron law, sorcerers could be killed without a trial, and in times of crisis extensive pogroms appear to have been unleashed against persons suspected of this crime.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, while individuals threatened to murder the Jesuits and on one occasion a council of the confederacy met to try the Jesuits on a charge of witchcraft,¹⁰⁹ none of the Frenchmen in Huronia was killed.

Although the majority of the people were frightened of the Jesuits and believed that they were working to destroy the country, their leaders repeatedly stressed that they could not afford to rupture the Franco-Huron alliance by killing the French priests.¹¹⁰ One well-placed chief said that if the Huron did not go downriver to trade with the French for even two years, they would be lucky if they found themselves as well off as the [despised] Algonkians.¹¹¹ While this statement was a bit of rhetoric, it stresses the importance of the fur trade to the Huron at this time and their growing reliance on French trade goods. During the entire course of the epidemics only one village, apparently a small one, was willing to give up the use of trade goods, and hence presumably to sever relations with the French.¹¹² Instead, the Huron resorted to indirect means to persuade the Jesuits to leave Huronia *voluntarily*. Children were encouraged to annoy them, their religious objects were befouled, and occasionally they were personally threatened or mistreated.¹¹³ The Jesuits noted, rather significantly, that these persecutions diminished before the annual trip downriver or after the return of a successful fleet.¹¹⁴ The French officials in Quebec were aware of the dangerous situation in which the Jesuits found themselves, but as long as feelings ran high in Huronia, these authorities could do no more than to try to spare them from the worst

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, XIX, 223.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, XXXIX, 129.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, XV, 59-67.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, XIV, 17, 53, 99-103.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, XIX, 179.

¹¹⁰At all times the Huron leaders appear to have been convinced that killing a priest or one of their assistants would terminate the Franco-Huron alliance.

¹¹¹Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XIII, 215, 217. For a French statement emphasizing the Huron dependence on trade goods see XXXII, 179 (1647-48).

¹¹²*Ibid.*, XV, 21.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, XV, 51.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, XV, 55; XVII, 115.

excesses of Huron anger. They did this by threatening to cut off trade if the Jesuits were killed.

By 1640 the serious epidemics in Huronia were over. That summer, the new governor of Canada, Charles Huault de Montmagny, took action to "punish" the Huron who came to Quebec for their bad treatment of the Jesuits.¹¹⁵ It is not clear what form this punishment took, but it appears that in the course of his dealings with them he made it clear that he considered their bad treatment of the Jesuits had terminated the existing alliance. At the same time he offered to renew the alliance, but only on the clear understanding that the Jesuits would continue to live in Huronia and work there unmolested. This is the first time, to our knowledge, that French officials had injected a positive element of threat into their dealings with the Huron. Presumably, the great losses in manpower and skills that the Huron had suffered and their consequent increasing dependence on trade and French support made such action possible. The Huron were in good health and expecting an abundant harvest; hence, many of the anxieties that had plagued them in recent years were dispelled. Because of this they were once more in a good mood and, hence, under the protection of a renewed Franco-Huron alliance the Jesuits found themselves free not only to continue the mission work among them but also to intensify their efforts.¹¹⁶

Already during the final crisis of 1639, the Jesuits had decided to establish a permanent centre for their missionary work in the Huron area. This centre was foreseen as serving various functions. Not only would it provide a refuge in time of danger (such as they lacked in 1639), but it also would allow them to put up buildings of European design. It had not been economical to construct these in the Huron villages which shifted their location about once every decade. The Jesuits' centre was thus designed to be a further example of European culture in the heart of Huronia, a focus from which new ideas could diffuse to the local population. Gradually, pigs, fowl, and young cattle were brought upriver from Quebec and European crops were grown in the fields nearby.¹¹⁷ The residence of Ste Marie acquired a hospital and a burial ground and became a place where Christian Indians could come for spiritual retreats and assemble on feast days.¹¹⁸ Being located apart from any one village, and near the geographical centre of the confederacy, it was better able, both from a political and a geographical point of view, to serve as a mission centre for all Huronia. (During the worst years of the epidemics the Jesuits had remained

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, XXI, 143; XXII, 310.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, XXI, 131.

¹¹⁷One heifer and a small cannon arrived in 1648 (*ibid.*, XXXII, 99).

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, XXVI, 201.

for the most part in the northwest corner of Huronia.) In 1639 the Jesuits also made a survey and census of the country prior to setting up a system of missions that would carry the Christian message to all of the Huron tribes and, as far as possible, to other tribes as well.¹¹⁹

The Jesuits had thus weathered a difficult period. It is clear that they had been allowed to enter Huronia and to continue there only because of the Franco-Huron alliance. That they were not killed or expelled from Huronia at the height of the epidemics is an indication of how dependent the Hurons were becoming on the fur trade and how much the alliance with the French meant to them. It also indicates that the Huron leaders were able to restrain their unruly followers in order to preserve good relations with New France.¹²⁰ Evidence of lingering malice towards the priests can be seen in the events that came to light on the visit of Fathers Brébeuf and Chaumonot to the Neutral country in the winter of 1640-41. There the priests learned that the Huron had offered the Neutral rich presents, if they would kill the missionaries.¹²¹ In this way the Huron hoped to destroy two of the "sorcerers" who had been tormenting their nation without endangering the French alliance. They also had other motives, however. The proposed murder, so long as it was not traced back to the Huron, would put the Neutral in a bad light and would prevent Brébeuf from pursuing any dealings with the Seneca. Although there is no evidence that Brébeuf planned to visit the Seneca, a rumour had spread that having failed to kill the Huron with witchcraft he now was seeking to turn their enemies loose upon them.¹²²

A CRISIS IN HURON-IROQUOIS RELATIONS

If the year 1640 marked the end of the persecution of the Jesuits in Huronia, unknown to them and to their Huron hosts, it also marked the beginning of a crisis that was to destroy Huronia. Beaver had become rare in the Huron country and most of the skins they traded

¹¹⁹Concerning the establishment of Ste Marie and the mission system see *ibid.*, XIX, 123-65.

¹²⁰There is a considerable amount of other evidence concerning the coercive power of Huron chiefs. See B. G. Trigger, "Order and Freedom in Huron Society," *Anthropologica*, N.S., V (1963), 151-69.

¹²¹Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXI, 213. About the same time the Huron were spreading bad reports concerning the Jesuits among the Petun (XX, 54) with whom they had recently made a new treaty of friendship (XX, 43). These rumours were spread by Huron traders.

¹²²*Ibid.*, XXX, 75-7. So bitter was the Huron opposition to Brébeuf after he returned to Huronia that the Huron mission was compelled to send him down to Quebec until the situation quieted down (XXIII, 35).

with the French came from neighbouring tribes to the north.¹²³ A similar decline in the beaver population of New York State seems to have reached a point of crisis by 1640. That year the number of pelts traded at Fort Orange is reported to have dropped sharply.¹²⁴ While it is possible that at least part of the decline was the result of clandestine traders cutting into official trade, most commentators agree that it was basically related to the exhaustion of the supply of beaver in the Iroquois' home territory.¹²⁵

While this hypothesis is not well enough documented that it can be regarded as certain, it seems a useful one for explaining Iroquois behaviour during the next few years. There is little doubt that after 1640 the Iroquois were preoccupied with securing new sources of pelts. The main controversy concerning their relations with their neighbours during this period centres on whether they were seeking to obtain furs by forcing the Huron to share their trade with them¹²⁶ or were attacking their neighbours in order to secure new hunting territories. Although Trelease¹²⁷ supports the latter theory, the data he uses apply for the most part to a later period and come mainly from sources in New York State and New England. Contemporary Canadian evidence definitely seems to rule out his claims; indeed if his hypothesis were true, the events leading to the destruction of Huronia would make little sense at all.

Trelease's theory finds its main support in claims made by the Iroquois in the early part of the eighteenth century that they had conquered Ontario and adjacent regions as beaver hunting grounds. In the treaty of 1701, in which the Iroquois placed their "Beaver ground" under the protection of the King of England, the Iroquois said explicitly that they had driven the indigenous tribes from this area in order to hunt there.¹²⁸ Trelease errs, however, in assuming that the reasons the Iroquois gave for conquering this territory in 1701 were the same as those they actually had for doing so half a century earlier. There is no doubt that in 1701 the Iroquois (mainly the Seneca) were hunting beaver in Ontario, but since the Huron country was reported in the 1630s to be as hunted out as their own it is

¹²³The Jesuit Relation of 1635 records that the beaver was already totally extinct in the Huron country and that all the skins they traded with the French were obtained elsewhere (*ibid.*, VIII, 57).

¹²⁴Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, pp. 118-20; Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 32-4. For a later source see Jean Talon cited in Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, 137.

¹²⁵Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 32-4; Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, p. 118.

¹²⁶This theory was first advanced by C. H. McIlwain in 1915. It was taken up in Innis, *Fur Trade*, pp. 34-6 and Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 32-7, 74.

¹²⁷Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, p. 120.

¹²⁸E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* . . . (15 vols.; Albany, 1853-87), IV, 908.

illogical to assume that they attacked this region in 1649 in order to secure more hunting territory. The Huron beaver supplies they sought to capture were those coming by trade from the north. Only after their attacks failed to capture the western fur trade and after Ontario was deserted for a time allowing the restoration of the local beaver population did the Iroquois begin to hunt there. Since they lacked historical records, it is not surprising that by 1701 the Iroquois believed the use that they were making of Ontario at the present time was the same reason they had for attacking the tribes there long before. The attacks that the Iroquois launched against the Petun and Neutral, following their attack on the Huron, offer no opposition to this theory. Although these groups had not participated in the fur trade prior to 1649, there was considerable danger that with the Huron gone they would attempt to do so. Hence, their dispersal was also necessary.

Trelease's theory thus fails to provide an acceptable explanation of events in Canada in the middle of the seventeenth century. It seems much more likely that the Iroquois, and mainly the Mohawk, began by trying to force the Huron to trade with them and that only latterly, when their efforts in this direction were unsuccessful, did they decide to destroy the Huron (and their neighbours) as an intermediary group.

The Mohawk began to intimidate the Huron by harassing those travelling along the Ottawa River—a tactic that had the additional advantage of providing a supply of captured furs. In 1642 Iroquois raiders spread fear and terror throughout all of the Huron villages,¹²⁹ and in 1644 they succeeded in preventing contact between Quebec and Huronia.¹³⁰ The increasing number of guns that the Iroquois were acquiring from the Dutch, English, and Swedish colonies along the Atlantic seaboard gradually gave them military superiority over the Huron, among whom the French had limited and controlled the sale of guns.¹³¹ In 1644 the French despatched more than twenty soldiers to Huronia to protect the Huron over the winter and assure the arrival of their furs in Quebec the next spring.¹³² The Mohawk were also harassing the French in the St. Lawrence Valley who were moved the next spring to discuss peace, both to assure their own safety and to re-open the river to trade. Although the subsequent treaty of 1645 was with the French, the Mohawk seem to have interpreted it as involving a commitment that in the future the Huron would trade with them as well as with the French.¹³³ The Huron, however, had no

¹²⁹Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXIII, 105.

¹³⁰Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, p. 76.

¹³¹Tooker, "Defeat of the Huron," pp. 117–18.

¹³²Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXVI, 71; XXVII, 89, 277. Brébeuf returned to Huronia at this time.

¹³³Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 77–8.

intention of doing this, and the French, who may not have perceived clearly what the Mohawk wanted, did not want to encourage them to divert trade. The main French reason for the treaty with the Mohawk was the short-term one of opening the river. The French had little to offer the Iroquois in return and refused to sell them guns, the one item they wanted.¹³⁴ When it became clear to the Mohawk that the Huron did not intend to trade with them, they renewed their attack on Huronia and on the Huron fleet.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CHRISTIAN FACTION

While this dangerous crisis in intertribal relations was boiling up, a situation was developing in Huronia that put a new strain on the Franco-Huron alliance.

Prior to 1640, most Christian converts were Hurons on the point of death, many of whom knew nothing about Christian theology but who hoped that baptism would save their lives.¹³⁵ At one point during the epidemics a Huron version of the rite of baptism became part of a native healing cult that was said to be inspired by a native deity who had revealed himself as the real Jesus.¹³⁶ In these rites the sick were sprinkled with water as part of an orgiastic ceremony typical of traditional Huron healing rituals. After 1640, however, the Jesuits began to convert increasing numbers of people who were in good health. Many were men of importance, whose conversions made that of their families, friends, and tribesmen easier.¹³⁷ In order to prevent backsliding, the Jesuits at first made it a policy to baptise (except in cases of extreme ill health) only adults who had provided substantial proof of their devotion to Christianity and whose family life seemed to be stable.¹³⁸

Many factors seem to have induced people to convert: some admired the bravery of the Jesuits, others wished to be able to follow a Christian friend to heaven, still others noted in their names a theological term that the Jesuits were using.¹³⁹

Although economic motives were not the only ones involved in conversion, it is noteworthy that at least a few Huron became Christians to avoid participation in pagan feasts, which required them to give away considerable amounts of property in the form of presents

¹³⁴For the Iroquois desire to obtain French guns, see the evidence presented in Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, p. 74.

¹³⁵Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, X, 13; XIII, 171.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, XX, 27-31.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, XX, 225; XXVI, 275.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, XV, 109. For the later relaxation of these requirements see XXXIII, 145-7.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, XIX, 191.

and entertainment.¹⁴⁰ A far larger number of people hoped through conversion to receive preferential treatment in their dealings with traders and officials in New France.¹⁴¹ In 1648, when only 15 per cent of the Huron were Christian, half of the men in the Huron fleet were either converts or were preparing for baptism.¹⁴² Those who traded with the French in Quebec not only were more exposed to French culture and to Christianity than were those who remained at home but also had more to gain from good relations with the French. Commercial considerations may also explain why the Jesuits generally found it easier to convert men than women.

While stressing the practical economic motives that certainly motivated many conversions, personal and cultural factors should not be ignored. The Huron were increasingly dependent on French culture and in the eyes of many, but (as we shall see) certainly not all, of the Huron the priest was coming to replace the native sorcerer as an object of awe and respect. This did not, however, lead the Huron to lose faith in themselves or in their culture, as it did many other tribes.¹⁴³ Supported by the respect shown by the Jesuits for the Huron people and for much of their culture, many Huron converts appear to have been imbued with a sincere zeal to change and reform their own culture. No doubt the size of the Huron confederacy and its isolation from unsupervised contact with the Europeans did much to prevent the deterioration in self-confidence that is obvious among many weaker tribes. Had other circumstances not been adverse, I think it would have been possible for the Jesuits to have transformed Huronia successfully into a nation that was both Christian and Indian.

For a time the growing number of Huron converts posed no serious problems for the rest of society, although individual converts were frequently taunted and sometimes expelled from their longhouses with much resulting personal hardship.¹⁴⁴ (A woman who had been a member of a pagan healing society was threatened with death when after conversion she refused to perform in the society.¹⁴⁵) Threats and assassination no doubt were the fate of other converts. The Jesuits and their assistants, however, were no longer attacked or molested in any way.¹⁴⁶ It appears that at least some headmen surrendered their

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, XVII, 111; XXIII, 129.

¹⁴¹Concerning this preferential treatment see *ibid.*, XX, 225, 227.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, XXXII, 179.

¹⁴³Vachon, "L'Eau-de-vie."

¹⁴⁴Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXIII, 67, 127; XXVI, 229. Pagan women also attempted to seduce Christian men to persuade them to give up their faith (XXX, 33). The Relation of 1643 mentions that some converts lived for six months at Quebec to avoid facing temptation in their homeland (XXIV, 121).

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, XXX, 23.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*, XXI, 131.

political office on becoming Christians, since they felt that the obligation to participate in Huron festivals which these offices entailed was contrary to their new faith.¹⁴⁷ In this and in other ways the nascent Christian community avoided for a time the possibility of an open clash with the large pagan majority.

Gradually, however, a rift began. Some Christians refused, for example, to be buried in their tribal ossuaries, which in effect was to deny membership in their village or tribe.¹⁴⁸ They also refused to fight alongside pagans in the war parties but instead formed their own detachments, no doubt because of the religious implications of traditional Iroquoian warfare.¹⁴⁹ As the number of converts grew, men retained their political offices after conversion, but appointed deputies to handle the religious functions traditionally associated with them.¹⁵⁰ As the number of Christians who held these important offices continued to grow, the split between pagans and Christians became increasingly a political issue.

The Jesuits, for their part, now set as their immediate goal the Christianizing of an entire village.¹⁵¹ Significantly the most promising town was Ossossané where the Jesuits had been working for a long time. This town, belonging to the Bear tribe, was also the political centre of the Huron confederacy.¹⁵² In 1648 they achieved their objective. By then the majority of people in Ossossané were converts. And that winter the chiefs of the village refused to allow the people who remained pagan to celebrate the traditional festivals, and they appointed a Jesuit as the chief headman of the village, with the right to act as a censor of public morals.¹⁵³

THE PAGAN REACTION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HURONIA

Although in 1645 such social revolutions were still several years in the future, many of the pagans had already begun to fear for the survival of their traditional customs and beliefs.¹⁵⁴ Undoubtedly a large number of these people were genuinely attached to the old ways and for this reason alone resented the growth of Christianity. It is also

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, XXIII, 185.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, XXIII, 31.

¹⁴⁹For another reference to the Huron-pagan rift see *ibid.*, XXIII, 267.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, XXVIII, 89. For other acts of Christian assertiveness around this time see XXIX, 263-9; XXX, 63.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, XXV, 85.

¹⁵²Tross, éd., *Histoire du Canada*, I, 200; *ibid.*, V, 259.

¹⁵³Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXXIV, 105, 217.

¹⁵⁴For one incident see *ibid.*, XXX, 61-3. Various cults also arose that appear to have been aimed at organizing ideological resistance to Christianity. One was the cult of a forest monster (XXX, 27); the second was more explicitly anti-Christian (XXX, 29-31).

possible that many chiefs who wished to remain pagan began to fear a decline in their own influence as Christians began to play a stronger role in the life of the country. They probably resented the closer contacts that Christian chiefs had with the French and feared that these contacts would be used as a source of power. As a result of these fears and rivalries, pagan and Christian factions began to develop within the various tribes and villages throughout Huronia.¹⁵⁵

Although the documentation in the Jesuit Relations is scanty, there appears to have been a considerable variation in attitude towards the Jesuits and Christianity among the different Huron tribes. The Bear, among whom the Jesuits had lived for the longest time and whose main town, Ossossané, had a large and rapidly growing Christian community, seem to have been the most pro-Christian and pro-French.¹⁵⁶ The Cord probably had much the same sort of attitude.¹⁵⁷ The Rock and Deer tribes, however, seem to have been considerably less friendly. The Jesuits report that the former tribe, being the easternmost, had suffered most from the attacks of the Iroquois and was therefore the most inclined to seek peace with their traditional enemies. The Rock were also described, however, as a tribe with a strong aversion to the faith who never had been converted.¹⁵⁸ The Deer had a reputation among the Jesuits for being sorcerers,¹⁵⁹ and one assumes from this that they gave the missionaries a bad time. Both of these tribes joined the Iroquois of their own free will after the break-up of Huronia in 1649.¹⁶⁰ Despite this variation, however, there were people in all the Huron tribes who were starting to have misgivings about the future of Huronia and who resented the changes that the French alliance was bringing about.

After 1645 these sentiments seem to have led to the formation of a sizable anti-French party, which apparently found a certain amount of support everywhere in Huronia, except perhaps in Ossossané. This marked a new development in French-Huron relations, all previous

¹⁵⁵As one Huron put it, "I am more attached to the church than to my country or relatives" (*ibid.*, XXIII, 137). The Jesuits also observed that it was hard to be a good Christian and a good Huron (XXVIII, 53).

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, XXVI, 217. The Jesuits had noted the special inclination of the Bear tribe to receive Christianity as early as 1636 (X, 31).

¹⁵⁷After the destruction of Huronia the Cord were very loyal to the French. They were the only Huron tribe that refused to leave Quebec to go and live with the Iroquois (*ibid.*, XLIII, 191). Prior to 1640, the Cord were not at all friendly with the Jesuits (XVII, 59); their change in attitude seems to have come about soon after (XXI, 285; XXIII, 151; XXVI, 265).

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, XLII, 73. Concerning their early desire for peace with the Iroquois see XXXIII, 119-21.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, XVII, 89.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, XXXVI, 179. The Deer lived among the Seneca in their own village and on good terms with their hosts (XLIV, 21). Many Rock people including the Indians of Contarea, lived among the Onondaga (XLII, 73).

opposition having been to the priests resident in Huronia rather than to the French in general. Supporters of this party seem to have reasoned that Christianity was a threat to Huronia, that Christianity flourished because the Jesuits were able to work there under the terms of the Franco-Huron alliance, and that the best way to save the country (and enhance the power of the pagan chiefs at the expense of their Christian rivals) was therefore to expel the Jesuits, break off the alliance, and begin trading with the Iroquois. In this way, not only would the traditional culture of Huronia be saved, but the attacks of the Iroquois, which had been growing in intensity,¹⁶¹ could be brought to an end. Thus for the first time a respectable body of opinion in Huronia came to believe that an alliance with enemies who shared similar beliefs and culture was preferable to one with strangers seeking to change the Huron way of life. The threat that was facing the traditionalists made the thought of trading with their old enemies and rivals seem much less unpleasant than it had been a few years previously.

The first plan for a rapprochement with the Iroquois was well conceived and sought to exploit internal differences within the Iroquois confederacy for the Hurons' own advantage. Since the treaty of 1645 had failed to obtain the furs they wanted, the Mohawk were likely to be suspicious of, if not hostile to, further Huron blandishments. The Seneca likewise were unfriendly because of recent Huron attacks on them.¹⁶² The Onondaga, however, had long enjoyed the position of being the chief tribe in the confederacy and were increasingly jealous of the Mohawk, who were exploiting their close contacts with the Dutch and the English in an effort to dominate the league.¹⁶³ It is therefore no surprise that it was through the Onondaga that the Huron attempted to make peace with the Iroquois.

The Jesuits did not record, and may not have known, the exact nature of the treaty that the Huron were trying to negotiate. The presence of a clause promising that the Huron would trade furs with the Iroquois is suggested by a remark, attributed to the Andaste or Susquehannock (who were allies of the Huron and sent ambassadors to the Onondaga to argue on their behalf), that such a treaty would promote the trade of all these tribes with one another.¹⁶⁴ It is also significant that among the Huron the Bear tribe was the one most opposed to this treaty.¹⁶⁵ The Jesuits said this was because the Bear had suffered less from Iroquois raids than had the other Huron tribes, but a second reason could be that the Christians, who were more

¹⁶¹For evidence of incipient deterioration in morale and the beginning of the abandonment of Huronia in the face of Iroquois attack, see *ibid.*, XXX, 87; XXXIII, 83-9.

¹⁶²*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 125. Hunt (*Wars of the Iroquois*, p. 72) notes that in 1637 the Huron had broken a peace treaty with the Seneca.

¹⁶³Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXXIII, 71, 123.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 131.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 119-21.

numerous in this tribe than in the others, saw in these negotiations a clear threat to the Franco-Huron alliance and to their own power and well-being. Negotiations continued for some time, but were terminated in January 1648, when a party of Mohawk warriors slew a Huron embassy on its way to the chief Onondaga town to arrange the final terms of the treaty.¹⁶⁶ A distinguished Onondaga chief, who had remained in Huronia as a hostage, committed suicide when he learned what the Mohawk had done.¹⁶⁷

There seems little reason to doubt the honesty of the Onondaga in these negotiations. The Mohawk probably attacked the Huron embassy because they were angry that negotiations were being conducted with the Onondaga rather than with them. The Mohawk may also have believed that the Huron were trying to deceive the Onondaga and that the only way of dealing with the Huron confederacy was to destroy it. In any case, the Mohawk managed to bring the first major political offensive of the anti-French faction in Huronia to an ignominious conclusion.

Even though this first effort had failed, at least some Huron apparently believed that a rapprochement with the Iroquois still was possible. Indeed, either because they were totally convinced of the necessity of appeasing the Iroquois or because of their extreme hatred of the Christians, a minority seems to have become convinced that a break with the French was a precondition for further negotiation. The group responsible for the next move was led by six, apparently distinguished, chiefs from three villages.¹⁶⁸ Unfortunately, these village are unnamed. The chiefs decided to make a public issue of the question of a continued Franco-Huron alliance through the simple expedient of killing a Frenchman. They do not appear to have designated any particular victim and their henchmen slew Jacques Douart, a *donné* whom they encountered not far from Ste Marie. Once Douart was slain, the conspirators issued a proclamation calling for the banishment from Huronia of the French and all of the Huron who insisted on remaining Christian.¹⁶⁹ An emergency council was convened (apparently from all over the country) and for several days these proposals were debated. On the one side were the Christians and those pagans who felt that the Franco-Huron alliance should continue; on the other the traditionalists who had stirred up the trouble and no doubt some other Hurons who hated neither Christianity nor the

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 125.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 125-7. He probably did this through anger at his allies and to show the innocence of the Onondaga. He might also have committed suicide to avoid Huron vengeance directed against his person, but this would have been construed as an act of cowardice. It is unlikely that the Onondaga would have exposed an important chief to almost certain death had they not been negotiating in good faith.

¹⁶⁸*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 229.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 231.

French, but who felt that a peace treaty with the Iroquois was important enough to be worth the termination of the French alliance. Among the latter must have been many refugees from the Rock tribe which had been forced to abandon its villages as a result of Iroquois attacks only a short time before.¹⁷⁰ The pro-French party finally won the debate and the Jesuits in turn agreed to accept the traditional Huron compensation for a murder, in this case one hundred beaver skins.¹⁷¹ The ritual presentation of this settlement made clear that it was designed to reaffirm and protect the Franco-Huron alliance which the unprecedented actions of these chiefs had endangered. Thus ended what appears to have been the last attempt to rupture the Franco-Huron alliance.

During the summer of 1648 the Seneca attacked and destroyed the large town of St. Joseph. As the situation grew more serious the Huron turned increasingly to the French for help and the number of conversions increased sharply.¹⁷² As in 1644, a few French soldiers were sent to winter in Huronia. These soldiers, so long as they remained in Huronia, were believed sufficient to hold off the Iroquois, but they had been instructed to return to Quebec with the Huron fleet in the spring.¹⁷³ As the military situation in Huronia grew more desperate, the French in Quebec became increasingly anxious to profit as much as possible while they still could. In the summer of 1649, a party of over thirty coureurs de bois made a flying trip to Huronia and returned to Quebec bringing with them 5000 pounds of beaver.¹⁷⁴

In the spring of 1649 the Iroquois unleashed the attack that resulted in the death of Fathers Lalemant and Brébeuf and brought about the dispersal of the Huron confederacy. Many factors contributed to the Iroquois victory, but their superior number of guns was undoubtedly the most important.¹⁷⁵ Hunt has suggested that the Huron were so given over to trading by 1649 that virtually all of their food was imported from the Neutral and Petun tribes and that the main factor in their defeat was therefore the cutting of their supply routes.¹⁷⁶ This suggestion is entirely without foundation. Agriculture was a woman's occupation and little affected by increasing trade. While men may have spent more time trading, the importation of iron axes made

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 81.

¹⁷¹*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 233-49.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, XXXIV, 227.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, XXXIV, 83.

¹⁷⁴Lancot, *History of Canada*, I, 194, based on *ibid.*, XXXIV, 59-61.

¹⁷⁵Tooker, "Defeat of the Hurons," pp. 117-18; Innis, *Fur Trade*, pp. 35-6. For the effective use of firearms by the Iroquois see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXII, 307. The Jesuits saw the danger of growing Iroquois firepower as early as 1642 (XXII, 307) but the French officials in Quebec never developed a policy to counteract it. The restiveness of the Huron pagans may be one reason why the French did not want too many guns in Huron hands, even if they were being sold only to Christians.

¹⁷⁶Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, p. 59.

it easier to cut trees and hence there was no problem clearing the forests for agriculture. There are frequent references to the Huron as engaged in agricultural activities in the years prior to 1649 and one of the reasons the Iroquois returned to Huronia in the spring of 1650 was to prevent the planting of crops.¹⁷⁷ Driven from their homes and deprived of food, the Hurons scattered and their trading monopoly came to an end. It is interesting that large numbers of Huron, particularly from the Rock and Deer tribes, migrated to the Iroquois country and settled there. The latter tribe settled *en masse* among the Seneca, where they lived in their own village and retained their separate customs for a long time.¹⁷⁸ Their tribal affiliations suggest that these refugees were for the most part traditionalists and probably among them were many of the people who had been the most hostile to the French during the last years of the Jesuit mission. This hostility explains how these groups were so easily adopted by the people who had destroyed their homeland.

For the Jesuits the destruction of Huronia was the end of their first dream of leading a nation to Christianity in the heart of the Canadian forest. At least once in the Relations they mentioned the work their colleagues were accomplishing in Paraguay and compared this work with their own.¹⁷⁹ The chance had been lost of converting a people to Christianity while allowing them to retain their language and those institutions and customs that were not incompatible with their new faith. Because they were writing for a patriotic French audience, the Jesuits have little to say about the constitutional status of the Huronia they wished to create. Nevertheless, it seems clear that what they aimed at was not so much a French colony as an Indian state, which under Jesuit leadership could blend the good things of Europe with those already in the native culture. A Catholic Huronia would of necessity have been allied with France, the only Catholic power in eastern North America. Years later Louis de Buade de Frontenac probably came closer to a basic truth than he realized when he accused the Jesuits at Quebec of disloyalty because they kept the Indians apart from the French and taught them in their own language.¹⁸⁰

The fur trade was the one means by which the Jesuits could gain admittance to Huronia and the only protection they had while working there. Ties with fur traders and government officials in Quebec were thus vital for the success of the Huron mission, but these ties do not

¹⁷⁷Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XXXV, 191.

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, XXXVI, 179; XLIV, 21; XLV, 243. Many of the Rock nation, particularly from Contarea, were later found living with the Onondaga (XLII, 73).

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*, XII, 221. The work in Paraguay is also mentioned in XV, 127.

¹⁸⁰G. Lanctot, *A History of Canada*, II (Toronto, 1964), 63.

seem to have prevented the Jesuits from seeking to serve the best interests of their Huron converts and Huronia at large—as they perceived these interests. To reverse the equation and say that the Jesuits were in Huronia mainly *for the purpose* of serving either the fur trade or the French government does not accord with anything we know about their activities.

In the short run the destruction of Huronia was a serious setback for New France. For a time the fur trade, on which the well-being of the colony depended, was cut to practically nothing. The Iroquois, on the other hand, seem to have achieved less than they hoped for from the destruction of Huronia. The western tribes soon became involved in a protracted war with the Erie¹⁸¹ and tribal jealousies rent the confederacy. As a result of these jealousies the four western tribes began to trade with the French to avoid travelling through Mohawk towns to reach the Dutch.¹⁸² By 1654 the French were starting to put together the rudiments of a new trading network north of the Great Lakes.¹⁸³ The remnants of the Huron and Petun who had remained in this area, and more importantly the Ottawa, an Algonkian tribe, played a major role in pushing this trading network to the west in the years that followed.¹⁸⁴ As the population of New France increased, the young men of the colony, with or without official permission, joined in this trade. Thus the destruction of Huronia was neither a total nor a permanent disaster for New France and certainly it did not help to save North America for Protestantism and the Anglo-Saxons as at least one eminent historian has suggested.¹⁸⁵

A more serious question is what would have happened had the anti-French party in Huronia been successful. Had they been able to organize an effective resistance to the Huron Christians and conclude a treaty with the Iroquois, the trade from the north might have been diverted permanently from the St. Lawrence into the Hudson Valley. Had that happened (and as Sagard and Le Clercq indicate the people in Quebec knew it well¹⁸⁶) the chances of the infant French colony surviving even for a short time would have been slim. Instead of the destruction of Huronia tipping the balance of power in favour of the English, its survival might well have led to a Huron-Iroquois alliance that would have resulted in the destruction of New France and the end of the French presence in North America.

¹⁸¹Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 100–2.

¹⁸²Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XLI, 201–3, and XLIV, 151; Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 99, 100.

¹⁸³Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XL, 215; Lanctot, *History of Canada*, I, 212–13. On the lack of furs in Montreal in 1652–53 see Thwaites, ed., *Relations*, XL, 211.

¹⁸⁴Hunt, *Wars of the Iroquois*, pp. 102–3.

¹⁸⁵Parkman, *Jesuits in North America*, pp. 550–3.

¹⁸⁶Tross, éd., *Histoire du Canada*, III, 811; Le Clercq, *Establishment*, I, 204.

The British Government, Sir John A. Macdonald, and the Fenian Claims

BRIAN JENKINS

TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE of the aftermath of the American Civil War—a surplus of war matériel, a period of political confusion, and an atmosphere of anglophobia—the Fenian Brotherhood subjected Canadians to a period of continual harassment and occasional invasion. This unprovoked campaign of terror and intimidation, designed by the American Fenians to extract Irish independence from Great Britain, resulted in the loss of several lives and considerable economic and social dislocation. It was to be expected, therefore, that the Canadian government would seek redress, and they sought compensation from two sources.

The first was the more obvious: they expected the United States to pay. The Canadian government quickly evinced a determination to write the Fenian claims into any general settlement of Anglo-American problems. During the negotiations of the ill-fated Johnson-Clarendon Convention two Canadian privy councillors then in London seized the opportunity to press Canada's Fenian claims. In December 1868 Sir George Cartier and W. McDougall wrote to Lord Granville, then Colonial Secretary, requesting that any tribunal established to adjudicate the *Alabama* claims also be empowered to adjust those arising out of the Fenian raids.¹ This request was forwarded immediately to Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Office, and in his reply he advised Granville to inform the Canadians "that if a Mixed Commission is constituted for the settlement of British and American claims due

¹Cartier & McDougall to Granville, Dec. 28, 1868, FO 5/1344, Public Record Office (PRO), London.

notice will be given so that all parties may present their claims.”² Unfortunately this settlement, which would have embraced the claims, was repudiated by the United States Senate on April 13, 1869.

The untimely demise of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention did not end Canadian interest in the Fenian claims, and a debate in the Dominion parliament during May made it quite clear that they had not been forgotten or the United States forgiven.³ Obviously the Canadians did not need the reminder, provided by the abortive raids in May 1870, of the expense to which they were periodically put to defend their country against unprovoked assaults by American citizens and residents. However, when the Canadian Postmaster General, Alexander Campbell, discussed the problem with the Earl of Kimberley, Granville's successor, in July 1870, it quickly became apparent that the Canadian government was prepared to seek an alternative source of compensation. Campbell suggested that the Imperial Treasury should bear some portion of the expenses incurred by the Dominion. The Canadians reasoned that their country, on account of her British connection, had suffered as a result of a quarrel in which she had no interest.⁴

Surprisingly, Campbell's suggestion did not fall upon unreceptive or unsympathetic ears. Indeed, Gladstone himself supported in principle the Canadian position. Unfortunately his support was modified in practice by the fear that such a decision, once made public, would induce the Fenians to launch another assault. The British government therefore procrastinated, studiously avoiding any decision which would have acknowledged their responsibility for the Dominion's losses. Instead, they urged the Canadians to prepare for an official approach to the United States and, on July 27, 1870, suggested that the Canadian government draw up “a full and authentic statement of the facts, and of the claims they found upon them.” When completed it was to be sent to London and the British government would then present it to the United States.⁵ Although the official despatch containing this suggestion made no mention of the Canadian request for imperial compensation Kimberley reassured Governor General Young, in an accompanying private letter, that this did not mean that the request had been denied. The Colonial Secretary emphasized that the presentation of the Canadian statement to the United States was only the first step towards redress and that the imperial government had not

²Clarendon to Granville, Jan. 2, 1869, FO 5/1345.

³Young to Granville, May 5, 1869, *ibid.*

⁴Kimberley Memorandum, July 11, 1870, Kimberley Papers, Public Archives of Canada (PAC).

⁵Kimberley to Young, July 27, 1870, CO 537/102, PAC.

barred, in principle, all future discussion of an imperial contribution.⁶

The Canadian government's diligent compilation of facts, and the expenses they founded upon them, was soon overtaken by the Anglo-American negotiations which led ultimately to the Treaty of Washington. The British government, anxious to settle their difficulties with the United States, attempted, in Gladstone's own words, "to sweeten the *Alabama* question for the United States by bringing in Canada." Gladstone was prepared to negotiate the bitter Canadian-American fisheries dispute. This decision, he realized, would be a pill in need of some sweetening in the Dominion, and this he hoped to do, he wrote to Granville, now Foreign Secretary, "by paying her compensation for the charges of the Fenian raid." At the same time he recognized that this solution might prove awkward, as the British parliament would presumably balk at such a suggestion, "except as part of a final settlement with the United States."⁷ Thus from the outset of the negotiations, October 1870, two points, both pertinent to the later confusion over the Fenian claims, emerge. First, Gladstone and Granville were thinking in terms of imperial rather than American compensation for the raids. This mental concession helps to explain, perhaps, the British government's oversight in failing to specify the Fenian claims as a proper subject for the consideration of the Joint High Commission constituted to settle outstanding problems. Other members of the government may well have assumed that the claims would be admissible but no one ensured that they were. The second point to emerge from the Gladstone-Granville correspondence was the attachment of imperial compensation to a final settlement with the United States. This meant, presumably, the solution of all serious problems.

The announcement of the formation of a joint commission was not wildly applauded in Canada, where there existed a considerable body of opinion favouring a retaliatory policy as a more satisfying answer to recent American conduct. Still, Kimberley hoped that the appointment of Sir John A. Macdonald, the Canadian Prime Minister, as a commissioner would moderate this sentiment. He expected this news to be accepted as evidence of the home government's genuine desire to give Canada every opportunity to make her case and exercise her "due" influence at Washington.⁸

The Gladstone government was also alive to the necessity of

⁶Kimberley to Young, July 28, 1870, Kimberley Papers.

⁷Gladstone to Granville, Oct. 14, 1870, in Agatha Ramm, ed., *Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1868-1876* (2 vols.; London, 1952), I, 147.

⁸Kimberley to Lisgar (Young), Feb. 16, 1871, Kimberley Papers.

preparing for difficulties with Macdonald once the negotiations opened in the American capital. Therefore, while the English commissioners, led by Earl de Grey and Ripon, were still crossing the Atlantic, Gladstone suggested to Granville "that *a propos* of the Commission in America, *this* is the time when we should supply them, through de Grey or Thornton [British minister to the United States], with the means of smoothing over any difficulties which may arise between us and *Canada* in the course of the negotiations by some undertaking on account of the expenses of the Fenian Raid."⁹

Granville forwarded Gladstone's proposal to Kimberley along with the suggestion that the Colonial Office incorporate it into a draft proposal which could then be submitted to Robert Lowe, Chancellor of the Exchequer and confirmed Little Englander, from whom the Prime Minister half expected opposition. Unexpectedly, Kimberley balked at this point. He reminded Granville of the government's decision, a mere seven months earlier, to secure a Canadian statement of claims as the first step, and as this document had just arrived in London he thought the government had nothing to lose by presenting it to the United States before committing Britain to pay. In addition, simply to withdraw a grievance which, in his eyes, was one of the most serious the empire had against the United States would, he reasoned, weaken the position of the British commissioners at Washington. But Kimberley's strongest argument was founded upon political expediency. To make concessions to Canada when she was already "out of humour" with the imperial government might, he feared, encourage the Canadians in the dangerous belief that they could have everything their own way. In other words the Colonial Secretary urged that the concession of imperial compensation, if it became necessary, be made at a more politic moment. "Will not a better opportunity be somewhat later," he wrote to Granville, "when we know what kind of arrangement as to fisheries is possible with the United States? Canada is in a bad temper about the fisheries and will be sure to kick at any reasonable settlement. A little grease to the wheels [later] in the shape of compensation for the Fenian raid might enable us . . . to drive in the right direction."¹⁰ Confronted by such rational opposition Gladstone temporarily dropped his proposal and the government waited for news of the developments in Washington.

There the commissioners were gathering with Macdonald the last to arrive. But he had long been present in the minds of his fellows, exciting the suspicion of the English and the Americans, because it

⁹Gladstone to Granville, Feb. 20, 1871, in Ramm, ed., *Political Correspondence*, I, 223.

¹⁰Kimberley to Granville, Feb. 21, 1871, Granville Papers.

was understood that he was bringing with him Whicker, Deputy Minister of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, who was considered an extremist on the fisheries. Indeed, de Grey was sufficiently unnerved to warn Granville, even before the Canadian arrived and he had had a chance to speak with him, that something from Kimberley might be needed to keep Macdonald "square."¹¹ Yet when the Canadian Prime Minister did appear he was at first reserved and silent, "acquiescing in all that was proposed by saying scarcely anything himself."¹² Lord Tenterden, secretary to the British commissioners, reported to Granville: "Macdonald is reserved, seems inclined to be stiff about the fisheries but to abandon the Fenian raid claims, or, at all events to treat them as of secondary importance."¹³ Certainly the Canadian's principal interest was the terms of any fisheries settlement, and he was determined to be stiff about them, but he was not quite as relaxed in his approach to the claims as Tenterden imagined.

As soon as he arrived in the American capital Macdonald read over the private instructions of the British commissioners; he found them quite satisfactory. "They are quite wide enough," he wrote to a colleague in Canada, "to admit of the presentation of the Fenian claims."¹⁴ And it was at his insistence that the British commissioners decided amongst themselves to raise the claims at the commission's first full meeting on March 4. Doubts had been expressed, particularly in Canada, as to the admissibility of the claims under the terms of the official correspondence establishing the commission,¹⁵ and Macdonald was anxious to test the question immediately. As a result the British broached the subject a little apprehensively, half expecting the Americans to react violently. Instead, they mildly suggested that the claims were not covered by the correspondence, but they agreed that further discussion should be postponed until the claims of British subjects in general were taken up later. The delay suited de Grey who wrote to Granville: "I do not think that it will be possible to make much of them and a postponement of their consideration was therefore very convenient."¹⁶ This lack of determination on the part of the senior British commissioner did not augur well for their successful reintroduction later and may reflect knowledge of the home government's latent willingness to compensate the Dominion.

Further discussion of the claims now rested until the problem of the fisheries threatened to destroy British hopes of a settlement with the

¹¹De Grey to Granville, Feb. 28, 1871, Ripon Papers, British Museum (BM).

¹²De Grey to Granville, March 3, 1871, Granville Papers, PRO.

¹³Tenterden to Granville, March 3, 1871, *ibid.*

¹⁴Macdonald to Tupper, March 5, 1871, Macdonald Letterbooks, PAC.

¹⁵Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1871, II, 59-60.

¹⁶De Grey to Granville, March 7, 1871, Granville Papers.

United States. In its simplest form the point at issue was the readiness of Britain to concede more to the United States than Macdonald believed Canada should be called upon to surrender. The English, of course, believed that Macdonald was demanding more than he had a right to expect, and de Grey quickly turned to the home government for help in bringing the Canadian prime minister into line. Consequently, on March 23, Kimberley wrote to Governor General Young, now Baron Lisgar, informing him that although Canada had the right to expect British support, Britain had a right to expect that the negotiations would not be endangered by a Canadian refusal to deal with the fisheries in a fair and conciliatory spirit.¹⁷ Meanwhile, Granville, taking a more direct approach, was authorizing de Grey to impress upon Macdonald that Britain could not permit her "friendly relations with foreign countries to be affected by unreasonable opposition from the Dominion."¹⁸ But in the struggle to move the Canadian mule the British cabinet decided to use a carrot as well as the goad. On March 25 Granville telegraphed de Grey:

The Cabinet would agree to entertain the question of a moderate compensation to Canada out of the imperial revenue for the Fenian raids, if it was clearly understood to be no precedent for the future, but part of the great and final settlement between Great Britain and the United States. But it should only be hinted to Sir John Macdonald after you have exhausted every effort to obtain such compensation for Canada from the United States, and if you are convinced that it would be an important element in securing a satisfactory settlement of the object of your commission in the aggregate.¹⁹

Obviously this was not an unconditional offer of imperial compensation. First, de Grey was only to raise the matter with Macdonald if compensation from the United States was not forthcoming. Secondly, de Grey was to withhold the concession, even after an American refusal, unless he was convinced it would ease the negotiations in Washington. Thirdly, Canada was to accept only on the clear understanding that the concessions would never be used as a precedent. And finally, imperial compensation was to be accepted on the understanding that it formed an integral part of the final settlement with the United States. The wording of this last condition did not appear at this point ambiguous.

De Grey, confronted by the formidable if not insuperable task of finding a solution to the fisheries that would be acceptable to Macdonald and the Americans, grasped the news from England thankfully. Unfortunately the difficulty of his position, with one of his own

¹⁷Kimberley to Lisgar, March 23, 1871, CO 537/102.

¹⁸Granville to de Grey, March 24, 1871, Granville Papers.

¹⁹Granville to de Grey, March 25, 1871, Ripon Papers.

colleagues representing interests different from those of the British government but at the same time given access to that government's private instructions,²⁰ prompted him to follow an excessively cautious and not entirely open course with Macdonald on the subject of imperial compensation. The result was that de Grey fumbled the Anglo-Canadian arrangement of the Fenian claims: he failed to define explicitly the conditions the British government had attached to their offer.

Anxious to preserve what he hoped would be a trump card until it could be utilized to its greatest advantage, and in accordance with his instructions, de Grey held the news back from Macdonald. As a result April 11 passed before the subject was first discussed.²¹ Then, following a meeting of the commission at which the Americans enlarged upon their technical objections to discussing the claims, the two men talked the problem over. Neither de Grey nor Macdonald now had much hope of securing redress from the United States. Thus it was at this point, with Granville's telegram in his pocket, that de Grey told Macdonald he would sound out the home government on its willingness to compensate the Dominion to get rid of this question. However, in this extremely cautious attempt to whet the Canadian's appetite de Grey had tied imperial compensation solely to the eradication of the claims from the commission's agenda, whereas the British government had attached several other strings to their offer. Undoubtedly, this rather simple arrangement was the construction Macdonald put upon the Englishman's words, and in reply he suggested that a railroad guarantee would be a more useful way of assisting Canada than a pecuniary arrangement.²²

De Grey, still attempting to tempt and prod Macdonald into a fisheries settlement, followed up his initial approach a few days later. On April 16 he informed the Canadian that in reply to his alleged inquiry the British government had agreed to pay compensation on certain conditions, and it was at this moment that he chose to bring forward the substance of Granville's cable of March 25. Compensation was no longer tied exclusively to the removal of the claims; it was now contingent upon Canadian acceptance of some general settlement with the United States, which, if it was to be arranged, would have to include the fisheries. "If, however, other matters are not settled," de Grey emphasized, "this understanding was to go for nothing."²³

Before the arrangement could be completed, however, de Grey

²⁰Granville to Gladstone, April 4, 1871, in Ramm, ed., *Political Correspondence*, I, 232.

²¹De Grey to Granville, April 11, 1871, Ripon Papers.

²²Macdonald to Tupper, April 16, 1871, Macdonald Letterbooks.

²³*Ibid.*

considered himself obligated to make one final attempt to secure redress from the United States. Therefore he raised the claims once again on April 26. Officially, the American commissioners merely repeated their earlier objections. Privately, Hamilton Fish, the American Secretary of State, exerted additional pressure upon de Grey by "frankly" discussing the likelihood of the rejection by the Senate of any treaty which embraced the claims. The point was well taken, but rather than accept the responsibility for the exclusion of the claims himself de Grey asked for time in which to consult his government.²⁴ There was never any doubt, given Gladstone's long-standing willingness to compensate Canada out of imperial funds, of the answer he would receive. The British Prime Minister summarized his position, which was endorsed by the Foreign Secretary, when he wrote to Granville: "I own that in my view their connection with the present subject is not so close as to warrant our pushing a l'outrance the demands for their admission into the Treaty now I hope about to be concluded."²⁵ They were supported by the government's principal legal officer, the Lord Chancellor, who reasoned that an American denial of liability for the Fenian raids would strengthen the British case at the arbitration of the *Alabama* claims. Therefore, although five cabinet members including Kimberley thought the exclusion of the claims "exceedingly objectionable,"²⁶ the point was conceded to the Americans by de Grey on May 3.

Macdonald's reaction to this decision was mixed. He was certainly irritated by the thought that a diplomatic blunder had permitted the United States to escape the consequences of her unjustifiably lax supervision of the Fenians. Yet he also recognized that, from the Canadian standpoint, this blunder was not a disaster. Imperial compensation, he was sure, would be more generous than any Canada might have obtained from the United States.²⁷ His satisfaction was qualified, however, by the realization that the news of the exclusion of the claims would not endear the treaty to the Canadian public. And the American rejection of the claims soon assumed considerable significance. Poor Sir Edward Thornton was pilloried as the principal culprit, but Macdonald and his colleagues received a full measure of the denunciations printed in the *Toronto Globe*.²⁸ Indeed, it was in an effort to nip these protests in the bud that Macdonald impressed upon de Grey the necessity for an early public announcement of the

²⁴De Grey to Granville, April 30, 1871, Ripon Papers.

²⁵Gladstone to Granville, May 1, 1871, Granville Papers.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷Macdonald to Lisgar, May 7, 1871, Macdonald Letterbooks.

²⁸Goldwin Smith, *The Treaty of Washington, 1871: A Study in Imperial History* (Ithaca, 1941), pp. 95-7.

home government's decision to compensate the Dominion. And, at Macdonald's insistence, the senior British commissioner agreed to raise the question with his cabinet colleagues as soon as he returned to England.²⁹ But, as the weeks passed and the assaults on the treaty mounted, no word came from Britain. Although pressed by one of the commissioners, Sir Stafford Northcote (the Conservative party's representative), perhaps at Macdonald's instigation, to give the Canadian Prime Minister what he wanted the cabinet held back. At Kimberley's suggestion they agreed "to wait to see in what temper the Canadian government receives" the treaty.³⁰

The British government's caution was a reflection of their suspicion and fear of Macdonald. At Washington he had consistently demanded, in their eyes, more than he had a right to expect; he had behaved like a huckster rather than a statesman. Certainly his intemperate outbursts in his letters to some of his colleagues in Canada led Lisgar to this conclusion. Consequently the Governor General's response to the suggestion that Macdonald should be rewarded with a privy councillorship for his labours in Washington was vigorous opposition. Referring to his prime minister's letters, Lisgar wrote: "Throughout the whole there is scarcely a shadow of consideration for imperial interests or the importance of procuring, if possible, a good understanding with the United States. The letters are the letters of a huckster, and if produced in Parliament they will cast ridicule on the bestowal of honours in such a case."³¹ For his attitude towards Macdonald, and his decision to send extracts from the letters to London, Lisgar has, by implication at least, been characterized as a malicious enemy of the Prime Minister.³² The question remains, however: Did Macdonald in his handling of the British government and the Fenian claims slip from statesmanship into huckstering?

Personal dislike and distrust of Macdonald were compounded by the fear that he would decide not to support Canadian ratification of the Treaty of Washington. It was by no means a groundless one for he had signed the document with evident displeasure and had told de Grey quite plainly that no action of his as a commissioner must be held to prevent him taking any course he "might deem proper on the subject as a member of the Government and Parliament of Canada."³³ Confronted by this danger the British government were no doubt genuinely convinced that in holding back a public announcement of imperial compensation they were in no way violating the de

²⁹Macdonald to Cartier, May 6, 1871, Macdonald Letterbooks.

³⁰Kimberley to Gladstone, June 19, 1871, Gladstone Papers, BM.

³¹Lisgar to Northcote, May 6, 1871, Ripon Papers.

³²Donald Creighton, *John A. Macdonald* (2 vols., Toronto, 1952), II, 108.

³³Marginalia by de Grey on draft of Kimberley to Lisgar, Sept. 21, 1871, CO 537/102.

Grey-Macdonald understanding. Payment was contingent upon a final settlement with the United States, and if Canada refused to ratify the treaty it was inconceivable that the Washington settlement would be final. Obviously Macdonald's support, as both a commissioner and a prime minister, was vital if ratification was to be secured in Canada. Therefore, when Kimberley wrote a despatch which dealt with the claims it was evident that imperial compensation was largely dependent upon Macdonald's attitude towards the treaty. "What does Sir John Macdonald mean to do?" Kimberley asked in a despatch to Lisgar. "If he is prepared to do his utmost to carry the Treaty through we shall be ready to strengthen his hands with respect to the Fenian claims; but he must understand that there is no chance of his obtaining concessions, such as a guarantee of the Pacific Railroad which he mentioned to Lord de Grey."³⁴ In effect Kimberley was attempting to give notice of the British government's disinclination to haggle any further with Macdonald on this subject.

When he forwarded this news to his prime minister Lisgar proffered the advice that Macdonald would gain more from the British government if he now gave them the assurance they wanted. Unhappily it was accompanied by an ill-considered statement of support for the British government's opposition to a railroad guarantee. A Pacific line, running for long distances through the United States and built largely at American expense, he reasoned, would be a more favourable economic proposition for Canada.³⁵ Macdonald contemptuously disregarded both suggestions, and on July 21 he replied to the Governor General, and through him to Kimberley, with a letter which violently rejected the Colonial Secretary's request. In so doing he opened an acrimonious dispute with Kimberley which both men continued through Lisgar. The root of the dispute was Macdonald's interpretation of the Anglo-Canadian understanding on the Fenian claims, and he sought to explain his position in two long letters on July 21 and November 29, 1871.

He insisted that he had accepted the offer of imperial compensation simply as an inducement not to press the claims before the commission,³⁶ and this was the only construction he could have placed upon de Grey's words when the subject was first broached. However, the Canadian freely admitted that the understanding was contingent upon the settlement of all other questions, but this he interpreted to mean, as he explained on November 29, "that if the negotiations were broken off and no Treaty made, or if any of the other questions in dispute

³⁴Lisgar to Macdonald, July 7, 1871, *ibid.*

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Macdonald to Lisgar, July 21, 1871, CO 537/102.

between the governments stood over for future discussion, that the Fenian claims should stand over as well."³⁷ In other words final settlement meant no more than the successful negotiation of a treaty in Washington, which might or might not be final. Once he had signed as a commissioner the Fenian bargain, in Macdonald's mind, had been sealed.

On the basis of his interpretation Macdonald saw no necessity to give the British government even a personal assurance of support for the treaty. Instead, he announced his determination to stand by the decision of his colleagues, whatever it was, on the question of ratification. Not content with this he also threatened the home government: "I hope no attempt will be made to make the settlement of the former [claims] contingent upon our acceptance of the Treaty. Such an attempt I would consider a breach of the understanding, and would at once abandon any attempt to reconcile my colleagues or the people of Canada to the adoption of the Treaty."³⁸

Lisgar forwarded this belligerent reply to London. He did, however, try to play the part of the honest broker by putting it into the Canadian setting. He enumerated Macdonald's formidable political difficulties: the implacable nature of his enemies, popular dislike of the treaty, especially resentment at the exclusion of the claims, and the approach of a general election. Therefore, Lisgar suggested that the home government yield to Macdonald, putting a ten-year limit on the fisheries clauses as he demanded and granting the Fenian claims on his terms. In return Macdonald, he was confident, would support ratification. "Of a majority if Sir John Macdonald goes straight," he wrote, "there cannot I think be any doubt."³⁹

Neither Macdonald's threats nor Lisgar's blandishments distracted Kimberley from his course, however. For him Macdonald's letters were a clear expression of the Canadian desire to conduct their relations with the mother country upon the childish principle of "heads you lose, tails I win." This principle, he wrote to his colleague at the War Office, Cardwell, "is not one on which our relations can be conducted, and this they must learn."⁴⁰ Thus Macdonald had admitted that compensation was contingent upon the settlement of all other questions, and Kimberley seized upon this admission, scrawling in the margin of the letter: "On his own showing the understanding would be broken and all other questions will not be settled with the United States unless Canada adopts the Treaty."⁴¹ The British government

³⁷Macdonald to Lisgar, Nov. 29, 1871, *ibid.*

³⁸Macdonald to Lisgar, July 21, 1871, *ibid.*

³⁹Lisgar to Kimberley, Aug. 3, 1871, Kimberley Papers.

⁴⁰Kimberley to Cardwell, Sept. 26, 1871, Cardwell Papers, PRO.

⁴¹Macdonald to Lisgar, July 21, 1871, CO 537/102.

understood final settlement to mean just that and not the signing of a document in Washington. For Kimberley the distinction Macdonald drew between himself as a commissioner and as prime minister of Canada and upon which he based his claim to be able to repudiate in Canada a document he had signed in Washington was a futile exercise in mental gymnastics. If the Canadian wished to indulge in it, however, he did so at the cost of forfeiting imperial compensation. The British government, Kimberley wrote to Lisgar, "entirely decline to admit that a conditional promise can be construed as if it were unconditional."⁴² Unfortunately, de Grey had failed to explain the conditions as explicitly as he might have during his conversations with Macdonald in Washington.

Undoubtedly unaware of the root of the confusion, Kimberley believed that a demand for Canadian ratification in exchange for imperial compensation would not have violated the terms of the agreement. More moderate forces within the cabinet, led by Granville and de Grey, were anxious, however, to ensure that Kimberley did not slam the door on some arrangement which would permit Macdonald to announce to the Dominion parliament, before it was called upon to debate the treaty, that Britain was prepared to make some restitution for the Fenian expenses.⁴³ Therefore, in a carefully worded letter, Kimberley restrained himself and merely observed that the Canadian Prime Minister would have no grounds for complaint against the imperial government *if* "they were to make the payment of any compensation . . . contingent upon the acceptance of the Treaty by the Dominion Parliament."⁴⁴ In effect the British government considered themselves justified in demanding ratification in return for compensation, but they were prepared at this point to concede this condition if Macdonald would give an assurance of support for the treaty. It was the absence of such an assurance which prevented them from accepting the solution offered by Macdonald in his letter of November 29.

Macdonald suggested that his position with respect to the treaty would be strengthened if Lisgar was authorized to announce imperial compensation in his speech opening the forthcoming session of the Canadian parliament. This, presumably, would put the members in a more receptive frame of mind when they debated the proposed settlement. Although this suggestion might well have been interpreted as an indication of Macdonald's willingness to support ratification it was not enough. The British cabinet sincerely believed that the

⁴²Kimberley to Lisgar, Sept. 21, 1871, *ibid.*

⁴³Marginalia on draft of Kimberley to Lisgar, Sept. 21, 1871, *ibid.*

⁴⁴Kimberley to Lisgar, Sept. 21, 1871, *ibid.*

Canadian Prime Minister was not playing a straightforward game with them.⁴⁵ Consequently, Kimberley's reply was hedged with the need for more explicit assurances. The British government, he announced, *might* be willing to meet Macdonald's views if the announcement of imperial compensation was accompanied by a recommendation on the part of the Canadian government "to the Dominion Parliament to assent to the Treaty," and if the Canadian Prime Minister and his colleagues would promise "to use every means in their power to induce Parliament to press the acts necessary to give validity to the Treaty."⁴⁶ In fact it was quite clear from a letter which the Colonial Secretary sent to Lisgar along with the despatch that there was really no question on this point. For even though an assurance by Macdonald would not have completely reassured the home government there appeared to be no alternative. "But as I see no way in which the Treaty can be carried without his cordial assistance," Kimberley confided to Lisgar, "I think the wisest policy on the whole is to proceed on the assumption that he will not throw us over, and that if he and his colleagues engage to support the Treaty they will really do their utmost to carry it through."⁴⁷

The British government were obviously determined to hold to their demand for an assurance; indeed their resolution on this point was stronger than ever. Kimberley considered it indispensable, and for Gladstone it was a matter of life and death.⁴⁸ Yet rigidity on this requirement was accompanied by flexibility on others. It is significant that Kimberley now suggested, privately, to Gladstone that the actual payment of compensation should not be made conditional upon Canadian ratification.⁴⁹ And a few days later, as Macdonald's biographer reports, the British Prime Minister informed the Queen that "it would be expedient to place in the hands of the Canadian government the power of assuring the legislature that this question would be entertained and submitted to Parliament, independently of the course which that legislature might adopt with respect to the Treaty."⁵⁰ Or, as Kimberley put it: "We must depend upon the Canadian ministers and it is our interest to give them a good card to play, if they promise to play on our side."⁵¹ In December, then, the British government were agreed that imperial compensation should be paid in return for a promise from the Canadian government to support the treaty. In

⁴⁵De Grey to Northcote, Dec. 21, 1871, Ripon Papers.

⁴⁶Kimberley to Lisgar, Dec. 21, 1871, CO 537/102.

⁴⁷Kimberley to Lisgar, Dec. 20, 1871, Kimberley Papers.

⁴⁸Kimberley to Gladstone, Dec. 15, 1871, Gladstone Papers.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰Creighton, *Macdonald*, II, 114.

⁵¹Kimberley to Gladstone, Dec. 15, 1871, Gladstone Papers.

other words compensation was not at this time contingent upon ratification; the understanding would be honoured even if Macdonald and his colleagues failed to carry the treaty in the Dominion parliament.

Moreover, Gladstone and his colleagues were prepared to concede to Macdonald the selection of the form of compensation. They were ready to accede to the request for a railroad guarantee. Indeed, this concession might well have been made earlier, in October, had not Kimberley misunderstood the drift of a discussion in cabinet.⁵² Thus he unequivocally refused a revived request for a guarantee at a time when the consensus of cabinet opinion favoured the consideration of such a proposal.

Although Macdonald's explanation of his interpretation of the claims understanding in his letter to Lisgar on November 29 may have played some part in softening the home government's attitude it was not the consideration uppermost in their minds, if indeed it existed at all. For them the impelling motive was the proximity of the next session of the Canadian parliament. This was the time to smooth ruffled feathers, particularly those of the powerful Macdonald, and a guarantee promised to do just that. With this concession Kimberley hoped to bring the Dominion parliament to "the point."⁵³

The British government's decision to accept a proposal for a railroad guarantee was welcomed in Canada, where even those elements within the Privy Council later described by Lisgar as having "behaved sensibly and well towards us"⁵⁴ were showing signs of irritation with the imperial government. Sir Francis Hincks, the Canadian Finance Minister, revealed to Lisgar shortly before Kimberley's letter arrived his dissatisfaction with what he understood to be the British government's suggestion, namely, that Canada should accept some paltry sum, "and that conditionally," for the raids.⁵⁵ Hence the Governor General greeted the news from England enthusiastically. "In my opinion," he cabled back, "you have taken exactly the right ground and tone. Your despatch must soon bring matters to a head."⁵⁶ The responsibility for its failure to do so is shared by Macdonald and the American delegation at the *Alabama* arbitration in Geneva.

By January 1872 Macdonald, as a result of an acrimonious correspondence with Kimberley during which he had shifted from threats to reticence, was virtually assured of substantial concessions on the fisheries and the Fenian claims. Had he accepted Lisgar's advice in July 1871, and given the British government an explicit assurance of

⁵²Kimberley to Gladstone, Dec. 12, 1871, *ibid.*

⁵³Kimberley to Gladstone, Dec. 15, 1871, *ibid.*

⁵⁴Lisgar to Kimberley, April 4, 1872, Kimberley Papers.

⁵⁵Hincks to Lisgar, Jan. 4, 1872, CO 537/103.

⁵⁶Lisgar to Kimberley, Jan. 18, 1872, *ibid.*

support for the treaty, he might well have failed to secure either of these gains. But in January 1872 Macdonald had little to gain from further procrastination and haggling. Had he now chosen to give the home government the explicit assurance and promised to use every means in his power to secure parliamentary approval, an obvious and equitable solution to the squabble over the claims was at hand. An announcement of imperial compensation, taking the form of a railroad guarantee, could be accompanied by a government endorsement of the treaty in Lisgar's speech opening parliament. Instead, Macdonald replied with the Privy Council Minute of January 20, 1872.

If, as Macdonald's biographer suggests, the Minute was a "Council decision to support the Treaty in Parliament in return for a guaranteed loan,"⁵⁷ that fact was not sufficiently explicit. The mood in which Macdonald approached the task was not the best. Lisgar rejected the first minute that was drawn up because its matter and form were objectionable, but his decision was resisted by the Prime Minister who yielded only after some controversy. And it was during this interview that the Governor General asked Macdonald to give the home government an explicit assurance of support for the treaty but he left without any definite promise being made.⁵⁸ When he received the amended minute Lisgar readily appreciated that it also failed to give the unequivocal undertaking the British government demanded. The Privy Council officially proposed that compensation should take the form of a railroad guarantee, which they described as "a mode by which their hands might be so materially strengthened that they would be enabled not only to abandon all claims on account of the Fenian raids, but likewise to propose with a fair prospect of success the measures necessary to give effect to those clauses of the Treaty of Washington which require the concurrence of the Dominion Parliament."⁵⁹ The Governor General forwarded this to London and again attempted to play the honest broker. "The acceptance of the proposal," he wrote, "would I am led to believe ensure the passing of the Treaty, and would go far to removing feelings of injury or sacrifice which have been so perseveringly and unscrupulously instilled into the minds of large numbers in relation to the provisions of the Treaty." Then, referring to the absence of an explicit assurance, he wrote: "If the Canadian terms are accepted I do not anticipate any difficulty as to the Ministry pledging itself to bring forward and support the Treaty in the ensuing session."⁶⁰

⁵⁷Creighton, *Macdonald*, II, 115.

⁵⁸Lisgar to Kimberley, Jan. 24, 1872, CO 537/103.

⁵⁹Privy Council Minute, Jan. 20, 1872, CO 42/705, PRO.

⁶⁰Lisgar to Kimberley, Jan. 24, 1872, CO 537/103.

Almost two months elapsed before Kimberley replied. For a brief period the entire settlement was jeopardized by the reintroduction of the so-called indirect claims during the *Alabama* arbitration in Geneva. Eventually, however, the British government decided to press on with Canadian ratification in the hope that, if successful, it would bring the United States to her senses. On March 18 Kimberley sent out the British government's reply to the council's minute. It was evident, from Kimberley's official despatch and a private letter he sent to Lisgar on March 21, that the problem of an assurance from Macdonald and his colleagues was now academic. Imperial compensation for the Fenian raids, in the form of a guarantee, was to be contingent upon Canadian ratification. "If the Treaty goes into operation," he wrote to the Governor General, "we shall propose to Parliament the guarantee of £2,500,000 and it cannot be doubted that Parliament would in such favourable circumstances grant the guarantee."⁶¹ This sum was much below the £4 million requested by the Canadians but Gladstone and Kimberley agreed that it was handsome enough, and they had no intention of increasing it. Finally, the Colonial Secretary made it clear that he considered this arrangement a complete fulfilment of "the assurance which Lord Ripon gave to Sir John Macdonald at Washington, that in the event of such a settlement we would entertain the question of a moderate compensation to Canada for the Fenian raids."⁶²

This stiffening of the British conditions was the product of apprehension and suspicion. Kimberley and his colleagues realized that a guarantee would not be popular in England and that their decision would have to be justified to the House of Commons. It was for this reason that the Colonial Secretary advised Lisgar in December 1871 to warn the Canadians not "to open their mouths too wide" on this subject.⁶³ And when the news eventually broke in England Kimberley found himself roundly condemned in many newspapers.⁶⁴ Yet this difficulty was not insuperable, as the British suggestion for solving the problem on December 21 indicates. In all probability the British government's principal concern was Macdonald, who continued to hold back an explicit assurance. The inflexibility this distrust bred in the home government was evident when Lisgar forwarded to London an apparently harmless suggestion from his government requesting that the guarantee should mature within a reasonable time of the passage of any bill supporting the treaty. In a letter to Gladstone,

⁶¹Kimberley to Lisgar, March 21, 1872, Kimberley Papers.

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³Kimberley to Lisgar, Dec. 20, 1871, Kimberley Papers.

⁶⁴Kimberley to Lisgar, May 15, 1872, *ibid.*

Kimberley observed: "Our offer of a guarantee of £2,500,000 is an offer of a guarantee which is to take effect when the Treaty goes into operation by an order of the Governor-General in Council. The Canadian government ask that the guarantee shall mature within a reasonable time of the passage of the bill. That is to say they want to be placed in the position of having the guarantee whether the Treaty comes into effect or not. I must doubt whether we ought to make such a concession."⁶⁵ His colleagues agreed and on the following day, April 9, 1872, Kimberley cabled Lisgar: "We cannot agree to the alteration suggested in your telegram received yesterday in the terms of the offer of a guarantee."⁶⁶ In effect Macdonald was to be treated like a huckster; he received his reward for his services only when they had been performed. On April 13 he at last gave an unequivocal promise of support for the treaty⁶⁷; five days later he laid much of the correspondence relating to the proposed settlement before the Canadian parliament,⁶⁸ and on May 3 he moved for "leave to bring in a Bill to carry into effect certain clauses of the Treaty negotiated between the United States and Great Britain in 1871."⁶⁹ On June 14, 1872, Lisgar gave royal assent to the Treaty of Washington bill and the Pacific Railway bill⁷⁰; on May 9, 1873, a bill to guarantee a Canadian railroad up to the sum of £2½ million received its first reading in the British parliament.⁷¹

The apportionment of responsibility for acrimonious squabbles of the kind that took place between Macdonald and the British government is usually a difficult and futile exercise. But there are conclusions which can be drawn in an effort to revise the traditional discussion of this Anglo-Canadian dispute. First, the British government's offer of compensation was intended from the inception of the negotiations to be contingent upon a final settlement with the United States. To them the meaning of this condition was obvious and they clung to it consistently between 1870 and 1872. Secondly, de Grey fumbled the discussions with Macdonald. His failure to define explicitly the conditions attached to imperial compensation left the arrangement sufficiently ambiguous for Macdonald to place his own interpretation upon their verbal understanding. Finally, Macdonald can be criticized for his handling of the British government. If two of the qualities of statesmanship are a sense of direction and a sense of timing Macdonald demonstrated during the squabble over the Fenian claims that his

⁶⁵Kimberley to Gladstone, April 8, 1872, Gladstone Papers.

⁶⁶Kimberley to Lisgar, April 9, 1872, CO 537/103.

⁶⁷Lisgar to Kimberley, April 14, 1872, *ibid.*

⁶⁸Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1872, III, 63.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, III, 293.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, III, 1145-50.

⁷¹*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Third Series, CCXV, 1778.

command of these was, on occasion, not as complete as it might have been. His deliberate refusal to give a sense of direction to his government's policy on the treaty was not unproductive of favourable results by January 1872. Much of the early opposition had burnt itself out while substantial concessions had all but formally been secured from Britain. It was at this moment that his sense of timing failed him. He continued to refuse to give an unequivocal assurance of even personal support for the treaty. This reticence, at a time when Lisgar was reporting to London the development of a public sentiment more favourable to the treaty, merely provoked the British government into imposing a harsh condition for the payment of imperial compensation. Macdonald had manoeuvred himself into a position from which the only escape was to accept the condition he had repudiated in July 1871 in the most belligerent terms.⁷²

It is tempting fate, perhaps, to criticize the man who successfully secured Canadian ratification of the Treaty of Washington. Yet the fact remains that continued obstinacy at a time when graceful concession was called for left Macdonald exposed to a line of attack, during the debate in the Canadian parliament, which was otherwise unnecessary. Although Sir George Cartier, replying to the opposition, stated that "the guarantee had reference to the Fenian claims only, and, was not, as the hon. mover desired to show conditional on the acceptance of the whole" treaty,⁷³ he was prevaricating. On May 10 Sir Alexander T. Galt observed that without assurances from the ministers to the contrary "the language in the papers that have been brought down would lead the casual observer to believe that the two questions—indemnity for the Fenian outrages and the acceptance of the Treaty—were the result of the guarantee."⁷⁴ Others were not so easily reassured, and five days later Mr. Holton caustically noted that "they [the government] howled louder than the Grits against the Treaty; yet because they got a small compensation for accepting the Treaty they came down, swallowed their declarations, and invited Parliament to affirm that it was after all a splendid treaty."⁷⁵ In effect, Macdonald and the government were attacked by Holton and others either for having blackmailed the home government into offering compensation in return for ratification, or for having accepted a bribe to bring forward and support the treaty before parliament.⁷⁶ Both charges could have been avoided had Macdonald been in a position to assure the House that Britain would compensate irrespective of the course taken by parliament.

⁷²Macdonald to Lisgar, July 21, 1871, CO 537/102.

⁷³Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1872, III, 368.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, III, 477.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, III, 572.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, III, 573, 589, 620.

Hughes, Borden, and Dominion Representation at the Paris Peace Conference*

L. F. FITZHARDINGE

THE PRINCIPAL CREDIT for the separate representation of the Dominions at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a major landmark in the evolution of dominion status, is generally attributed to Sir Robert Borden,¹ or to Borden, Smuts, and Hughes working as a team.² A different interpretation, it is true, in which W. M. Hughes plays a larger part, is suggested in the narrative of Sir Ernest Scott, but this is not documented in detail and does not seem to have been generally noticed.³ The Canadian view scored a long start by the commendably prompt publication of their documents, and the theoretical conclusions which were later drawn from the representation of the Dominions were in line with Canadian sentiment, and not with Australian, or indeed with that of Hughes himself. Nevertheless, a careful examination of the events of November 1918, together with some evidence not previously available, strongly suggests that Hughes, with characteristic intransigent indirectness, was primarily responsible for the form actually taken by that representation and specifically for its distinctive feature, the representation of the Dominions by independent delegations as well as, and distinct from, membership in the imperial delegation.

*I am greatly indebted to Mr. Henry Borden of Toronto for permission to read and quote from the diary of Sir Robert Borden for the period covered here. All references to Borden's movements and contemporary comments are based on this diary under the appropriate date.

¹E.g., R. M. Dawson, *The Development of Dominion Status* (London, 1937), p. 31; G. M. Carter, *The British Commonwealth and International Security* (Toronto, 1947), p. 3; A. B. Keith, *The Dominions as Sovereign States* (London, 1938), p. 15.

²W. K. Hancock, *Smuts: The Sanguine Years* (Cambridge, 1962), p. 496.

³E. Scott, *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18*. XI. *Australia During the War* (2nd ed.; 12 vols.; Sydney, 1937), 750-4.

Hughes had reasons of his own for seeking a place at the Peace Conference. Representation had already been on his agenda when he visited London in 1916 and his talks then with Grey and the Japanese ambassador had left him convinced that what he regarded as Australia's most vital interests would face a challenge from Japan as soon as the war was over and that Britain could not be relied upon to defend them. His experience in connection with the Paris Economic Conference of that year, when Asquith, yielding reluctantly to pressure, had finally appointed him one of the British delegation and then tried to insist that the delegates must speak and vote as one,⁴ had forewarned him of the danger of a common delegation in which Australia's voice might be submerged in a single vote. There is good reason to believe that from this time on the need for an independent voice at the peace table itself, though not openly proclaimed, was never far from his mind. Borden, on the other hand, in spite of Canadian sentiment for an assertion of independence, was personally conservative and inclined to follow Britain's lead, and Canada, unlike Australia, had no special interest to guard in the peace. Borden was also jealous of his position as prime minister of the senior Dominion, both by virtue of Canada's seniority and of his own tenure of office. Smuts, for his part, was more interested in playing down than in encouraging South African nationalism, and his personal influence and his place in the British War Cabinet ensured that his country's interests would in any case be adequately safeguarded.

From the British point of view the promise given in 1915 and frequently repeated, that the Dominions would be fully consulted as to the terms of peace, had been fulfilled by the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet, as much of its second session in 1918 had been occupied with full, if somewhat academic, discussions of this subject, in which Hughes had asserted Australia's interests with his customary vehemence. By the end of August, however, when the German collapse began to seem possible, this was no longer in session and Hughes alone of the dominion prime ministers remained in England. Early in October, with the collapse of the central powers imminent, Hughes commenced a series of speeches stressing Australia's special interests in the peace terms and the achievements of her soldiers.⁵ From the twelfth to the fifteenth during a visit to Paris to receive the Legion of Honour he attempted to enlist the support of the French government, and especially of Clemenceau.⁶ He then, after a brief illness, set off on a speaking tour of northern England, on which he was engaged when

⁴W. M. Hughes, *The Splendid Adventure* (London, 1929), p. 43.

⁵Cf. *The Times*, Oct. 4, 10, 16, 18, 21, and 22, 1918.

⁶Scott, *Australia in the War*, XI, 748-9.

the Supreme War Council met at Versailles to discuss the German offer of an armistice "on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points." Since his visit to Paris, if not before, Hughes had been convinced that the end was close at hand, though much expert opinion, including that of Smuts, still believed the Germans could not be defeated before 1919.

Hughes first heard the proposed terms of the armistice at a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on November 5 and immediately entered a protest against the acceptance of the Fourteen Points, even with the reservations which had been added at the instance of Lloyd George, as binding for the peace terms: "Speaking for himself, he declined to be bound to the chariot-wheel of the Fourteen Points."⁷ He received a somewhat evasive assurance from Lloyd George. On November 7 he publicly launched a violent protest against "the terms of peace being decided without the Dominions first being consulted" and repeated his refusal to be bound by the Fourteen Points.⁸ An official reply sought, somewhat disingenuously, to distinguish the armistice from the peace terms, and in a letter published in the same issue of *The Times* Hughes re-stated and amplified his objections and his claim that he had not been informed of the discussions at Versailles until they had been concluded, and that although the Imperial War Cabinet had discussed the question of peace terms, "most certainly Dr. Wilson's Fourteen Points were never agreed to; they were not even specifically discussed." He added: "Had the conditions of peace as set out left no room for criticism, the mode of their settlement would still be quite incompatible with the relations which ought to exist between the self-governing Dominions and Britain."⁹

Meanwhile, on October 27, on the eve of the armistice discussions which had so upset Hughes, Lloyd George had cabled Borden urging him to return at once to London "in order to participate in the deliberations which will determine the line to be taken at these conferences by the British delegates." In his reply, dated October 29, Borden for the first time raised formally the question of dominion representation. "There is need," he said, "of serious consideration as to representation of the Dominions in the peace negotiations. The press and people of this country take it for granted that Canada will be represented at the Peace Conference."¹⁰ It is worth noting that at this stage Lloyd George clearly did not envisage actual participation in the peace conference, but prior discussions, and it is probable that he was

⁷W. M. Hughes Papers, Imperial War Cabinet, 1918, Minutes of Meetings, August 13-December 31, 1918, no. 36, p. 5.

⁸*The Times*, Nov. 8, 1918.

⁹*Ibid.*, Nov. 9, 1918.

¹⁰Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1919, 41J, 1-10, quoted in Dawson, *Dominion Status*, pp. 178-9.

"not enthusiastic" at the idea of dominion representation as such,¹¹ and though Borden proposed representation, he made no suggestion as to its form. What precedents there were, including the Paris Economic Conference of 1916, would have suggested a single delegation, possibly including one or more dominion delegates, but acting as one unit. The only precedents for separate dominion representation were at conferences of a purely technical character, dealing with postal communications or the like.¹² Even as late as December 1918, the Foreign Office was surprised by the Canadian claim.¹³

Sir Robert Borden reached England on November 17 and immediately discussed arrangements for the Peace Conference with Lloyd George and Bonar Law.¹⁴ They suggested that the delegation should consist of Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Balfour, Barnes, and Borden, the latter specially representing the Dominions. They also suggested that Borden should be "selected" by the Dominions. Borden thought that he should not have "any special status to represent the Dominions," but should be appointed on the same footing as the other delegates. He agreed, however, to see Smuts, which he did the next day. Smuts agreed that he should not go as a special representative of all the Dominions, but as an "Empire Delegate." He suggested, however, telegraphing the other Dominions for their concurrence. Later that day (November 18) Borden received a visit from Sir Robert Garran "evidently to see how I stood on the Hughes situation."¹⁵

On November 20, in "a yellow fog, sulphurous in smell and taste," the Imperial War Cabinet met. Before the meeting Borden saw Lloyd George, who said Smuts had not seen him, and agreed with Borden that the desire of both Ward and Massey of New Zealand to attend the conference was "absurd."¹⁶ In the cabinet Borden raised the question of the retention of the German colonies as one likely to cause

¹¹F. V. Englenberg, *General Louis Botha* (London, 1929), p. 317.

¹²For a convenient discussion of the precedents, see A. B. Keith, *War Government of the British Dominions* (Oxford, 1921), pp. 147-8.

¹³A. E. Zimmern, *The Third British Empire* (London, 1926), p. 30, quoted by Scott, *Australia in the War*, XI, 752.

¹⁴Sir Kenneth Wheare suggests (*Cambridge History of the British Empire*, III, 647) that Lloyd George and Borden were restricted by the French paper on the organization of the Peace Conference, dated November 15, which opposed separate representation, drawing an analogy between the Dominions and the states of the United States. This however was not an official statement of French views, nor was it officially circulated; it was merely a paper prepared by officials at the Quai d'Orsay as a basis for discussion. Its reference to separate representation, which no one had at this stage officially proposed, may have been provoked by Hughes's feelers of October. In the event, it was not France but Wilson who opposed dominion representation. Even if Lloyd George was already aware of the French proposals, he was certainly not bound to accept them. (The French document is in D. H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris; with Documents*, 21 vols., New York, 1924, II, 21-2, and is discussed in F. S. Marston, *The Peace Conference of 1919*, London, 1944, p. 35.)

¹⁵Borden Diary, Nov. 17-18, 1918.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1918.

trouble with Wilson and "put forward the suggestion that it was highly important that the Dominions themselves should press their claim strongly so that it would come rather from them than from the Government of the United Kingdom."¹⁷ Lloyd George agreed, and it was resolved that "at the important Allied Conference which should precede the Peace Conference, India and each self-governing dominion should be given the fullest opportunity to express their views on those questions which may closely concern them."¹⁸ This, though a step forward, was still well short of separate representation.

Meanwhile, at the same time that Borden's cabinet was pushing him forward, Hughes's government was trying to hold him back. His attack on the British government over the armistice lost none of its calculated bellicosity in the extracts cabled to Australia, and these aroused a storm of criticism as well as some support. In the House of Representatives Hughes's implied claim to representation was vehemently attacked, and the acting Prime Minister, W. A. Watt, was clearly embarrassed in his defence. After cabinet consideration, he cabled: "Claim for representation of Dominions as Dominions, either at Versailles or Peace Conference, is not reasonable, and cannot be supported by the Cabinet. It is not proposed to ask Parliament to carry any resolutions claiming representation of Dominions as Dominions. We feel that it would be impossible to pass such a motion."¹⁹ Though this was supported by a private cable from G. F. (later Sir George) Pearce,²⁰ who shared Hughes's nationalist labour background and had been his closest official associate throughout the war, Hughes remained unmoved. Watt's cable was pocketed, not to be disclosed until much later, after Hughes's stand had been vindicated by events.

Meanwhile, informal discussions continued, not entirely in his favour. On November 24 Borden "was informed that Hughes would be strongly opposed to any representation from another Dominion unless he was appointed."²¹ This presumably ended the idea of Borden acting as sole dominion representative. The next day Borden discussed the personnel of the British delegation with Smuts, who told him that "Hughes gets on Lloyd George's nerves."²² On the same day (the

¹⁷*Ibid.*; printed in Henry Borden, ed., *Sir Robert Borden: His Memoirs* (London, 1938), p. 868.

¹⁸Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, no. 37, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹*Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, XCIV (1920), 5817.

²⁰Pearce Collection, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, Bundle 3, folder 3: decode of cable, Pearce to Hughes, Nov. 22, 1918: "Cabinet suggestion of non-insistence on direct representation at Conference but insistence on consultation in War Cabinet but not in public will effect object and carry all Commonwealth with you and strongly recommend that course."

²¹Borden, Diary, Nov. 24, 1918; printed in Borden, ed., *Borden Memoirs*, p. 871.

²²Borden Diary, Nov. 25, 1918; printed in Borden, ed., *Borden Memoirs*, p. 872.

twenty-fifth) Smuts drew up a memorandum for the Imperial War Cabinet proposing that the fifth place in the British delegation should be filled in rotation from a panel of representatives of all the Dominions. At the meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on November 26 discussion of this memorandum and of a telegram from Lord Derby setting out the French proposals on representation was deferred owing to the absence of Balfour, but Hughes launched several attacks on the reported views of President Wilson and laid it down as an axiom that "no country would allow its vital interests to be decided by anyone except itself."²³ Borden's comment on this meeting was: "Arrangements for the Peace Conference were again discussed. I note from my diary: 'Not very fruitful discussion. Hughes cranky and unworkable.'"²⁴

The question of the representation of the Dominions was next raised at the conference of allied prime ministers on December 3, at which it was agreed that each of the great powers—France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States—should have five delegates and that representatives of the British Dominions and India should attend as additional members of the British delegation when questions directly affecting them were under consideration. This decision gave the Dominions an advantage over the smaller allied powers, to the extent that they would participate in discussions in which they were concerned as members of one of the great power delegations, and not as outsiders. It seems, so far as the record goes, to have passed without comment at the meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on December 4 to which Lloyd George reported on the interallied talks, though other matters raised were discussed at length.

In Canada, meanwhile, there was some impatience, and on December 3 the acting Prime Minister cabled to Borden: "Council . . . is even more strongly of opinion than when you left, that Canada should be represented. Council is of opinion that in view of war efforts of Dominion other nations . . . should recognise unique character of British Commonwealth . . . and that provision should be made for special representation of these nations at Conference, even though it may be necessary that in any final decision they should speak with one voice; that if this is not possible then you should form one of whatever delegation represents the British Commonwealth."²⁵

In the light of what had passed, there can be no doubt that Borden would have readily settled for the second alternative. Since this had been made impossible by Hughes's obstinacy, the panel system seemed the next best thing, preserving the unity of empire yet satisfying

²³Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, no. 38, pp. 43, 45.

²⁴Borden Diary, Nov. 26, 1918; printed in Borden, ed., *Borden Memoirs*, p. 872.

²⁵Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1919, 41J, quoted by Dawson, *Dominion Status*, p. 179.

dominion *amour propre*. Borden, too, was conscious of the advantage of appearing as a delegate of one of the great powers, rather than of a small Dominion. He did not reply to this cable for nearly a month, by which time his hand had again been forced. On December 24, in a discussion of the League of Nations in the Imperial War Cabinet, Hughes "observed that . . . it would be necessary to create or develop machinery so that the different parts of the British Empire could express themselves effectively."²⁶ His mind was clearly still exercised by the question of "effective" representation. A week later, on December 30, he again irritated Borden by a sustained and intemperate attack on Wilson's views, as reported to the Imperial War Cabinet by Lloyd George after his preliminary conversations with the President. According to Lloyd George, "the Cabinet were much impressed with the critical power of the Hughes speech. . . . It was a fine specimen of ruthless and pungent analysis of President Wilson's claim to dictate to the countries that had borne the brunt of the fighting."²⁷ Borden noted sourly in his diary: "Hughes took up at least one third of time of Cabinet in indulging in violent invective against Wilson on account of his reported opposition to Australia's claims to German colonies."²⁸

The interallied discussions which would finally settle the constitution of the Peace Conference were to take place within a few days. Clearly Hughes would neither compromise nor be silenced. Borden had already sought means to dissociate the empire as a whole from the colonial claims of individual colonies. Perhaps after all, he may have thought, it would be better for the cause of Anglo-American amity which was Canada's major interest to let Hughes go his own way. But if Australia had a separate voice, Borden could not appear at home in Canada as having settled for anything less.

Next day, the last of the eventful year 1918, the Imperial War Cabinet returned to its postponed consideration of Lord Derby's telegram and Smuts's memorandum. The suggestion of the latter for a panel to fill the fifth place in the empire delegation had been accepted by the British government and embodied in the interallied agreement. It was now proposed to accept the French proposals as modified by that agreement. Hughes at once raised his voice in protest. Under these proposals, he said, the Dominions would not have as much representation as, say, Sweden. This was particularly serious where the organization of the League of Nations was under discussion. This was one of those questions which would most vitally concern the

²⁶Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, no. 46, p. 12.

²⁷D. Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (2 vols.; London, 1938), I, 201.

²⁸Borden Diary, Dec. 30, 1918.

Dominions in the future. It was probable that in twenty-five years the white population of the British empire overseas would exceed that of Great Britain. When this question was discussed, therefore, the Dominions were entitled to representation equal to that accorded to neutrals. He pointed out that Australia had put and kept more men in the field than Belgium and deserved as much representation at the Conference.²⁹

After Lloyd George had defended the position accorded to the Dominions under the interallied agreement and had repeated that it was intended to include in the five delegates representing Great Britain one representative of each of the Dominions and India, Borden followed with a long speech in which, for the first time, he put strongly the dominion point of view, as expressed in the Ottawa cable of December 4. He urged that the question of representation had "a very serious aspect" for the Dominions and a peculiar significance for Canada, which had no special material or territorial interests to safeguard. "It would be regarded as intolerable in Canada that Portugal should have a representation in the Peace Conference which was denied to that Dominion. . . . If the French proposals were adopted . . . the result upon public opinion in Canada would be such as he did not care to suggest, or even contemplate." Foreigners did not understand the status of the Dominions, and it was the duty of the British government to set it forth fully. "The British Empire had the right to define the powers and functions of the nations which compose it, and foreign Powers had no right to question that definition." The Imperial War Conference in 1917 had declared the principles of equal nationhood and an adequate voice in foreign relations. Each Dominion

should have as ample a representation as Belgium or Portugal. There was no question on which the people of Canada were more insistent than their claim to representation at the Peace Conference which would settle the issues of the war in which they had taken so notable a part. He hoped that the Cabinet would appreciate, although it was almost impossible for them fully to appreciate, the strong feeling in Canada on this subject. To provide that Canada should be called in only when her special interests were in question would be regarded as little better than a mockery. It would be most unfortunate from the point of view of the Dominions that the British delegation should be selected entirely from the British Isles. That delegation had authority to represent not only the British Isles, but the whole Empire. He, therefore, strongly urged that the delegation representing the British Empire should be in part selected from a panel, upon which each Prime Minister from the Dominions should have a place, and that one or more of those Prime Ministers should be called from time to time, as occasion might require, to sit in the delegation representing the whole Empire at the Conference.

²⁹Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, no. 48, pp. 7-9.

It is noteworthy that in this speech, in which Borden assumed the role of spokesman for the claims of the Dominions, he is still thinking of representation in a single delegation through a panel. The claim to "as ample a representation as Belgium or Portugal" is an incidental flourish, following Hughes's lead, a matter of prestige rather than practice. Yet it provided the germ of the final solution. How precisely this was reached is not clear from the *précis* in the minutes. For after Lord Robert Cecil and Lloyd George had endorsed the panel system (which was not in dispute), and Lloyd George had urged the un-wisdom of pressing for as many as five delegates from Great Britain and three each from the Dominions and India, the cabinet not only endorsed the proposal that the prime ministers of the Dominions and the representative of India should be placed on a panel from which part of the British delegation could be filled, according to the subject of discussion, but also resolved that "the British Dominions and India should in all respects have the same powers as, and be on an equal footing at the Conference with, Belgium and other smaller Allied States."

Thus was formulated the dual position of the dominion representatives at Paris, as delegates in their own right as well as alternate members of the British delegation. Lloyd George, once the decision was made, loyally threw the whole of his great powers of persuasion and argument into winning its acceptance by a puzzled France and a somewhat hostile Wilson. Borden cabled to his acting Prime Minister at home: "In Cabinet to-day I took up question of representation of the Dominion and spoke very frankly and firmly as to Canada's attitude. My proposal . . . was accepted by Cabinet." In his diary he noted: "On the question of representation I spoke very strongly . . . Cook and Hughes supported me; and Lloyd George agreed."³⁰ But the official minutes, as well as Lloyd George's narrative,³¹ make it clear that it was Hughes, not Borden, who brought up the subject at the meeting of December 31 and Borden who spoke in support, laying stress on the theoretical aspects of dominion status, which Hughes tended to ignore, and continuing to advocate a panel. Who formulated the final resolution is not clear, but it seems to have been an attempt to cover the conflicting points of view that had been expressed.

In conclusion, it is clear that Borden was willing to accept representation of the Dominions by his own inclusion in the British delegation (which would have satisfied, if only as a second best, his own government) and, when the intransigence of Hughes made this impossible, representation on a single delegation through the panel

³⁰Borden, *Diary*, Dec. 30, 1918; printed in Borden, ed., *Borden Memoirs*, p. 890.

³¹Lloyd George, *Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, 204.

system suggested by Smuts. Only at the last moment, when it was clear that Hughes would not be muzzled, did he accept, in a somewhat indirect formulation, the principle of *separate* representation. Smuts's role seems to have been confined to the attempt to find a formula that would satisfy both parties; he succeeded with Borden, but not with Hughes. Hughes was throughout concerned not with constitutional theory (which he distrusted) or with centrifugal tendencies (which both he and his country repudiated) but with the brute facts of a world in which Japan would be seated as one of the great powers at the Peace Conference while Australia would be outside in the corridors, represented in the bargaining by others not necessarily sympathetic to her views and interests. The situation was the more complicated because he could not openly proclaim his fears.

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Canada

The Oxford Companion to Canadian History and Literature. By NORAH STORY. Toronto, London, and New York: Oxford University Press. 1967. Pp. xx, 935, maps. \$15.00.

ON SOUHAITAIT DEPUIS LONGTEMPS, surtout chez les bibliothécaires, la publication dans la collection des Companions d'Oxford d'un ouvrage sur le Canada. Jusqu'à ces derniers temps, il semble bien que personne n'avait eu le courage d'entreprendre ce travail de bénédictin qui d'ailleurs, aujourd'hui, relève beaucoup plus d'une équipe que d'un seul compilateur. C'est une ancienne bibliothécaire des Archives du Canada, bien connue de tous les chercheurs, Mlle Norah Story, qui a voulu communiquer à autrui le fruit de toute une vie de travail en rédigeant un tel ouvrage. Elle a profité de l'aide de nombreux anciens collègues auxquels elle rend hommage sans les compromettre puisqu'elle écrit que "neither of these scholars, however, has read the article on his subject."

Un auteur est toujours maître de ses procédés de rédaction et on ne peut strictement lui reprocher que de n'avoir pas rempli le but qu'il s'était proposé. Mlle Story semble, dans bien des cas, avoir préféré à de courtes notices des articles de synthèse et des bibliographies générales. C'est ainsi que "Fiction in English" et "Fiction in French" couvrent près de 25 pages alors que ceux qui consultent fréquemment *The Oxford Companion to American Literature* (fourth edition, 1965) de James D. Hart ou *The Oxford Companion to English Literature* (fourth edition, 1967) de Sir Paul Harvey savent que dans ces deux recueils, on trouve des notices pour la plupart des œuvres littéraires. En d'autres termes, je puis lire rapidement les résumés de *Barnaby Rudge* de Dickens ou de *The Scarlet Letter* de Hawthorne alors que dans l'ouvrage de Mlle Story, je ne puis pas faire la même chose pour *Two Solitudes* de Hugh MacLennan ou d'*Au Pied de la pente douce* de Roger Lemelin.

En face d'un travail aussi considérable que celui que s'est imposé Mlle Story, on hésite à signaler quelques erreurs ou des oublis. Voici tout de même quelques corrections qui pourraient être utiles dans une seconde édition. Marius Barbeau n'est pas né à Québec (p. 49), mais à Sainte-Marie-de-Beauce. Je ne crois pas que l'abbé Louis-Edouard Bois "entered the Oblate Order" (p. 82): du moins aucune de ses biographies n'en parle. Ecrire que "since 1962 he [Jean Bruchési] has been ambassador to Morocco" est pour le moins ambigu et laisse croire que c'est le poste qu'il occupa après celui d'ambassadeur en Espagne. En réalité, il détint en même temps les deux postes et il aurait mieux valu signaler qu'il fut envoyé ensuite en Argentine. *Le Canadien* est disparu en 1909 et non en 1919 (p. 148). Le fait de ne pas préciser avant 1923 s'il s'agit de l'Université Laval

de Québec ou de celle de Montréal crée de la confusion. Ainsi qui nous dit si c'est à Québec ou à Montréal que P.-J.-O. Chauveau "joined the staff of Laval University as professor of Roman law and became dean of the faculty" (p. 170): en réalité, c'était à Montréal. Roger Duhamel n'a jamais été "appointed editor-in-chief of *La Presse* in 1953" (p. 231): il a travaillé dans presque tous les quotidiens de Montréal, mais jamais à *La Presse*. *L'aventure poétique de Saint-Denys-Garneau* n'est pas de Romain Fortier (p. 310), mais de Romain Légaré. Alexander T. Galt, après sa démission du gouvernement, en 1866, n'est pas retourné "almost immediately once he had given an explanation of his position" (p. 307): il fit partie de la délégation du Canada-Uni à la Conférence de Londres, mais il n'était pas membre du gouvernement. Le Conseil législatif de la Nouvelle-Ecosse n'a pas été aboli en 1892 (p. 448) mais en 1927. Esdras Minville n'est pas né à Montréal (p. 528), mais à Grande-Vallée en Gaspésie, et il est ambigu d'écrire que "he was educated at the Collège Saint-Laurent" alors qu'il s'agit du Pensionnat Saint-Laurent des Frères des Écoles chrétiennes. Félix-Antoine Savard n'a pas été ■ l'Université Laval doyen de la faculté des arts (p. 747) mais doyen de la faculté des lettres.

Le choix des sujets de biographies semble parfois arbitraire. Pourquoi des biographies de Maurice Duplessis et du Cardinal Taschereau, alors qu'on n'en trouve pas de Mitchell Hepburn et du Cardinal Rodrigue Villeneuve?

Quoique un peu déçu de ne pas avoir retrouvé dans le *Companion* canadien toute l'utilité des *Companions* américain et anglais, je me réjouis que Mlle Story ait accompli un travail pour lequel tous les chercheurs doivent lui être reconnaissants, et, en terminant, je me permets de noter qu'à une époque où les problèmes de la dualité canadienne créent tant de nervosité, la part à la culture française au Canada est très large dans le recueil.

JEAN-CHARLES BONENFANT

Bibliothèque de la Législature
Québec

Word from New France: The Selected Letters of Marie de l'Incarnation. Translated and edited by JOYCE MARSHALL. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1967. Pp. x, 435. \$6.50.

MARIE DE L'INCARNATION of the Ursuline order came to Canada in 1639 and remained until her death in 1672. Her letters are an important source for the history of this period, one in which primary source material is relatively scarce. The author of the letters lived in this country during its most crucial period; when the colony, one of the advanced outposts of European imperialism on its way to dominance everywhere in the world, was struggling desperately to maintain itself in the face of continual assaults by some of the native Americans determined to retain control of their own destinies. This was also the age of religious enthusiasm in France, of Vincent de Paul, the Devils of Loudon, the Compagnie de St Sacrement. In Canada Montreal was recklessly founded as a missionary outpost on the borders of the Iroquois lands, the Huronia mission was established then destroyed, and the Jesuits attained the martyrdom they avidly sought. In the world of secular affairs Sister Marie witnessed the slow growth of the infant colony, hampered by frequent disasters and the stolid indifference of the government in France. But she lived long enough to witness the transformation that occurred when Louis XIV and Colbert took charge; to see Talon, Tracy, Courcelle, the Régiment de Carignan-Salières arrive, then march off to humble the

Iroquois; to see shipload after shipload of immigrants disembark at Quebec, then speedily begin to push back the forest from the banks of the St. Lawrence; and at the end to see the French set out in the great surge of expansion into the west.

What do the letters tell us of these great events? Actually they tell us little that is not contained in the *Jesuit Relations*, but they do add a great many details. They make very plain the religious climate of the age, the peculiar values that dominated the clergy and the devout settlers of the early period. There is a good deal of valuable information on missionary activities, on relations with the Indians and the myriad problems, many of them unique, that had to be faced. Economic, social, political, and military events are described and the characters of the colonial dignitaries remarked upon. The initial high hope for the conversion of all the pagans is seen to wane as the enormity of the task becomes manifest. The expectation that faith and effort alone would eventually bring even the Iroquois to accept Christianity is abandoned and the plea becomes to destroy this nation completely since their continued bitter resistance can only mean that they are agents of Satan. In one letter to her son Sister Marie expresses the hope that he will be fortunate enough to be martyred for the faith, and in another the fate of an Indian child, recently baptized then crucified by the Iroquois, is mentioned with envy. All too often what the religious wished to believe was true was accepted as truth, but eventually facts had to be faced and in a letter dated August 1668 the bleak admission is made that the Ursulines had only nineteen girls under their tutelage, and of these only three were Indians.

There can be no doubt that all this information is of great value to the historian, and has been made good use of, but the letters also provide, sometimes inadvertently, a wealth of information for the social historian. The heavy loss of life from disease on the immigrant ships of the 1660s is stressed, and that amongst the survivors "there were Portuguese, Germans, Hollanders, and others of I know not what nations. There were also Moorish, Portuguese and French women, and some from other countries." It is not without interest that of the women brought in one large convoy, the first to find a husband was a Moor. The existence in 1658 of a thriving trade between Quebec and the Dutch of New Amsterdam is mentioned. The sudden wave of prosperity that the Carignan-Salières regiment brought to the colony is of particular significance. Money, previously extremely scarce, suddenly abounded and the economy was no longer restricted to barter. From this time on war, and the military establishment it supported, was the colony's second major industry, perhaps even its first.

The next question is: how well did the editor perform her task in editing and translating these letters? The answer has to be very well indeed. Not all of Marie de l'Incarnation's letters have been included and not all the letters are given in their entirety; a selection was made from the Richaudeau 1884 edition, with the addition of one letter from the later edition by Dom Albert Jamet. The editor states that the selection was made on the basis of historical interest and it appears to have been a judicious one. A thirty-three-page introduction provides adequate background information on Sister Marie and the Ursuline order; there are three brief historical essays describing the main events and introducing the letters, the first for 1632-41, the second covering 1651-62, and the third 1663-72. These essays are succinct and useful, serving to place the letters in their historical context; moreover they are sound. Only one error was detected, the statement (p. 286) that after 1672 shipbuilding in the colony was forbidden by the home government. In addition each letter is carefully annotated. Forty-five pages of reference notes give exact information on practically everything and everyone, persons, places, events, mentioned in the body of the letters. As to the translation,

not all the letters were compared with the Richaudeau edition, but enough were to be able to vouchsafe that they have been rendered very faithfully with little loss of the author's style or the flavour of the age. If anything the translation errs occasionally on the literal side, but better so than to err the other way.

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Monumenta Novae Franciae. I. La Première Mission d'Acadie (1602-1616). Par LUCIEN CAMPEAU, S.J. Québec: Les Presses de l'université Laval. 1967. Pp. 276, 719, illus. \$22.00.

IL N'EST PAS INUTILE de situer l'ouvrage que nous présentons ici au lecteur. Il fait partie des *Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu*, publication officielle et scientifique des sources de l'histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus. Il est le 96^e de la collection générale, le 23^e de la série missionnaire et il inaugure une série particulière relative aux travaux des Jésuites de la Nouvelle-France.

Jusqu'en 1672, date de la suppression des *Relations des Jésuites*, celles-ci constitueront l'élément principal des *Monumenta Novae Franciae*. Toutes les *Relations* seront rééditées selon les exigences de la critique historique moderne. Elles seront accompagnées du plus grand nombre possible de documents connexes déjà connus, mais devenus aujourd'hui d'un accès difficile, ou encore inédits. On voit déjà l'ampleur et l'importance de cette collection des sources de notre histoire. Un jésuite canadien, le P. Lucien Campeau, membre de l'Institut historique de la Compagnie, dont le siège est à Rome, a été chargé de réaliser cette œuvre avec le concours de collaborateurs compétents.

L'analyse des *Monumenta Novae Franciae*, I, dont il est lui-même l'auteur, nous aidera à mieux comprendre ce que sera cette collection. Que contient-il? Après une bibliographie qui compte vingt-cinq pages, une Introduction qui a déjà les dimensions d'un volume (pp. 55-276). Il s'agit de replacer les Souriquois, peuple indigène à convertir, dans leur milieu humain, d'en décrire les mœurs, la psychologie religieuse, le mode de vie, leurs ramifications. On est ainsi préparé à la lecture des textes. De 1602, date où le P. Pierre Biard demande les missions lointaines, jusqu'à 1616, date de sa *Relation de la Nouvelle-France*, il y en a 162, d'importance et de longueur inégales, mais se rattachant tous au sujet. Les uns étaient déjà connus, les autres inédits. Dans chaque cas, le document est décrit, et la source de provenance indiquée. Les pièces les plus importantes sont précédées d'une courte préface. Comme l'Introduction, la description des documents et les préfaces sont rédigées en français, dans un style clair et qui ne manque pas d'élégance. Les documents sont publiés dans leur langue originelle: français, anglais, italien, espagnol, portugais. Des notes infrapaginales d'ordre historique, géographique, linguistique, etc. aident à une meilleure intelligence des textes.

L'auteur a eu l'heureuse idée d'insérer en fin de volume (pp. 660-83) de courtes mais substantielles notes sur les principaux personnages reliés de près à la première mission d'Acadie. Le P. Campeau n'est pas tendre pour le jeune Charles de Biencourt: "Il s'occupa surtout à recueillir des fourrures, en prélevant à l'occasion par la force sur ses concurrents. Il utilisa son titre de vice-amiral, mais sans avoir les moyens d'en imposer l'autorité. Son administration à Port-Royal ne paraît pas avoir été bien ordonnée et il subit à l'excès l'influence des aventuriers qui l'entouraient. A l'endroit des missionnaires, il se montra soupçonneux et jaloux. . . . Son poste fut détruit par Argall le 1.11.1613. Dans une entrevue

avec l'assaillant, il réclama le P. Biard pour le faire pendre. . . . On le fait mourir à l'âge de 32 ans, c'est-à-dire en 1623, exprimant le regret de sa dureté à l'égard des missionnaires." (p. 664) Ceux qui ont lu Lescarbot souscriront volontiers au jugement suivant: "Mises à part une vanité littéraire agaçante et une inspiration poétique trop rare, l'œuvre de L. le montre très curieux et érudit; il est aussi un chroniqueur soucieux d'honnêteté et digne de foi. Il est remarquablement moderne en orthographe française" (p. 674).

L'index analytique des personnes, des lieux et des choses (pp. 685-719) a été particulièrement soigné. L'ouvrage est enrichi de sept hors-textes: six cartes, la première, de l'Acadie et de Norembègue est l'œuvre d'un cartographe expérimenté travaillant sous la direction du P. Campeau; les autres sont des reproductions photographiques fort bien réussies des cartes et plans de Lescarbot et de Champlain. La dernière illustration est un portrait de Madame de Guercheville, la grande bienfaitrice de la mission d'Acadie.

À notre connaissance, on n'a jamais réuni et publié scientifiquement en un même volume autant de documents sur la première mission d'Acadie. Est-ce à dire que tout y est sans reproche? Les prises de position de l'auteur dans son introduction sur les Souriquois méritent assurément la plus sérieuse considération. Parviendront-elles à faire l'unanimité chez tous les chercheurs et historiens? Il est permis d'en douter. Quelques-uns trouveront peut-être que sont trop nombreuses les lettres des *Indipetae*, c'est-à-dire de ces jeunes religieux qui demandent les missions lointaines, mais dont la plupart ne sont jamais venus au Canada. Ces pièces attestent du moins l'enthousiasme suscité en France au XVI^e siècle pour notre mission. Et les réponses des Supérieurs nous rassurent sur la prudence avec laquelle ils choisissaient les missionnaires.

Ces quelques remarques n'enlèvent rien à la valeur de fond des *Monumenta Novae Franciae*, I. Travail de longue haleine, qui a coûté à l'auteur six années d'un *labor improbus* dans les grands dépôts d'archives d'Europe et d'Amérique; travail d'un historien compétent et consciencieux, qui rendra d'incontestables services aux chercheurs et aux historiens d'aujourd'hui et de demain. Et nous souhaitons plein succès à la collection de documents sur la Nouvelle-France, qu'il inaugure lui-même de façon à la fois solide et brillante.

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Minutes of His Majesty's Council at Annapolis Royal, 1736-1749. Edited by CHARLES BRUCE FERGUSON. Halifax: Public Archives of Nova Scotia. 1967. Pp. 113.

DR. C. B. FERGUSON's slim volume deals with the proceedings of the Nova Scotia Council during a most critical period when the survival of the colony appeared to be threatened both from within and without. The thousands of Acadian inhabitants were not trusted by most of the British officials at the tiny and dilapidated outpost of Annapolis Royal especially when these men compared their military strength with that of Louisbourg—the "French Gibraltar of North America."

In general, the *Minutes* from 1736 to 1749 are concerned with three major issues—Nova Scotia's relations with New England, the colony's relations with Louisbourg, and the Acadian problem. One man, Paul Mascarene, dominates the proceedings. He was not only a skilled colonial administrator and politician but

he was also an unusually gifted military leader. Mascarene played a key role in 1744 and 1745 in preventing the French from Louisbourg and New France, and their Indian allies, from capturing Nova Scotia's capital.

Dr. Fergusson's *Minutes of His Majesty's Council* will, without question, be frequently used by those specialists interested in Nova Scotia in the eighteenth century. But the book will be of limited use to others. It is unfortunate that there is no introduction that could put the Council proceedings in their proper historical context. Nor are there any editorial notes about the many individuals referred to in the *Minutes*. An excellent index is no substitute for the lack of editorial comment.

G. A. RAWLYK

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Yankees at Louisbourg. By G. A. RAWLYK. Orono, Maine: University of Maine Press. 1967. Pp. xviii, 209. \$2.50 (US).

THE AUTHOR WRITES that most historians would agree with L. E. DeForest's assessment that "the capture of Louisbourg in 1745 was the most important military achievement of the American colonists prior to the War of the Revolution." He states that the purpose of his book is to account for and to describe this colonial achievement. Mr. Rawlyk's book stands or falls on how well he has achieved his purpose.

He has written an excellent narrative of the New England attack on and capture of Louisbourg. The great mass of source material gathered from so many places in Canada, the United States, Great Britain, and France by the staff of the Louisbourg Historical Unit between 1962 and 1966 has been available for his study. He has had access to the various reports and the thousands of index cards prepared for that project. Writers such as Parkman and MacLennan did not have the benefit of such an accumulation of source material gathered together in one place, and it is rather disappointing for former members of the Louisbourg staff to find no recognition of their work given in the list of acknowledgments. However, the result is an interesting and authoritative account of the attack and capture of Louisbourg, one with which little exception can be taken and which should supersede earlier works on this section of the Louisbourg saga.

The author's attempt to account for the attack on Louisbourg has not been so well done. In his introduction, he indicates that possession of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton was the key to the control both of the interior of the northern half of the continent and also of "The Empire of the North Atlantic." He further describes the economic ties between the New England merchants and Louisbourg. He fails, however, to give sufficient attention to the adverse effects of a French monopoly of the Grand Banks fishery on the New England economy, and especially on certain communities there. Surely this was the principal reason for the expedition, supported by such other factors as antipathy towards the French, hatred of Roman Catholics, frontier Indian raids, and high hopes of plunder.

No mention is made in the book of the interesting geographic pattern of recruitment for the expedition. A relationship could well be established between recruitment and other factors, such as the course which the Great Awakening had followed, towns from which fishing fleets sailed annually for the Grand Banks, settlements of Irish Protestants, and communities where New England merchants carried on illicit trade with Louisbourg.

The epilogue might have developed more fully the relationship between the

1745 expedition against Louisbourg and the events of 1775. New England success there did more than give the colonists a sense of destiny and widen the gap with Great Britain. It helped them find courage to undertake the revolution. There were even those at Bunker Hill who had received their first military experience at Louisbourg. Surely it is this relationship which gives the expedition its true significance.

There are a few minor points for which the book can be adversely criticized. The fighting "Parson" Moody, of York Harbour, Maine, although perhaps an overworked subject, should not be omitted from a book entitled *Yankees at Louisbourg*. The Abbé LeLoutre has received a whitewashing which he scarcely deserves; scalping parties are a rather strange activity for Christian missionaries of any generation to participate in.

The bibliography will be useful for any student of Louisbourg. It coincides with that compiled by the Louisbourg Restoration Section, except for the inexplicable omission of *The Life of Sir William Pepperell, bart.*, by Usher Parsons (Boston, 1855).

The book is a valuable addition to the list of works on Louisbourg and should now become the authoritative work on the events of the siege and capture of the fortress by the New Englanders in 1745.

C. G. LUCAS

United Church Archives
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Histoire économique et sociale du Québec, 1760-1850: Structures et conjoncture.
Par FERNAND OUELLET. Montréal et Paris: Fides. 1966. Pp. xxxii, 639. \$10.00.

I AM GOING TO find it very difficult to refrain from superlatives in reviewing this work of uncommon excellence, for I think it easily one of the most important scholarly books on nineteenth-century Quebec history to be published in this generation.

It is important because of the method M. Ouellet has followed. Believing the (perhaps debatable and/or obvious) fact that "l'histoire politique ou constitutionnelle n'a de sens que . . . si elle fait appel à un ensemble complexe de facteurs qui la fondent au niveau des réalités humaines, quelle que soient leur diversité" (p. 323), he has minutely examined and analysed thousands of records of marriages and births and funerals, of salaries of workers and expenses of employers, of licences issued to tavern keepers and pedlars, of transport and cost of foodstuffs from one region of the province to another; statistics of imports, customs dues, and traffic across the border, of land grants and sales prices, of ships constructed in naval dockyards and the value of their tonnage; inventories of property of the deceased and notarial deeds of its sale; account books of religious communities; newspapers; census lists; private diaries; letters; and, in a word, whatever else (there are twelve pages of bibliography) might possibly help to "substituer à une histoire construite à l'aide des seuls documents qualitatifs, une histoire autant que possible quantitative" (p. 33).

This type of "quantitative" history which links M. Ouellet with the school of Gayer, of Rostow, and of Labrousse, Braudel, and others is thus described by Pierre Chaunu:

Il s'agit de substituer à un découpage logique, donc artificiel, à un découpage géographique plus concret, et pourtant, encore arbitraire, le découpage réel du temps que l'étude dynamique de la réalité impose. Il s'agit, surtout, de mettre en parallèle,

au sein du cadre chronologique, les différentes séries de phénomènes que la réalité ne sépare pas et que, seules, séparent les exigences de l'exposé, de faire surgir entre les séries traduites en chiffres les relations que les précédentes méthodes d'exposition ne pouvaient révéler. (quoted p. 33)

And it leads, in this instance, to conclusions which provide not only corrections to the work of a number of English-speaking Canadian historians, but more especially—and this is the second reason why the book is so important—a shattering refutation of the Conquest thesis so dear to French-Canadian nationalist and neo-nationalist writers. Indeed, neither the reviewers who have already described the book, nor M. Robert Mandrou who wrote the Preface, nor yet the author himself hide the fact that it constitutes a “réfutation argumentée du ‘traumatisme’ de 1763, qui aurait subjugué une nation encore adolescente et lui aurait imposé une sujétion qui se prolonge jusqu’à nos jours” (p. xi).

According to M. Ouellet then, the Conquest of 1759–63 brought no sudden breach of continuity for French-Canadian merchants, the Quebec Act giving a consecration to their social and economic *status quo ante*. “Le changement d’empire et de métropole,” he sums up (p. 553), “ne signifie pas une rupture fort appréciable avec le passé.” Indeed, after 1763, the French-Canadian commercial community continued to hold over the relatively few and relatively poor British merchants “la supériorité du nombre et une connaissance approfondie des conditions locales” (p. 565).

How then does he explain the celebrated *déchéance* of the bourgeoisie? By some three hundred pages of argumentation, closely knit together with facts, and charts, and price indices, which (if I understand them correctly) provide the clue in the “phénomène de résistance des mentalités devant les exigences du temps” (p. 551). Unprepared by the economic structure of New France, which since the end of the seventeenth century had been one “composé[e] de secteurs presque indépendants évoluant en gros d’une façon autonome” (p. 557), the French-Canadian bourgeois were caught up after 1785 in the commercial crisis of the country’s incipient capitalism—a revolution which was not of their making or of their British associates’. While the latter were able to “tirer parti de toutes les sources possibles de profits et n’hésitent pas à en créer de nouvelles” (p. 564), the *Canadiens* “se révèlent dès lors incapables d’assumer les orientations nouvelles. Leur faiblesse dans le secteur des importations, leur goût exclusif pour un monde dominé par les relations personnelles, leur individualisme, l’attrait du genre de vie “noble” et l’emprise des valeurs familiales et religieuses expliquent, croyons-nous, qu’ils soient demeurés stationnaires au moment où le capitalisme commercial réalisait de nouveaux progrès” (p. 567).

Furthermore, they hardened their hearts. And their minds were darkened. They clung to the Ancien Régime, to the coutume de Paris, to the seigneuries, to ancestral values, to an educational system in which a generation that enjoyed one of the widest suffrage laws in the world was brought up in a “philosophie de la monarchie de droit divin et le culte de l’obéissance passive au pouvoir établi” (p. 545). (Indeed, as late as 1959 Queen Elizabeth’s arrival on a Sunday in a fairly important French-Canadian urban centre was marked by a sermon in the cathedral on the moral duty of passive obedience to the Crown.) By the first decade of the nineteenth century, the *Canadiens* had taken refuge in nationalism, “ce sentiment,” as the French ambassador to the United States wrote about them in 1837, “si puissant sur l’esprit d’hommes simples et naïfs” (p. 412). In a word: left singularly ill-equipped by their experience during the French era for an economic juncture demanding expansion and diversification of investment, the French-Canadian bourgeois retreated into reactionary nationalism. Thus they

were vanquished, not by the forces of Wolfe, but by those of the century of progress. And thus, also, in a way, the failure of the rebels of 1837–38 saved Quebec and French Canada from separatism, “*recherche inconsciente de l’isolement politique et culturel et de la féodalité*” (p. 433).

M. Ouellet’s method also provides illuminating answers to many other questions. He shows, for example, how the Church profited from the Conquest, and emerged more vigorous than ever into the 1840s. Or, he discovers that the decline of the seigneurial class was due much less to the constitution of 1791 and the electoral system than to the arrogance and pretence that seemed to grow in reverse proportion to the seigneurs’ economic strength and ability to compromise with the commercial revolution. Or yet, he underlines the crucial role of LaFontaine in diagnosing the need of the professional class for a compromise with capitalism, and his no less crucial failure (but did he really try?) to change significantly the *ancien régime* mentality of his people. Et cetera, et cetera. He disposes of the “plot theory” about the constitution of 1791, underlines the real reasons for the mass emigration of *Canadiens* to the United States, points out how nationalism—and reactionary at that—is the only ideology that has ever penetrated the French-Canadian masses. . . . But it is impossible even to summarize all M. Ouellet’s reappraisals.

The obvious difficulty with so large and convincing a tableau, is, of course, that some of the nuances are lost. John Neilson’s stance in 1834, for example, is said to derive from his realization that Papineau was no reformer but a conservative nationalist. Fair enough. But in 1839–41, Neilson, in his opposition to the Union, was to reveal colours that were very much like Papineau’s. LaFontaine’s picture also comes out clear enough: the practised politician who knows which issues will and which will not be understood (and voted for) by the electorate—“*En somme, le politique aurait nécessairement la primauté sur l’économique et le social*” (p. 533). There should however be a few “buts.” For between 1838 and 1842 LaFontaine was acting under the persistent advice of Etienne Parent, Francis Hincks, James Leslie, and others who were certainly not men who ignored the economic and social. Afterwards, he was mentor to George-Etienne Cartier, certainly as much a railroad builder as any. (Liberal or Conservative: Papineau? Neilson? LaFontaine? Cartier?—there is stuff for at least a generation of undergraduate essays. Or is it important?) In all events I must beware of asking M. Ouellet to have done what he clearly did not set out to do.

His *Histoire* is more than a history book—and this is a third reason why it is so important. In French-Canadian historiography it is (I hope and expect) a turning point away from the *terribles simplificateurs* towards the scholars that understand the past as a complex story in which the truth is seldom simple and choices always difficult. It is, of course, an interpretation very much *à thèse*. It will be considered a challenge, and our French-Canadian nationalist seminars will doubtless soon resound with the usual shrill, little, secondary-source rebuttals. But perhaps not. For Fernand Ouellet has done some fundamental thinking. And he has certainly exposed the weakness of seeking explanations for economic phenomena in nationalist ideology. Significantly, perhaps, the dean and genius of the nationalist and neo-nationalist authors died within a few months after the publication of this research. A new life had begun to breathe over the historical profession in French Canada.

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Montreal

The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857. By E. E. RICH. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 1967. Pp. xii, 336, maps, illus. \$10.00.

THIS EXCELLENT VOLUME, ranked eleventh in its series, deserves pride of place at the top, beside Professor Trudel's *New France*. For, just as the society and economy of ancient Egypt were the gift of the Nile, so, with hardly less emphasis, the ethnic and political make-up of Canada today is to be ascribed to Hudson's strait and bay. It was that waterway which gave the English their first foothold on this subcontinent and has since twice decisively controlled the course of its history. The French, in the St. Lawrence valley, were first in the field, but the English, coming in by way of the Bay, bypassed most of the obstacles which hampered the northwestward expansion of their competitors and gave Great Britain a vested interest strong enough to determine that in 1763, given the choice, she preferred the possession of Canada to that of a West Indian sugar island. It was the Bay route, also, which determined that the Anglo-French community thus called into being should extend across the continent. In the mid-nineteenth century, when the settled parts of Canada were still severed from the Central Plains by geographical barriers, it was the presence on the prairies of the fur traders and a handful of settlers (who had arrived by way of the Bay in 1811, and at that date could have come by no other route) which confirmed the British title to possession and ensured that the 49th parallel should be a boundary in fact as well as in law. When gold miners, chiefly from the United States, poured into British Columbia, it was the trader James Douglas who intervened to secure that region from sharing the fate of Texas. Yet, though modern Canada is the joint offspring of the St. Lawrence and Bay areas, it is the former region almost exclusively which has moulded our national tradition. For the most part the country where the trader operated has not yet come to terms with civilization: the trader himself was migratory and inarticulate. The present volume should do something to restore him to the national consciousness.

Professor Rich furnishes a lucid and readable account of the history and significance of the fur trade, giving proper weight to the personal, political, and geographical factors. The latter, as was natural in an unknown country, were at first dominant. French and English both wished to tap the fur forests; the former were hampered by distance and the barrier of the Canadian Shield, which shouldered them southwards away from the region where the best pelts were to be found. Groseilliers and Radisson, who early perceived the strategic importance of the Bay, were snubbed and driven to seek the patronage of a foreign power. French adventurers traced the Mississippi from its upper reaches to the Gulf of Mexico long before they set eyes on Lake Winnipeg or the Saskatchewan River. On the other hand the Bay gave the English a saltwater passage deep into the continent and a base at a point where the Canadian Shield is narrow and traversed by the Hayes and Nelson waterways. Hence, while more than a century elapsed between the founding of Quebec and the prairie journeys of La Vérendrye, the Englishman Kelsey reached the Touchwood Hills barely twenty years after the granting of the Hudson's Bay Company charter. Had the traders from the Bay made a proper use of their natural advantage, they could have outdistanced their competitors from Montreal, as Alexander Mackenzie was to acknowledge at a later date.

Professor Rich makes the point that the early shareholders in the Hudson's Bay Company were numerous and that, though their primary concern was the fur trade, they had broader interests: their "motives were so mixed" and their

"personal investments so small in relation to their wealth that they could persist in their claims even when the fur trade, which had become their prime motive, had ceased to pay." Hence the astonishing tenacity of shareholders in the period 1686-1713, when every one of the Bay posts was, at one time or another, overrun by the French, and no dividends were payable. If, as may well be the case, the Company owed its broad foundations and resultant stability to the patronage of three princes of the House of Stuart, English-speaking Canadians owe a considerable debt to that underrated dynasty.

The complex story of the various associations of pedlars which finally coalesced into the Northwest Company, their magnificent contribution to discovery, and the squalid history of their rivalry with the Hudson's Bay Company are clearly and adequately summarized. This is a remarkably clear and well-balanced narrative, especially when one considers the bulk and diversity of the author's materials and his severe limitations in space.

L. H. NEATBY

University of Saskatchewan

Frozen Ships: The Arctic Diary of Johann Miertsching, 1850-1854. Translated and with an Introduction and Notes by L. H. NEATBY. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. Pp. xviii, 254, maps, illus. \$6.50.

BY THE FALL OF 1850 public opinion and the appeals of Lady Franklin had compelled the British Admiralty to put in hand a large-scale concerted effort to ascertain the fate of Sir John Franklin and his ships, the *Erebus* and the *Terror*. Moving into the Arctic Ocean from the east through Lancaster Sound were the barques *Resolute* and *Assistance*, together with two steamers, the *Pioneer* and the *Intrepid*; in addition there were the brigs *Lady Franklin* and *Sophia*, acting under Admiralty orders but independently provided; the Hudson's Bay Company had organized the schooner *Felix* and a supply ship, both under command of Sir John Ross; Lady Franklin herself had organized the outfitting of the *Prince Albert*; and two American-sponsored ships came from New York. Eastward through the Bering Strait came the Admiralty ships *Enterprise* and *Investigator* while the *Plover* stood by in Bering Strait as a depot ship, annually supplied with provisions by the *Herald*. Captain Kellett of the *Herald* was the senior officer in this west-to-east probe, and Captain Collinson of the *Enterprise* was senior to Robert McClure of the *Investigator*, recently promoted to the rank of commander. But McClure dodged Collinson on the way north from the Sandwich Islands, slipped into the Arctic Ocean ahead of his superior despite a delaying order from Captain Kellett, and only again made contact with Kellett when, after two winters in the ice (during which Kellett had returned to England and had come out to join the east-to-west probe in command of the *Resolute* and of the steamer *Intrepid* and had reached Melville Island) he was about to abandon the *Investigator*.

Because Kellett then ordered McClure to leave his ship in the ice it became possible to argue that, but for this intervention, the latter would have sailed through from west to east. He later received an award on the ground that he had been the first person to prove the existence of a northwest passage (indeed, two passages), but this claim has been refuted; for while it could be made to

appear that McClure never devoted himself to the search for Franklin but bent all his energy to seeking for the passage, even in this he was anticipated by Franklin himself.

Controversial as McClure's voyage was, it clearly marked a great advance in arctic discovery. McClure published no account of his own although he allowed his journals to be used for an adulatory narrative by J. S. Osborn, who commanded the steamer *Pioneer* but who was not aboard with McClure. Evidence from aboard the *Investigator* came from the able but bitter medical officer, Dr. Armstrong, whose account contributed much to the attacks on McClure, and from the Moravian missionary Johann Miertsching, who was carried as an interpreter. Miertsching had previous experience with Eskimos in Labrador; he was nothing of a sailor or a navigator, and although he was interested in people and in natural phenomena he was always, above all things, the kindly sentimental missionary. His memoir of the voyage, published soon after his return, bears this mark and so does his full account now published, for the first time, by Dr. L. H. Neatby.

The Diary's addition to evidence on the geographical achievement of the *Investigator* is negligible. This was to be expected, especially since the original had to be left behind in the ship, together with Miertsching's botanical and geographical specimens, and disappeared mysteriously—perhaps, as is darkly hinted, so that McClure could suppress evidence as to the plight of his ship. The Diary now published for the first time was later put together from memory, aided by McClure's own journal. Uncertain in technical details, it adds noticeably to the human picture. Above all it casts a kindly light on McClure himself and on the admirable relations with his officers and crew which, after some difficulty, he managed to establish; in the early days the crew were insolent and godless, the officers quarrelsome and incompetent. Other detailed character studies are lacking, for Miertsching was uncritically kindly in depicting his shipmates.

Perhaps the best evidence yielded by the Diary lies in the casual references to Eskimo habits. These Miertsching does not analyse; but he reveals traits which are of the greatest significance. He tells of the Eskimos of Point Barrow who did not understand the use of money and who flagrantly purloined property from the white men at every opportunity; of the Eskimo who had somehow got hold of an English gun; of the groups on Victoria Island who could not comprehend the nature of a gift; and again of those who traded westwards from Mackenzie River to another Eskimo group, not with the Hudson's Bay men on the Mackenzie. Neither of these groups had ever seen a white man before, but they had indirect trading contact with Russians on Colville River. Similarly, the Cape Bathurst Eskimos exchanged goods with Loucheaux Indians and so traded indirectly with the Hudson's Bay post far inland at Fort Good Hope. These are invaluable, if small and casual, signs of the way in which the influence of European trade outran by many hundreds of miles the actual European traders in their advance across North America and into the Arctic.

Dr. Neatby performs an admirable work as translator and editor. His thorough knowledge of the broad and long story of the search for a northwest passage qualifies him perfectly for this task, and his contribution is at once scholarly and self-effacing—all that should be asked of an editor!

E. E. RICH

St. Catharine's College
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The Great Coalition. By P. G. CORNELL. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association. 1967. Pp. 23. \$.50.

The French Canadians and the Birth of Confederation. By JEAN-CHARLES BONENFANT. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association. 1967. Pp. 20. \$.50.

The Quebec Conference. By W. M. WHITELAW. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association. 1967. Pp. 27. \$.50.

THE THREE LATEST HISTORICAL BOOKLETS published by the Canadian Historical Association all deal with the general topic of Confederation. While not perhaps as original as many of the earlier efforts, they provide useful and pleasant reading for the student of Canadian history.

In the *Great Coalition*, which is by far the best of the three, Paul Cornell restates succinctly his thesis on political parties during the Union period, a thesis which he has argued at great length elsewhere. Concerning the Coalition itself, he affirms what is now surely incontestable, that its members did not enter into the accord for "personal aggrandizement or the seeking of short-term tactical success in the political battle" but rather for the achievement of "large long-term goals" which had been considered by its three political components for several years. The Coalition thus "rescued Canadian public life from frustrating deadlock." Professor Cornell also wisely reminds his readers that, particularly for the inhabitants of Ontario and Quebec, Confederation marked no great break in continuity. It was the developing alignment of political groups during the Union period in old Canada, particularly events surrounding the "watershed" coalition of 1854, that prepared the way for the party alignments in the young dominion.

Those of us who emphasize the plurality of political groups, rather than their growing duality, during the pre-Confederation decade are naturally disquieted by Professor Cornell's omissions and oversimplifications. Surely recognition of the only partial victory by George Brown, the metropolitan, capitalistic, British-inspired, monarchical liberal, over the original Clear Grits with their "theoretical democratic and republican ideas" is essential to an understanding of Confederation politics. It is also a preview to late nineteenth-century tensions within Ontario Liberalism and to the party's swing to provincial rights. Despite Professor Cornell's assertion, the Great Reform Convention of 1859 did not work out "generally agreed goals." A majority of the delegates probably preferred Shepard's dissolution of the Union to Brown's scheme for dividing it into a federation; representation by population at the time received no emphasis. Largely ignored is the whole middle group (not "centre" in any ideological sense), that is the Baldwinites who accepted Canadian cultural duality and the Mauves who rejected Cartier's leadership and political style. Yet the way Upper Canadians viewed French Canada, the Union, and the Montreal metropolis was of great importance in the determination of political lines. The majority of cabinet ministers in the Brown-Dorion régime of 1858 considered themselves neither Grit nor Rouge. Between 1858 and May 1862 this middle group slowly and falteringly coalesced around Sandfield Macdonald, Foley, and Sicotte, with Josiah Blackburn of the *London Free Press* acting significantly in the background. The Mauves could not take Brown, and when he forced Macdonald in May 1863, to abandon the double majority and accept much more Grit-Rouge influence, the group broke up. All this strengthens the argument that Cartier was far from being the popular *chef* of French Canada at the time of Confederation. As Professor Cornell notes, Cartier has certainly not become an historical *chef*.

In the *French Canadians and the Birth of Confederation*, Professor Bonenfant presents a somewhat whiggist view of his topic. He rightly asserts, however, that Confederation was basically an English-Canadian scheme, the negotiations for which were carried on in a basically English atmosphere. For its success the French Canadians were necessary, and they thus affected the federal structure. But while the majority of them "probably" favoured Confederation, most of them did so unenthusiastically, seeing in it "the only realistic solution to their problems." They were thus hardly committed to a role of Canadian nation-building. The unpleasant alternatives were dreaded annexation to the United States or ultimate Grit-dominated representation by population in a united province of Canada. Each would doom *la survivance*. Although the Rouges had talked separatism around 1850, independence did not seem a realizable solution in 1865. Still the author quotes from Cauchon's *Journal de Québec* that French Canadians wanted "to be a nation one day," as was their "necessary destiny." Perhaps he somewhat overestimates Bleu concern for "provincial power" in light of the commitment of Cartier and other leaders both to a continuing role for themselves personally at the federal rather than the provincial level and also to their ideal of *bloc* politics for French Canada. Professor Bonenfant reminds his readers that the Québécois "can be reproached" for ignoring the situation of French Canadians outside Quebec. He reminds them that educational problems were then more related to religion than language. His analysis of Dorion's opposition is most useful, but it might have helped if he had included a description of Dorion's 1856 proposal for a "Canadian" federation. Furthermore many of us hoped for some discussion on Cartier's views on the acquisition and settlement of the West. Bonenfant also accepts the myth that the victory of Laurier in 1896 was the decisive event in ending the influence of bishops and curés "over the electorate in political matters."

The Quebec Conference, while graphically and poetically portraying the Confederation setting and rephrasing the attitude of Maritimers to the Canadian initiative, does not add a great deal to our understanding of this important event. Many of the insights given in Peter Waite's *Life and Times of Confederation* are ignored. The author, arguing that the constitution of 1840 was "thoroughly inadequate," depreciates the party differences in old Canada and the role of Brown in the negotiations for Confederation. Furthermore, there seems little proof for the reassertion that Mowat argued for provincial rights at the conference. Despite Murray Beck's booklet on Joseph Howe, the author sees the old Nova Scotian as the genius behind his province's opposition. The author has the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council "for the remainder of the century . . . dominated by Lord Haldane," who actually did not sit on that body until a few years before World War I. The booklet strangely asserts that the protection of separate schools was a major concession to the French of Lower Canada, one that helped keep them "remarkably silent." The work is also rather fuzzy on Galt's role in educational matters at the final Westminster Conference. It also has the New Brunswick railway pushed at great expense "to far away Rivière-du-Loup."

All in all, however, the three booklets, together with two earlier ones by W. L. Morton and P. B. Waite and five more published by the Centennial Commission, give the student of Confederation ten stimulating and very differing approaches to the over-all question of the unification of British North America.

BRUCE W. HODGINS

The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967: A Century of Achievement. Edited by Lt.-Col. D. J. GOODSPEED, C.D. Ottawa: Directorate of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters. 1967. Pp. xii, 287, illus. \$6.00.

AFTER READING THIS, the most recent publication of the Directorate of History at Canadian Forces Headquarters, I could not help but recall the first book to issue from that source, namely Brigadier-General E. A. Cruikshank's *History of the Organization, Development and Services of the Military and Naval Forces of Canada*. What a contrast! The latter bearing no author's name, printed on the poorest quality of newsprint, lacking any illustrations; the former appearing under Goodspeed's name, printed on the finest quality of glossy paper, filled with interesting half-tones, colour prints, and maps. The Directorate of History has come a long way since 1920 as far as the art of publishing books is concerned. Certainly the volume under review is a delight to look at and a joy to hold. It will make a bold appearance on anyone's bedside table or bookshelves.

Unfortunately, as far as the military historian is concerned, the pleasure will be largely tactile and visual. He will be disappointed in the text, particularly if he is familiar with other books which have been prepared by the Directorate of History. In *The Armed Forces of Canada* the historian will find nothing challenging, nothing he has not read in greater detail elsewhere. He will find a brief history of the three services under one cover; but that is about all that is new in this book. The emphasis is on the operations of the two world wars. As if this were all that Canadian military history consisted of since 1867. The years from 1867, or rather 1609, to 1914 are dismissed in twenty-seven pages. World War I is given sixty pages; the between-wars period, twenty; World War II, ninety-six; and the postwar years, sixty. In none of these pages will the reader discover any hints of controversy, of differences between the civil and military powers, of the role of the militia in politics, of disputes between Great Britain and Canada over matters of command, of the struggles of the armed forces in Canada against public indifference and hostility. There is no mention of the problems attending the development of an officer corps in Canada; no mention of the early and generally unknown struggles over unification in the days of MacBrien and Hose, or of any opposition to the more recent and more familiar efforts of Paul Hellyer in the same direction. The writer who has to market his books through a university press or a commercial publisher will look with envy at the beautiful maps, particularly those in colour and relief, and wish that the text was as revealing and as attractive.

In a word this is a book for the non-specialist; a nice present for a friend at Christmas. The military historian will continue to have recourse to those other, much more useful, even if less thoroughly illustrated books which have come out of the Directorate of History from as far back as General Cruikshank's day.

G. F. G. STANLEY

Royal Military College of Canada

Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918-1919, and the Part Played by Canada. By JOHN SWETTENHAM. Toronto: Ryerson Press. 1967. Pp. 315, maps, illus. \$9.00.

ALLIED INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA was a strange, inconclusive affair, "a war of few casualties and unnumbered executions." Restrained by politicians mindful of their domestic problems or, like President Wilson, imbued with a utopian concept of

international relations, American, British, Canadian, Japanese, and a handful of French and Italian troops sustained few losses. It was the Russian forces, Red and White, who fought and suffered, while civilians, trapped by contending armies, were butchered in untold numbers. In Soviet history the allied intrusion is a significant episode. Yet it is not surprising that much remains unknown about the venture or its relation to the civil war. The canvas is vast, the details complex. Access to soviet and western documents has been limited and difficult: much of what has been written about the period by soviet historians is propaganda; material, including emigré accounts, in a multiplicity of languages, is widely scattered. It is to this important episode that John Swettenham's book addresses itself.

It begins with a recapitulation of the reasons why the allies considered intervention necessary and concludes with a brief appraisal of what the action accomplished. Six chapters of varying length and penetration trace the course of campaigns in the main theatres of conflict. Operational conditions and the size and nature of allied forces in different regions varied enormously. In the Caspian area Dunsterforce, a small *ad hoc* British unit laced with a sprinkling of Canadians, took and briefly held Baku in the summer of 1918. To the north Syren and Elope forces, mostly British but including 595 Canadians, the majority of them artillerymen, occupied the Murmansk and Archangel regions. In Siberia, well-equipped Canadian and American contingents remained tethered to Vladivostok which, because of its proximity to North America and to Japan, became the main allied *entrepôt* for anticipated major actions to the west.

The author rightly pinpoints the armistice as the major reason for allied vacillation over Russia. Before November 11, 1918, intervention was a logical military possibility with short- and long-term objectives. The United States, however, remained unconvinced of its merits. As a result, intervention did not proceed until President Wilson, moved by the plight of the Czech Legion stranded deep in Russia, finally committed his country to the venture on July 6, 1918. After the armistice the military reasons for intruding into Russia evaporated, exacerbating allied uncertainties and divisions. Thus, while the Paris Peace Conference inconclusively discussed Russia, Winston Churchill, the British war minister, pressed for a continuation of intervention on an enlarged scale. Canada, which became involved when Prime Minister Robert Borden agreed in July 1918 to participate on grounds of military necessity and in the hope that commercial advantages in Siberia would accrue to the Dominion once fighting in Russia ended, became increasingly sceptical about continuing with the operation. Conscription of men for the Siberian Expeditionary Force after the armistice was strongly resented, and the costs of maintaining over 4000 troops and 180 horses were alarmingly high.

Although the book claims to be written "against the background of the issues and events of the Civil War" in Russia, it touches only superficially upon that turbulent phase of Soviet history. There is no resort to soviet or emigré sources, or to German documents captured during World War II. Trotsky is quoted at second hand from W. H. Chamberlain's admirable work on the Russian Revolution, and Kolchak's personality and régime appear to be drawn from Peter Fleming's thoroughly unsatisfactory work on the unfortunate admiral.

Treatment of Canada's part in the intervention is surer because the nature and extent of evidence available in sources such as the Borden Papers and Department of Militia and Defence files is specific, clearly delineated, and accessible. Even so, there are surprising gaps. With the exception of an untenable generalization about the Winnipeg General Strike in the last chapter, there is no consideration of the Russian Revolution's impact upon the Canadian population or

government or any assessment of its ideological fallout upon the Siberian Expeditionary Force. The influence upon all three, however, was considerable. On September 27, 1918, government alarm over the activities of radicals culminated in the banning of fourteen organizations considered dangerous to the state. Within a week of the armistice two platoons of Russian-speaking troops in the Siberian contingent were broken up and "35 undesirable Russians" were separated from the force. By February 1919 seventy-four Russian-speaking soldiers had been summarily discharged for "Bolshevik tendencies and general menace to the community." Earlier, on December 21, 1918, in Victoria, B.C., a small number of French-Canadian troops of the 259th Battalion refused to board the S.S. *TEESTA* in order to proceed to Vladivostok. Actions such as these, together with differences over intervention within the cabinet, economic recession, mounting labour unrest, and Borden's realization that Britain and the United States were unable and unwilling to commit themselves wholeheartedly to intervention, resulted in withdrawal of Canadian troops from Russia.

Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918-1919, is a useful outline, but the real story of intervention and Canada's role in it has still to be written.

WILLIAM RODNEY

Royal Roads Military College

Mitch Hepburn. By NEIL MCKENTY. Toronto/Montreal: McClelland & Stewart. 1967. Pp. x, 307, illus. \$8.95.

THE 1930s WERE a decade suited to the rise of doctrinaires and demagogues. Some were crusaders with a mission, zealots with a creed; others had no very clear ideological position but simply reflected and exploited the pain and confusion of the times. Canada produced a number of such men, many but not all at the level of provincial politics, each attempting in his own way to challenge the omnibus, amorphous, consensus liberalism of Mackenzie King. Among them was the subject of this interesting book, who, Father McKenty remarks in a notable understatement, "has been considered one of the most colourful Premiers" of Ontario.

It is not easy to call to mind any more colourful than Mitchell Hepburn, any more mercurial in temperament, more rambunctious in action, or more constantly embroiled in controversy. How he escaped from the comparative obscurity and irksome frustrations of a back bench in the House of Commons to resurrect the nearly moribund Liberal party of Ontario and what he did after leading it to victory in 1934 is here engagingly recounted. Since the book is modestly described as only a political profile rather than a complete portrait or a full-blown biography, it is perhaps ungenerous to complain that certain things are dealt with somewhat superficially. Every political biographer, and perhaps every "profiler," is bothered by the problem of striking a balance between the "life" and the "times." Father McKenty has concentrated on delineating the man, which he does with detachment but not without sympathy, rather than on exploring thoroughly his administration of Ontario or the complicated political, economic, and social issues of the Hepburn period.

Not that these are ignored, of course; they could not be. We are told quite a bit, for example, about the wrangles over liquor control, financial support for separate schools, and hydroelectric policy. There is the best account yet published of Hepburn's outlandish war against the cio in Oshawa. Most of all, attention is paid to his feud with Mackenzie King, which at one stage so annoyed the latter

that, noticing in the paper that Hepburn had pneumonia, he wrote: "I don't often wish that a man should pass away but I believe it would be the most fortunate thing that could happen at this time." It was not to be, however. The Unseen Hand faltered and Hepburn recovered to fight again. The story of his part in the efforts to oust King is the main theme of the second half of the book and is well told, though the author may be thought by some readers to accept too uncritically the conventional view that trying to destroy King was tantamount to a wilful attack on the very edifice of Canada.

Hepburn himself is summed up as a rural conservative with a streak of liberal humanitarianism, a man who knew instinctively how to appeal to the people on the back concessions. At the same time he admired and enjoyed consorting with the wealthy and successful, surrounding himself with cronies like J. P. Bickell, Frank O'Connor, and "Sell 'Em Ben" Smith. He "lacked any kind of philosophical base," writes Father McKenty, "any firm commitment, any real sense of direction . . . one will look in vain through the Hepburn era in Ontario for any positive, progressive theme. . . . Politically he lived pretty much from hand-to-mouth, showing contempt today for his opinions of yesterday." He "always remained a boy," the author observes at another point, "—an exuberant, impulsive boy, generous to a fault, implacable with those who crossed him, jealous, hostile to authority, susceptible to flattery, somewhat naive, over-sensitive to criticism, brash and cocky, yet . . . constantly needing approbation, continually having to prove himself, throwing a temper tantrum if thwarted, demanding obedience from others, undisciplined himself, an extrovert who, like most children, had neither the time nor the ability for self-examination." The examination has been made in these pages and it is well worth perusing.

Unfortunately, though, the book is open to severe criticism on one count: while it has some excellent passages it is badly written in many places. Worse than that, it must rank as one of the most carelessly edited volumes in the annals of Canadian publishing. The reader's attention is all too frequently diverted from the narrative by minor errors of fact, by words missing, misused, or mis-spelled, and by some of the most mixed up sentences to be found this side of a freshman essay. These defects ought to have been corrected long before the book was in its final form.

So, regrettably, one cannot congratulate author and publisher of their high literary standard. Hopefully one will not be faulted or attacked for being impatient of and having an antipathy for poor writing and worse editing. This criticism is structured so that whoever faulted in editorial care may be lead, perhaps even pressured if that is not contradictary, to once again tighten up controls. They might even be threatened by the swash-bucking chieftan of the publishing house, who could do it single-handedly and easier than anyone else without raising his voice, violating the properties or putting himself in a power bind. This would contribute to the salvific effect of sparing us "English" such as this.

ROGER GRAHAM

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Louis St. Laurent, Canadian. By DALE C. THOMSON. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. 1967. Pp. xii, 564, illus. \$9.50.

THE TITLE OF THIS BIOGRAPHY IS A BIT AMBIGUOUS. As a bald statement of fact it is quite accurate; as deliberate understatement it is contrived and excessive;

and as an indication of national character it is acutely embarrassing. Professor Thomson wants his readers to believe that his subject was a great prime minister and devoted servant of his people, but the evidence he presents doesn't quite carry such a burden. Louis St. Laurent emerges as an excellent lawyer and an able cabinet minister, but nothing more. Despite his image as the avuncular guardian of his people's interests, he was really insensitive, unimaginative, and politically naïve. He was content to allow his superefficient colleagues to run the country on the principle of administrative expediency while he played the part of *pater familias* to eighteen million Canadians.

According to his biographer, he was "paternalistic by nature" and being fatherly became his style as prime minister. It was particularly apposite because, like most fathers, he achieved that position with little effort, had no real understanding of the processes involved, and remained convinced that he alone knew what was best for his children. It was characteristic of St. Laurent that he refused Walter Harris' request to raise the pension increase from six to ten dollars during the 1957 election campaign—St. Laurent was satisfied that six dollars was adequate and the people could take it or leave it. What was seen by some to be stern adherence to principle was often smug indifference to public feeling. His speeches were fatherly: pompous and trivial; his public appearances characterized by the contrived dandling of strange children on a fundamentally unsympathetic knee.

Much was made in the press of St. Laurent's lack of ambition; he did not seek either of his jobs as cabinet minister and prime minister. In the first instance this was undoubtedly true. In fact, once the war was over, and immediately after his re-election in 1945, he seemed to think of little else but getting back into private life and his law practice. As his biography indicates, he planned to resign his seat within six months of resuming it. Apart from anything else, it was an odd attitude for someone to express having just asked the voters to return him to office, presumably for the life of that parliament. But it was this attitude that enabled Louis St. Laurent to insulate himself from politics. He constantly refreshed himself with the thought that he could quit at any time and go back to Quebec, his practice, and his directorships. The determined refusal of his wife to accept his political career probably reinforced this attitude.

The implication in this biography is that St. Laurent did not actively seek the leadership of the Liberal party in 1948. He was certainly not an active candidate. The memoirs of C. G. Power do suggest, however, that he was not wholly indifferent. His reluctance may have been caused by a feeling of unworthiness for such high office, as his biographer implies, but he obviously did not think anyone else in the party was more worthy than he. St. Laurent was a man who liked to be coaxed.

Understandably, Professor Thomson is anxious the reader should think well of his old chief. The popularity of St. Laurent is demonstrated by the retelling of such signal events as his waving a stetson in Calgary, becoming an Indian chief in Saskatchewan, and being applauded by the New Delhi press corps—"a rare tribute." In fact all the members of the St. Laurent ministry emerge as pretty swell fellows—hard-working and imaginative. We have to turn to C. G. Power to find that Jimmy Gardiner considered St. Laurent a disaster in the west and that in Quebec politics St. Laurent was a "flop." It was Senator Power who wrote: "It was said when St. Laurent was at the zenith of his power and prestige that if he were ever defeated there might be regret but no tears or sorrow, and so it was."

It is difficult to make a case for St. Laurent as a great leader, if only because his cabinet colleagues did not need—or did not want—any direction. During the

debate on the redistribution of 1953, St. Laurent insisted that he wanted no partisan considerations to intrude; yet, as Thomson points out, his failure to provide any leadership ensured that just such considerations did intrude. After 1953 he really wasn't in charge at all. His listless conduct during the Defence Production Department debate proved this. His support of C. D. Howe throughout the protracted evolution of the pipeline fiasco was apparently due to his realization that "Howe had his heart set on carrying out the project." St. Laurent's hesitations over the South Saskatchewan dam project and the St. Lawrence Seaway were typical of his caution and of his refusal to take any steps until the ground before him had been poked, prodded, and paved.

It is equally difficult to see St. Laurent as a great liberal. Unfortunately Professor Thomson is not much help in discovering what St. Laurent's political attitudes were. We are told that he was paternalistic and a pragmatist in public affairs. But we are also told that Clement Attlee was delighted with "his rather unusual combination of . . . idealism and common sense," and that his "conservative appearance belied his progressive views." Yet, it turns out, he had much in common with Leslie Frost and George Drew, especially on "basic issues." Apparently his conservatism was really "idealism tempered by years of practical experience"—as a corporation lawyer?

This kind of exegetic approach may be unfair to St. Laurent's biographer, but in the absence of any discussion of the former prime minister's views, of any consistent analysis of St. Laurent as a politician, one is forced to tease the answers out of Professor Thomson's narrative skein. How else can one find an explanation for the part played by St. Laurent as justice minister in the detention and deportation of the Japanese Canadians, or of his threat to invoke the censorship regulations against Agnes Macphail for her criticism of judicial appointments, or of his curious behaviour throughout the Gouzenko episode? In this latter instance his initial refusal to see Gouzenko almost gave the Russian clerk back to his employers. Subsequently St. Laurent was to tell the House of Commons that he had forgotten about a secret order-in-council under which the espionage suspects were arrested and held incommunicado.

During the Quebec election of 1948 St. Laurent was described by one candidate as having an "English mentality." This was not entirely accurate but, viewed from the perspective of today, it seems not far off the mark. It seems odd that eleven years ago a French-Canadian prime minister would be unaware of the problems which are so important today. Yet at a banquet in Quebec City, celebrating his seventy-fifth birthday, in 1957, St. Laurent addressed these words—in French—to his compatriots: "[It is] perhaps time that we stopped wondering with too much anxiety about our future; it will be what we ourselves make of it by our work, our perseverance, our confidence that there is a place for us in the Canadian nation, that we are capable of filling that place, and that it is a place which is growing larger and is becoming more and more assured as the nation expands." Then he quoted Browning: "Grow old along with me. . . ." He may have been Uncle Louis in the rest of Canada, but he was Uncle Tom in Quebec.

Professor Thomson's task must have been difficult. If the footnotes are any indication, there was no access to any personal papers—only to *Hansard*, newspaper files, and the kind of comment politicians make about retired colleagues. The paucity of unpublished material may have led him to confine the book to what amounts to a careful account of the major events in St. Laurent's political career. There is little analysis of the man's character or of his role in such events as the formation of NATO. We are told what he did, what he said, and what the

press said about it; but Professor Thomson never gets behind the public figure and the public pronouncements. One would like to think, for the sake of Canadian character, that there was more to Uncle Louis than this.

WALTER YOUNG

University of British Columbia

The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945-1967. By BLAIR FRASER. New York and Toronto: Doubleday. 1967. Pp. x, 325. \$6.75.

THIS BOOK IS THE LAST in the Canadian History Series conceived by the late Thomas B. Costain and designed to tell the story of Canada in an imaginative style, a tone of high adventure that would make popular reading not only in Canada but throughout the English-speaking world. It is not a scientific historical study; nor does the author claim it is. A member of the parliamentary press gallery for many years, he describes it as "the chronicle of an onlooker—occasionally an eyewitness, more often a gleaner of other men's observations." Judged on that basis, it is an excellent piece of work.

Selecting an approach to a contemporary subject is always difficult, for it implies developing some aspects at the expense of others, and Blair Fraser's book is no exception in this regard. Apparently he decided not to write a comprehensive survey of the period, and that task has still to be undertaken. He chose not to provide references, and his quotes often appear to be paraphrasings, with the result that their value for future historians is somewhat limited. At the same time, his obvious desire to "cover" the twenty-year period following World War II prevented him from giving the first-hand account that he is so well qualified to pass on to future generations. This is the most grievous shortcoming of all, for Blair Fraser spent most of those years in the Press Gallery and enjoyed the trust and confidence of some of the men who made Canadian history then. Prior to the defeat of the Liberal party in 1957, only Grant Dexter of the *Winnipeg Free Press* had comparable sources of information in the cabinet and senior civil service. And while his work as a parliamentary correspondent was made more difficult during the Diefenbaker years because he had been so closely identified with the Liberals, he had good friends among the high-ranking Conservatives as well. In addition, he was absent from Ottawa during most of the period of Conservative government. To some extent, Blair Fraser has scooped himself by telling part of what he knows in *The Search for Identity*; he has much more to tell, and it must be hoped that he will be persuaded to write a much more detailed account of his years as observer of the Canadian political scene.

Blair Fraser tells his story in the clean, direct prose that has made him, if not "Canada's most distinguished journalist" as is claimed on the jacket of the book, certainly one of the leading members of his profession. The twenty-eight chapters have something of the character of *Maclean's* articles, with gimmicky titles, catchy lead sentences, and a tendency to oversimplification. Preoccupation with effect occasionally leads the author into imagery and colourful phraseology at the expense of accuracy. For example, much as he might enjoy the description, Walter Gordon hardly rates the title of "Liberal firebrand" (p. 72). Picture him on the same platform with William Lyon Mackenzie! And any average history undergraduate could refute the statement that John Diefenbaker's 1963 campaign was "a political rear-guard action that has no compare in history or legend since Horatius held the bridge" (p. 196). As for the claim that René Lévesque's statement, prior to 1966 on federal-provincial affairs "left as little for Ottawa to do

as for a late Holy Roman Emperor" (p. 202), that might be first-rate prophecy but it is second-rate political analysis.

Faced with the usual difficult choice between a chronological narration and a subject by subject approach, the author chose the latter; he was thus better able to develop the topics that interested him most, and about which he is most knowledgeable. He deals well with the pipeline debate of 1956 and with the spate of scandals that plagued the Pearson administration, but his treatment of the Diefenbaker period reflects his absence in London for much of that time. In choosing his anecdotes and illustrations, he is also inclined to rely on his personal experiences, often sacrificing more poignant examples to prove his point. But that is the nature of the book. The quality of the different chapters also reflects the fact that 1957 was something of a watershed in Fraser's own career. He makes much of the role of television during the pipeline debate, referring to the "breathless broadcasts" on the new medium. The greatest performer in that regard was the author himself; he was an impressive figure before the Parliament Buildings in dawn's early light as he reported the bitter debates that had just concluded. That may well have been the high point in his career. The Diefenbaker government had other reporters on whom it bestowed its confidence, and when the Liberals returned to power, younger members of the Press Gallery were vying for prominence.

There are errors in this book, but not serious ones. Mackenzie King "found" St. Laurent in 1941, not 1942 (p. 183). St. Laurent's nomination speech at the Liberal convention in 1948 was carefully prepared; it was his acceptance speech that was made from notes jotted down during the convention (p. 88). I doubt if Mackenzie King made a firm offer of the External Affairs portfolio to Brooke Claxton in 1946; the two men more likely discussed the possibility of such an appointment (p. 89). Separatist Marcel Chaput wasn't "dismissed" from the federal civil service; he resigned (p. 201). Claude Morin is Quebec deputy minister for federal-provincial, not dominion-provincial, affairs (p. 257).

But let us not quibble. Blair Fraser set out to write a certain type of book; he explained his goals carefully, and he achieved them. He has made a contribution not only to the understanding of Canada within and without our borders, but also to the fund of knowledge required for the more intensive study of the postwar period. He does not provide a very satisfactory answer to Canada's search for identity—he sees it in the possibility that a Canadian can still "enjoy the illusion of solitude" in the country's vast emptiness—but that is a quest that has frustrated writers in the past and will likely continue to do so in the future.

Université de Montréal

DALE C. THOMSON

The Canadian Political Nationality. By DONALD V. SMILEY. Toronto and London: Methuen. 1967. Pp. xvi, 142. \$4.25.

CE PETIT LIVRE est très utile dans l'ensemble, déçoit un peu partout, irrite à la fin.

C'est une excellente introduction à l'étude de la crise constitutionnelle canadienne. Dans une langue juste et sobre, l'auteur résume d'abord en deux chapitres d'une cinquantaine de pages l'évolution constitutionnelle jusqu'à 1960. Il procède au choix des matériaux à utiliser avec une sûreté et un flair étonnants. Préoccupé de ne pas perdre le fil conducteur, il ne nous livre que l'essentiel au point qu'on s'étonne même qu'une histoire, plus enchevêtrée encore que complexe, apparaisse tout à coup lucide, intéressante sinon passionnante à lire. Sur le sujet, nous ne connaissons pas de meilleur texte en français ou en anglais.

Le troisième chapitre ("The Federation and Quebec since Duplessis") est un rappel strictement politico-constitutionnel de la "révolution tranquille" de la "belle Province." Utile résumé sur ce plan, l'auteur évoque fréquemment les points de vue officiels, des aperçus d'analystes québécois. Mais on reste continuellement sur sa faim. On sait assez bien ce qui fut, très peu comment cela se fit, et presque pas du tout pourquoi cela se produisit. On saisit plutôt des "épiphénomènes" s'enchaînant en processus que le phénomène en sa dialectique évolutive. Le sujet n'était certes pas facile à cerner en une trentaine de pages; mais, à la lecture, on n'éprouve aucun frisson d'*hindsight* comme dans la partie historique. Le *Quebec Problem* est aussi un "problème" majeur pour la compréhension de l'analyste, présentant une dose de quasi-imperméabilité que l'auteur n'a pu percer. Mais plus prudente ou dégagée que les analyses de Québécois qui participent à la "bagarre," cette esquisse reste, par sa schématique même, une utile référence initiale pour une étude plus englobante et profonde.

On serait peu enclin à reprocher ce grief à l'auteur si ce n'était de la très faible partie terminale ("Toward the Canadian Political Nationality"). D'une part, "if Canada cannot become a political community—one community not two—it is not worth preserving" (p. 128); mais, aussi, "the future pattern of political and constitutional relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada is thus a matter of fundamental conflict within the province itself" (p. 128). Devant un tel problème, l'auteur ne fait que parodier, sur le thème de "equal partnership" dans "a community of political allegiance alone" (W. L. Morton), le programme de George-Etienne Cartier, cité en exergue du volume: "Now when we were united together, if union were attained, we would form a political nationality with which neither the national origin, nor the religion of any individual would interfere."

Ce n'est pas assez. Il est peut-être trop tard. Pas plus que quiconque, l'auteur n'est en possession de l'avenir. Mais son ouvrage ne contribuera à le modeler. Livre "trop court," dans les deux sens.

GÉRARD BERGERON

Université Laval

Fate and Will in Foreign Policy. By JAMES EAYRS. Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Publications. 1967. Pp. xii, 87. \$1.25 paper.

UN TON NON-CONFORMISTE, un style brillant, un subtil recours à un parallélisme constant entre deux thèmes opposés, une galaxie d'images et de citations bien choisies font de *Fate and Will in Foreign Policy* un recueil d'essais d'une grande originalité. James Eayrs a ce don unique de provoquer les uns et de charmer les autres en même temps. Ses attaques sont souvent cinglantes, ses suggestions parfois contestables mais ses idées sont toujours inédites. Dans les présentes causeries (prononcées sur les ondes de la CBC en 1966 et 1967), James Eayrs s'est efforcé d'aller au-delà des événements pour saisir les points faibles et les points forts des hommes d'Etat et des diplomates qui gouvernent l'échiquier mondial.

Le but de l'auteur? Montrer que les hommes d'Etat contemporains sont beaucoup plus libres qu'ils veulent bien l'admettre; que ceux-ci pourraient manifester plus de "volonté" et refuser de se plier inconsciemment aux "lois du fatalisme" dans la conduite des affaires internationales.

Plusieurs hommes d'Etat constesteront sans doute qu'ils pourraient infléchir quelque peu le sens de l'histoire, s'ils faisaient davantage preuve de courage, de lucidité, s'ils "connaissaient mieux" les forces qui façonnent le monde, bref s'ils

le voulaient vraiment. L'auteur en veut pour preuve les attitudes d'un Khrouchtchev et d'un Kennedy lors de la crise de Cuba. Ce sont certes là des exemples valables mais ils ne permettent pas de formuler des généralisations.

Fate and Will est présenté comme une suite de *Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy*; l'ouvrage est mieux construit et plus "mesuré" que le précédent. L'originalité de la présente série d'essais réside dans sa manière de présenter certains éléments de force et de faiblesse qui exercent une influence prépondérante dans les rapports internationaux. L'auteur y arrive en bouleversant la chronologie traditionnelle et en trillant sur l'échiquier mondial des hommes qui personnifient le mieux ces deux tendances. Plutôt que d'analyser successivement "ses personnages," James Eayrs les place "en situation." Il crée un milieu particulier dans lequel ceux-ci vont dévoiler ou faire éclater leurs grandeurs et leurs faiblesses. Ainsi en huit chapitres succincts, James Eayrs fera ressortir le caractère, le sens de prévision, les tactiques diplomatiques d'hommes aussi différents que Lénine et Roosevelt, que Churchill et Nehru, que McNamara et de Gaulle, que Johnson et George Brown. A la détermination des hommes qui savent ou veulent infléchir le sens des événements, il oppose la résignation de ceux qui acceptent les dictées du destin. "Fate or Will?" Qu'est-ce qui compte le plus en politique internationale? La diplomatie américaine est-elle du "statesmanship" ou du "salesmanship?" Le machiavélisme a-t-il toujours droit de cité dans la diplomatie contemporaine? Voilà des questions auxquelles James Eayrs répond en n'hésitant pas, en passant, de renverser quelques-uns des pions placés sur son échiquier et de faire valoir les qualités de quelques "habiles cavaliers" de la scène internationale tout en n'oubliant pas de mettre échec et mat plusieurs chefs d'Etat, ministres des affaires étrangères et diplomates "trop conformistes."

Ignorance et connaissance, politique de l'autruche et sens de la prévision, acceptation du statu quo et souci du renouveau, incapacité d'agir et vaste potentiel d'action, puissance des petits Etats et faiblesse des grandes nations, voilà les thèmes qui sont tour à tour évoqués dans chacun des chapitres. Plus on avance dans la lecture de ces essais, plus "l'échiquier" se transforme en un véritable "tableau" dont l'idée maîtresse se dégage clairement: la diplomatie est peut-être l'art du possible mais elle doit être avant tout affaire d'intelligence et de perspicacité.

De ces situations contradictoires où il a fait évoluer les hommes et les Etats, James Eayrs conclue que la "volonté" et les "connaissances" des petites nations représentent des atouts précieux pour la stabilité d'un monde dominé par des "grands" trop souvent dominés par un malin fatalisme qui a nom "d'idéologie" ou de "grandeur."

Avec ce volume, James Eayrs s'attirera peut-être les foudres de plusieurs responsables de la formulation de la politique étrangère du Canada et des Etats-Unis en particulier. Il soulèvera l'ire de plusieurs diplomates à la retraite et d'observateurs "rangés" de la scène internationale. N'hésite-t-il pas à dédicacer *Fate and Will* au premier socialiste qui occupera le poste de ministre des affaires étrangères du Canada! On pourra ne pas être d'accord avec l'auteur sur plusieurs de ses idées—en particulier lorsqu'il confère aux intellectuels des qualités d'imagination et un sens d'innovation que bien peu d'entre eux possèdent à un haut niveau, du moins dans ce pays; ce n'est pas parce que trop de nos "bureaucrates" manquent d'esprit, d'initiative et d'originalité, que les universitaires en ont nécessairement—mais la conception de ce tableau, la clarté et la hardiesse de ses traits en font une œuvre typiquement personnelle, originale et instructive. Le coup de pinceau peut nous sembler brusque ici et là mais le tout est agréable à l'œil. C'est une œuvre typiquement contemporaine qui satisfait pleinement sur le

moment. En écrivant *Fate and Will in Foreign Policy*, James Eayrs vient de prouver une fois de plus qu'il se classe d'emblée au premier rang des internationalistes canadiens.

LOUIS SABOURIN

Université d'Ottawa

Great Britain

The Aspiring Mind of the Elizabethan Younger Generation. By ANTHONY ESLER. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1966. Pp. xxiv, 266. \$8.50.

ELIZABETH I WAS EIGHTEEN YEARS OLDER than Walter Raleigh, and hardly any of her famous courtiers were born in the interval. The Queen surrounded herself with men her own age or a little older and kept them until they died, which was long after the younger generation—their sons, sons-in-law, and nephews—started hammering at the door. From the 'seventies on, Elizabeth's court exhibited a remarkable state of generational cleavage in which the frustrations of the young were compounded by what ought to have allayed them—a moral education according to which ambition was sinful. Mr. Esler sees these frustrations as a central and dominant fact uniting a whole age group. He argues this forcefully and up to a point persuasively, but he seeks to prove rather too much. The feelings in the hearts of men long dead cannot be displayed in evidence. His method is, inevitably, the purest impressionism, and some of his choices have an arbitrary look; I suppose he includes Marlowe with the young courtiers in honour of the phrase "aspiring mind" (of which the reader is likely to get tired), but why practically omit Sir Philip Sidney? The impressionistic use of evidence is going out of fashion but it is probably the only way to handle a subject of this nature. Unfortunately Mr. Esler wants to be in the fashion, and in his introduction he defends the "generational approach" as a new tool for the historian. This it is not. The concept may be useful to social psychologists, but like psychoanalysis—which some historians also feel hopeful or wistful about—it simply cannot be applied to the historian's kind of material. The situation at Elizabeth's court, where a connected group of elder statesmen were generationally divided from a connected group of young men in a hurry, and these two groups contained most of the interesting people, was a wholly exceptional situation. Rare cases do occur where we know so much about a man's childhood, relations with his parents, and so on that we almost can psychoanalyse him *in absentia*. The historian must recognize that he normally has no such luck. And even with all the luck, Mr. Esler has been put to considerable pains to make his case.

University of Toronto

ELLIOT ROSE

The Correspondence of Edmund Burke. VI. July 1789–December 1791. Edited by ALFRED COBBAN and ROBERT A. SMITH. Cambridge: At the University Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1967. Pp. xxvi, 495. \$13.50.

"THERE IS A TIME OF LIFE, in which, if a man cannot arrive at a certain degree of authority, derived from a confidence from the Prince or the people . . . it becomes him to remit much of his activity. Perpetual failure . . . will detract

every day more and more from a mans Credit until he ends without Success and without reputation." It must indeed have seemed to Burke in July 1789, when he wrote this, the first letter in the sixth volume of this handsome and definitive edition of his correspondence, that his reputation had sunk beyond recovery. He and his friends had just suffered in the Regency crisis their greatest defeat since Pitt had replaced them in office five years earlier and they emerged from it divided and humiliated. No one had suffered more than Burke. He had taken a leading part in the debates and had spoken with such violence and passion in favour of the principle of hereditary right and against the right of parliament to interfere with the succession that he had made himself ridiculous in the House and was even isolated and unheeded in his own party. It was not only ministerial newspapers that were writing in the summer of 1789 of the "mad extravagance in the ravings of Mr. Burke."

All this was to be changed in the thirty months covered by this volume, during which the revolution in France and the dangers he saw in its principles drove Burke to frantic activity and to some of his best writing, including the work that was to establish his reputation as a prophet and a political thinker of genius. The events in France, the writing of the *Reflections*, and Burke's dealings with the *émigrés* naturally and inevitably dominate this volume. There are a few unfortunate gaps here and there. Very little of his correspondence survives, for example, from the six months before the publication of the *Reflections* in November 1790. But there is quite enough from the last half of 1789 and the early months of 1790 to reveal the stages of the growth of his opinion about the revolution. While the general English reaction at the very beginning was in varying degrees approving of events in France, Burke was cautious and pessimistic. He rapidly became hostile. In September 1789 he said that the French people, "along with their political servitude, have thrown off the Yoke of Laws and morals"; and in October that in France "the Elements which compose Human Society seem all to be dissolved, and a world of Monsters to be produced in the place of it." When he was asked by Depont in November for his opinion of the revolution, he had already decided that it was a disaster for France. This enquiry became one stimulus of the *Reflections*. Another, and the emotional driving force, was provided when English radicals began to applaud the French example and speak of winning the rights of man in England. Burke clearly took the radicals' oratory very seriously and warned against underestimating this group. The central object of the revolution, he thought, was the destruction of the aristocrat and gentleman; and it was an object that he assumed would be most attractive to the mass of Englishmen if the radicals and conspirators were allowed to propagate French principles uncontradicted. Their activity, he said at the end of 1791, "can have no other Effect than to root out all principle from the Minds of the Common people, and to put a dagger into the hands of every Rustick to plunge into the heart of his Landlord." Though there is not a great deal in these letters concerned directly with the English scene, what there is reveals Burke's increasing fear of those, like the Dissenters, who were pressing for even moderate change and his contempt and fear of the mass of the populace. His mind and his correspondence are dominated in these years by the affairs of courts and cabinets, by the activities of the *émigrés* (especially in 1791 when his son, Richard, went as an unofficial envoy to their headquarters at Coblenz), and, above all, by the need for a great crusade to save European civilization and the British constitution from the pollution of French principles.

Of the 225 letters printed, 164 were written in whole or in part by Burke; 79 of these are printed for the first time. The editing is a model of precise and

illuminating scholarship. The notes, without being obtrusive or pedantic, are numerous enough and sufficiently full to make the letters intelligible. The editors have maintained the standard set in previous volumes and that is saying a great deal.

J. M. BEATTIE

University of Toronto

Essays on Economics and Society. I. 1824–1845; II. 1850–1879. By JOHN STUART MILL. Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, IV and V. Introduction by LORD ROBBINS. Textual editor, J. M. ROBSON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1967. Pp. lviii and viii, 847. \$25.00 the set.

OF ALL THE VOLUMES published or projected in the Collected Works these two must take high rank in terms of usefulness to the historian. They bring together twenty-eight items of which two are new attributions and of which the majority have not been republished before. The two most important works, "Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy" (1844) and "Chapters on Socialism" (first published posthumously in 1879), have, indeed, been reprinted. However, they have been difficult to obtain and their re-appearance in this form is to be welcomed. At last one can send students to Mill on the Corn Laws, the Bank Act of 1844, graduated income tax (which he opposed), land tenure reform, and other topics without let or hindrance.

Lord Robbins' Introduction is distinguished, as is to be expected, by its lucidity as well as by its elegant and logical arrangement. The warmth of his enthusiasm lights up the great and seemingly effortless learning which he deploys in assessing the extent of Mill's achievement. He shows how impressive that achievement was—particularly in the field of general economic theory. Mill was the first systematically to demonstrate demand as a function of price and to make this idea the analytical basis of significant propositions. Karl Marx once said that Mill owed his eminence entirely to the flatness of the surrounding terrain. The Introduction helps almost as much as the Essays themselves, to expose the harsh injustice of this judgment.

Yet the Introduction has the defects of its qualities. It discusses the essays in groups according to subject: "Money and Banking," "Public Finance," "Labour," and so on. Lord Robbins adopts this procedure despite his recognition of the "sound historical reasons" for the chronological order in which the essays appear in the volumes themselves. The result is that he gives us the economist's, not the historian's, Mill. And this is a pity since most of those who consult these essays will do so for historian's reasons. They will want to relate Mill to the great social and ideological transitions of his age: to see him in terms of the shift away from the world of the professional gentleman to that of the professional man, and away from philosophic radicalism towards socialism. They will certainly be much more concerned than Lord Robbins with the particular circumstances in which these essays came to be written. For example, it is not historically satisfactory to treat the programme of the Land Tenure Reform Association as merely "an explicit statement of the actual reforms in the law relating to property in land which Mill's general views [*sic*] on the subject led him to support" (p. xxxv). Lord Robbins points out that Mill's "general attitude" was that the principles of free trade and free contract were not applicable, or wholly applicable, to landed wealth. But oddly enough the invitations to the private conference at which the association was established were headed with the words of Cobden: "I would have a League

for free trade in land, just as we had a League for free trade in corn." Moreover, the first three points in the association's programme were all directly concerned with promoting "free trade in land." Whatever its relation to Mill's "general attitude" to the land question, the programme of the association cannot be understood without taking account of the competition of the Land and Labour League and the growing demand for land nationalization. Between 1869 and 1872 Mill was torn by the conflicting pressures of middle- and of working-class radicalism. He described his predicament in a letter which he sent to J. Boyd Kinnear on July 22, 1870.

Lord Robbins wants to abstract Mill from such special circumstances and show him to us under conditions of "perfect equilibrium." He discounts "frictions" whether they take the form of youthful arrogance or of the impact of 1848 or of the new model unionism of the 'Sixties. Having established what Mill "really meant," he is able to infer the opinions which he *would* have held about a whole host of questions ranging from the present legal status of trade unionism to the relative merits of the British and the American methods of financing higher education. Lord Robbins' old colleague, Sidney Webb, used to attempt the same kind of exercise—although to a very different purpose. Webb liked to reach his conclusions from other men's premises and he made much of Mill's conversion to socialism. At the same time he drew a discreet veil over his essentially negative and individualist conception of liberty: his enduring regard for competition and his hopes respecting the self-governing workshop. There is much to be said for Lord Robbins' view that Mill was never a socialist, but rather a "non-revolutionary syndicalist." The Introduction supports this characterization with references to the *Principles* and the *Liberty* as well as to the essays included in these volumes. However, Lord Robbins does not always prepare the reader for what he will find. Thus, he suggests that the famous chapter in the *Principles*, "On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes," contrasts "the theory of dependence and protection and the theory of self-dependence." In fact the contrast is more particular, more historically specific, than this suggests. It was drawn between the belief that "the rich should be in *loco parentis* to the poor" and the belief in the salvation of the workers through *collective* self-help. Likewise, the reader who comes to Mill after Lord Robbins may be surprised to find how insistent Mill was on the reality of conflicting class interests within capitalism: how strongly he condemned "the great social evil of a non-labouring class": how impatient he was for a social reconstruction which would sweep away the wages system.

It has been said that a great thinker is one who is still worth refuting fifty years after his death. What then is to be said of one whose name and authority is still thought worth enlisting after he has been dead for nearly a hundred?

The editing of the volumes is outstanding. They are splendidly produced so that they are a pleasure to handle and to read.

ROYDEN HARRISON

Sheffield University

The Whigs in Opposition, 1815–1830. By AUSTIN MITCHELL. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1967. Pp. xi, 266. \$6.45.

ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES facing students of early nineteenth-century English politics is that contemporaries were never certain whether they belonged to the age of Namier or to the age of Ostrogorski. Consider for example George IV's remark to J. W. Croker, "... the names Whigs and Tories meant something a hundred years ago, but are mere nonsense nowadays." In Croker's opinion, however, party was a real if somewhat indefinite institution: "I agreed . . . that

Whigs in power soon assimilated themselves to Tories, and that Tories in opposition would soon become Whigs, but that I still thought that there were two marked and distinct parties in the country, which might for brevity be fairly called Whig and Tory." Dr. Mitchell in his book on the Whig party between 1815 and 1830 comes down substantially on the side of Croker and the party system. Of course, much has to be conceded to Namierite orthodoxy. There were still, admits Mitchell, the small connections and interest groups "plying for hire on the most favourable terms." More numerous and more important in Mitchell's estimation were the country gentlemen, the unattached members of parliament, who often held the balance between government and opposition. Nor can all the controversies of the period be explained in party terms. Many issues, some of them quite important, such as slavery, the slave trade, currency, protection in general, and the Corn Laws in particular cut straight across party lines. The Whig party by Mitchell's own account is often shown to be an ill-disciplined and mutinous crowd. For much of the period the Whigs were virtually leaderless in the Commons and, given the frequency of Grey's ritual abdications, nominally leaderless in the Lords. Moreover, not even Mitchell is prepared to argue that the Whigs functioned as a party in the confused period between the death of Liverpool and the resignation of Wellington.

If much is conceded, however, much is also proven. By analysis of admittedly incomplete division lists, Mitchell discerns in the Commons between 1812 and 1826 a pattern of voting which strongly implies the operation of a party system. In the three parliaments of the period a large body of members voted in a partisan manner. Between 149 and 171 members voted steadily in opposition, and a somewhat larger number voted steadily for the government. These two groups ("which might for brevity be fairly called Whig and Tory") taken together represent about two-thirds of the membership of the house. This leaves over two hundred members who cannot be described as steady voters for either the government or the opposition. But on further inspection the voting of this last group reveals strong partisan tendencies. In fact the majority of these members gave a significant proportion of their votes either to the Whigs or to the Tories. Only a minority of the "waverers" can be said to have always voted impartially or upon the merits of the question. Equally significant is Mitchell's argument that the Whigs not only stuck to their principles on reform and Catholic emancipation but suffered for them as well. Both at court and in the Commons Whig measures blocked the path of Whig success. Even the sternest Namierite must admit that when politicians begin to martyr themselves for their policies the era of party has begun.

F. A. DREYER

University of Western Ontario

Women's Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain, 1886-1914. By CONSTANCE ROVER. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1967. Pp. xvi, 240. \$6.75.

Socialists, Liberals and Labour: The Struggle for London, 1885-1914. By PAUL THOMPSON. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1967. Pp. viii, 376. \$10.50.

CONSTANCE ROVER'S STUDY marking the centennial of the women's suffrage movement—it began with J. S. Mill's petition to the Commons in 1866—stops short in 1914 and therefore deals only with the prolonged period of failure and frustration

in the history of the movement in Britain and with a phase of the feminist revolution which, if it conferred credit on any, proved only the determination of its participants under adversity. The absence of results down to 1914 was no doubt in large measure the result of the fact that few even of the most passionate adherents of the movement thought of the vote as anything more than a badge; few could or did argue that it would have constructive results for the body politic or for anything else. Dr. Rover has endeavoured to overcome the lacklustre character of her theme by adopting an analytical rather than a narrative approach. Her discussion centres upon the arguments used by the suffragists and by the anti-suffragists throughout the period, the tactics employed by the constitutionalists and by the militants viewing both as parliamentary pressure groups, the responses of the five political parties, and the difficulties which obstructed progress. This approach is an appropriate one, but in important respects the author does not carry it nearly far enough. Her review of the activities of both opponents and proponents assumes that the whole thing was fundamentally a rational business, while the quotations from contemporaries with which large parts of the book are larded make it apparent that for both sides, and especially for the opposition, the cause engaged emotions, prejudices, and interests of a powerful and profound order. Had the analysis been approached as a study in social psychology, a study in the dynamics of change and stability in modern society, or as a study in the political and legislative importance of prejudice a more stimulating and useful book would have resulted. It is surely not enough merely to quote the rejoinder which suffragists often met: "Votes for Women, indeed; we shall be asked next to give votes to our horses and dogs." To do so is to leave the fundamentals of the subject unplumbed. Dr. Rover's analysis seems inadequate on another score. While she sees the women's suffrage movement as but one aspect of the feminist revolution of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries she has little to say about all those achievements which made up the broad front of feminist advance: exercise of the municipal franchise from 1869, service as Poor Law guardians from 1875 and as parish and district council men from 1894, membership on school boards from 1870, participation in regular party organizations through such societies as the Women's Liberal Federation, and so on. These changes of the late Victorian age carried women into public life and responsibility; it was in these areas that the real advance took place in the years between 1866 and 1914; and it was here that the foundations were laid for the eventual winning of the suffrage in the course of World War I.

Thompson's book, a revised doctoral thesis, is a study of the urban infrastructure of politics in which national history is seen writ small—"Local history is a microcosm, and that ultimately, must be its justification"—but the author has analysed the changing fortunes of political London not only at the level of national representation but at the level of borough and metropolitan government as well. He has done so against the background of a careful study of the city's social and economic structure and growth, and with an impressive volume of research. Exploiting if not always digesting a small mountain of official and unofficial, printed and manuscript materials the book will prove an important source of information for scholars interested in the Progressives, the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), the Socialist League, the Fabians, and all the rest. They will at the same time be interested in Thompson's major purpose which is to explain the rise of labour as an independent political force in the capital and the reasons why the Liberal party declined as Labour advanced. Thompson is fully alive to the peculiar political circumstances which conditioned these developments at the local and constituency level in London: the broad franchise

and the corrupt practices legislation meant that support could no longer be maintained by the old methods of personal patronage and influence, yet there were still no media by which party leaders could speak directly to the people as a whole. "Lacking a direct approach to the electorate, the parties relied on the enthusiasm of local political activists to bring their supporters to the poll," and all parties and groups experimented with caucus politics after 1885—democratic associations in the constituencies and wards with armies of volunteer workers.

There is much debunking of accepted ideas along the way. Thompson makes it clear that the national parties played a far more direct and influential role in London politics than has been generally thought. He disputes the idea that the Liberal revival of 1900–6 was a genuine recovery since it is apparent that in London at least it did not represent a solution of the Liberals' basic problem of combining middle- and working-class support. His work reinforces that of McBriar on the Fabians: little is left of their boasts of having permeated the centres of Liberal strength, of aiding in founding the local Labour parties and building the Progressive party. And he is able to demonstrate that the judgment which has commonly dismissed the SDP as an alien element, so un-British that it had no chance of popular appeal, is far from the mark.

In all these respects Thompson's book is a valuable one. It is a pity that it is not better written. More serious still is the fact that his structural sense is not the equal of his industry. His general themes are not developed with sufficient boldness and the book is marred by a serious lack of coherence: the separate analytical essays do not hang together as parts of a whole and there is no clear logic in the arrangement by which one succeeds another. Finally, it is more than slightly strange that Thompson should have excluded the Conservatives from anything but passing notice. That they were highly successful in London throughout this period is clear indeed. Of seventeen safe seats which never changed hands, fifteen belonged to them. In the general election of 1900 they collected, according to Thompson's own estimate, 50 per cent of all the working-class votes cast. Even in terms of the author's special interest—the electoral behaviour of the labouring masses—the Tories deserve better treatment than he gives them.

These two books show what a varied as well as extended series Michael Hurst's *Studies in Political History* has now become. Neither of these new additions, however, comes up to the standards set by such books as Royden Harrison's *Before the Socialists* or Henry Parris' *Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain*.

McMaster University

H. W. MCCREADY

Great Britain and the War of 1914–1918. By Sir LLEWELLYN WOODWARD. London: Methuen [Toronto: Methuen Publications]. 1967. Pp. xxxiv, 619, maps. \$14.95.

HERE IS A BOOK that merits attention, if only because its theme is one which does not appear to have received detailed treatment before.

Sir Llewellyn Woodward was a young man of twenty-four just out of Oxford when war broke out in 1914. He applied for a commission through the ORC, but, as he tells us in the lengthy introduction to his book, his doubts about the justification of killing Germans more than once brought him to the point of backing out. He decided, however, that he had a duty to do what the state asked of him, and he was commissioned in the Royal Artillery. In the army he became increasingly alarmed at the "lowness of professional competence among the

higher ranks," who from Kitchener downward "just did not know how to set about their task of winning the war." From the autumn of 1916, by which time the British High Command had fallen back upon the frustrating doctrine of attrition, the young officer was "in a state of angry depression. I was a totally insignificant part of a vast, ill-directed machine."

The author gives these autobiographical notes because he considers it essential for an historian of war to set forth his philosophy. They provide a background for his attempt to reconcile his abhorrence of mass slaughter with his realization that there was really no other way. Looking back across half a century, Sir Llewellyn concedes the priggishness and intellectual intolerance that characterized his wartime attitudes; yet mature re-examination appears to have done little to modify his earlier strictures on the British conduct of the 1914-1918 war. He sees his book as being a short account giving "the essential facts and a running commentary" of Great Britain's part in the conflict. Having read his Introduction, one will not be surprised at the frequency and vehemence with which the author exposes the ineptness which he charges was displayed by Britain's military and political leaders during that struggle.

There is high praise for the heroic British Expeditionary Force which in 1914 sacrificed itself in defeating Germany's plans for a short war. But then the unexpected development which committed the western front to the stalemate of virtual siege warfare bewildered the professional soldiers. "I don't know what is to be done. This isn't war," Kitchener told Grey. Yet the adoption of some means of armoured protection for infantry attacking over open ground in the face of rifle and machine-gun fire from an entrenched enemy protected by wire entanglements would be long delayed—not, asserts Woodward, because the military authorities refused mechanical devices when they were actually put in their hands, but because "they did not grasp from the first the problems with which they were faced and insist that their solution should receive the highest priority." Characteristically, after the first use of tanks at the Somme (49 of them in "dribbles" in mid-September 1916) Haig's order for 1000 of them was promptly cancelled by the army council. Fortunately Lloyd George restored it. Among many other examples of dilatoriness in applying Britain's technical skill and resources, the author shows that although the French were issuing steel helmets to their infantry in the spring of 1915, British soldiers continued for another year to suffer unnecessary head wounds from shrapnel.

In appraising England's political and military leaders, Sir Llewellyn thinks that Asquith, with his "wait and see" philosophy, might have been a better wartime prime minister if his main task "had been to guide and restrain a brilliant but impetuous military commander." Kitchener was neither. Sir John French, often in the dark about the general strategic policy of the British government—"if indeed they can be said to have had any policy than that of postponing decisions"—did not show himself to be an outstanding commander. French, surprisingly, committed untried troops just arrived from England in the abortive Battle of Loos instead of using his experienced reserve divisions, on the grounds that the latter, having been engaged for a long time in trench warfare, would have lost the "habit" of attacking in the open! Haig is accepted, with all his shortcomings, as "the ablest British Commander to be found among the small circle of high military officers." In general, Woodward seems to prefer Haig to Lloyd George. He questions Haig's conviction that the war could be won only on the western front, labelling his method of winning it "clumsy, tragically expensive of life, and based for too long on a misreading of facts."

The book covers every land campaign in which British troops participated, as

well as the war in the air and at sea. Sir Llewellyn deals competently with the diplomacy of the war years. He considers the peace settlement with Germany at some length, and shows how the "legend of the infamous treaty of Versailles" came to be widely accepted in Britain. A section devoted to the organization of British resources for total war—the only part of the book in which one might hope to meet the ordinary English civilian—rather disappointingly tends to concern itself mainly with production figures and other statistics and has relatively little to say about how people carried on on the home front.

Canadian participation in the war escapes with scant attention. Any Canadians who may have been present during the first gas attack at Ypres are presumably included among "the British in the salient" who were in danger of being cut off when French territorial and African troops withdrew in panic. A couple of lines in each case gives credit to the capture of the Passchendaele ridge by Canadian forces and to their breach of the Drocourt-Quéant line. The winning of Vimy ridge and the successful attack by the Canadian Corps at Amiens in August 1918 receive footnote attention.

Ottawa

G. W. L. NICHOLSON

Europe

Samnium and the Samnites. By E. T. SALMON. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1967. Pp. xii, 447, maps, plates. \$12.75.

THIS IS A COMPETENT MONOGRAPH about an Umbro-Sabellic-speaking Villanova nation of Iron Age Old Italy which might, during the decades before and after 300 BC, have had a chance to lay the foundations for an Italian empire, but could not succeed because the civilization and the military potential of the nascent Imperium Romanum were by far superior. This book describes well, in eleven chapters, sources, land, people, culture (why not "civilization," instead of germanizing), the First, Second, Third, and Pyrrhic Wars, Roman domination from the third to the first centuries BC, and the end of the Samnites as a consequence of the Social War.

The author is an expert in Roman history and of international repute. His omissions and commissions are, as a rule, intentional. Professor Salmon is more reluctant than this reviewer would have been to embellish his survey by comparing and elucidating our rather fragmentary source evidence for Samnite civilization, including Samnite linguistics and religion, with the help of generally Indo-European and global folklore facts and some of the more plausible Indo-European and anthropological hypotheses. Worse, Samnite political and military decisions are treated as if this still almost prehistoric tribal federation had been rationally advised and directed by a small number of individuals and the factions around them, as can be argued for the Roman Republic in the fourth and third centuries BC. In Samnite agriculture, forest exploitation was characteristically interconnected with grain growing, viticulture, and pig-breeding.¹ In spite of such minor shortcomings this is a rather informative contribution to Roman republican history.

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F. M. HEICHELHEIM

¹Cp. H. Dohr, "Gutschoefe nach den Schriften Cates und Varros" (Phil. Diss., Cologne, 1965), 15 f.

Défrichements, peuplement et institutions seigneuriales en Haut-Poitou du Xe au XIII^e siècle. Par ROLAND SANFAÇON. Québec: Les Presses de l'université Laval. 1967. Pp. xxii, 146, cartes. \$8.00.

IN THIS BRIEF BUT NOTABLE STUDY, M. Sanfaçon investigates the progress of land clearances in the Haut-Poitou between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, and the parallel transformations in the region's seigneurial institutions. The Haut-Poitou is well endowed with monastic chartularies, and M. Sanfaçon has subjected them, both published and unpublished, to thorough scrutiny. But the chief originality of his work rests in his utilization of soil analysis, photographs, and maps dating from the ancien régime to reconstruct the direction and extent of the mediaeval clearances. The book not only contributes to our knowledge of mediaeval Poitou, but has the additional value of illustrating these new and promising methods of agrarian history.

Some few criticisms may still be made. Monastic chartularies, which form the chief documentary base for the author's research, are notoriously difficult to interpret. The charters, couched in impersonal legal language, give few reliable insights into the burdens borne by the peasants, or the degree to which they may have been exploited by those above them on the social scale. But M. Sanfaçon still affirms that the countryside of Poitou in the tenth century presents a "sombre picture" and that the peasants were indeed "crushed" by the weight of seigneurial exactions. This may be true, but the charters themselves do not warrant such conclusions. So also, in a brief work, the author is prone to raise questions which seem moot and unresolvable in the light of what his sources tell him. He speculates, for example, on the importance of technical innovations, on the standard of living in the countryside, and on whether the peasants lived better before or after the clearances. One can appreciate M. Sanfaçon's desire to write a rounded study, but the information he has on the topics he considers is very uneven. Finally, secondary studies in languages other than French seem neglected. Sidney Painter and, more recently, George Beech have written valuable studies on the Poitou; they are cited in the bibliography, but no use is made of their research in the text, and no effort to relate the results of the author's own investigations to these older studies is apparent. This is a book which in its best parts is of major interest, but it is not without some weaknesses.

DAVID HERLIHY

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The French Armies in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Military Organization and Administration. By LEE KENNETT. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press [Toronto: Burns & MacEachern]. 1967. Pp. xvi, 165, chart. \$7.80.

THIS GOOD LITTLE BOOK, which seems to have begun as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Virginia, is based in great part on manuscripts in the French military archives at Vincennes. It is too brief to be a definitive study, and as the author notes it says next to nothing about the French forces overseas; but it is an important original contribution to the history of warfare in Europe in the eighteenth century. Particularly valuable are its analyses of the French logistical organization and of the professional shortcoming of the French corps of officers. Mr. Kennett's conclusion is that the typical French officer was valiant, factious, and ignorant. The records of the Seven Years' War in America certainly bear him out.

The criticisms one can make of the book are chiefly on points of detail. It was not only in the French cavalry, as the author seems to suggest on page 37, that detached forces had to be composite in nature, lest some captain or colonel be exposed to the loss of his whole command; this practice was invariable throughout the British and French armies, and presumably most others. The property rights of commanders had to be protected. Mr. Kennett seems to get much of his information on the British army from a single book, Rex Whitworth's biography of Ligonier. The fact that "only 9 per cent" of the wounded men admitted to Les Invalides in 1762 had bayonet wounds (p. 116) does not in itself prove that there was little bayonet fighting; bayonet casualties in general go to the cemetery rather than the hospital. Nevertheless, Mr. Kennett is doubtless right in arguing that bayonet fighting seldom happened; in this respect the Seven Years' War was like all other wars. The book is not written with much style, but it does not often fall to the level of a statement on page 55: "The charges of general officers were not venal." The meaning appears to be that general officers' appointments were not obtained by purchase.

C. P. STACEY

University of Toronto

The Russian Empire, 1801-1917. By HUGH SETON-WATSON. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1967. Pp. xx, 813. \$11.00.

PROFESSOR HUGH SETON-WATSON of the University of London, the author of many prominent studies in East European and Russian history, has now published his most massive volume. In bulk this contribution to the Oxford History of Modern Europe amounts to more than eight hundred pages. As to scope, it begins with an introductory part on the eighteenth century and then devotes six parts to a detailed exposition of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, from 1801 to 1917. Even disregarding the Introduction, the present study thus doubles in coverage, as well as supersedes, Professor Seton-Watson's earlier book, *The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914* (New York, 1952). Some seven hundred and fifty pages of narrative are followed by a twenty-six-page annotated bibliography, thirteen maps, and two indexes: an index of persons, with dates, and an index of places and subjects.

The organization is conventional, principally according to reigns and various "aspects" of Russian history within the reigns. Nor is there much novelty in the treatment of particular subjects. The work, however, is notable for its richness and detail. Indeed it is the most informative single volume on nineteenth-century Russia. The material is presented in a balanced, judicious, and intelligent manner. Although interested in exposition rather than argument, the author is not afraid to speak his mind, and he makes his points effectively. There are few errors or even unconvincing views or interpretations. Professor Seton-Watson is probably at his best when dealing with foreign policy, but he also devotes much skilful attention to politics at home, social evolution, economics, intellectual history, literature, and even culture in general. To be sure, the author is not equally successful in every respect. One could cavil, for example, that he at times appreciates Russian literature better in terms of its social role than in its own terms, or he would not refer to Derzhavin as "not a great figure yet important in the development of Russian as a language of poetry" (p. 38). Also it seems unduly severe to remark that had Lomonosov "lived in a country of greater opportunities, he might have made original contributions to science" (p. 37).

Long on facts, *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917* is somewhat short on analysis and interpretation. To be sure, Professor Seton-Watson has a point of view to present to his readers. This point of view can perhaps be best described as a combination of old-line liberalism, so prominent in Russian historiography, with the recent emphasis on industrialization and modernization. The problem of education occupying a central position in both approaches, Professor Seton-Watson stresses it heavily in his discussion of imperial Russia. On page 226 he writes:

A gap between the intellectual *élite* and the masses has existed, of course, to some extent in all societies and at all times. But it is exceptionally painful at a time when a society is embarking on a new process of economic and cultural transformation, whose origin lies not in its own history but in external forces, a process into which it has not grown, as in western Europe since the sixteenth century, but has been impelled by the will of rulers resolved to acquire for their country the advantages and the power of the modern world. This is the problem of the "underdeveloped society," so familiar throughout the world in the midtwentieth century, of which Russia was one of the first examples in history. The gap is bound to be there at the beginning of the process, and it is bound to have painful political and social consequences. Everything depends on whether, and how quickly, the gap is narrowed. This in turn depends on the extent to which, parallel with the more obviously desirable expansion of the higher education needed to train an *élite* in military or technical skills, there is also created an efficient network of primary schools. The sooner the whole nation becomes literate, the healthier the society and the more powerful the state. This is the lesson of the history of Prussia in the first half of the nineteenth century, and still more strikingly of Japan in its last decades. Russia is, however, the classic example of the opposite, an example which later had its parallels in China, Persia, and the Ottoman empire. In Russia the government dreaded the spread of education. It did not wish the people to be taught to read and write, because it feared that this would lead to the spread of the ideas that had infected so large a part of western, southern, and even Central Europe.

As this formulation indicates, Professor Seton-Watson's approach enables him not only to consider modern Russian history in a coherent manner, but also to place it in the global framework. The author likes especially to draw comparisons with Japan, which country apparently almost invariably succeeded where Russia failed. Yet, unfortunately, page 226 is a great exception, and as a rule Professor Seton-Watson relies almost entirely on strictly narrative history. This, considering especially the length and detail of the narrative, makes the volume heavy going, and it also deprives us of some of the author's wisdom.

NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

University of California
Berkeley

Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. By ROBERT V. DANIELS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons [Toronto: Saunders]. 1967. Pp. xiv, 269, illus. \$8.75.

ON NOVEMBER 7, 1917, in addressing the discomfited Menshevik leaders, a triumphant Trotsky advised in his most celebrated taunt that their historical role was now played out and that they should therefore betake themselves to their rightful place: "the dustbin of history." In that depository of Soviet unpersons the Mensheviks have since been joined by a variegated host, in which historians are particularly well represented. Their task has indeed been one of enormous delicacy, nowhere more so than in attempting to analyse the course of events and

the role of individual participants in the crucial days immediately preceding the Bolshevik coup. Western historians have also avoided undue concentration upon those momentous two weeks and have usually preferred to examine the revolutionary year as a whole. To both sides October still presents formidable complexities.

To begin with, as Professor Daniels points out in this study, there is simultaneously too much material and too little: a vast amount of "I was there" literature, inevitably polemical in nature—Trotsky, Sukhanov, and Reed being obvious examples—together with a profound lack of detailed and dispassionate analyses of the vital ten days between the decision to strike and the act itself. Moreover, although the author has made the widest possible use of the available sources, his task is made more difficult by the historiographical vicissitudes of his subject. Purges of participants and archives, shifts in the party line and in ideological requirements have combined to so confuse the issue of Red October that the temptation is strong to ascribe it to Lenin's brilliance, Kerensky's folly, and the inscrutable ways of history and let it go at that.

Professor Daniels, already well known as a leading historian of early Soviet Russia, will have none of this and performs a real service in demolishing some especially stubborn sacred cows. To mention a few: he shows what a near thing this "inevitable" triumph was, how very nearly it failed to come off, how hesitant the "resolutely united" Bolshevik party was, and how hard a time Lenin had in pulling most of his colleagues with him. Even so, as the author demonstrates, success was due less to the tactical genius of the party's Military Revolutionary Committee than to the general confusion in Petrograd and to the failure of nerve on the part of the Provisional Government that was, to quote Professor Daniels, more "frightened to death" than militarily overwhelmed.

In depicting this scene Professor Daniels by no means minimizes the role of Lenin. Indeed, if anything, he enhances it by making clear how uphill a struggle he had in leading his fainthearted troops to victory. A few points are perhaps open to some quibbling, such as the author's assertion (p. 20) that "it is impossible to escape the very strong suspicion that Lenin's deepest motive was the drive for personal power" in the years of preparation before October. If this be meant as censure surely it is inappropriate? Certainly Lenin wanted power; his whole career before the coup was bent to that end. But power for what purpose and how used? This is of course beyond the author's immediate objective but is none the less of some relevance, particularly when Lenin's practice is compared to that of his successor, who, incidentally, plays a distinctly modest role in Professor Daniels' narrative. A final chapter on the myth and reality of Red October, concluding with a most apposite quotation from Engels, puts the event in modern perspective to complete a study of high quality of an event that needed some fresh re-examination in its fiftieth anniversary year.

ROBERT H. JOHNSTON

University of Calgary

Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
BY MARION MAGEE

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later review; *T.B.R.* following an entry indicates a review already in preparation.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

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The Methodist Church and World War I

J. M. BLISS

THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY of English Canadians' participation in World War I was largely a function of their militant idealism. That idealism was encouraged and sustained by the nation's Christian churches, which, like the churches of every belligerent nation, mobilized all of their spiritual resources for battle. No churchmen in Canada worked harder at hammering their ploughshares into swords than "the people called Methodists." Yet, at the same time as they were preaching a crusade against the German anti-Christ, Methodists in Canada refused to idealize the social order at home. During the war years the Methodist Church's historic concern for social redemption blossomed into a comprehensive programme of social reconstruction. By 1918 the Methodist Church of Canada had become the most radical religious denomination in North America. More clearly than any other group in Canada, the Methodists of 1914-1918 synthesized militarism with a radical social critique.

Few Canadian Methodists worried about war in the spring of 1914. Those who did tended to share the attitude of Dr. W. B. Creighton, editor of the prestigious and widely read *Christian Guardian*, who felt that arms makers were the chief impediments to a peaceful world order. Rather than increase taxes in a militarist cause, Dr. Creighton felt that Canada should withdraw from the arms race and press on Britain her desire for "a broader and more Christian internationalism."¹ Another writer in the *Guardian* called for a general strike by the working class of any nation resorting to war, to be supported by a world boycott of its trade. Under no circumstances was the Christian church to involve itself in support of war of any kind.² These pacifist tendencies appeared to have deep roots among Canadian Methodists. As early as 1845 the *Christian Guardian* had condemned both offensive and defensive war

¹*Christian Guardian*, Jan. 28, April 15, 1914.

²*Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1914.

as contrary to Christian faith and practice. At every quadrennial conference but one since its formation in 1884 the Methodist Church of Canada had called for the substitution of arbitration for war. At its 1902 conference, however, the church had condoned the Boer War as being waged, "not for greed or conquest, but for freedom, for just and honest government." In fact the church's tradition of pacifist statement has to be measured against its proclaimed support of every British war after and including the opium wars.³ Ripples from the world tide of peace sentiment increased the volume of pacifist rhetoric in Edwardian Canada. They did not produce a serious re-examination of the ethics of war.

On August 12, 1914, the *Guardian* defined the war as a defensive struggle against the mediaeval despotism of the Kaiser. The time for fighting had come. But for the next six weeks or so most churchmen limited themselves to the fatalism of the writer of Ecclesiastes. Commentators wondered if Britain and France had not been overly jealous in preventing Russia and Germany from claiming their rightful places on the world stage and whether Christians who had prayed for peace while preparing for war could be entirely absolved from responsibility for the conflict.⁴ The earliest atrocity stories were disregarded, as "the German nation as such is as humane and kindly as our own."⁵ Christian doctrine required loving one's enemies. War was criminal and un-Christian. We hang murderers, wrote Dr. Creighton, "but in this climax of national folly we adjudge the prize to him who is the best butcher of his fellows, and the nation which destroys the most life and property is hailed as the victor and lauded as one enjoying the special favour of the gods."⁶ God must not be asked for victory: "All that we can do is pray 'God pity us all, God forgive us all, God show us a better and a holier and a more brotherly way of life.'"⁷ The church was going to war, but with a twofold purpose according to the Rev. Ernest Thomas: "on the one hand to support with hallowed fire the glow of loyalty and devotion, and at the same time with a strong hand purge that loyalty of its blatant and sordid features."⁸

In the autumn of 1914, however, church leaders abandoned their critical acquiescence in war in favour of an unquestioning belief in the righteousness of the conflict and the church's duty to play a positive role in achieving victory. Samuel Dwight Chown, the church's general superintendent, had wired Ottawa on August 5 offering his services in

³M. V. Royce, *The Contribution of the Methodist Church to Social Welfare in Canada*, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1938, pp. 268-78.

⁴*Christian Guardian*, Aug. 12, Sept. 16, 1914.

⁵*Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1914.

⁶*Ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1914.

⁷*Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1914.

⁸*Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1914. Thomas wrote under the pen name of "Edward Trelawney."

any capacity. Since then he had been tramping the hills of British Columbia conditioning himself for possible service as a combatant—at age sixty-one.⁹ In the middle of September he published his first open letter to Methodists on the war; it set out the view of the war from which the church would never again vary:

We are persuaded that this war is just, honorable and necessary in defence of the principle of righteousness and the freedom of our Empire in all its parts. We believe it to be a world struggle for liberty against military despotism which, if successful, would make our life not worth living. . . . We are constrained to applaud, and with all our power endorse, the drawing of the sword by Great Britain and Canada. . . . To our people, loyal Methodists and true, I would say—enlist in the Canadian army, unless you feel you can serve the Dominion better at home in peaceful avocations than in the thickest of the fight. When that conviction gives way, go to the front bravely as one who hears the call of God.¹⁰

All of the allied nations were absolved from blame as Methodist writers, assisted by government-sponsored pamphlets, uncovered Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of war and explained the militarism inherent in German civilization. The Old Testament provided a useful interpretive framework: the German Sennacherib had descended out of the night on Hezekiah (Belgium); alternatively, Germany's envy of Britain and France led to war as surely as Haman's jealousy for Mordecai the Israelite led him to try to slay the Hebrews. It was comforting to realize that Haman had been hanged and that the people of Sennacherib had been smitten "an hundred four-score and five thousand" by the angel of the Lord.¹¹ By the summer of 1915 the wave of atrocity stories had convinced Methodists that the Germans did not fight like other nations. Like most Canadians, Methodists eventually believed they were fighting a people that inoculated its captives with tuberculosis, decorated its dwellings with human skin, crucified Canadian soldiers, and enforced a national policy of compulsory polygamy on its virgins.¹² Analysts who had at first argued that a basically Christian people had been misled by the Kaiser's worship of Woden now decided that Christianity had been extinguished among the whole German people so that German religion had become the exact antithesis of Christianity.¹³ Methodist leaders nevertheless insisted on some form of humanitarian concern for the German people until well into 1917.¹⁴

Despite the accumulated evidence that this was a war worth fighting

⁹United Church Archives (UCA), S. D. Chown Papers, undated "Address on the Abolition of War."

¹⁰*Christian Guardian*, Sept. 16, 1914.

¹¹*Ibid.*, Nov. 18, 1914; Jan. 13, 1915.

¹²*Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1917; Sept. 11, Oct. 23, 1918.

¹³*Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1915; Nov. 1, 1916.

¹⁴By 1918 Methodists were ready to hang the Kaiser and make Germany pay the total costs of the war. At no time had they supported any of the peace proposals.

for, Christians were faced with the special problem of reconciling their support for war with those statements of Jesus which seemed to deny the use of violence in any circumstances. For the first three years of the war a handful of pacifist critics periodically challenged the editor of the *Guardian* to explain his trust in bullets rather than bibles or to imagine St. John plunging his bayonet through the heart of a fellow man. A pacifist contributed one of the better poems published in the *Guardian* in 1915:

I heard the rumble of distant guns,
And I saw mad, marching men.
Each man was flinging his life away
For a God he'd found again;
An old God laughing at war and might,
But Christ I saw not marching that night.¹⁵

Dr. Creighton responded by arguing that Christians must use force to defend the right until all men renounce violence.¹⁶ His arguments were reasonably sophisticated; more commonly, pacifists were challenged with images of ruffians attacking their wives and children. Most Methodists agreed with Dr. Chown's view of Christ's probable behaviour:

For myself it is enough to know that Christ, as I perceive Him, would not stand with limp hands if a ruthless soldier should attempt to outrage His holy mother as the women of Belgium were violated. To Him all motherhood is sacred; nor would He retreat and give place to the armed burglar, breaking with murderous intent into His home; nor would He witness, without any effort to prevent it, the destruction of the civil and religious liberty which His teaching has enthroned in our British Empire. His manhood is without seam throughout, and I believe Canada is right in this war.¹⁷

There is no evidence to suggest that any significant body of Methodists openly opposed the war. The only notable Methodist ministers who appear to have been pacifists were J. S. Woodsworth and William Ivens in Winnipeg. Neither spoke out more than a handful of times against the war. Western Canada's most popular Methodist, Salem Bland, staunchly supported Canada's efforts in both world wars. (An error in the *Canadian Annual Review* for 1915 has misled some writers into seeing Bland as a pacifist.) In attempting to win the Unionist nomination for Winnipeg Centre in the 1917 election Bland was "first and foremost . . . heart and soul for the war."¹⁸ On at least one occasion he spoke of it as the noblest, divinest cause the world had ever known.¹⁹

The war did become a divine cause for Canadian Methodists. By the end of the first year of war the church had "transfigured" the war into a

¹⁵*Christian Guardian*, May 5, 1915.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Jan. 27, Oct. 6, 1915.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1916.

¹⁸UCA, Salem Bland Papers, "Nomination Address," Aug. 14, 1917.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, undated clipping included in sermon "Cheering Thoughts on a Dark Day."

crusade for Christianity rather than a simple defence of liberty. Both Dr. Chown and Dr. Creighton came to identify Germany with the anti-Christ, the struggle as a clash between eternal principles of good and evil, and allied soldiers as the instruments of God. In November 1915 Wesley College (Winnipeg) told its students at the front: "It is God's battle you are fighting in Flanders and at the Dardanelles, as Englishmen fought it when they scattered the Armada in wild flight, as Israel fought it when they overthrew Philistine or Midianite. . . . By a sad necessity, the highest service to the kingdom of God on earth has become the service to which you have consecrated your manhood."²⁰ By 1918 the dominant Methodist attitude to the war was a simple belief in the literal truth of the words of the church's favourite wartime hymn: "The Son of God goes forth to war, / A kingly crown to gain; / His blood red banner streams afar; / Who follows in his train?"

The most immediate consequence of the church's crusading posture was its support of recruiting. Ministers and students enlisted to a total of almost five hundred by the end of the war. Roughly 90 per cent of the Methodist clergy who served were combatants.²¹ This remarkably high figure illustrates the intensity of Methodist support and verifies the assumption that the clergy saw themselves as fighting a holy war. Pacifists who objected to preachers carrying rifles were reminded that Christians must practise what they preach.

By spring of 1915 the tide of patriotic fervour among Canadian men had begun to ebb ever so slightly. The churches began to play an active role in recruiting. In March Dr. Chown began asking every young man at patriotic meetings to give an account of himself "to his Empire and to God why he is not in khaki" which was now "a sacred color."²² In June the *Guardian* began to carry articles on the duty of Methodists to serve their country; by August it was able to note that pulpits had been the best recruiting stations in the first year of the war.²³ A number of ministers noted for their patriotic addresses were appointed recruiting directors early in 1916. Four of the seven clergymen involved were Methodists, including the Rev. C. A. Williams of St. James Church, Montreal, who won a special place in history as the English Protestant in charge of Quebec's recruiting.²⁴ In December 1915 the church's Army and Navy Board asked each minister to supply the names of the men in his community "who should respond to the call," promising that "this valuable information would be properly used without revealing

²⁰*Christian Guardian*, Nov. 10, 1915.

²¹*Journal of Proceedings of the Tenth General Conference of the Methodist Church* (Toronto, 1918), pp. 140-1.

²²*Christian Guardian*, March 15, 1915.

²³*Ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1915.

²⁴*Canadian Annual Review*, 1916, p. 305.

your name."²⁵ The recruiting drive reached a crescendo in the autumn of 1916 when the *Guardian* itself was turned into a clearing house for recruits and a great Methodist patriotic meeting in Toronto was the signal for similar meetings in every district of the church in Canada.²⁶

The church's Army and Navy Board organized all of these meetings. It suggested that the chairman of each district have a small advertisement placed in local newspapers on the day of each meeting, "not so much to get an audience as to insure the attendance of reporters and get a good report in the press."²⁷ Good reports in the press had become important in 1916 because of widespread complaints that Methodists were letting down their nation in its time of crisis. Anglicans were doing most of the complaining, having discovered that their denomination was supplying more than half of the recruits for the Canadian army. (The government had conveniently released figures on recruitment according to religious denomination.) Anglican mathematicians calculated that the Methodist Church was sending only 50 per cent of its "share" of recruits, the lowest percentage of any Protestant denomination.²⁸ Anglicans worried aloud about "the stain of failure in national duty" of Methodism.²⁹ The Methodist hierarchy responded with complaints that the government's religious categories were inaccurate and biased. Dr. Chown vowed in 1918 that Methodists "do not now and never will accept" the government's figures.³⁰ But two years previously the Army and Navy Board had told the Methodist clergy in a confidential letter that its own tabulations substantially agreed with the government's totals. The figures showed, the board complained, "that in this awful crisis in British history and Christian civilization the Methodist Church is not playing a noble part."³¹

Reluctant young men faced almost irresistible pressures to enlist. When direct appeals to patriotic and Christian loyalties were ignored, the church urged its women to encourage their husbands and sons to protect them from "the outrage which overtook Belgian women at the beginning of the war."³² In their section of the *Guardian* children were taught to badger young men on the street in the hope of shaming them

²⁵UCA, Methodist Church Army and Navy Board, Correspondence, General Letter, Dec. 22, 1915.

²⁶UCA, Army and Navy Board, *Minutes*, Nov. 13, 1916. J. S. Woodsworth's description of a typical Methodist patriotic service is quoted in Kenneth McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics* (Toronto, 1959), p. 70.

²⁷Army and Navy Board, *Minutes*, Nov. 13, 1916.

²⁸Toronto *Mail and Empire*, Sept. 19, 1916, letter to the editor.

²⁹*Canadian Churchman*, Oct. 5, 1916.

³⁰*Journal of Proceedings, Tenth General Conference*, p. 143.

³¹Army and Navy Board, Correspondence, undated letter, "The Methodist Church and the British Flag."

³²Chown Papers, "War Address," Aug. 4, 1915.

into enlisting.³³ Narrowly selfish mothers were condemned for bringing up sons with no sense of duty or responsibility: "Such mothers train degenerate sons."³⁴ In November 1916 an eligible young man wrote to the *Guardian* explaining the impossibility of his enlisting without completely ruining the thriving business he had built up from nothing in his community. After two years of war, "I cannot go to a public meeting, I cannot walk down the street, I cannot go to Sunday School, League or Church, I cannot attend any of the District conventions, I cannot even go home and read *Youth and Service* or *The Guardian* without being told I am a shirker."³⁵ Should he enlist or quit the church and all public meetings until after the war? He was advised to enlist.

Every other facet of the domestic war effort was fully supported by the church. Methodist women joined in the sewing and knitting campaigns which must have made Canadian soldiers the best clothed, best bandaged fighting men in the history of warfare. Boston baked beans became the main course at church suppers; at home Methodist families trimmed their menus to the bone. Their children sublimated their taste for sweets to save their pennies for Belgian relief. Ministers made church land free for cultivation, preached sermons on methods of increasing food production, and went into the fields themselves to help with 1917's harvest. Methodist churches opened their recreation rooms to returned soldiers and men on leave. St. James Church in Montreal allowed smoking and billiards in its basement despite its secretary's fears that St. James might go the way of the Parliament Buildings and a billiard company's complaints that its minister was unfit to be a recruiting officer because his church did business with a German billiard table firm.³⁶ Presumably Methodists contributed heavily to the Victory Loan after Dr. Chown defined it as a proposition on which "we shall save or lose our souls."³⁷

The most important aspect of the church's war effort was intangible. Any secular institution could organize recruiting drives, knitting bees, or conservation campaigns. Only the churches had the ideological resources to provide solace and comfort to the discouraged, the frightened, the despairing, and the mourning. There is no way of determining the contribution to national morale made by the zealous and sincere minister planning his Sunday evening patriotic service, organizing a midweek prayer meeting, or finding time to pay a special visit to the family whose son had been reported missing in action. Because the

³³*Christian Guardian*, Dec. 13, 1916.

³⁴*Ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1916.

³⁵*Ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1916.

³⁶UCA, Methodist Church, Correspondence, J. H. Carson to S. D. Chown, Feb. 25, 1916; *Beck's Weekly Tattler*, April 1, 1916.

³⁷*Toronto Globe*, Nov. 26, 1917.

Canadian community was profoundly Christian before and during World War I, it is highly questionable whether its citizens could have endured the emotional nightmare of war without the sustaining belief that God was on their side, that their loved ones were only doing their duty to God and their country, and that death, if it came, was only *The Beautiful Thing That Has Happened to Our Boys*.³⁸ Those families who doubted that their sons had walked the straight path before they went off to fight were assured that soldiers learned to pray in the trenches. Even mothers with openly irreligious sons could rest at ease, "... because this war, unless we are the victims of some terrible delusion, and all our thinking and teaching, praying and preaching, is utterly false, is God's war, and doing our bit in any capacity to help win it is a supreme manifestation of faith, a supreme act of decision and of sacrifice for Christ."³⁹

The crises of 1917 show how completely Methodists identified the war effort with practical Christianity. In the autumn of 1916 Methodist leaders began to call for conscription. When a scheme of national service was initiated at the beginning of 1917, Dr. Chown officially urged ministers "to stimulate conformity to the desire of the Government in this hour of national peril" on the scriptural ground that shirkers were clearly immoral: "If *any* man will not work, neither shall he eat."⁴⁰ In June every Methodist conference resolved in favour of conscription; most also called for a union government.⁴¹ The Union government and its policy of conscription were duly approved of by Methodist leaders. In the December election Methodists, like most other Protestant churchmen, threw open their pulpits to Unionist speakers and their church halls to Unionist election meetings. Resolutions were passed on all levels of the church organization favouring the Unionist cause. The *Guardian* actively supported the Unionists. Dr. Chown issued a lengthy open letter explaining why he favoured the government; excerpts from it were published in leading newspapers by the Unionist party publicity committee. Disclaiming any intention of dictating to Methodists how they should vote, the executive of the Board of Social Service and Evangel-

³⁸By Charles Allen; available for fifty cents from the church publishing house. *Christian Guardian*, Jan. 7, 1917, advertisement.

³⁹*Christian Guardian*, June 6, 1917.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, Jan. 3, 1917.

⁴¹It is not clear how representative of local sentiment these resolutions were. T. Albert Moore, secretary of the Army and Navy Board, had visited each conference specifically to plead for conscription and union government. He described the results of his work in a long letter to the Prime Minister, who replied that "the approval of the various conferences of the Methodist Church must have a notable effect in influencing public opinion along the right lines with respect to Compulsory Military Service." Army and Navy Board, Correspondence, T. A. Moore to R. L. Borden, June 14, 1917; Borden to Moore, June 25, 1917.

ism issued a statement to be read in every pulpit explaining its support of the Union government and urging: "At the polls on December 17th, 1917, every Methodist elector, the women as well as the men, should conscientiously meet personal responsibility and both vote and work for the election of candidates which [*sic*] stand with the Union Government."⁴² In a day when few ministers openly engaged in politics Dr. Salem Bland attempted to win the Unionist nomination for Winnipeg Centre. He was rejected because of his political unorthodoxy; one writer called him "a sort of Independent-Labor-Socialist-Free-Trade-and-What-Not-Candidate."⁴³ Nevertheless, he continued to support the Unionist cause.

Methodists accepted the Unionist claim that a Liberal victory would mean Canada's withdrawal from the war. The election became a plebiscite on the righteousness of the crusade. Dr. Chown interpreted political duty in exclusively religious categories:

This is a redemptive war, and its success depends entirely on the height of sacrifice to which our people can ascend. It is under this conviction that ministers of the gospel feel in duty bound to enter the political arena. We shall fail and fail lamentably as Christians unless we catch the martyr spirit of true Christianity and do our sacrificial duty between now and on the 17th of December. But if we fail, I, for one, will never be sorry that I tried to bear aloft the banner of the cross amidst the tumult of the fight.⁴⁴

Earlier in the war the church had spoken out strongly against a wartime election on the ground that partisanship would confuse and divide the national purpose. Now there was only one party attempting to divide the national will, and its patriotic wing had rejected partisanship. This showed that the election was no ordinary political struggle. Dr. Chown wrote of the conscriptionist Liberals: "To permit such patriots to be defeated would be to doom all independence of political thought and action in Canada, and forge the shackles of blind partisanship upon us, with its accompaniment of corrupt patronage and all that such a system entails, for generations to come. Now is the time for Canada to strike for freedom from the system of political grafting."⁴⁵ Methodists had traditionally blamed the patronage that flowed from partisanship for most of the evils in Canadian political life. They had condemned the Borden government for its corruption; but now it had disappeared into the coalition. Even in peacetime Methodists would have been delighted with a movement that promised to cure the political ills of the nation.

Racial and religious antipathies were kept more or less under control

⁴²*Globe*, Dec. 8, 1917; *Christian Guardian*, Dec. 12, 1917.

⁴³Bland Papers, clipping in "Union Government" portfolio.

⁴⁴*Christian Guardian*, Dec. 12, 1917.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

in the *Guardian*. Condemnations of Quebec's recruiting record were usually well qualified. In the election campaign Dr. Creighton cautioned against racial bitterness: "... we are persuaded that the great mass of the Quebec people are loyal to the Empire and sanely law-abiding, and the wild utterances of a few political firebrands are not to be taken as reflecting the feelings or sentiments of the people of the province as a whole."⁴⁶ Dr. Chown was less moderate. He had privately written in 1916: "Is it fair to leave the Province of Quebec to retain its strength in numbers, ready for any political or military aggression in the future, while our Protestants go forth to slaughter and decimation?"⁴⁷ He warned publicly in 1917 that a Liberal victory would give "one type of religion . . . a prepondering influence in the counsels of the Government of Canada."⁴⁸ Probably Dr. Chown's sentiments approximate Methodist opinion at the circuit level.

The Military Voters' Act and the War-time Elections Act were also approved by the church. Dr. Creighton had come to believe that German behaviour in Europe made it impossible to trust any German: "There can be no apology for . . . [disfranchisement] except the fact that just now there are few, if any, Canadians who believe that these German-born Canadian citizens desire that Britain should win the war. . . . The Anglo-Saxon is not usually suspicious, but he has learned at last to suspect the German."⁴⁹ Scattered through the church records are complaints about pro-German American periodicals, reports of invitations to American speakers with neutralist tendencies being withdrawn, and letters suggesting that there was no place in Canadian Methodism for the opinions of pacifists. After conscription was enacted Methodist ministers played a leading part in alerting the Saskatchewan government to the "Mennonite menace" and suggested that the policy of exempting Mennonites be reviewed.⁵⁰ In Guelph, Ontario, the Rev. H. G. Christie led the city's Protestant ministers into battle against the nearby Jesuit novitiate college by charging that some of the college's recently accepted novitiates, including the Hon. C. J. Doherty's son, were draft dodgers. This incensed one Ontario MLA into charging that "the greatest menace to the Province of Ontario is the Methodist Church"⁵¹ The Methodist Church was certainly a menace to the conscientious objector. Accepting the biblical injunction, "If any man will not work, neither shall he eat," the *Guardian* was willing to support measures to make conscientious objectors literal "outlaws":

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1917.

⁴⁷Army and Navy Board, Correspondence, S. D. Chown to K. Kingston, Nov. 30, 1916.

⁴⁸*Christian Guardian*, Dec. 12, 1917.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1917.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1918.

⁵¹*Canadian Annual Review*, 1918, pp. 457-61.

We may not feel like forcing such a man to fight, nor like punishing him for his honest opinions; but if he be honest, then let him be prepared to take the full consequences of his opinions. If he does not believe it is right to fight in defence of his privileges as a citizen, then let him refuse to allow those privileges to be maintained by the efforts of others. . . . According to this theory such a man would have no legal rights. He could not vote, he could not hold property, he could not in case of any invasion of his rights call upon the Government or the courts for protection.⁵²

In 1918 Methodists decided that pacifism was no longer a legitimate Christian doctrine. The *Guardian* had repeatedly warned against the evil consequences of "knocking" the war effort. Critics of the war were too often the people who had never done anything for the empire; with any sense they would use their right of free speech with discretion. Until 1918, however, the *Guardian's* correspondence columns were open to dissenters. In March of that year Dr. Creighton concluded that pacifism could not be tolerated "no matter who may teach it."⁵³ A frontispiece in April was entitled "The Vice of Pacifism"; it commended to Methodists Moses' action in killing the Egyptian slave driver he found beating an Israelite.⁵⁴ On May 1, probably in part because of the recent Order-in-Council suppressing seditious and antiwar opinions, the *Guardian* silenced the pacifists within the Church:

In time of war any type of religion which is pro-German is not a desirable type for this country, and any type which is not ardently pro-British and pro-American is not very much better. The matter of conscience does not change these facts, and a conscience which does not sanction patriotism is a very poor affair. . . .

. . . where the man's conscience is of such a stubborn type that it refuses to admit that a victory for the Allies is any more to be desired than a victory for the Germans . . . no plea of Christian liberty and of freedom of speech can be allowed for a moment, any more than we would allow it in a case where a man preached free love or polygamy. It is not a case of conscience, but a case of Christian morals, and the sin of unpatriotic speech and act is one which the Church cannot afford to condone.

J. S. Woodsworth had been drifting away from orthodoxy for a number of years. His church's attitude towards the war, particularly its expression in this editorial, drove him to insist that his resignation from the ministry be accepted.⁵⁵ It is essential to note that Woodsworth was the only major figure in Methodism to leave the church because of the war. The most significant protests against the church's leadership were made on the issue of political control during the 1917 election. At that time a few congregations were disrupted, members of one congregation

⁵²*Christian Guardian*, Aug. 8, 1917.

⁵³*Ibid.*, March 6, 1918.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, April 3, 1918.

⁵⁵McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics*, pp. 82-7.

came to blows during Sunday worship, several ministers were intimidated into keeping silent, and a several months' controversy raged in the correspondence columns of the *Guardian*.⁵⁶ But feelings were assuaged without any recorded ministerial resignations or seceding congregations. The wartime dismissals of Salem Bland and William Ivens from appointments in Winnipeg were not related to their attitudes on the war.

The Methodist Church's social conscience was in no way stifled by its patriotism. How could a denomination as outspoken in its denunciation of national sinfulness as Methodism had been proclaim honestly that the existence of a truly Christian civilization was now at stake? Methodists insisted that in a war of ideals the right ideals must prevail at home. A righteous war would have to end with Canada nearer the kingdom of righteousness. Many Methodists thought the war would not end until Canada did come closer to that kingdom. Underlying prayers for victory and assurances that the outcome of the war was in God's hands was a strong current of feeling that somehow God was punishing Canadians for their sins. Dr. Chown asked Methodists to pray that God would "show us wherein our sins have unfitted us to be the servants of Jehovah in bringing the reign of peace to the heart of this troubled world."⁵⁷ The Rev. Nathanael Burwash, formerly a leader in the fight for a liberal interpretation of Scripture, meditated on the sins of the Israelites and concluded: "It would seem as if we had repeated all the national and personal sins of this ancient people. And now we, like them, are passing under God's rod. . . . Just now in God's presence we should remember only that *we have sinned*. Our penitent prayers will bring the answer of peace when we open the way to God's forgiveness by turning away from the sins which have called for this terrible chastising."⁵⁸ For perhaps the wrong reasons Methodists rightly concluded that the allied nations shared the responsibility for the war. They were determined that it would never happen again.

The records of the church's 1914 quadrennial conference show a dualistic concern with complex social problems on the one hand and the traditional varieties of individual sin on the other hand. A carefully phrased "statement regarding Sociological questions" is matched by a nine-page report on the temperance movement. While its Committee of Social Service and Evangelism called for the abolition of poverty, a minimum wage, and an equitable partnership between employer and employee, the Department of Temperance, Prohibition, and Moral Reform concentrated on its attempts to redeem "lost women," its quest to

⁵⁶*Globe*, Dec. 17, 1917; *Christian Guardian*, January and February 1918.

⁵⁷*Christian Guardian*, Dec. 22, 1915.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, March 20, 1918.

discover and restore victims of the white slaver, and the problems of the seduction of female employees and the age of consent. The conclusion of the department's report reflects the secondary importance of the social gospel in Methodist thought: "Christ's witnesses must survey, chart, invade, and conquer the world for Him. The drunkenness, the vice, the violence, the industrial injustice, the indecent theatres, the immoral cafes, cabarets and hotels, the moral slaughter of girlhood and youth connected with the evil business of the Twentieth century, call out the old challenge to Christ's people, 'Watchman, what of the night?'"⁵⁹

The war was a godsend to the temperance movement. Who could deny the proposition that "the beer-befuddled soldier is a poor defence to his country?"⁶⁰ The liquor interests became "the worst pro-Germans we have in Canada to-day, the most treasonable persons."⁶¹ Well into 1915 Methodists insisted that "King alcohol" was a greater menace to Canadians than all the Kaiser's legions. Playing on the nation's concern for its soldiers and food supplies, as well as the desire to make tangible sacrifices, the temperance forces had won their battle by 1917 in every province but Quebec. Seven days after the 1917 election the Union government announced that the importation of liquor would be prohibited. Unionist leaders were probably not surprised to read of Methodist ministers announcing that their vote for the Union government was already justified.⁶²

But on Salisbury Plain in 1914 General Alderson had told the men of the first contingent of the CEF that they were men and proceeded to open a wet canteen. Speaking for Canadian Methodists, Dr. Chown questioned General Alderson's "moral right" to thus treat Canadian motherhood.⁶³ For the next four years petitions against the wet canteen and the fraud involved in shipping the rum ration to the front disguised as medical supplies regularly descended on Ottawa. The largest petition was signed by 64,000 mothers and wives of Ontario. All petitions were forwarded to the British government.

Many Canadian Methodists came to believe that sex and liquor in England were worse threats to Canadian manhood than the guns in France. Methodist ministers protested against the government's interpretation of "bad" books when it proscribed pamphlets put out by British temperance organizations.⁶⁴ After exhaustive investigations in

⁵⁹*Journal of Proceedings of the Ninth General Conference of the Methodist Church* (Toronto, 1914), p. 266.

⁶⁰*Christian Guardian*, Nov. 18, 1914.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1915.

⁶²*Globe*, Dec. 24, 1917.

⁶³*Canadian Annual Review*, 1914, p. 206.

⁶⁴For correspondence on the topic see Public Archives of Canada, R. L. Borden Papers,

Great Britain in 1917 Dr. Chown stated on his return to Canada that the boys "were submitted to greater temptations in London than they should be called upon to bear."⁶⁵ In his private report to the Army and Navy Board, however, he admitted that drunkenness and venereal disease were not major problems among Canadian soldiers. (Most of the venereal disease, he felt, was confined to the British-born majority of the CEF. British officials countered by claiming that most of the stricken had been infected in Canada.⁶⁶)

The church's concern for the moral health of Canadian soldiers probably hurt its own recruiting efforts. Fear of the consequences for recruiting must have been the reason for the censorship of British temperance pamphlets. Castell Hopkins concluded that Canadian moral asceticism had hindered recruiting: "The extreme degree to which objection to liquor and the smoking of cigarettes had been bred made domestic sentiment against the Army—smoking in the trenches or a wet canteen at the Front—very vigorous; . . ."⁶⁷ Dr. Chown was so distressed by the liquor trade in England that he held private doubts whether the English nation was worth fighting for.⁶⁸

The war years marked the apogee of moral fundamentalism in Canada. Neither the nation as a whole, fed up with sacrifice, nor its returned fighting men, impatient with what seemed to be the trivia of a provincial society, would ever again approach the wartime pitch of hatred for "King alcohol" and its concomitant vices. By 1922 only 35,000 Methodist Sunday school members had signed pledge cards; in 1916 the total had been 118,000.⁶⁹ Movements to interdict the spread of smoking were drowned by protests that tobacco was essential to the mental health of the fighting men. Sabbatarianism suffered from the necessity for full use of productive facilities. The first chinks in Methodism's wall of

OC 387. One of the prohibited pamphlets, Arthur Mee's *The Fiddlers*, describes hundreds of incidents similar to the following:

"A boy got his V.C., and came home wounded. The publican in his street sounded his praises in the taproom, where they subscribed to the bar for 120 pints for him when he arrived. He came home and began to drink it, and was nearly dead with it before he was rescued." (p. 23)

"A Canadian soldier, helplessly drunk, was seen at King's Cross Station tearing, crumpling up, and eating one pound notes, and would have lost about fifteen pounds but for kindly help from passers-by." (p. 37)

"A Sergeant-Major from Canada declared that he had lost 20 per cent. of the men of his battery through venereal disease. They had a little drink, and were captured by the swarm of bad women at Folkestone." (p. 38)

⁶⁵*Christian Guardian*, Sept. 26, 1917.

⁶⁶Army and Navy Board, Correspondence, undated report, S. D. Chown to the board.

⁶⁷*Canadian Annual Review*, 1915, p. 217.

⁶⁸Army and Navy Board, Correspondence, undated report, S. D. Chown to the board.

⁶⁹*Journal of Proceedings of the Eleventh General Conference of the Methodist Church* (Toronto, 1922), p. 440; *Journal of Proceedings, Tenth Conference*, p. 434.

ignorance and inhibition about sex were made by the new consciousness of venereal disease ("social disease" before the war) that the war forced on Canadians. Clear-minded Methodists realized what was happening. Dr. Creighton in the *Guardian* admitted that under the stress of war "the great majority of us feel that to some degree at least old restrictions and habits must yield."⁷⁰

Relaxed restrictions did not imply a relaxed concern for the health of society. On the contrary, the Methodist social conscience became increasingly sophisticated as churchmen interpreted and applied "The New Things We Are Seeing" on the home front. Within a few months of the outbreak of war Methodists were remarking on the changes that had come over Canada. Dr. Chown felt humanity had been raised up to "one of the highest mountain peaks in the experience of our race," for:

... the Christian ideal of service is displacing all other conceptions of success. The trappings of earthly estates are relegated to oblivion, and only the core of consecrated manhood is held in high esteem in these crucial days. The teachings of Jesus concerning sympathy and self-denial are being accepted by the secular arm as the dominant motives of diplomacy and the very soul of patriotic action.⁷¹

Dr. Creighton argued that "the fierce furnace of war" was burning up "the waste and rubbish and evil of our lives." Class distinctions, empty pleasure-seeking, indolent shirking of responsibilities were all being replaced by "an instinct of brotherhood and high and holy and self-sacrificing ideas and purposes of life."⁷² In the west Salem Bland pictured the war as the beginning of "a new era of redemption" which would feature more government ownership and control, a readjustment in the relations of capital and labour, steps towards the equalization of wealth, the abolition of the competitive principle in Canadian life, and the extension of economic democracy throughout the world.⁷³

Methodists expected that all members of a community dedicated to a common goal would sacrifice equally and to the limit. From the moment that war broke out Methodists insisted that profiteering be abolished. That Methodism's leading layman, Joseph Flavelle, was intimately involved in the most sensational of the profiteering inquiries did not deter the *Guardian* from condemning his company's excessive profits.⁷⁴ To defend itself the company was forced to take three-page advertisements in the journal. The efforts at food control of W. J. Hanna, a Methodist himself, paled in comparison with Jesus' demonstration of

⁷⁰*Christian Guardian*, April 18, 1917.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1915.

⁷²*Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1916.

⁷³Bland Papers, collection of sermons on the war.

⁷⁴*Christian Guardian*, Nov. 28, July 25, 1917.

what could be done with two loaves and five fishes.⁷⁵ Conscription of wealth was always a part of the Methodist "platform" in 1917. It is not always realized that the Union government specifically promised to conscript wealth by taxing war profits and increasing the income tax.⁷⁶ Dr. Creighton ably summed up the church's wartime attitude to business:

The war has taught us many things, and it is teaching us that the right conduct of business is, after all, fundamentally a national affair, and while individualism must necessarily prevail to a certain extent, that extent is definitely limited to the point where it conserves the national wellbeing. Business exists to serve, and not to prey upon, the life of the community. And whenever business becomes predatory it is essential to the national wellbeing that it be brought under proper control. The state has the right to control all business and to wipe out of existence any business which is a damage to the state. It seems to us that in reaching this point in our national thinking we have made a distinct and moral advance.⁷⁷

By 1917 Methodist leaders were calling for the application of war principles in peacetime. If the nation could maintain such unity and nobility of purpose in war, it could and should continue to do so in the peacetime struggle against sin. If individual prerogatives such as the right of private property could be justly sacrificed in the national interest in wartime, the same sacrifices could be validly called for by the nation after the war. In the last two years of the war these themes were outlined a number of times in the *Guardian* by Ernest Thomas, F. N. Stapleford, and Dr. Creighton. The editor's summary is representative:

The war has been a great leveller, and there is no question that it is causing men to see, as they never saw before, that manhood is a nation's chief asset, and the old theory of the sacredness of property is bound to be roughly shouldered aside by the new theory of the sacredness of life; and in the coming years it seems assured that this new theory will work mighty changes in our social fabric, and it seems probable that every one of these changes will be in the direction of righteousness and justice. A square deal for every man will be the national motto. In this way the war promises to bring the Kingdom of God nearer to us.⁷⁸

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, May 15, 1918.

⁷⁶Borden Papers, OC 367, *Manifesto of Sir Robert Borden to the Canadian People*, Nov. 17, 1917.

⁷⁷*Christian Guardian*, April 12, 1916; see also issues of Oct. 11, Nov. 29, 1916. In the *Guardian* of Nov. 7, 1917, the Rev. Ernest Thomas called for state controls more rigid than any existing form of war socialism: "Let the nation lay down for every citizen the principle that during the war no private person shall be allowed more than is needed to meet the demands involved in the maintenance of his private business, the demands of efficient life, and the provision against dependency. Let luxuries be refused any recognition. Let all motor cars used for private pleasure, and all other expenditures on matters which do not make for social and national efficiency, be prohibited. All the surplus should go to the nation, which will either assign its citizens a place in the national service or confirm him [*sic*] in his present life as one furthering the interests of the nation. There he may demand the means of efficient living. Beyond that the nation should tolerate nothing being diverted to private ends."

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1917.

The church's opinion of the new ideas that had captured the *Guardian* was expressed at the 1918 quadrennial conference. The Committee on the Church, the War, and Patriotism presented a report outlining what it understood to be the lessons for Canada and for Methodism of the war. After reminding the delegates that Methodism "was born in a revolt against sin and social extravagance and corruption," the committee pointed out that:

Under the shock and strain of this tremendous struggle, accepted commercial and industrial methods based on individualism and competition have gone down like mud walls in a flood. National organization, national control, extraordinary approximations of national equality have been found essential to efficiency.

Despite the derangements and sorrows of the war, the Motherland has raised large masses of her people from the edge of starvation to a higher plain of physical well-being, and in consequence, was never so healthy, never so brotherly, nor ever actuated by so high a purpose, or possessed by such exaltation of spirit as to-day—and the secret is that all are fighting or working, and all are sacrificing.

It is not inconceivable that when Germany ceases to be a menace, these dearly bought discoveries will be forgotten. Relapse would mean recurrence, the renewal of agony.

The conclusion seems irresistible. The war is a sterner teacher than Jesus and uses far other methods, but it teaches the same lesson. The social development which it has so unexpectedly accelerated has the same goal as Christianity, that common goal is a nation of comrade workers, as now at the trenches, fights so gloriously—a nation of comrade fighters.

Because of these lessons, because the twentieth century had shown that political democracy meant little without economic democracy, and because of the ethics of Jesus, the committee advocated "nothing less than a transference of the whole economic life from a basis of competition and profits to one of co-operation and service." A new system of production and service for human needs rather than for private profit would require the national government to "enlist in the service of the nation" the industrial resources of the country. Joint boards of employers and workers to regulate working conditions on the model of the British Whitley Councils would be one possibility, but only temporarily: ". . . we do not believe this separation of labor and capital can be permanent. Its transcendence, whether through co-operation or public ownership, seems to be the only constructive and radical reform."

Although it had prefaced its argument with a denial that its report bound the church to any specific economic policy, the committee spelled out what acceptance of its report implied: "The acceptance of this report, it cannot be too clearly recognized, commits this Church, as far as this representative body can commit it, to nothing less than a complete social reconstruction. . . . we think it is clear that nothing less than the goal we have outlined will satisfy the aroused moral

consciousness of the Church or retain for the Church any leadership in the testing period that is upon them." The report concluded by exhorting ministers and members to familiarize themselves with recent literature on reconstruction, including the British Labour party's programme, and called for a national conference of Christian churches to consider the problems of reconstruction.⁷⁹

The committee included most of the leading social gospellers in the church.⁸⁰ Its report was accepted by the conference with only four dissenting votes after a vigorous debate which included denunciations of the document as committing the church to socialism.⁸¹ The fact that there was such a debate shows that the conference knew the implications of the document. The Methodist Church did not move to the left in a fit of absence of mind. To underline its concern the conference went on to accept the report of the Committee on Social Service and Evangelism which condemned unearned wealth and all forms of profiteering and recommended old age pensions, a living wage, and nationalization of excess profits, natural resources, the means of communication and transportation, and public utilities.⁸²

This was the consequence of the interaction of the wartime experience with Methodism's social consciousness. One of the three largest and wealthiest Protestant denominations in Canada, only recently "in the pocket" of the Union government, had committed itself to a political and economic programme far to the left of anything acceptable to the major political parties. It was useless to charge that the church had gone socialist: "Whatever else it may mean, one thing is sure, it certainly means Christianity in practice."⁸³

The Methodist Church freely and fully supported the Canadian war effort. Pacifists within the church did not significantly affect its position. Demographic factors such as national origin, residence, and education explain the church's difficulties in its recruiting drive. Zeal for the purity of Methodist sons did have an incidental effect on recruiting, but in this case the operative motive was revulsion against London bars and brothels, not revulsion against warfare.

The church supported the war because it believed the cause was just. Methodists, like most English-speaking Canadians, were "taken in" by the atrocity stories. World War II has surely taught historians to have more tolerance for people who believed atrocity stories in the earlier war. At the same time historians must ignore some of the lessons

⁷⁹*Journal of Proceedings, Tenth Conference*, pp. 290-3.

⁸⁰Internal evidence suggests that the report was written by either Salem Bland or Ernest Thomas.

⁸¹*Christian Guardian*, Oct. 23, 1918.

⁸²*Journal of Proceedings, Tenth Conference*, p. 312.

⁸³*Christian Guardian*, Nov. 13, 1918, editorial.

of the two wars. Most Canadians of his generation would have agreed with Dr. Chown's later statement that in 1914 "war appeared to be something legitimate, noble and even sublime."⁸⁴ Brought up in Kingston, S. D. Chown had hired a soldier's son to teach him the rudiments of drill when he was twelve years old, had enlisted in a battalion of riflemen at fifteen, and had seen active service at seventeen during the last of the Fenian raids.⁸⁵ In 1914 most Canadians shared his Fenian raid concept of war.

Paradoxically, the pacifism at the heart of the Christian gospel was largely responsible for the extremism of Methodism's defence of Canadian liberty. No Methodist could fight a war that Jesus would not have supported. Therefore Methodists could fight only a holy war. If men were not dying for Christ their deaths would have appeared to be meaningless. The despair and sorrow would have mounted with the casualties until the church would have damned the war completely. In its crusading zeal the Methodist Church acquiesced in suppressions of basic liberties; to its own people it eventually denied the right of conscience. The amount of damage that would have been done to the nation's collective morale if its religious institutions had stood in critical judgment of the war is impossible to calculate.

It is not sufficient to explain the church's wartime behaviour as a response to political and social pressures. The church was afraid of being labelled disloyal, particularly on the recruiting issue, and of the consequences for Methodism when the soldiers came home. But at the basis of this fear was the feeling that such a label would have been *justly* applied if the church had shirked its patriotic and its Christian duty. The pressures on Methodism inherent in its own theology were of greater consequence in shaping its outlook than the pressures applied by the government or by Canadian society. Coincidentally they worked in the same direction.

If Methodism had been concerned either consciously or unconsciously with social status it would never have turned so radically to the left in 1918, adopting as it did a policy which must have infuriated the "pillars" of a number of its most powerful urban churches. The adoption of socialism grew directly out of the church's desire to redeem the Canadian people and the lessons it drew from the government's wartime controls. Church leaders observed the direction of government policy, thought that it was resulting in efficient and equitable allocation of resources, and concluded that such a policy was necessary for the future. In this way the war acted as a positive catalyst on Methodism's

⁸⁴Chown Papers, undated address (postwar), "What Does the Bible Teach About War?"

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, Both Chown and Creighton became professed pacifists in the 1920s and apologized in print for their 1914-1918 activities.

social thought, hastening the church along a path it may have been bound to take, but not a path calculated to win the maximum of public favour.

Canadian church historians have not yet noticed this aspect of the war's impact on Methodism. H. H. Walsh, the only ecclesiastical historian who has covered this period, feels that the war put the social problem into the background. He sees it raised again only by the Winnipeg general strike and finds the first signs of the rejection of personal evangelism as a method of reform appearing in the United Church's 1932 general council.⁸⁶ J. S. Woodsworth's biographer has noted the importance of the social gospel in Canada, but takes the social gospel out of Methodism along with Woodsworth and Ivens.⁸⁷ The most recent writer, Stewart Crysdale, agrees that the war caused an outburst of social idealism in Canada, but then suggests that "the disliked regimentation of the First World War and extreme disapproval of bolshevism produced a reaction in favour of individualism."⁸⁸ Nothing is more certain about the Methodists than that they liked the regimentation, such as it was, of World War I. They also thought that socialism was the best means of staving off bolshevism.⁸⁹ Crysdale himself goes on to show that the Methodist Church strongly supported labour in the post-war struggles; its radicalism was finally tempered only by church union.⁹⁰

Another neglected problem is the connection between the social gospel and the more traditional methods of rooting out evil in Canadian life that churchmen favoured. It cannot be lightly assumed that Christian concern for temperance, sabbatarianism, and sexual restraint meant that churches were ignoring social problems to concentrate on healing flaws in individual behaviour. The Lord's Day Act of 1906 was one of the most significant extensions of the state's power to regulate social conditions made in the Laurier period. For two generations before

⁸⁶H. H. Walsh, *The Christian Church in Canada* (Toronto, 1958), pp. 334ff.

⁸⁷"When A. R. M. Lower suggests that Methodism fathered a large proportion of Canada's radicals perhaps he should have written 'expelled' rather than 'fathered.'" McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics*, p. 98. In 1918 there was obviously a place in the Methodist Church for the radicalism of Woodsworth and Ivens. By 1922, when the church began to repent of its support for the war, there was also a place for their pacifism. The real problem by then was that neither of them would have been willing to work again within the framework of organized religion. But other socialists, such as Ernest Thomas and Salem Bland, worked effectively in the Methodist Church and the United Church throughout the interwar years.

⁸⁸Stewart Crysdale, *The Industrial Struggle and Protestant Ethics in Canada* (Toronto, 1961), p. xii.

⁸⁹See, for example, the *Christian Guardian*, Nov. 6, 1918: "It has been clearly manifested that the truest safeguard against Bolshevism... lies not in the intellectual and social enslavement of the masses, but in their complete intellectual and social emancipation."

⁹⁰Crysdale, *The Industrial Struggle*, pp. 76ff.

World War I Protestant churches had been applying political pressure in every conceivable form to win temperance legislation. Sabbatarians and temperance advocates aimed at creating an ideal Canadian community. They believed they were attacking the most basic social evils in Canada. Well before 1914 they had agreed that government authority was to be a main agent of social change. Because they accepted this view Methodists were sympathetic to regulation and regimentation during the war and favoured massive expansion of state power in peacetime. Social gospel thought, at least in the Methodist Church, *evolved* out of Methodism's historic concern for a just and righteous social order. It did not *supersede* an irresponsible puritanism. By 1914 the church was willing to use the state to remake the individual's life. By 1918 it was willing to use the state to remake the community. The distinction is very fine.

It may be generally true that when Canadian historians come to study the wartime experience in depth they will find that these were vital years in Canada's social and intellectual development as well as in its rise to nationhood. The new sense of identity fostered among English Canadians by the war was more than simple patriotism. It was an expression of revived ideals of service to a common principle, participation in communal activity, and membership in an organic whole. Nationalists and social reformers alike had protested against the fragmentation of community life and the destruction of spiritual values caused by rapid economic growth before the war. Because they aspired to the same end—the achievement of some form of organic unity in society—many nationalists and social reformers could unite in hailing the wartime experience as marking the birth of a new society. Indeed, as the Methodist experience demonstrates, it was both possible and consistent for the same individuals to combine militant nationalism with a determination to reconstruct Canadian society. As nationalists, as socialists, above all as Christian idealists, Methodists in 1918 were ready to participate in the creation of a peacetime community as unified and egalitarian as the wartime society. It is surprising how many other Canadians shared their determination.⁹¹ Somewhere in the 1920s, though, the new society got lost.

⁹¹Significant expressions of this idealism can be found in the Farmers' platform of 1918, the Liberal party platform of 1919, the collection of essays *The New Era in Canada* (Toronto, 1917), W. L. M. King, *Industry and Humanity* (Toronto, 1918), Stephen Leacock, *The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice* (Toronto, 1920), and C. W. Gordon ("Ralph Connor"), *To Him That Hath* (Toronto, 1921).

Seattle, Vancouver, and the Klondike

NORBERT MACDONALD

THE HISTORY OF A GREAT MANY TOWNS AND CITIES is closely linked with the arrival of a particular ship. For Seattle, Washington, the vessel was called, somewhat ironically, the *Portland*. She arrived from St. Michael, Alaska, on July 17, 1897. On board were sixty passengers, most of whom had spent the previous year prospecting for gold in the Klondike region of Canada's remote Yukon Territory, and every one of whom seemed to have struck it rich.¹ The *Portland* was not the first ship to publicize the news of the Klondike discoveries; two days prior to her arrival in Seattle, the *Excelsior* had docked in San Francisco with a group of miners from the same region. With the arrival of these vessels virtually the entire world learned about the Klondike, and North America's last "old-fashioned" gold rush was set in motion.

From the beginning of this stampede, Seattle's leaders asserted that their city was the only logical gateway to the gold fields and that it controlled practically all the trade to the Klondike. On July 28 the editor of the *Post Intelligencer* asserted:

Seattle . . . is the present terminus of every single line to the Yukon country now in operation. It was at Seattle that the present population of the Klondike procured their supplies; it was to Seattle that the first returning miners came, and from Seattle it was that the news has gone out to the world of the wonderful discoveries which have been made. Naturally and inevitably the great bulk of adventurers who propose to seek fortune in the new gold fields will flock to Seattle as the point of final departure for the Yukon.

This claim was challenged by every major seaport on the Pacific coast. San Francisco, Portland, Tacoma, Vancouver, and Victoria all asserted they had excellent facilities to offer. Lesser ports like Bellingham, Nanaimo, and Juneau sought a share in the trade, while interior cities like Edmonton, Calgary, and Spokane also tried to establish themselves

¹See the Seattle *Post Intelligencer* and the Seattle *Daily Times* of July 17, 1897.

as outfitting centres. Although these cities shared in the Klondike trade, not one of them had seriously challenged Seattle's early dominance by the time the peak of the rush was over in 1899.

In the scramble for business and profits, one of the most interesting rivalries was that of Seattle and Vancouver. Both of these cities had started as minor logging and lumbering towns and had grown modestly in their early years. Only with the great railroad boom of the 1880s when the Northern Pacific and the Canadian Pacific were completed to the west coast and when large numbers of migrants could travel in the comfort of a railroad coach did they grow rapidly.² On the eve of the gold discoveries Seattle was much larger than Vancouver, 55,000 to 20,000, yet the economic life of both cities was quite similar as each was a lumbering, trading and transportation centre for its respective region.

The business leaders of Seattle and Vancouver also showed interesting similarities.³ In both cities they tended to be well-educated, native-born migrants who had settled on the Pacific coast only after living and working in a number of other places on their way west.⁴ Most of them were sons of businessmen, skilled artisans, or professionals, and in both cities they were overwhelmingly Protestant. In Canada they voted Conservative, and in the United States Republican. Regardless of where they lived, they were active "joiners" and flocked to a host of social, fraternal, business, and athletic clubs. Vancouver had more Englishmen and Scotsmen, and fewer European-born business leaders than Seattle, but otherwise the backgrounds of these two groups of men were alike.⁵

These businessmen saw in the Klondike gold discoveries an excellent chance to make immediate profits as well as capture an extensive economic hinterland. Their competition in the late 1890s shows not only an interesting urban rivalry, but indicates something of the way in which Americans and Canadians responded to an economic opportunity. It also shows how urban communities in both nations played an important

²The Northern Pacific was completed to Tacoma in 1883 and linked to Seattle by 1884. Trains of the Canadian Pacific reached tidewater at Port Moody, B.C., in 1886. By 1887 service had been extended to Vancouver. See D. O. Johansen and C. M. Gates, *Empire on the Columbia* (New York, 1957), and M. A. Ormsby, *British Columbia: A History* (Toronto, 1958).

³See Norbert MacDonald, "The Business Leaders of Seattle, 1880-1910," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, L (1959), 1-13, for an analysis of 87 businessmen. A similar approach was followed in studying 38 Vancouver business leaders. Biographical information was collected from J. B. Kerr, *Biographical Dictionary of Well Known British Columbians* (Vancouver, 1890); R. E. Gosnell, *A History of British Columbia* (compiled by Lewis Publishing Co., 1906); F. W. Howay and E. O. S. Scholefield, *British Columbia; From the Earliest Times to the Present* (4 vols.; Vancouver, 1914), vols. III and IV.

⁴Of the 38 Vancouver business leaders studied, 17 had lived or worked in the United States. Thirteen of Seattle's 87 business leaders had lived or worked in Canada.

⁵Of Seattle's 87 business leaders, 62 were born in the United States, 11 in Europe, 8 in Canada, and 6 in Great Britain. Vancouver's 38 business leaders consisted of 21 born in Canada, 10 in Great Britain, 6 in the United States, and 1 in Europe.

role in shaping the policies of their respective federal governments.⁶ Although the focus in this paper will be on Seattle and Vancouver, it should be noted that the basic lineup pitted Seattle on one side against Vancouver and Victoria on the other. While Seattle continually scoffed at the efforts of Tacoma, Portland, and San Francisco to share in the Klondike trade, there was remarkably little friction between Vancouver and Victoria. Rather the Canadian cities emphasized the need for co-operation against their common American rival.⁷

An examination of the Alaska-Yukon region prior to 1897 helps explain Vancouver's difficulties and Seattle's early dominance of the gold rush trade. Up to the time of the Klondike discoveries most Americans had little interest in the area and thought of it as an isolated, barren region fit only for polar bears and Eskimos. By the 1880s, however, the Alaska Commercial Company, owned in San Francisco, had steamers operating on the Yukon River and had extended its posts well into the Canadian Yukon.⁸ There was considerable seasonal work in the salmon canneries of southeast Alaska, but as late as 1890 Alaska had a permanent white population of under five thousand.⁹ What little trade there was with the outside world was virtually monopolized by San Francisco, and the only regular transportation was provided by the Pacific Coast Steamship Company of that city.¹⁰ A few Portland-based firms sent the occasional vessel to Alaska, but on the whole San Francisco's dominance was largely unchallenged.¹¹

It was not until 1891 that Seattle merchants began to seek out Alaskan business. In that year, McDougall & Southwick, Fisher & MacDonald, and the Seattle Hardware Company, three of the city's largest wholesale firms, sent representatives to Alaska.¹² These agents usually ignored the large firms which got all their supplies from their San Francisco

⁶For a suggestive treatment of the impact of metropolitanism on Canadian development see J. M. S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXV (1954), 1-21.

⁷See for example *Vancouver News Advertiser*, Oct. 24, 1897, Jan. 26, Feb. 4, Dec. 9, 1898; *Victoria Daily Colonist*, Oct. 3, Oct. 12, 1897, Feb. 6, 1898. *Report of Victoria Board of Trade*, 1902 (Victoria, 1902).

⁸Hutchinson, Kohl & Company of San Francisco bought out the Russian-American Company in 1868. By 1871 the new firm was known as the Alaska Commercial Company. See William Ogilvie, *Early Days in the Yukon* (London and New York, 1913), pp. 64-70, 75-83.

⁹*Abstract of the 11th U.S. Census (1890)* (Washington, 1894), gives Alaska a white population of 4,298. The total population was 32,052.

¹⁰See *Report of the Governor of Alaska, 1889* (Washington, 1889), *passim*.

¹¹Jonas A. Jonassen, "Portland and the Alaska Trade," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, XXX (1939), 132-3; Ogilvie, *Early Days in the Yukon*, p. 68. The distribution of the Alaska salmon pack of 1889 showed San Francisco's dominance. Of a total pack of 702,993 cases, over 90 per cent went to San Francisco; Portland got about 2 per cent; the rest were lost in shipwrecks. *Report of the Governor of Alaska, 1890* (Washington, 1890), p. 20.

¹²See *Post Intelligencer*, Oct. 18, 1891.

owners and concentrated on the independent merchants and canneries in Sitka and Juneau. Seattle had definite advantages as a possible supply base for Alaska's merchants. The city was nearer Alaska than either San Francisco or Portland and it could therefore offer lower freight rates and faster service. In 1891 for example the Pacific Coast Steamship Company charged \$10 per ton of freight from Seattle to Sitka, \$11 from Portland, and \$13 from San Francisco.¹³ While the average steamer took about seven days to go from San Francisco to ports in southeast Alaska, those from Seattle made the trip in four days.¹⁴

With these advantages Seattle's foothold in the Alaska trade increased steadily. In 1892 the Pacific Coast Steamship Company of San Francisco shifted its centre of operations from Portland to Seattle.¹⁵ In the same year the North American Transportation and Trading Company, which had a number of trading posts on the Yukon River, also made Seattle its base. A locally owned line, the Alaska Steamship Company, was organized in Seattle in 1895. City firms obtained the government contract for carrying mail,¹⁶ and in 1895 and 1896 Seattle also served numerous gold miners who were headed for Alaska.¹⁷ In their annual business survey for 1896 the *Post Intelligencer* (January 3, 1897) could claim that 75 per cent of all Alaska's trade was controlled by Seattle. The claim might be an exaggeration but there can be no doubt that Seattle had the experience, business contacts, and regular shipping facilities for trade with Alaska well before the gold rush started.

Canadian contacts with the Alaska-Yukon region were very limited before 1897.¹⁸ The one business concern that might have given Canada a solid foothold for the Yukon trade ceased operations in 1889. In that year the Hudson's Bay Company, which had done considerable exploring and trading in the Yukon Valley, withdrew completely from the area when it discovered that its trading post on the Porcupine River was in American, rather than British territory.¹⁹ What little contact there was between Canadian ports and southeast Alaska depended on American facilities. When the Canadian government sent the original party of twenty officers and men of the North West Mounted Police to establish its authority in the Yukon in 1895 the group left from Seattle and went by way of St. Michael and the Yukon River on board American

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*, April 14, 1893.

¹⁵See W. A. Mears, "History of the Alaska Trade," *Bulletin of the Portland Chamber of Commerce*, April, 1905, p. 11; *Post Intelligencer*, July 2, 1892, Jan. 3, 1897. Portland's merchants continued to sell in Alaska after 1892 but all their goods were first shipped by rail to Seattle for the trip north. Not until 1897 did a general trading ship again leave Portland for Alaska. Jonassen, "Portland and the Alaska Trade," p. 132.

¹⁶Mears, "History of the Alaska Trade," p. 11.

¹⁷*Seattle Press-Times*, Feb. 4, 1895; *Seattle Times*, Aug. 15, 18, 20, 1896.

¹⁸Ogilvie, *Early Days in the Yukon*, pp. 34-40.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 22-6.

vessels to reach its destination at Fort Cudahy.²⁰ After the first year and until 1898 this group purchased its supplies from the Alaska Commercial Company and the North American Transportation and Trading Company both of which were American concerns.²¹ Much of the mail came *via* Seattle.²²

The net result of this lack of Canadian facilities was that when the *Excelsior* and the *Portland* publicized the exciting news of the Klondike gold finds,²³ Vancouver had to start virtually from scratch in its attempt to capture some of the trade. Seattle on the other hand could concentrate on expanding a trade that it had been cultivating for seven years. By early August 1897 Alaska-bound vessels carrying one hundred to twelve hundred tons of cargo were leaving Seattle wharves at the rate of about one a day.²⁴ Vancouver, at this time, could send one steamer a week to Dyea, with about a hundred tons of merchandise.²⁵

In the following three years Vancouver struggled vigorously to capture the supply trade of the Canadian Yukon. Although it did not succeed during the peak years of 1897 and 1898, it is significant that its basic approach was much like that of its American rival. In some cases, Vancouver's techniques were clearly modelled on Seattle's example, but on the whole the Vancouver entrepreneur made his decisions quite independently of his Seattle counterpart.

One similarity in the approaches of Seattle and Vancouver was that both carried on vigorous advertising campaigns in order to publicize their facilities and attract potential Klondikers. In this sphere Seattle's efforts dwarfed those of Vancouver. In fact almost five times as much

²⁰Report of the Commissioner of the North West Mounted Police, 1895, in Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1896, No. 15, p. 21. See also Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1898, No. 15, pp. 308, 309.

²¹Report of the Yukon detachment, North West Mounted Police, in Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1897, No. 15, pp. 233, 237.

²²Thomas Fawcett, Canada's first gold commissioner in the Yukon, noted the reliance on American facilities. See his report in Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1898, No. 13, Pt. 2, pp. 74, 79.

²³The *Excelsior* belonged to the Alaska Commercial Company, the *Portland* to the North American Transportation and Trading Company.

²⁴*Post Intelligencer*, Aug. 1 to Aug. 10, 1897.

²⁵*News Advertiser*, July 29, Aug. 2, Aug. 8, 1897. In the early summer of 1897 Vancouver had two locally owned steamship lines capable of providing service to Alaska. The Union Steamship Company ran the *Capilano* and the *Coquitlam*, each carrying about one hundred tons. Evans, Coleman and Evans had a number of small vessels serving coastal logging camps and canneries. By making a trip to Victoria, tie ups could be made with the Victoria-based Canadian Pacific Steamship Company and the Pacific Coast Steamship Company from San Francisco and Seattle. See *Report of Vancouver Board of Trade, 1897-98* (Vancouver, 1898), p. 32; P. Roy, "Railways, Politicians, and the Development of the City of Vancouver as a Metropolitan Centre, 1886-1929," M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1963, p. 78; G. M. Schuthe, "Canadian Shipping in the British Columbia Coastal Trade," M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1950, pp. 22-30.

advertising material came from Seattle as from Vancouver, Tacoma, Portland, or San Francisco.²⁶ Most of this was generated by a committee of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce under the energetic and skilful leadership of Erastus Brainerd. Through a system of monthly contributions by local business firms Brainerd received a steady stream of cash to spread the message that Seattle was the only place for any sensible gold hunter to outfit and begin his trip north.²⁷ Most of this money was used to place advertisements in syndicated newspaper lists that covered the mid-west. Illinois alone had four hundred and eighty-eight different weekly newspapers carrying a Seattle advertisement.²⁸ National periodicals such as *Munsey's*, *McClure's*, *Cosmopolitan*, *Harper's*, and *Scribner's* also carried Seattle ads.²⁹ Migrants to the Pacific northwest were urged to write their hometown newspaper about their fine treatment in Seattle. If one found writing difficult, Brainerd provided the stationery, postage, and even the message itself. All the "author" had to add was his signature. On one occasion Brainerd persuaded Washington's secretary of state to sign one of the Chamber of Commerce circulars. It automatically became an official proclamation. The most ambitious undertaking was an eight-page special Klondike edition of the *Post Intelligencer* published on October 13, 1897. Altogether 212,000 copies were printed. Every postmaster and public library in the United States got a copy. Hundreds of additional copies were sent to newspapers, businessmen, politicians, and railroad executives. But whether it was through newspaper advertisements, letters, journal articles, tips, or official proclamations the message that Brainerd and his associates pounded home was consistent, "Seattle is the gateway to Alaska."

Vancouver's advertising efforts were inundated by the stream of material that came from Seattle, but a number of steps were taken. In August 1897 Vancouver's Board of Trade established a committee to advertise the city's advantages as an outfitting point for the Klondike.³⁰ Businessmen in the city promptly subscribed \$7,545 for the campaign but in the first year only \$4,514 was actually collected. Advertisements were placed in Canadian, British, American, and Australian newspapers. A variety of pamphlets were prepared, the *Vancouver World* turned out a Klondike edition, and a small agency was established in Seattle to drum up business in the rival camp. In addition a number of

²⁶Jeanette Nichols, "Advertising and the Klondike," *Washington Historical Quarterly*, XIII (1922), 20-6. The *Seattle Times* (Aug. 15, 1899) carries a detailed account of the activities of this Bureau of Information of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce.

²⁷In September 1897, for example, approximately \$980 were contributed, ranging from \$75 given by Schwabacher Brothers, a wholesale firm, to the \$5 given by an anonymous donor. See *Post Intelligencer*, Sept. 30, 1897.

²⁸*Ibid.*, March 11, 1898.

²⁹Nichols, "Advertising and the Klondike," pp. 23-6.

³⁰*Report of Vancouver Board of Trade, 1897-98*, pp. 11, 12; *ibid.*, 1898-99.

Vancouver firms distributed brochures, while the city council and local newspapers emphasized the need for effective advertisement.³¹ But the Vancouver campaign never achieved the volume, co-ordination, or impact of that of Seattle. It was particularly painful for Vancouverites to read in British newspapers and journals that Seattle was the outfitting centre for the Klondike.³² Brainerd's message on behalf of Seattle had obviously been effective.

A further similarity in the approaches of Seattle and Vancouver was the way in which both cities appealed to their respective federal governments for policies that would protect and benefit them. The policies ultimately adopted in both Ottawa and Washington reflect in substantial part the wishes of Pacific coast cities. Governmental action probably assumed greater importance for Vancouver than for Seattle, but both cities sent out a steady stream of letters, telegrams, lobbyists, and legislators asking for consideration of their particular needs.³³

Within a week of the first news of the Klondike strike the Vancouver *News Advertiser* was criticizing the federal government for not having customs officials in the Yukon. "The country is losing a large amount of revenue," it pointed out, "while the business which should come to British Columbia merchants is being done in Seattle and other American towns" (July 21, 1897). When Clifford Sifton, Canada's minister of the interior, visited Vancouver in November 1897 after an inspection trip to the Yukon, he received a detailed series of recommendations from Sol Oppenheimer, vice president of Vancouver's Board of Trade. They called for telegraph communication with Dawson, subsidies for railroads and shipping lines, establishment of special postal facilities, modifications of the mining regulations, issuance of miners' licences in Vancouver, development of special escort systems, systematic and co-ordinated advertising, and the use of federal facilities to acquaint British authorities with Vancouver's special advantages for Yukon outfitting.³⁴ The Canadian government was definitely interested. Within three years many of these recommendations were implemented.

The issue of greatest concern for both Vancouver and Seattle centred on customs regulations. The overwhelming majority of persons bound for the Klondike in 1897-98 took a steamer from a Pacific port to Dyea or Skagway in southeast Alaska. A rugged twenty-five-mile hike across the mountain passes followed. After reaching the Yukon Territory a

³¹*News Advertiser*, Nov. 9, 10, 1897; *Daily Colonist*, Oct. 12, 1897.

³²The *Daily Colonist* of Sept. 30 and Oct. 3, 1897, specifically mention the *Consular Journal of London* and the *Review of Reviews*.

³³Senators W. Templeman and W. J. MacDonald were very active on behalf of British Columbia's cities. Congressman J. H. Lewis and Senator J. L. Wilson frequently spoke for Seattle. By 1901 Brainerd was a paid lobbyist for Seattle, making \$1000 a month while serving in Washington.

³⁴*Report of Vancouver Board of Trade, 1897-98*, pp. 21-2; *News Advertiser*, Nov. 5, 1897.

boat was built to navigate a series of lakes and rivers for another six hundred miles to reach the main gold fields in the Klondike. Customs duties, whether levied by American authorities in Alaska or Canadian officials in the Yukon, accounted for a significant proportion of any miner's expenses and often determined where he bought his original outfit. All outfitting centres were therefore very conscious of any regulation that might affect their chance of getting a share of the supply business.

From the start of the rush Seattle and Vancouver each sought customs regulations that would benefit itself, but the stampede of miners caught both nations largely unprepared. A scarcity of officials, ambiguous regulations, and the need for on-the-spot improvisation led to much bitterness. For about eight months, newspapers and politicians in Vancouver, Victoria, and Seattle exchanged a virtually endless series of threats, boasts, charges, and countercharges. Minor victories were accepted with glee, setbacks looked upon as the forerunners of a complete loss of trade. In the first month of the rush Canadian customs duties were seldom collected simply because there were no customs officials in the Yukon. By September 1897 a customs post was established at Lake Tagish, but exemptions on miners' outfits were quite liberal.³⁵ To the great irritation of Vancouver's merchants, Seattle newspapers suggested that virtually no Canadian customs whatever would be collected on goods purchased in the United States.³⁶

Vancouver merchants in the meantime were advertising that Canadian goods could be landed in Skagway in bond and then taken across the mountain passes to Canadian territory without paying any American duties.³⁷ This too was premature as many persons discovered who bought their supplies in Vancouver.³⁸ Although Dyea had been made a subport of entry for British goods, and theoretically no duty had to be paid on them, American officials in Alaska developed an ingenious

³⁵A miner's blankets, personal clothing, cooking utensils and one hundred pounds of food were exempt. Duty was charged only on the excess. See letter of J. McDougall, Commissioner of Customs, to Collector of Customs, Victoria, as printed in *Victoria Daily Colonist*, Aug. 20, 1897. For discussions of the rush and the customs controversy see F. W. Howay, W. N. Sage, and H. F. Angus, *British Columbia and the United States* (Toronto, 1942), esp. pp. 354-9; H. A. Innis, *Settlement and the Mining Frontier* (Toronto, 1936), esp. pp. 178-85, 258.

³⁶See for example *Post Intelligencer*, July 25, Oct. 25, Nov. 7, 1897. In July a Vancouver newspaper had predicted possible difficulties: "[Americans] are imbued with the idea that it is rather patriotic . . . to evade the payment of taxes of any kind to the British authorities." *News Advertiser*, July 29, 1897.

³⁷An advertisement of the Vancouver Board of Trade pointed out, "All goods purchased in Vancouver will be certified by the Customs Officers there, and be admitted free of duty, thus saving time, trouble and money to the miner." *Victoria Province*, Sept. 25, 1897. See also *News Advertiser*, Jan. 19, 1898. For similar Victoria advertisements see *Daily Colonist*, Sept. 15, 1897.

³⁸See letter by group of Australians in *News Advertiser* Dec. 18, 1897, also editorials of Dec. 27, Jan. 4, Jan. 8, 1898.

convoy system.³⁹ In practice it meant that a man with a Canadian outfit could either pay an American official about nine dollars a day to trudge along the trail with him, and "convoy" his goods to Canadian territory, or else pay the regular American duty of about 30 per cent of the value of the goods landed in Dyea. It was usually cheaper to pay the regular American duty and most persons with Canadian outfits did precisely that.

With the establishment of regular Canadian duties on January 1, 1898, and the continuation of the American convoy system, irritation was increased on both sides. While the Vancouver Board of Trade bombarded the Canadian Minister of the Interior for clarification of the regulations, and for retaliatory action, Vancouver and Victoria newspapers accused the American government of deliberate delaying tactics so as to benefit Seattle.⁴⁰ Though the Secretary of the Treasury announced new regulations on February 2, 1898, it was not until May 15 that the American convoy system was abandoned.⁴¹

Though seldom reaching the intensity of the customs controversy, both Vancouver and Seattle interests approached their respective governments on a host of other issues. Quite understandably the two cities took opposite positions on the desirability of establishing a subport of entry at Dyea. Vancouver urged Ottawa to issue Yukon miner's licences only at selected Canadian cities, while American interests pushed equally hard for issuance of the licences at the passes or at British consulates in American cities. Both Seattle and Vancouver sought and obtained government assay offices, mail subsidies, and federal support for transportation companies. The Canadian government, with some support from Vancouver and Victoria, also sought to build a railroad to improve transportation to the Yukon. This proposal for a Stikine River-Lake Teslin railroad, however, was defeated.⁴²

Another way in which Seattle and Vancouver showed a similar response was that businessmen and journalists in both cities used questionable tactics to secure benefits for themselves or their community. Not unexpectedly, businessmen in each city claimed to be able to provide supplies and equipment to the prospective Klondiker at prices lower than their competitors. Specific prices were seldom given. From

³⁹Report of Inspector F. L. Cartwright of the North West Mounted Police, 1897, in Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1899, No. 15, p. 112.

⁴⁰Virtually every issue of the *News Advertiser* and *Daily Colonist* of December 1897, and January and February 1898 has some discussion of this or some other controversy. See esp. *News Advertiser*, Jan. 26, 1898.

⁴¹Report of Commissioner Wood of the North West Mounted Police, 1898, in Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1899, No. 15, p. 47.

⁴²See R. C. Brown, *Canada's National Policy, 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian-American Relations* (Princeton, 1964), pp. 299-314; John W. Dafoe, *Clifford Sifton in Relations to His Times* (Toronto, 1931), pp. 157-72.

the welter of conflicting testimony it seems fair to conclude that there was no substantial difference in outfitting costs, especially for food and general provisions.⁴³ On woollen goods, and especially blankets, Vancouver apparently had the edge, whereas in general hardware, Seattle was cheaper. Much depended on the relative quality of the goods concerned. Miners' outfits cost about \$200 to \$300, but since they ranged from \$100 to \$1000 valid comparisons of outfitting costs in Vancouver and Seattle are difficult to determine.

The most consistent thorn in the side of Vancouver and Victoria was that Seattle's merchants and newspapers played down or ignored the fact that the Klondike was in Canadian territory and that American goods were subject to Canadian duty.⁴⁴ Though Canadian papers endlessly proclaimed the real state of affairs, few Americans heard or heeded. Petty harassments and distortions abounded. The *Seattle Times* refused to print a Victoria advertisement.⁴⁵ The *Post Intelligencer* (February 2, 1898) urged the Seattle city council to place a \$500 monthly licence fee on Canadian agents in Seattle. A steamship of the Washington and Alaska Steamship Company was magically transformed into a vessel of the British Columbia and Alaska Steamship Company when it was advertised in the *Vancouver News Advertiser* on February 23 and 24, 1898.

Canadian papers were not outdone, however.⁴⁶ On July 20, 1897, Victoria's *Daily Colonist* gave a detailed, enthusiastic description of the departure of the steamer *Al-ki* for the north. She carried 110 passengers and 350 tons of merchandise along with 30 horses, 65 head of cattle, and 900 sheep. The general tone of the article was that most of this cargo had originated in Victoria. The *Colonist* conveniently ignored the fact that the *Al-ki* belonged to a Seattle firm and that it had obtained virtually all of its passengers and freight in that city. In fact most of the column itself was cribbed word for word from the *Seattle Post Intelligencer* of the previous day. Except for some cattle that were loaded in the Canadian city, Victoria's total contribution to the cargo consisted of the following: 1 sack of onions, 1 sack of potatoes, 1 bundle of shovels, 1 bundle of axes, 3 bundles of pack saddles, and a few packages of

⁴³Frank Leeds, special correspondent of the *Cincinnati Post*, visited Vancouver and judged prices there to be lower than on Puget Sound; see *News Advertiser*, Feb. 26, 1898. After a visit to Seattle, George Duncan, passenger agent of the Canadian Pacific Railway, found some prices there lower than in Vancouver; see *News Advertiser*, Oct. 24, 1897.

⁴⁴See for example *Daily Colonist*, July 21, 30, 1897; *Province*, Dec. 25, 1897; *Post Intelligencer*, July 29, Oct. 26, Nov. 10, 1897; *Report of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce 1897* (Seattle, 1897), pp. 66-7.

⁴⁵Times Printing Co. to *Colonist* Printing & Publishing Co. as printed in *Province*, Aug. 7, 1897.

⁴⁶*Post Intelligencer*, July 19, 1897; *Daily Colonist*, July 20, 1897; *Province*, July 24, 1897.

general hardware. Altogether this weighed somewhat less than 350 tons!

It was not until early in 1898 that Vancouver shared significantly in the Klondike trade. Beginning in February and lasting for about four months, the city's merchants and businessmen experienced the prosperity that had been so often prophesied. A number of factors contributed to this expansion. Not only had a convenient bonding system been established for carrying Canadian goods through Alaska, but Canadian customs were now regularly collected on American goods entering the Yukon.⁴⁷ Vancouver-owned steamship lines had expanded their operations, and numerous Puget Sound-based steamers now stopped at the city for additional passengers and freight on the way north.⁴⁸ Victoria's steamship companies had also expanded operations. Most important of all, the Canadian Pacific Railway had transferred two ocean-going steamers, the *Tartar* and the *Athenian*, to the Vancouver-Skagway run. Both of these vessels were big, fast, and comfortable. The *Tartar* was 4,425 tons gross register and could make the run to Skagway in under three days.⁴⁹ For one short period during the entire gold rush Vancouver had the shipping facilities it wanted.

This flurry of activity proved to be brief. By late summer it was over and businessmen were disappointed to find themselves heavily overstocked with goods.⁵⁰ It was only after the peak of the stampede had passed that Vancouver and Victoria clearly replaced Seattle as the supply centre for the Yukon. Seattle retained its dominance in Alaska,⁵¹ but the completion of the White Pass and Yukon Railway from Skagway, Alaska, to Whitehorse, Yukon, in July 1900 changed the pattern of Yukon trade.⁵² In that year approximately 75 to 80 per cent of the goods entering the Yukon came from Canada, whereas in 1898 about the same proportion had been from the United States.⁵³ Unfortunately

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1898, discusses United States regulations in detail.

⁴⁸*Report of Vancouver Board of Trade, 1897-98*, p. 32, lists the main shipping lines from Vancouver. The Union Steamship Company added *Cutch* to *Coquitlam* and *Capilano*. Evans, Coleman and Evans chartered the 2,708-ton *Ningchow*.

⁴⁹*News Advertiser*, April 2, 1898.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, Oct. 5, 25, Nov. 3, 1898. Victoria businessmen were also disappointed. See *Daily Colonist*, Oct. 21, 28, 1898.

⁵¹Margaret C. Rodman, "The Trend of Alaskan Commerce through the Port of Seattle," M.A. thesis, University of Washington, 1930, covers the period 1910-30. Wm. A. Siddall, "Seattle and the Hierarchy of Central Places in Alaska," M.A. thesis, University of Washington, 1955, shows that in 1955 Seattle was still the commercial and financial capital for Alaska.

⁵²The Pacific and Arctic Railway and Navigation Company (incorporated in West Virginia) operated in American territory to the summit, the British Columbia Railway Company in British Columbia (May 8, 1897), and the British Yukon Mining Trading and Transportation Company (June 29, 1897) in the Yukon. Innis, *Settlement and Mining Frontier*, p. 213.

⁵³Report of Superintendent Z. T. Wood of the North West Mounted Police, 1900, in Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1901, No. 38a, p. 5.

for the Canadian cities, however, the population of the Yukon declined steadily in the next decade as individual prospectors were displaced by highly capitalized mining concerns.⁵⁴

Vancouver's inability to capture a larger share of the Klondike trade in 1897-98 can be accounted for primarily by its lack of a substantial, Vancouver-based line of steamers and its heavy dependence on vessels that started their voyage in San Francisco, Seattle, or Victoria. American economic dominance of the Yukon Valley and the contacts, knowledge, and experience gained by Seattle in the years before 1897 also played a part. It is also significant that 65 to 80 per cent of the prospectors in the Canadian Yukon were Americans. A careful count of Dawson City in 1899 showed 3,205 Americans out of a population of 4,445.⁵⁵ Whereas Canada's Dominion Day on July 1 was virtually ignored, the Glorious Fourth of July saw an immense celebration that lasted the entire day. Most of these Americans in the Yukon outfitted in an American city, usually Seattle; few but British subjects chose to outfit in Vancouver or Victoria.⁵⁶

Although Vancouver never threatened Seattle's early dominance, the response of the Canadian city to this economic opportunity was nevertheless remarkably similar to that of its American rival. The awareness of the stakes involved, the general publicity and advertising campaign, the appeals to the federal government for assistance, and the willingness to use questionable tactics were quite like the reaction of Seattle. The only real difference was one of degree. The Vancouver business community never matched the commitment of its Seattle counterpart to the task at hand. Canadian businessmen worked hard, yet the sense of urgency that permeated the Seattle scene was never quite as intense in British Columbia. On August 14, 1897, the editor of the *Province*, warning prospective miners of the difficulties and dangers inherent in

⁵⁴The population of the Yukon in 1901 was 27,219, by 1911 it had declined to 8,512, and by 1921 to 4,157.

⁵⁵In addition there were 645 from Canada, 208 from England, 69 from Scotland, 65 from France, 48 from Ireland, 46 from Germany, 39 from Sweden, and 120 others. Report of the Superintendent of the North West Mounted Police, 1899, in Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1900, No. 15, p. 54.

⁵⁶Of fourteen volumes of personal reminiscences investigated, in every case but two, Americans bought their supplies in the United States, British and Canadians in Canada. These volumes were: T. Adney, *The Klondike Stampede* (New York, 1900); L. A. Craig, *Glimpses of Sunshine and Shade* (Cincinnati, 1900); M. L. Davis, *Sourdough Gold* (Boston, 1933); L. Day, *Tragedy of the Klondike* (New York, 1906); W. B. Haskell, *Two Years in the Klondike* (Hartford, 1898); M. E. Hitchcock, *Two Women in the Klondike* (New York, 1899); R. D. Medill, *Klondike Diary* (Portland, 1949); C. Margeson, *Experience of Gold Hunters in Alaska* (Hornellsville, N.Y., 1899); M. MacGowan, *The Hard Road to the Klondike* (London, 1962); E. McElwaine, *Land of Gold* (Chicago, 1901); J. M. Price, *From Euston to Klondike* (London, 1898); J. H. E. Secretan, *To Klondike and Back* (London, 1898); S. Tollernache, *Reminiscences of the Yukon* (London, 1912); E. Tyrrell, *I Was There* (Toronto, 1939).

a trip to the Klondike pointed out, "there is plenty of time . . . the gold won't run away. It has been there for several million years already, and will no doubt wait a month or two longer." No such cautious sentiments came from Seattle in the summer of 1897.

Historians recognize that both national and city economies were stimulated by the gold rush of the 'nineties, yet the importance of this rush in the urban growth of west coast communities can be easily overestimated. Seattle, the unquestioned leader in the Alaska-Yukon trade, grew significantly. It had 42,837 residents in 1890, grew steadily in the early part of the decade, and spurted in the late 1890s to reach 80,671 by 1900. For the decade as a whole its population rose by about 88 per cent.⁵⁷ Tacoma, on the other hand, had very little gold rush business and virtually stagnated in the 1890s, its population creeping from 36,006 to 37,714. On the basis of the Seattle-Tacoma example it would appear that the Alaska-Yukon trade was the dominant factor in the growth of the state of Washington's urban communities.

Yet when we look further afield the picture changes. Portland and Vancouver, neither of which had seriously challenged Seattle's control of the gold rush trade, both grew at a faster rate in the 1890s than did Seattle. Portland rose from 46,385 to 90,426, a 95 per cent increase, while Vancouver went from 13,709 to 27,010, a 97 per cent increase. At the same time Spokane, which had only the slightest of connections with gold rush, grew from 19,921 to 36,848, and Los Angeles jumped from 50,395 to 102,497. San Francisco and Victoria both of which had done considerable business in the 1897-8 rush only increased by 15 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. It seems reasonable to conclude that the rush of the 1890s helped establish Seattle as the dominant city on Puget Sound. Yet for most Pacific coast cities Horace Greeley's old advice, "Go West, young man, go West," was probably a more significant factor in their growth than was the Klondike gold rush.

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City	Population		Increase 1890-1900	
	1890	1900	Number	%
Los Angeles	50,395	102,497	52,102	103
San Francisco	298,997	342,782	43,785	15
Portland	46,385	90,426	44,041	95
Tacoma	36,006	37,714	1,708	5
Seattle	42,837	80,671	37,834	88
Spokane	19,921	36,848	16,927	85
Vancouver	13,709	27,010	13,301	97
Victoria	16,841	20,919	4,078	24

U.S. Census 1900, Population, Vol. I, Pt. 1, pp. 430-2; *Census of Canada 1891, 1901, Population*. The data for Vancouver and Victoria are for 1891 and 1901.

Charles Inglis and his “Primitive Bishoprick” in Nova Scotia

JUDITH FINGARD

A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT of the Church of England in the maritime colonies of British North America during the years following the Loyalist immigration of the 1780s necessarily entails a thorough examination of the character and effectiveness of the first resident bishop. Yet the career of Bishop Charles Inglis has been persistently neglected by scholars, and the numerous minor works which briefly describe his episcopate constitute a plethora of superficial and inaccurate generalizations. These prosaic accounts, together with the cursory references to Inglis in general religious and social histories, have usually been uncritical¹ and have tended to portray the first bishop of Nova Scotia as an eminently capable, and even outstanding, church leader.

The origin of this traditional estimate can be traced to the eulogies of W. S. Perry in the 1880s which extolled Inglis as an exceptional prelate who

proved himself to be a missionary apostle by the wisdom of his charges and sermons, and the magnetism of his personal interest in each one who had been placed under him in the Lord. In long and most wearisome visitations he visited, so far as was in his power, the various portions of his almost illimitable See, and till the close of a long and honoured life he maintained that character for devotion, that reputation for holiness, that fervour of ministrations, that faithfulness in every good word and work, which should characterise the “good man,” “full of the Holy Ghost and of faith.”²

¹H. H. Walsh took his cue from S. D. Clark in criticizing Inglis for his failure to understand the need for “social reorganization” in Nova Scotia after the American Revolution. Walsh, *The Christian Church in Canada* (Toronto, 1956), p. 106; Clark, *Church and Sect in Canada* (Toronto, 1948), chap. 2.

²W. S. Perry, *A Missionary Apostle. A Sermon preached in Westminster Abbey, Friday, August 12, 1887, on the occasion of the Centenary of the Consecration of Charles Inglis, D.D. First Bishop of Nova Scotia* (London, 1887), pp. 10–11.

Perry's laudatory and largely unsubstantiated assessment was uncritically endorsed by subsequent historians of the Anglican Church. Inglis has accordingly been represented as possessing an "indefatigable nature"³ and exhibiting "an apostolic zeal unusual to an eighteenth-century prelate."⁴ R. V. Harris, his biographer of the 1930s, concluded that Inglis was "a man of vision, far-sighted in his outlook upon life, and possessed of a deep insight into human character," endowed with "seer-like qualities of mind, which enabled him to penetrate into the future, and to discern the needs of the country long before they were apparent to the ordinary mind."⁵

Bishop Inglis' estimable reputation has been created and preserved by undue emphasis, firstly, on his role as the founder of King's College, the earliest chartered university in British North America, but an institution which in fact floundered during his episcopate as a result of an exclusionist policy and improvident management, and, secondly, on the missionary zeal and administrative proficiency naturally expected of the first colonial bishop. A closer scrutiny, however, of the extent to which Inglis actually possessed the qualities of leadership attributed to him by later writers suggests the need for some modification of the traditional assessment if a true appreciation of the character and significance of his episcopate is to be reached. A full appraisal would involve numerous considerations, but the present article will concentrate on two questions that seem particularly crucial: Inglis' attitude and response to the prevailing religious situation in Nova Scotia, the colony which he considered the centre of his diocesan operations, and his capabilities as an ecclesiastical administrator. It is hoped that an evaluation along these lines of Inglis' qualities and success as a church leader will suggest more substantial grounds on which to judge his spiritual and administrative achievements in the years between 1787 and 1816 than the mere fact that he was the first colonial bishop.

I

An examination of Inglis' episcopate must begin with a brief reference to certain influences which effectively shaped his approach to the problems facing the Church of England in Nova Scotia. By the time he embarked on an episcopal career, his outlook and social philosophy had already been profoundly affected by a long pastoral experience in America before and during the Revolution. While he was stationed at Dover, Delaware, in the years between 1758 and 1765, the young Irish-

³R. V. Harris, *Charles Inglis, Missionary, Loyalist, Bishop (1734-1816)* (Toronto, 1937), p. 139; P. Carrington, *The Anglican Church in Canada, A History* (Toronto, 1963), p. 48.

⁴Walsh, *Christian Church in Canada*, p. 107.

⁵Harris, *Inglis*, p. 141. It should be noted that Harris' biography was the combined work of Harris, C. M. Serson, and F. W. Vroom, and expressed their collaborated views.

man gained the reputation for being an energetic and conscientious clergyman, whose youthful enthusiasm was occasionally interpreted as evidence of Methodist leanings.⁶ A move to Trinity Church, New York, as curate in 1765 from the backwater of Pennsylvania enabled him to indulge a fondness for material comforts, a trait not unusual in clergymen of his day, and thereafter as curate and later rector he evinced impeccable Anglican attitudes. His energies soon found a new outlet in pamphleteering, as he stoutly defended the British and Anglican position during the years of growing discord and open hostilities between England and the colonies.⁷ By the end of the American war, however, Inglis had reached his fiftieth year and his energies had waned with the defeat of the cause he had espoused and under the strain of domestic grief occasioned by the deaths of his elder son and his second wife. Moreover, in England during the mid-1780s he was bitterly attacked in print by Samuel Peters of Connecticut who endeavoured to blemish Inglis' character while vying with him for the appointment as first bishop of Nova Scotia.⁸

Apart from personal disappointments, the events of the revolutionary era gave explicit definition to Inglis' ideas on the relationship of church and state, the connection between religion and society, and the role of the English church in the colonies. One lasting effect of the Revolution was that it greatly strengthened his conservative views on the nature of colonial society. He believed that from the beginning English institutions and customs had been transplanted to the American colonies because emigrants were in "a continuous state of society, before, during, and after their emigration."⁹ For Inglis the British constitution and way of life represented absolute perfection, and throughout the rest of his career he refused to acknowledge the slightest necessity for political or social change.¹⁰ Although he was forced to accept the Americans'

⁶V. H. Paltsits, ed., "Journal of Benjamin Mifflin, the Record of a Tour from Philadelphia to Delaware and Maryland July 26 to August 14, 1762," *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, June, 1935, p. 17; C. M. Serson, "Charles Inglis First Bishop of Nova Scotia," *American Church Monthly*, Nov., 1937, pp. 218-19.

⁷For a documentary discussion of Inglis' career in America, see J. W. Lydekker, *The Life and Letters of Charles Inglis* (London, 1936). On his role as a Tory pamphleteer, W. H. Nelson, *The American Tory* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 74, 150-1, 185-6. On the character of his churchmanship, C. Bridenbaugh, *Mitre and Sceptre: Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas, Personalities, and Politics, 1689-1775* (New York, 1962), chaps. 9-12 *passim*.

⁸For a discussion of the events preceding the appointment of the bishop, see J. Fingard, "The Establishment of the First English Colonial Episcopate," *Dalhousie Review*, XLVII (winter, 1968), 483-9.

⁹Nelson, *American Tory*, p. 185; C. Inglis, *The True Interest of America impartially stated, in certain strictures on a pamphlet intituled Common Sense* (Philadelphia, 1776), p. 14.

¹⁰Inglis used the argument that anything new was unnecessary as a basis of his opposition in 1800 to the proposed liberalization of the marriage laws and in 1813 to the introduction into Nova Scotia of the British and Foreign Bible Society. See Inglis to Moore, 26 July 1800, Lambeth Palace Library, SR 176, SPG MSS, Box 7, and

rejection of this invaluable heritage, he considered that it should be fostered throughout British North America. Both an emphasis on this continuity and a desire to promote the pattern of English society in the colonies made him unwilling to adapt the attitudes, forms, and services of the episcopal church to the needs and peculiarities of a situation in Nova Scotia which did differ noticeably from the societies of both England and Loyalist New York.¹¹

A further effect of the American Revolution on Inglis' attitudes was that, like his Tory contemporaries, he associated dissent in religion with disloyalty in politics. He believed that the leading revolutionaries had been dissenters, and he even claimed that one of their objectives had been the abolition of the Church of England.¹² Inglis thereafter regarded the church as a powerful instrument for ensuring the loyalty of the inhabitants in the remaining colonies to the imperial connection. Even at a time when dissenters formed a significant element in the society of Nova Scotia and the rest of British North America, he continued to frown on dissent as a potential instigator of civil disorder and persisted in describing religious revivalism as fanaticism. In 1799 the bishop was able to write with assurance that

experience has uniformly evinced that fanaticism leads directly to infidelity; & that it has a malignant influence on the principles of even those who have not been drawn into its vortex. For many are hereby led to consider all religion as a mere illusion. Fanatics are impatient under civil restraint, & run into the democratic system. They are for Leveling [*sic*] every thing both sacred & civil; & this is peculiarly the case of our New Lights, who are as far as I can learn, Democrats to a man—the Methodists will probably fall into the same plan.¹³

It is clear, therefore, that as a result of his experiences during the American Revolution, Bishop Inglis entertained certain prejudiced and illiberal preconceptions concerning the nature of colonial society and the character of religious dissent, while the optimism and energies of his youth had given way to disillusion and growing infirmities.

The political and social upheavals of the French Revolution exerted a significant and enduring influence on Inglis' attitudes after he became bishop. Events in France, and especially the advocacy of democratic principles, reinforced the bishop's distrust of nonconformity and change and provided grist for his Tory mill. He attributed the overthrow of the established institutions of church and state to an excess of political

John Inglis' summary of his father's position on the Bible Society in the *Acadian Recorder*, 11 Dec. 1813.

¹¹For a general discussion of religious and social development in late eighteenth-century Nova Scotia, see M. W. Armstrong, *The Great Awakening in Nova Scotia, 1776-1809* (Hartford, 1948), and Clark, *Church and Sect in Canada*, chaps. 1, 2, 4.

¹²Inglis to Hind, 31 Oct. 1776, Archives of the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, London (SPG), B MSS, Vol. 2, No. 68.

¹³Inglis to Bailey, 3 April 1799, Public Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS), Bailey Papers, Vol. 3.

radicalism and irreligion, and this explanation confirmed his views on the importance of religion as an agency for preserving the *status quo* and on the role of an established church as the partner of government and a guarantee against civil discord:

Government and Religion are therefore the pillars, as it were, on which society rests, and by which it is upheld; remove these, and the fabric sinks into ruin. . . .

. . . there is a close connection between that duty which we owe to God, and the duty we owe to the King, and to others in authority under him. So intimate is this connection, that they can scarcely be separated. Whoever is sincerely religious towards God, from principle and conscience, will also, from principle and conscience, be loyal to his earthly Sovereign, obedient to the laws, and faithful to the government which God hath placed over him.¹⁴

The French Revolution made an even greater impact on Inglis' outlook because it occurred at a time when the nonconformist churches in Nova Scotia were making notable progress in comparison with the faltering appeal of the Church of England after its promising opportunities in the 1780s. The bishop was inclined to draw a loose parallel between the revolutionary movement in France and the threat which the success of the "fanaticism" displayed by the dissenting sects in the colony appeared to present to the position of the local church. This is not to suggest that Inglis' outlook and attitudes were different from those of the majority of his contemporary churchmen, but Nova Scotia was neither a typical English diocese nor a traditional Anglican environment, and it is these circumstances which give particular significance to his ideas.

But if Inglis' impressions of the American and French Revolutions shaped many of his opinions, his actual policies as bishop were equally determined by more urgent considerations of the moment, and in particular by his individualistic interpretation of the religious situation in the diocese. On his arrival in Nova Scotia the two considerations which most concerned him as spiritual leader were the large dissenting population and the prevailing state of indifference towards the Church of England which he called "lukewarmness." Although Inglis was not

¹⁴C. Inglis, *Steadfastness in Religion and Loyalty recommended, in a Sermon, preached before the Legislature of His Majesty's province of Nova-Scotia in the Parish Church of St. Paul at Halifax, on Sunday, April 7, 1793* (Halifax, 1793), pp. 6, 28. See also C. Inglis, *A Charge delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Nova-Scotia, at the Triennial Visitation holden in June and August, 1803* (Halifax, 1804), p. 23. It is not surprising that Inglis also considered it the duty of every citizen to support the established constitution of his country, and this precept applied particularly in the case of the hallowed British constitution. "To resist innovations in such a Constitution, is an evident duty. For if any are discontented under it, if they are restless and given to change: The cause must be sought in their own bosom, and not in the Constitution. Instead of its bending to them, and changing to suit their interested or wanton purposes; they ought in reason and conscience to conform to it, and live peaceably under it." *Steadfastness* . . . , p. 30.

unaccustomed to living amongst nonconformists, he had apparently assumed that a vast majority of the Loyalists in Nova Scotia would be church people¹⁵ and that these immigrants would have arrived in sufficient numbers to overwhelm the earlier dissenting elements which already existed in "a settlement made up of foreigners bred in other churches."¹⁶ At the same time, Inglis had not fully realized, or taken the trouble to ascertain, the extent to which the population of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was in the throes of a widespread evangelical revival which threatened to undermine the appeal of the traditional churches. The obvious success of itinerant Newlight and Methodist preachers and the sustained expansion of the evangelical sects distressed the new bishop, and he continued to regard them as a threat to ordered religious and civil government. As late as 1811 Inglis was still apprehensive:

Swarms of Teachers, who are ignorant, low and fanatical to a degree that is scarcely credible, infest every district. . . . Their wild notions are imbibed, which militate against Order both in Church and State. The minds of people are hereby perverted, and prejudiced against our excellent Church. One of these Teachers lately declared to a large Congregation—that *Infant Baptism and Confirmation were invented in Hell*. Judge what impression must be made on the ignorant multitude by such asseverations when uttered with the usual accompaniments—a violent zeal—intrepidity of countenance, and great exertion of lungs. For my part I shudder at the probable consequences of such a state of things, if continued. I see, in their embryo, the same state which produced the subversion of Church and State in the time of Charles I.¹⁷

The basic obstacle to the successful pursuit of active and practical methods for promoting the welfare of the church and expanding its popular appeal was that widespread indifference towards the church which Inglis distinguished amongst the inhabitants of Nova Scotia.¹⁸ The bishop regretfully noted that his institutionalized brand of religion apparently had a very slender hold over the minds of the inhabitants, and he encountered amongst laity and clergy alike "a greater laxness in all ecclesiastical matters" than he had previously found in the American colonies. Although he was initially prepared to attribute this situation, in part at least, to the confusions resulting from the recent American war,¹⁹ he continued to express dismay at the existing state of the church: "I find a general and deplorable lukewarmness prevailing—a strong attachment to former usages, however wrong; and that those who are most indifferent about the practice of religion, are the readiest

¹⁵Inglis to Morice, 22 March 1805, PANS, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1798–1811, p. 147.

¹⁶Delaroche to SPG, 2 Aug. 1779, SPG, B MSS, Vol. 25, No. 232.

¹⁷Inglis to Morice, 26 Nov. 1811, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1808–14, p. 82.

¹⁸C. Inglis, *A Charge delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Nova Scotia, at the Primary Visitation holden in the town of Halifax, in the month of June 1788* (Halifax, 1789), p. 9.

¹⁹Inglis to Morice, 18 Dec. 1787, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787–91, p. 42.

to obstruct my measures for promoting it. This indeed is too much the case everywhere; but it is peculiarly unfortunate in a new country like this, where the little that can be done to serve the cause of religion depends so much on unanimity, and the joint exertion of all."²⁰

Bishop Inglis consistently attributed the inability of the church to expand its popular appeal to the shortage of Anglican clergy in the diocese and to the readiness with which many of them accepted with resignation the depressing state of religion, as reflected in both the apathy of Anglicans and the evangelical excesses of their rivals. "Instead of being checked by the reigning lukewarmness," the bishop urged his ministers, "Your ardour should be manifested the more to remove that evil. Instead of holding back when men who are influenced by Enthusiasm labour to pervert Your people; Your endeavours should be the more earnest and steady to prevent it, and to rescue Your flocks from delusion."²¹ The persistence of Inglis' criticisms of his clergy on this score suggests that he failed to appreciate that their indifference to some extent reflected a deep frustration at the success of dissenting preachers and a feeling of helplessness concerning the most effective means of combating the challenge of dissent in the absence of positive guidance from the bishop. One major reason for Inglis' failure to provide constructive suggestions and sympathetic encouragement for coping with the situation can be found in his faulty interpretation of the religious problem facing the church. He did not clearly appreciate that the apathy of the inhabitants towards the Church of England reflected their preference for the more appealing and emotional services of the dissenting sects which responded more directly to their spiritual tastes and needs. Some members of the church did understand this basic lack of communication. Before the appointment of the bishop, John Halliburton, an Anglican Loyalist and sometime colonial councillor, had recommended to officials in London that a "small Tincture of Enthusiasm might not be Amisss" in the personality of the new diocesan because of "the universal Preference which People of the National Religion in New England, seldom faill [*sic*] of giving to Missionaries of that Turn of Mind."²²

Bishop Inglis was not a man of "enthusiasm," however, and he entertained a deep suspicion of any undue display of religious emotion

²⁰Inglis to Moore, 1 March 1788, *ibid.*, p. 47. The prevailing indifference was particularly displayed in the unwillingness of church people to contribute financially towards the support of their ministers. C. Inglis, *A Charge delivered to the Clergy of Nova-Scotia, at the Triennial Visitation holden in the Town of Halifax, in the month of June 1791* (Halifax, 1792), p. 53n.; Inglis to Morice, 12 Nov. 1804, *Copies of Inglis Letters 1798-1811*, pp. 139-40.

²¹Inglis, *A Charge . . . 1791*, p. 22.

²²Halliburton to Nepean, [1783], Public Record Office, CO 217/35, f.340.

which he condemned as fanaticism. While he recognized the need to expand the popularity and influence of the church in the colony, he preferred to pursue this basic objective by the adoption of a cautious, conservative policy, comparing his pioneering prelacy to that of "a primitive Bishoprick" in the early Christian church.²³ He gave high priority to the augmentation of the number of missionaries serving in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, as far as the supply of available candidates would allow, and in the early years he placed great weight on the provision of suitable churches as the focus of Anglican worship in the local communities. In the confusion of the immediate post-revolutionary years the church was presented with an opportunity to increase its membership with the influx of new settlers, the paucity of religious services, and the shifts in religious affiliations. But if an initial expansion in popular support was to be maintained and consolidated at a time when further immigration was slight, the bishop and clergy had to win converts from other denominations or from the irreligious. In other words, the church had to meet the formidable challenge presented by the increasing popularity and zeal of the evangelical sects.

To compete successfully with Newlights, Baptists, Methodists, and the energetic Secessionist ministers of the Presbyterian Church meant adopting radical measures and fighting dissent with its own weapons: the use of lay readers, the promotion of itinerancy, and the adaptation of traditional forms and practices to the needs and tastes of various ethnic groups. Inglis did attempt to exploit the services of lay readers, a method of ministration which he considered essential in North America with its scattered settlements and shortage of ordained clergymen. But in London the members of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel strongly disapproved of this design, and Inglis' willing subservience to the missionary organization discouraged him from pursuing an independent course of action.²⁴ Lay readers, often SPG schoolmasters, were employed by individual ministers in Nova Scotia, but this practice was not officially endorsed or encouraged, and its benefits were therefore confined to those areas where it was adopted clandestinely.

Even less was done by the bishop to promote itinerancy. Very few of the clergy were apparently compulsive travellers or showed any interest in missionary activity in neighbouring localities beyond the vague boundaries of their missions where there were no resident ministers. Moreover, the salaries paid to the clergy in Nova Scotia by the

²³Inglis to Cumberland, 7 May 1788, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787-91, p. 62.

²⁴J. Inglis for the bishop to SPG, 10 June 1811, and Minutes of SPG Meeting, 18 Oct. 1811, SPG Journal 30, pp. 177-9.

SPG and the British government tended to be associated with a particular settlement rather than with the individual missionary. New missions were not established until the local congregation had agreed to comply with certain conditions—the erection of a church and parsonage, and the provision of a salary and glebe for the prospective minister. In return for the fulfilment of these obligations, the small core of conservative church people in the community tended to demand and expect the exclusive attention of their resident minister. Furthermore, the bishop himself did not encourage missionary enterprise or set an example of energetic travelling in his diocese. Certainly there is no truth in the assertion that, “with apostolic zeal, he was indefatigable in visiting the churches committed to his care.”²⁵

Moreover, in the campaign against dissent, Inglis generally refused to admit the need for any adaptation of the time-honoured practices of the church to accommodate the preferences of the inhabitants of Nova Scotia. Admittedly, no Church of England bishop, clergyman, or missionary society was going to condone wanton changes in ritual or rubric that would be inimical to the constitution of the church. Yet the appeal of the established church would undoubtedly have been widened if Anglican ministrations had been more closely adjusted to the particular needs of the country and if individual ministers had been allowed a greater latitude and discretion in these matters. Bishop Inglis, however, demanded conformity and uniformity from his clergy:

As Clergymen of the Church of England, You are under solemn engagements to conform to the Liturgy, Offices and Rubric contained in the *Book of Common Prayer*. . . . I am aware that difficulties may sometimes arise *here*, as in all new countries, in adhering to the directions of the Rubrics on certain points. But . . . I shall beg leave to observe in general with respect to such cases—that if a Clergyman makes it appear that he is actuated by a principle of conscience in conforming to the Rubrics—if he perseveres with temper and uniformity, and shews that his perseverance proceeds from a sense of duty, not from wilfulness, or a disobliging disposition: I am persuaded, from my own knowledge and experience, that he will in time surmount every difficulty.²⁶

The bishop's emphasis on conformity extended to such a seemingly minor matter as hymn singing. Indeed, when one clergyman dared to enrich the ceremonial of his local church by encouraging the use of Isaac Watts' psalms and popular American hymns, both bishop and SPG were up in arms.²⁷ While Inglis' individual supervision of the practices and eccentricities of his ministers may have been slight, the

²⁵Harris, *Inglis*, p. 139.

²⁶Inglis, *A Charge* . . . 1788, pp. 19–20.

²⁷Inglis to Morice, 7 March 1791, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787–91, p. 254; Inglis to SPG, 11 Oct. 1800, SPG Journal 28, p. 108; Morice to Twining, May 1801, SPG Letter Book, X.146, pp. 61–2.

uncompromising attitude of the conservative church people, who dominated the affairs of the established church in most communities and provided its financial patronage, even more effectively precluded the fruitful adaptation of traditional forms and practices. As far as the expansion of its popular appeal was concerned, the Church of England remained a missionary church only in name and financial constitution. Inglis always preferred to wait for the "slow hand of time" to resolve his difficulties,²⁸ and meanwhile he attempted to restrict the pernicious influence of dissent by the distribution of prayer books and religious tracts thoughtfully provided in large quantities by the SPG.

Faced with the continued progress of the nonconformist churches in Nova Scotia, and the difficulties created by a complicated system of ecclesiastical administration, Inglis concentrated his efforts on a jealous defence of the existing privileges of the established church against encroachments by the dissenting sects and against the development of a multiconfessional society in the colony. He considered it of paramount importance to uphold the church's exclusive rights to receive government grants for the stipends of missionaries and church building, to perform or regulate marriages, to acquire glebe and school lands, and to benefit from government aid to education. In 1800, for example, Inglis had to argue assiduously with colonial officials to preserve the exclusive right of Anglican clergymen to receive marriage licences issued by the lieutenant governor, and the following year he unsuccessfully challenged the validity of a marriage performed by a Baptist preacher.²⁹ At the beginning of his episcopate Inglis even discussed the possibility of securing the passage of an act in the local legislature to provide a more explicit legal statement of the rights and privileges of the established church than had been contained in the original act of 1758.³⁰ He soon discovered, however, that this proposal failed to take into account the sentiments of the large number of dissenters in the province and their representatives in the assembly. In these circumstances, Inglis reluctantly considered it politic to postpone further attempts to extend the existing legal establishment of the church in Nova Scotia.³¹ His decision undoubtedly contained an element of shrewd realism, but it equally reflected his innate caution, as well as a

²⁸Inglis to Moore, 18 Dec. 1788, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787-91, p. 123. See also, Inglis to Morice, 18 Dec. 1787, *ibid.*, p. 42.

²⁹Inglis to Moore, 26 July 1800, SR 176, SPG MSS, Box 7, and Wentworth to King, 15 Sept. 1800, PANS, MSS, Vol. 53; I. W. Wilson, *A Geography and History of the County of Digby, Nova Scotia* (Halifax, 1900), pp. 112-13, and J. Inglis to Moore, 28 Oct. 1801, SR 176, SPG MSS, Box 7.

³⁰Inglis to Moore, 16 Jan. 1788, and Inglis to Thomas Carleton, 24 Oct. 1789, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787-91, pp. 46, 170-1.

³¹Inglis to Grenville, 8 Sept. 1790, CO 217/72, f.43.

preoccupation with defending the church's exclusive privileges rather than with expanding its popular support.

Inglis' determination to uphold the privileged position of the church in a colony where the nonconformist sects were active and numerous was also illustrated by the duality of his attitude towards dissenters. Because he was bishop of an established church which was also a minority church, Inglis' conduct reflected the necessity of exhibiting, at least outwardly, a benevolent tolerance towards non-Anglicans. He accordingly advised his clergy to observe "a candid, brotherly and respectful behaviour" in their relations with nonconformists.³² His own personal contacts with dissenters in the province, especially in the early years of his episcopate, demonstrated a proclivity for conciliation. Inglis claimed that this considerate behaviour was the outcome of his experience in America. "My long and extensive acquaintance with the Americans," he explained in 1788, "enabled me to avoid in my conduct what would give them [dissenters] disgust and shock their prejudices. The whole secret lay in this, and in observing a candid and brotherly behaviour, and convincing them that the zealous discharge of my duty which did not in[ter]fere with them, was the only object I aimed at."³³

It is clear from his private correspondence, however, that Inglis expressed both an extreme disgust for many nonconformist practices and some very mistaken and exaggerated notions concerning the beliefs of the more enthusiastic dissenting sects. Instead of being able to understand the need of the inhabitants for emotional expression in religion rather than for "ritualistic formalism,"³⁴ he repeatedly denounced their ignorance and illiteracy.³⁵ Furthermore, as a true establishmentarian, the bishop's outward tolerance naturally had one significant qualification: he was insistent that dissenters and Catholics should gain no advantages which had hitherto belonged exclusively to the established church. In 1804, for example, he vehemently attacked the proposed foundation of a Roman Catholic seminary in Halifax. On this occasion he claimed that "no person is a sincerer friend to Liberty of Conscience than I am; but prudence & self-preservation forbid me to put a Sword in the hand of an enemy who will not fail to employ it against me."³⁶ In another instance Inglis resisted the development of a general practice of allowing government stipends to Presbyterian ministers, though he

³²Inglis, *A Charge* . . . 1788, p. 39.

³³Inglis to Cumberland, 26 Sept. 1788, *Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787-91*, p. 98a.

³⁴E. M. Saunders, *History of the Baptists of the Maritime Provinces* (Halifax, 1902), p. 121.

³⁵See Inglis to Morice, 16 Aug. 1799, *Copies of Inglis Letters, 1798-1811*, p. 35.

³⁶Inglis even objected to the Roman Catholic bishop of Quebec's jurisdiction over Catholics in the Anglican diocese of Nova Scotia. Inglis to Hobart, 16 Feb. 1804, CO 217/79, ff.167-8.

was quite prepared to countenance a grant to a particular Presbyterian clergyman as an act of individual benevolence. The bishop was even more insistent that funds for building churches and other privileges which implied more permanent support from government should be withheld from the Church of Scotland and limited exclusively to the established church.³⁷

It is true that Inglis expressed gratitude to dissenters, particularly in the opening years of his prelacy, for their willingness to allow Church of England clergymen, and indeed the bishop himself, to officiate in meeting houses in those communities where no suitable churches existed. But in 1814 he exhibited the insincerity of his earlier views and an unflattering narrowmindedness when he refused to allow a Presbyterian congregation to hold an ordination in one of the parish churches, on the ground that such a concession might establish a dangerous precedent.³⁸ This lack of genuine benevolence towards dissenters, and even those of the more traditional variety like Presbyterians, was largely a reflection of Inglis' defensive position as head of a privileged, though minority, institution and it was not at all unusual in churchmen of his day. Nevertheless, it can be considered extremely unimaginative in the circumstances of Nova Scotia and unfortunate for the future. It did not produce any worthwhile benefits or contribute to the popularity of the church in the province, but it did serve to foster interdenominational struggles, particularly in the field of education.

II

If Inglis, the spiritual leader, had become discouraged by and resigned to the prevailing religious situation in Nova Scotia by the mid-1790s, his effectiveness as a diocesan administrator had meanwhile been undermined by the minimal powers he was granted to perform his episcopal task and by his own cautious and retiring personality. The bishopric established in Nova Scotia in 1787 was intended to be an experiment in limited episcopacy. The bishop was not granted any temporal or civil authority, as in such matters as the issue of marriage licences and the probate of wills, because the imperial government considered that purely ecclesiastical powers would successfully enable him to discharge his primary task of strengthening the spiritual and political influence of the colonial church. Inglis was therefore authorized to confirm willing laity, to ordain, institute, licence, supervise, and discipline his clergy, and to hold visitations. Diocesan administrative duties were to devolve on the bishop alone and no provision was made

³⁷Inglis to Moore, 3 Oct. 1791, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787-91, p. 272.

³⁸J. Inglis to King, 20 June 1814, *ibid.*, 1808-14, p. 145.

for the establishment of a truly hierarchical ecclesiastical system with archdeacons, dean, and chapter. The bishop was also expected to work closely with the civil authorities in the colony and in England, as well as with the SPG, and, perhaps to ensure his co-operation, his salary was entirely paid from London. At the same time Inglis was not endowed with the right of presentation to livings or any of the ecclesiastical patronage that had hitherto rested with the governor, the SPG, or local congregations according to colonial statutes and precedents.³⁹ The British government was clearly anxious neither to offend colonial traditions or the sensibilities of local officials and Anglican inhabitants, nor to alienate the goodwill of dissenters whose freedom of worship and statutory exemption from providing financial support for the established church under the act of 1758 were scrupulously preserved.

This experiment in limited episcopacy represented a drastic decentralization rather than a consolidation of colonial church government and produced a debilitating division of ecclesiastical authority. The responsibilities of the bishop touched upon and overlapped the existing rights of the lieutenant governor and the SPG in many administrative matters. Consequently, considerable friction and disharmony initially developed after Inglis assumed his duties in Nova Scotia and began to handle affairs which were claimed either by the lieutenant governor or by the society as their concerns and which they had grown accustomed to deciding. Inglis experienced a particularly difficult struggle with John Parr until the lieutenant governor's death in 1791. Controversies over presentation to livings, institution to benefices, and control of government funds for church purposes therefore clouded the early years of Inglis' episcopate.

At the same time, the bishop had good reason for his bitter complaints that in his conflict with Parr the SPG failed to give him the vigorous support in the exercise of his jurisdiction that he might reasonably have expected.⁴⁰ Indeed, in matters of mission organization the distant society showed a singular unwillingness on many occasions to accept the bishop's recommendations, and the petulant attitude of William Morice, the society's secretary, adversely affected the smooth functioning of ecclesiastical administration during the first decade of the episcopate.⁴¹ Meanwhile Inglis carefully avoided the adoption of an independent course of action on the issues in dispute, because he was extremely reluctant to alienate the goodwill of the SPG. This tactful policy undoubtedly contributed to the growth of more cordial and

³⁹Copy of the bishop's commission can be found in PANS, MSS, Vol. 433.

⁴⁰Inglis to Moore, 5 Jan. 1791, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787-91, p. 248.

⁴¹Hans Cnattningius first delineated the strained relations between Inglis and Morice in *Bishops and Societies: A Study of Anglican Colonial and Missionary Expansion, 1698-1850* (London, 1952), pp. 30-7.

co-operative relations between bishop and society by the late 1790s as the SPG grew accustomed to sharing its responsibilities, and the now acute problem of obtaining additional clergy gave them a new identity of purpose.

Moreover, Inglis was able to establish more harmonious relations with Lieutenant Governors Wentworth, Prevost, and Sherbrooke. The bishop's authority in ecclesiastical affairs had become recognized and accepted, and Parr's successors were generally willing to follow Inglis' lead in church matters, while remaining at least outwardly sympathetic to the welfare of the establishment. At the same time the bishop's frequent and prolonged absences from Halifax after 1795 considerably reduced the likelihood of friction between the heads of church and state in the colony.⁴² The development of more co-operative relations was, however, only the first step towards a more orderly, but still complex, system of ecclesiastical government. It is therefore patently untrue to claim that "administrative order . . . was provided by the appointment of a bishop."⁴³

The limitations placed on Inglis' authority by the terms of his commission and the need to share administrative responsibilities were further accentuated by his character and personality. Throughout his episcopate Charles Inglis acted as an extremely cautious, reserved, and weak-willed administrator. Despite his dissatisfaction with the prevailing "lukewarmness" and religious nonconformity in the province, and despite his frequent appeals to the clergy to labour to improve the discouraging situation, Inglis himself did not display a dynamic approach to the problems of the church in his diocese. His innate caution stemmed partly from an awareness that his task as the first bishop in British North America would not be an easy one. He would have to superimpose his ecclesiastical authority over a church which was unaccustomed to a bishop and over a number of diverse colonies. Moreover, he was initially apprehensive of encountering or arousing opposition to his new office from disgruntled laity or resentful clergy, and there is little reason for regarding him as the congenital optimist he had reputedly been during the American Revolution.⁴⁴ Inglis considered himself essentially a pioneer whose primary task was to remove obstacles to the future progress of the church and prepare the way for his successors.⁴⁵ Yet in

⁴²For a discussion of some of the early problems in administration created by the appointment of Inglis, and particularly the bishop's relations with Parr and the SPG, see J. Fingard, "Administrative Relationships in the Church of England in Nova Scotia, 1787-1816," *Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society*, XXV (1966), 53-78.

⁴³Carrington, *Anglican Church in Canada*, p. 47.

⁴⁴See Nelson, *American Tory*, p. 163. Inglis to Mountain, 5 May 1794, Quebec Museum, Quebec Diocesan Archives, Series C, Mountain Papers, Vol. 1, No. 16.

⁴⁵Inglis to Moore, 1 March 1788, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787-91, p. 48.

the pursuit of this objective he showed little of the enterprising and resolute spirit required of a pioneer.

This caution was also a reflection of a certain aloofness in Inglis' character which discouraged him from active participation in local politics. He was of course unable to maintain a complete detachment from governmental affairs, and after the turn of the century his indifference waned to some extent under the encouragement of his son, John, and out of a concern for the position of his successor in office. Until this time, for example, the bishop had shown no desire to obtain a seat on the colonial council, apparently because he did not consider an appointment during pleasure a sufficiently respectable form of tenure for an Anglican prelate.⁴⁶ But in 1805 he confided to Bishop Jacob Mountain of Quebec that "I have hitherto declined a seat in our Council which could have been easily obtained. Yet it might be proper & of much benefit if my Successors should be Members of Council."⁴⁷ Even after he had assumed his responsibilities as councillor in 1809, however, Inglis attended irregularly and showed no greater eagerness for participation in the daily concerns of provincial politics.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the fact that the destinies of the church in Nova Scotia at this crucial period were guided by this type of leader did have one advantage: the likelihood of sectarian controversy and bitter conflict in the relations between church and state was largely avoided. Inglis refused to become a dominant personality in colonial society, and by so doing, he preserved the established church from political and social involvements which might otherwise have disturbed the tranquillity of the local scene to the greater disadvantage of the church.⁴⁹ As a quiet, withdrawn individual who preferred to avoid controversy, it might even be suggested that Inglis' principal aim was to enjoy the emoluments of his office. Indeed, there is some evidence to indicate that he viewed his position as a comfortable means of retirement which the British government owed him for his loyalty and losses in the Revolution, rather than as an opportunity to promote Anglicanism in the colonies.⁵⁰

Inglis' cautious approach to his task also suggests a feeling of insecurity. This lack of confidence in his own judgment and initiative

⁴⁶Inglis to Mountain, 20 March 1796, Mountain Papers, Vol. 1, No. 77.

⁴⁷Inglis to Mountain, 19 Oct. 1805, *ibid.*, Vol. 4, No. 91.

⁴⁸Inglis attended only half the council meetings between 1809 and 1812, and none thereafter. Council Minutes, PANS, MSS, Vols. 214, 214½.

⁴⁹S. Whiteside refers to the absence of church and state controversy in "Colonial Adolescence: A Study of the Maritime Colonies of British North America, 1790-1814," M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1965, p. 77, but fails to suggest the reason for this harmony, which can be attributed essentially to Inglis' personality and policy.

⁵⁰Inglis to Brook Watson & Co., 24 Feb. 1797, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1791-99, pp. 99-100; Inglis to White, 8 April 1797, quoted in W. S. Perry, "The First Bishop of Nova Scotia," *Church Review*, L (Sept., 1887), 358.

stemmed initially from apprehensions concerning the reception which would be accorded the new bishopric in Nova Scotia, and was thereafter maintained by the continued unsatisfactory state of the church in a colony heavily populated by dissenters. The bishop's wariness was particularly shown in a reluctance to act independently in the performance of his duties. He was quite prepared to submit to the administrative supervision and guidance of the SPG, sometimes to the disadvantage of his episcopal authority or the welfare of the church. Moreover, for almost twenty years between 1787 and 1805 Inglis relied heavily on the sympathetic advice and support of John Moore, archbishop of Canterbury, and the strength of Moore's influence over the deliberations of the SPG, of which he was an active president, and his proximity to the British government. Since Inglis was to all intents and purposes an American without many influential connections in England, he felt that Moore's patronage was essential if the interests of the colonial bishopric were not to be ignored or neglected in London. Inglis successfully appealed to the archbishop on numerous occasions to change decisions of the society, to intercede with government to preserve the church's privileges or secure financial aid for King's College and church building, and to protect episcopal authority when it was challenged by lieutenant governor or clergy.⁵¹ Co-operation with the authorities in England and in the colony to the degree of submission was therefore Inglis' chosen method of rendering the episcopate an acceptable institution and preserving harmony amongst the various parties involved in the administration and spiritual work of the colonial church.

Inglis' lack of administrative initiative and self-assertion had its most unfortunate repercussions in his relations with the clergy in the diocese. Since he was not "an asserter of high Episcopal prerogative," the bishop hesitated to exert his authority, particularly over the senior clergymen, trusting rather to the moral force of precept, example, and brotherly love.⁵² In practice, however, sympathetic concern was no substitute for clerical discipline, nor did it provide the individual minister with sufficient encouragement and active guidance in the difficult task of extending the appeal of the church and meeting the challenge of dissent in the local communities. Although Inglis met the missionaries of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick at visitations and on infrequent diocesan tours and probably corresponded with most of them from time to time, he made no attempt to develop close and co-operative relations between himself and his subordinates, or to foster an *esprit de corps*. Moreover, the interference of the SPG in matters of mission organization did nothing

⁵¹See, for example, Inglis to Moore, 26 Nov. 1791, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1791-99, pp. 13-14.

⁵²Inglis to White, 4 Aug. 1788, quoted in Perry, "The First Bishop of Nova Scotia," pp. 350-1.

to strengthen Inglis' tenuous authority over the clergy.⁵³ In many respects the missionaries continued to owe their first loyalty to the distant society, which paid their allowances and was not in a position to supervise their activities. S. D. Clark has aptly illustrated the ambiguities and paradox of this situation. Here was a colonial bishop who was supposed to have the power to exercise complete authority over the clergy, and yet the continuance of a missionary society in an episcopal system automatically restricted his effective leadership. "Thus, while in principle the Church was authoritarian in character, in practice the centralization of control in England meant that the individual missionaries in the colonies were free of almost any control."⁵⁴

The rudimentary system of ecclesiastical administration in British North America also tended to preclude the effective exercise of episcopal authority. The lack of assistance at the supervisory level positively restricted the scope and immediacy of the bishop's disciplinary control over the activities of his clergymen. In England archdeacons considerably relieved the weight of a bishop's routine administrative duties. In New Brunswick Inglis always had an ecclesiastical commissary to act as intermediary between bishop and clergy and to assist him by holding annual visitations in that colony. But in Nova Scotia he felt unable to afford assistance, and it was not until 1802 that the government approved the appointment of his son as secretary and ecclesiastical commissary for Nova Scotia. Certainly the bishop had to administer a large diocese, which initially included Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, and Quebec. In theory, therefore, he should have had very little time available to supervise personally the activities of individual clergymen in any one of the colonies.

In actual fact, however, Inglis spent a surprisingly small proportion of his time on diocesan duties beyond mainland Nova Scotia. During the first few years of his episcopate he attempted to acquaint himself with the extent and problems of his see by travelling in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Quebec. After his diocese was reduced in size in 1793 with the appointment of the bishop of Quebec, however, Inglis' travels outside Nova Scotia and New Brunswick virtually ceased. During his episcopate he never visited Newfoundland and, indeed, completely ignored church affairs in that colony. He paid a single visit to Prince Edward Island in 1789, and only once did he enter the colony of Cape Breton, and that was not until 1805.⁵⁵ Moreover, he never travelled to

⁵³See Inglis to SPG, 12 Nov. 1794, and Minutes of SPG Meeting, 16 Jan. 1795, SPG Journal 26, pp. 288-90, 294-5.

⁵⁴Clark, *Church and Sect in Canada*, p. 76.

⁵⁵There is some evidence to suggest that Inglis heartily disliked sea travel. Inglis to Dorchester, 27 Dec. 1787, and Inglis to Moore, 5 Jan. 1791, Copies of Inglis Letters, 1787-91, pp. 29-30, 251.

the Guysborough or Yarmouth missions in Nova Scotia, or to St. Andrews in New Brunswick. In the latter province Inglis strictly confined himself to the St. John River Valley, and not even the repeated urgings of the Reverend Samuel Andrews could persuade the bishop to visit the St. Andrews parish.⁵⁶ It is even more surprising that communities close to Halifax were neglected by the bishop. The Reverend William Walter of Shelburne expressed his resentment of Inglis' remissness in 1789 when he wrote: "We have been expecting the Bishop to assist in opening our New Church, but the Season is far advanced, voyaging upon [the] Coast is dangerous, and great men should be careful not to expose themselves lest the affairs of the world should stand still by their Loss or Sickness."⁵⁷ Inglis did visit Shelburne in 1790, but the seaport did not entertain the bishop again until 1807, despite the existence of serious discontent with the resident clergyman.⁵⁸ If Inglis did not in fact visit some local settlements or the more distant parts of his diocese with any frequency, its excessive extent cannot be used as a legitimate excuse for his failure to superintend energetically the affairs of the church in Nova Scotia.

In this as in many other spheres of ecclesiastical responsibility, Inglis remained too cautious an administrator to take the direction of missionary efforts and clerical discipline under his exclusive control, though his appointment had been specifically designed for that purpose. He was always fearful of offending the lieutenant governor, giving the clergy grounds for dissatisfaction, or alienating the goodwill of the society. Inglis tried to preserve harmonious relations amongst all these parties by staying slightly aloof from everyday church affairs and becoming involved only when the rights of the established church needed protection. For this reason the SPG was able to exercise much the same authority in Nova Scotia as it had before 1787, and, as a result, the clergy seldom had occasion to apply to the bishop for advice. This arrangement was Inglis' deliberate choice. A more forceful man might have ignored the society, but the need for its continued financial aid, and Inglis' own long association with the society, guided him away from a course of administrative independence.

From 1796 onwards the bishop appears to have lost almost all interest in active episcopal responsibilities. In that year he moved from Halifax to a country residence near Aylesford on the pretext that this would

⁵⁶The minister admitted in 1795 that the settlement was too remote to render the bishop's journey practicable, and this fact did "shew the need of a resident Bishop in this Province." Andrews to Morice, 12 Oct. 1795, SPG, C MSS, New Brunswick.

⁵⁷Walter to Bailey, 11 Nov. 1789, Bailey Papers, Vol. 3.

⁵⁸For appeals to the bishop against the Rev. Thomas Rowland, see Four Shelbourne JPs to Inglis, 18 April 1803, and S. Campbell to Inglis, 5 July 1803, PANS, White Collection, Vol. 7.

be a more central location for his diocese.⁵⁹ In practice, however, this move simply made him even more inaccessible at a time when, according to one minister, Inglis was "by no means a popular Character."⁶⁰ For over twelve years the bishop farmed, worried about King's College, and engaged in literary pursuits, returning to Halifax only in 1809, after the British government had agreed to increase his annual salary if he lived in the capital.⁶¹ By the time that Inglis returned to Halifax he was growing old and infirm—"tombé en enfance,"⁶² as Bishop Plessis of Quebec described him—and he devoted the greater part of his remaining years to promoting the claims of his son to be acknowledged the next bishop.

In many respects, therefore, Charles Inglis can be adjudged a failure as an episcopal administrator and missionary bishop. Admittedly, it can be forcibly argued that a crusading prelate, who actively exploited his powers in an attempt to extend the popular appeal and privileges of the religious establishment in colonies where the church was a minority and suspect institution, could have been an explosive element in society and have caused the church more harm than Inglis' aloofness. Nevertheless, while he succeeded in his unambitious design to introduce the episcopate into British North America without arousing undue opposition, the institution under his direction remained as ineffective as it was unexceptionable. Inglis failed to exert his episcopal authority, meet the challenge of dissent, check the erosion of the church's privileges, or maintain the level of popular support enjoyed in the 1780s.

As far as the administrative structure and spiritual welfare of the colonial church were concerned, only a positive and active policy could have created more importance for the Nova Scotian bishopric and have made its authority effective and indispensable. Failure to invest the episcopate with this importance was reflected in the impression which Archbishop Manners Sutton had formed by 1816, that the "difficulties of the office . . . are not very formidable, nor requiring very extraordinary talents."⁶³ In conformity with this view, Inglis had ordained, confirmed, and consecrated, but the limitations of his personality and circumscribed powers had produced an ecclesiastical figurehead. It may be significant that his clergy scarcely noted his death in 1816, whereas the decease of an exemplary missionary commonly excited tributes to his

⁵⁹Inglis to SPG, 16 July 1796, SPG Journal 27, p. 106.

⁶⁰Stanser to Morice, 10 Aug. 1797, SPG, C MSS, Nova Scotia. Also Stanser to SPG, 10 Nov. 1796, SPG Journal 27, p. 126.

⁶¹Prevost to Castlereagh, 1 Aug. 1808, CO 217/83, f.135; Castlereagh to Chancellor of Exchequer, 25 May 1807, CO 324/120, pp. 161-2.

⁶²H. Têtu, éd., *Journal des visites pastorales de 1815 et 1816 par Monseigneur Joseph-Octave Plessis, évêque de Québec* (Québec, 1903), p. 76.

⁶³Manners Sutton to Bathurst, 16 April 1816, CO 217/98, f.183.

memory from his brethren: Inglis had long since ceased to make a mark on the lives of his clergy and the society in which he lived. It is therefore wildly inaccurate and thoroughly misleading to assert that Charles Inglis was "a faithful missionary bishop, and able administrator of the affairs of his large, steadily-growing diocese,"⁶⁴ or that he was an "exceptionally active administrator,"⁶⁵ who acted with "zeal and ability."⁶⁶ On the contrary, in a wider discussion of the social and religious history of the period, of the relations between church and state, or of the rise and fall of the established church in British North America, it might be said that Inglis' role and activities as the first colonial bishop were more significant for their negative effects than for their positive achievements.⁶⁷

⁶⁴A. W. H. Eaton, "Bishop Charles Inglis and his Descendents," *Acadiensis*, VIII (1908), 187.

⁶⁵R. S. Rayson, "Charles Inglis, a Chapter in Beginnings," *Queen's Quarterly*, XXXIII (Oct.-Dec., 1925), 176.

⁶⁶SPG, *Annual Report*, 1817, p. 40.

⁶⁷Since this article was written, a considerable proportion of the original Inglis Papers has been found in England, and microfilm copies are available at Church House, Toronto, and the Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Halifax. It was too late to quote from the originals in the present article, and reference can be made to the Inglis Letter Books C-23 to C-25 for some slight variations in spelling and abbreviation.

Ontario Hydro: A 1925 Tempest in an American Teapot

RICHARD LOWITT

IF DEVELOPMENTS OR EVENTS in the history of other nations come to the attention of the United States Senate, it is usually in connection with matters pertaining to American foreign policy; rarely is it with reference to the internal affairs of the United States. Such was the case, however, with the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission which Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska had been citing in the Muscle Shoals controversy throughout the 1920s as an illustration of the advantages of public ownership and operation of hydro-electric power resources. In his effort to defeat the Underwood bill, calling for the leasing of government properties at Muscle Shoals, during the Sixty-Eighth Congress (March 4, 1923, to March 3, 1925) Norris had found occasion to cite the Ontario experience. It was not his mention of public power in Canada that created the *contretemps* however; rather it was the involvement of the executive branch of the government in the controversial Wyer report on the Ontario experience. To be sure, Calvin Coolidge was not directly implicated in the incident. But though there is no evidence to suggest that the President knew what was involved before the lid blew off the teapot, there is evidence that he was interested in a similar report being prepared on behalf of Muscle Shoals.

During the 1920s there was a massive effort, aided and abetted by the Republican administrations, to lease to private interests those properties which the Wilson administration had acquired in 1916 to help produce ammunition during World War I and fertilizer thereafter. The government had started construction of a huge dam and other facilities along the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals in Alabama for these purposes. When the war ended the dam was not finished, though most of the facilities were in operation. The question then arose, "What to do with these properties?" At the outset the almost universal response was

to lease the properties to private enterprise for the production of cheap fertilizers, a project which would aid the farmer. Henry Ford, the American Cynamide Company, numerous power companies, and others all offered to do just this, but in each instance Norris appeared as a powerful opponent of their proposals. Arguing that their bids merely masked a desire to control the hydro-electric potential at Muscle Shoals and that in any case fertilizer could be produced more cheaply by processes requiring no hydro-electric power, he mercilessly dissected these offers and slowly converted both his colleagues in Congress and influential segments of the American public to his cause. It was in good part through his efforts, spanning more than a decade, that the Muscle Shoals properties eventually began to fulfil their potential under public ownership and operation as part of the Tennessee Valley Authority created within the first hundred days of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. At possibly the most crucial time in Norris' war to save Muscle Shoals for public operation, the fight over the Underwood bill being the toughest battle in the entire controversy, the tempest involving Ontario Hydro arose.

The Smithsonian Institution, largely supported by federal funds and under federal direction, has as its motto, "For the Increase and Diffusion of Knowledge Among Men." In January 1925, in the midst of the fight on the Underwood bill, it issued a handsomely printed pamphlet which purported to be an examination of the power possibilities and preservation of Niagara Falls and was written by Samuel S. Wyer, whose title was given as associate in mineral technology, United States National Museum. Seemingly then, it was a report by a government scientist who had made an investigation for scientific purposes. Ordinarily, it would never have come to the attention of George W. Norris, fully occupied in the Senate with the Muscle Shoals controversy, but the greater part of this pseudo-scientific pamphlet was given over to a diatribe against the publicly owned and operated Ontario Hydro-Electric System. Figures were cited to prove that the enterprise was not solvent, that it was almost twenty million dollars short of the actual cost of the service furnished, but the source of these figures was not named. Moreover, Dr. Charles D. Walcott, secretary and head of the Smithsonian Institution, had written an introduction to the pamphlet in which he called special attention to Wyer's assertions of the superiority of private over public ownership.¹

¹Investigation revealed that Samuel S. Wyer was not an employee of the Smithsonian Institution and was not on the payroll. A resident of Columbus, Ohio, he was a private consulting engineer and was actively opposed to public power programmes. Most of his statements, Norris felt, were fallacious, misleading, and unfounded. See *National Popular Government League*, Bulletin No. 96, Jan. 20, 1925. Judson King was the director of the League. See too Judson King, *The Conservation Fight* (Washington, D.C., 1959), p. 133, for further delineation of Wyer's relations with private utilities.

Started in 1906 under the leadership of Adam Beck, by the 1920s the Ontario Hydro-Electric System was generally recognized as the most successful government-owned operation in the world at that time. It had an investment of over \$250 million, and paid its own way, including depreciation, out of rates without further involving the taxpayers. It supplied more than 350 farm districts, towns, and cities with power at minimum rates—an average of 4.5 cents per kilowatt hour, less than half the rate charged the people of American cities. Wyer argued, however, that domestic consumers in Ontario were given lower rates than the true cost situation warranted because of the need to gain votes for bonds issued periodically to finance improvements in the system. That, in fact, domestic consumers were “being carried at a loss.” Wyer further stated that the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission was not taxed; that domestic consumers were supplied at rates below cost to the detriment of industrial users and thus to industrial growth; that part of the cost of power had not been included in consumer rates, thereby creating a deficit to be borne by others. In brief, in a pamphlet purporting to examine power possibilities and preservation at Niagara Falls, Samuel Wyer inserted a section entitled “Ontario and United States Electric Service Compared,” which contained the controversial remarks just cited.²

The pamphlet was widely distributed to newspapers, members of Congress, and numerous other officials. The United States Chamber of Commerce republished it in its official journal, the *Nation's Business*, and also in pamphlet form with more than 170,000 copies in circulation in February 1925. Norris was appalled. He thought the action of the Smithsonian Institution disgraceful and he wrote, virtually apologizing for the pamphlet, to Sir Adam Beck, now chairman of Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission. “To me,” he observed, “it is rather humiliating that we have any institution connected with our Government, that will issue a pamphlet similar to the Wyer pamphlet, criticizing in language that is hardly respectful, a great governmental activity of a friendly nation.” And so disturbed was Beck by the pamphlet that he prepared a rejoinder entitled *Misstatements And Misrepresentations Derogatory To The Hydro-Electric Power Commission Of Ontario Contained In A Report Published By The Smithsonian Institution Entitled “Niagara Falls: Its Power Possibilities And Preservation,” Under The Authorship Of Samuel S. Wyer.*³

²*Congressional Record*, 69th Cong., Special Session, March 18, 1925 pp. 332–5. Information gleaned from Norris' remarks and a pamphlet by Sir Adam Beck. Both men quote and paraphrase Wyer.

³George W. Norris to Bruce Bliven, March 4, 1925, and Norris to Sir Adam Beck, Feb. 11, 1925, George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington. See too, Judson King to Charles D. Walcott, Feb. 25, 1925, copy in the Harry Slattery Papers, Duke University. *Congressional Record*, 69th Cong., Special Session, March 18, 1925, p. 333.

Norris inserted Beck's response in the *Congressional Record* where it consumed the better part of five double-column pages. In it Beck observed that while the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission had been both praised and criticized in the course of its history by many foreign visitors, "never has the commission had an attack made from a source so little expected as that from which comes the report just issued by Charles D. Walcott, the executive chief of the Smithsonian Institution of Washington." Dr. Walcott, he noted, presented the report prepared for him by Samuel S. Wyer. Without the *imprimatur* of the Smithsonian Institution, he claimed, it would have been unnecessary to review and refute it in any detail "if for no other reason than that in its plausibility it is, perhaps, per se, the most feeble of all the attacks that have been made. . . ." Regrettably, however, it had "the support of the fair name of the Smithsonian Institution of Washington," which meant that a copy would be sent, as the articles governing the work of the institution stated, "to every first class library on the face of the earth," and thus it had to be answered.

Sir Adam then proceeded to the heart of the matter: the refutation of Wyer's charges. He noted that Wyer had spent little time at the commission's offices conferring with officials or staff members and had conveyed the impression "of an individual wishing to make a somewhat superficial survey" of an agency recognized as "the largest distributor of hydro-electric energy in the world." He had not considered many facets of the system and often presented only partial and misleading statements about other aspects. Nevertheless, after a brief and cursory investigation Wyer claimed to have discovered damaging facts which other investigators "even after months of close study" had been unable to discover. Sir Adam showed that the Ontario municipally owned system did pay taxes both to municipalities and to the provincial government "to the extent of hundreds of thousands of dollars annually" and that it also paid "millions of dollars in customs duties" on materials and equipment imported from the United States and other countries. He refuted the charge that Ontario domestic rates were below cost and observed "the votes of the domestic consumers, under the law in Ontario, are not needed to carry bond issues for extensions [of service]." Moreover, he demonstrated that industrial rates were not higher than cost and did not serve, as Wyer suggested, "to retard industrial development" in the province. And all rates were lower than those charged in the "government-regulated" private utilities in the United States, where in recent instances, called to the commission's attention, they were ten times higher.

Point by point and in considerable detail, Adam Beck answered all of Wyer's charges: alleged deficits in the system did not exist; general

provincial expenses were not part of the cost of power; sinking fund shortages were fictitious; a surplus not a deficit existed. While Wyer's presentation could be explained partly by ignorance, Beck detected throughout the pamphlet a derogation of the "publicly owned and operated system in Ontario." And he concluded by observing "it is almost beyond comprehension that an institution like the Smithsonian, with such an honorable record, could have its executive head so influenced as to indorse and publish a report such as Mr. Wyer's—a report, indeed, which for prejudice and puerile superficiality leaves nothing to be desired." If public funds in the United States could be used for the purpose of attempting to injure the co-operative efforts of the people of another nation "to avail themselves at the least possible cost of the benefits resulting from the development of a great natural resource," relations between the United States and Canada might be affected. Charles D. Walcott, head of the Smithsonian Institution, in endorsing Wyer's findings in his introduction to the report, was guilty, in Beck's view, of "unpardonable negligence."⁴

Appearing when it did, the Wyer pamphlet could have served as a propaganda weapon in favour of private operation and against public retention of Muscle Shoals. This view, of course, was the one that supporters of the Norris position imputed to it. That such an imputation had more than an element of truth in it is evident from a letter by Charles D. Walcott in his capacity as secretary of the Smithsonian Institution to President Calvin Coolidge. Walcott suggested that "in continuation of the Smithsonian Institution's study of natural resources," there had been no thorough study or any "concise statement of the outstanding features of the Muscle Shoals power situation." This letter was written in January 1925 while the controversy over the Underwood bill was still at its height. Walcott proposed a "concisely summarized" statement "so that the average intelligent American citizen" could readily "comprehend the energy possibilities and what has been and is now involved in their development and utilization." Within the context of the period and coming after the Wyer pamphlet, Walcott's letter to the President could only mean that the secretary of the Smithsonian Institution was prepared to permit another piece of propaganda to help the hard-pressed Coolidge administration get rid of Muscle Shoals.⁵

⁴*Misstatements And Misrepresentations Derogatory To The Hydro-Electric Power Commission Of Ontario Contained In A Report Published By The Smithsonian Institution Entitled "Niagara Falls: Its Power Possibilities And Preservation," Under The Authorship Of Samuel S. Wyer* (Examined and refuted by Sir Adam Beck). Inserted in *Congressional Record*, 69th Cong., Special Session, March 18, 1925, pp.334-8.

⁵Charles D. Walcott to Calvin Coolidge, Jan. 31, 1925, Norris Papers. The President's secretary responded saying the President thought Walcott's idea "an excellent one." See Everett Sanders to Charles D. Walcott, Feb. 2, 1925, Box 127, Folder 44, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Library of Congress.

On his part, Norris intended to discuss at length the Wyer pamphlet to help avoid a final vote on the Underwood bill if it again came to the floor at the end of the Sixty-Eighth Congress. As it turned out the opportunity did not arise until the brief special session of the Senate in the next Congress in March 1925. Norris then denounced the pamphlet as propaganda "pure and simple" and called for the removal of Walcott by the trustees of the Smithsonian Institution. The pamphlet, besides being an indefensible attack on the business methods of a friendly nation, contained facts and figures that differed from those found in official sources. While Norris felt Samuel Wyer was acting within his rights as a "professional propagandist," the role of Walcott in printing the pamphlet as a scientific document under government auspices seemingly called for his expulsion. Further, Norris suspected he was acting in accordance with the wishes of administration officials in supporting their side in the Muscle Shoals controversy. The incident served only to lower the standards of the Smithsonian Institution by using its name in behalf of private interests. And to Norris the behaviour of Walcott was both inexcusable and disgraceful.⁶

To support his contentions Norris presented for publication along with his remarks a sheaf of letters, articles, and editorials from both American and Canadian publications condemning Wyer's irresponsible and dangerous report. To many it demonstrated how far private power corporations would go to obtain the privileges they desired. To Norris it was another phase of the bitter battle he was waging to create along the Tennessee River in northern Alabama a publicly owned and operated hydro-electric power system that would bring even greater benefits than the one in Ontario since it would be integrated with other functions pertaining to navigation, flood control, and agriculture throughout the river valley.⁷

In the early summer of 1925 Norris went to Ontario to see for himself. He travelled by automobile and visited the principal towns. He went into the country, talked with farmers, and made as thorough an investigation of the system for the generation and distribution of electrical energy as possible. And he acquired a mass of documents. All of this

⁶Norris to Bruce Bliven, March 4, 1925, and Norris to M. L. Cooke, May 13, 1925, Norris Papers. The *Chattanooga News*, March 19, 1925. *Congressional Record*, 69th Cong., Special Session, March 18, 1925, pp. 332-61 for Norris' remarks and the voluminous material he inserted in the *Record* pertaining to Ontario Hydro and the Wyer report.

⁷*Congressional Record*, 69th Cong., Special Session, March 18, 1925, pp. 341-62. The bulk of the material was critical of the Wyer report and the Smithsonian Institution and therefore in accord with the views of Sir Adam Beck and Senator George Norris. Items from the following publications were inserted: *Toronto Globe* (Feb. 7 and 17, 1925), *Nation* (Feb. 25, 1925), *New Republic* (Feb. 25, 1925), *Labor* (Feb. 14, 1925), *Baltimore Evening Sun* (Feb. 7 and 9, 1925), *Survey Graphic* (March, 1924), and a series of articles by Edwin P. Clapp appearing in Hearst morning papers dated Feb. 7, 8, and 9, 1925.

travel and analysis of documents was designed to help him in presenting "as good a front as possible in the Muscle Shoals fight."⁸

At the request of Paul Mallon, a United Press vice-president, Norris prepared an account of his trip. The Ontario operation, he felt, offered an opportunity to compare costs involved in the generation of electricity, something with which private corporations "interested solely in the almighty dollar" were not always concerned. To maintain their high profits the "gigantic electric trust" influenced both political contests and political parties. Magazines and newspapers came under their influence and control and "the real truth" about electric power costs was withheld from the people. If this power were properly converted into electricity, Norris believed, the labours of man would be lessened and the drudgery of every housewife would be relieved by the efficient work of a universal servant. And through the use of transmission lines the power not in use in one system could be transferred to another where it was needed and its blessings would become manifold.

Since electricity was usually generated by property that belonged to the public, Norris felt it should not be converted to private ownership where profit became the primary incentive and the consumer was compelled to foot the bills. Since the universality of the use of electric current depended upon its price, the lower the price, the more widespread its use and the less drudgery to be performed. To Norris a most wonderful demonstration of the possibilities for the generation and distribution of electric current had been given to the civilized world by the province of Ontario.⁹

While in the United States people paid from eight to twelve cents per kilowatt hour for electricity, the cities of Ontario were getting their current for from two to five cents per kilowatt hour, "and in many instances at less than two cents." Included in these rates were all items necessary to continue the system indefinitely: maintenance, a sinking fund, repairs and upkeep, emergency expenses, interest, indebtedness, and cost of construction. In the United States, Norris noted, private utility companies made no provision for sinking funds to cancel debts and eventually place the property in a position where the only items would be the cost of operation and management. Therefore American rates were not likely to be reduced, whereas the prevailing low rates in Canada would go still lower when the original investment could be charged off the books.

⁸Norris to Carl D. Thompson, July 10, 1925, Norris Papers.

⁹Writing about Sir Adam Beck shortly after Beck's death, Norris said, "The time will come when the natural resources of civilization are in the hands of the people, and when the common folks of civilization begin to realize the God-given gifts that can come from the handling of these resources, they will revere the memory of Sir Adam Beck as the slave reveres the memory of his emancipator." See Norris to the Hon. Frederick L. Gaby, Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission, August 18, 1925, *ibid.*

Norris suggested that as rates were reduced the current consumed increased very materially. "The ordinary home in Ontario," he wrote, "consumes from twice to three and four, sometimes ten times as much current as is consumed in similar homes in the United States. . . ." In the Canadian home electricity was the ever available servant, relieving the housewife of labour and drudgery and saving money for the head of the household at the same time. If the American housewife could see "the lighting, the cooking, the heating, the ironing and the washing, all being done in the Canadian house by this silent and uncomplaining servant," Norris was convinced there would be a clamour that would make Congress and the state legislatures "sit up and take notice." The benefits of electricity that he witnessed in Ontario could not occur in the United States until the cost of electricity was cheaper. In the United States the people paid not only for the actual cost of electricity, but also for "premiums on watered stock, profits on fictitious values" and for the propaganda circulated by utility companies in praising the benefits they offered while vehemently denouncing public-operated systems. In short, the American user of electricity paid the cost of his own deception.¹⁰

Ontario Hydro thus served as an important weapon in Norris' arsenal of information. Again and again he mentioned it as a prime example of the efficacy and efficiency of a publicly owned and operated system. Initially cited in the battle to save Muscle Shoals for public use, Norris constantly referred to Ontario Hydro in his war against utility companies. He continually compared rates, examining typical utility bills always to the marked disadvantage of the American customer who paid exorbitant rates compared to those charged the Canadian consumer serviced by Ontario Hydro. But it was the 1925 tempest over the Wyer report that fully revealed to him the extremes to which his opponents were willing to go to defeat his position on public ownership.

¹⁰Draft of an article written by Norris for the United Press at the request of Paul Mallon, n.d. (June, 1925?). See too, Norris to John T. Duncan, March 25, 1926, *ibid.*, for an example of Norris' explanation of the Ontario system to an interested correspondent.

Good-Bye to All That

RAMSAY COOK*

THE TITLE OF THE PANEL, in effect, asserts that the function of the historical journal is changing. Perhaps the assertion is self-evident in the age of the computer and, in this, the home of Marshall McLuhan. But I at least would question the assertion. Now, as always, the historical journal's function is to provide a convenient vehicle for the publication of new research, fresh interpretations, and critical assessments of the new and old literature of the subject. But, within that general framework, there are doubtless a variety of new problems facing editors.

The problems in editing the *Canadian Historical Review* are recognizable to the editor of any academic journal. There is the perennial difficulty of obtaining enough first-class material—a problem magnified by the increased ease with which book-length studies can find their way into hard covers in this period of publishing affluence. There is the equally persistent problem of satisfying authors whose works are rarely revealed to the waiting public with sufficient rapidity. Nor have I ever met an author who felt that his book had been adequately reviewed. Finally, there is the readership: in this time of the narrow specialty, failure to publish at least one article in every field of interest may bring cries of anguish from the far corners of the profession. But every editor knows these occupational hazards. So I might best attempt an outline of problems that may be peculiar to the *Review*.

The *Canadian Historical Review* suffers the same structural and psychological difficulties as beset Canada. We are a small country, so our historical profession is tiny. We are a highly regionalized com-

*Professor Ramsay Cook, currently appointed to the Chair of Canadian Studies at Harvard University, was the editor of the *Canadian Historical Review* from 1 June 1963 to 1 July 1968. His remarks were originally presented to a session entitled "Historians and Editors: The Changing Functions of Historical Journals" at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Toronto in December 1967. In them he reflected on both the problems and potential of the *Canadian Historical Review* as seen from the editor's desk. Believing that they would be of interest to the readers of this journal, the editors requested Professor Cook's permission to publish them.

munity, so it is difficult, in publishing terms, to balance one section against another. We are bicultural—at least in our dreams—so we must attempt to reflect this duality. And, we are a relatively unimportant country, so we get little help from interested outsiders in exploring our past.

Let me take the last point first. It would be unreasonable for Canadian historians to expect any widespread international interest in our past. Whereas foreign scholars may rush to study the United States or China, Canada's modest status ensures that we have none of that love-hate attraction which draws the outsider to an examination of great powers. We might reasonably expect some greater interest on the part of our mother countries, England and France—but not even General de Gaulle is likely to stimulate any great outpouring of scholarly writing on Canada. Our American neighbours have often enough produced capable scholars with Canadian interests. But these so often find Canada too small for their large appetites, or too insignificant to meet the curricular demands of teaching departments. So Canada becomes a small part of an empire-Commonwealth specialty. And, of course, with travel grants so plentiful, the one-time advantage of proximity has become a disadvantage. What scholar wants to spend a winter in subzero Ottawa when the romantic east or sunny Caribbean beckons? Consequently the *Review* receives few contributions from foreigners. And this is a pity, for the insights of the outsider could very well provide exactly the stimulus that Canadian historical writing currently needs.

As for Canadian regionalism, the editor of the *Review* is made aware of it in several ways. First there is the shrill war whoop from the distant provinces which translates: "Why are all your contributors at the University of Toronto?" Though the charge is never accurate, it is not easy to muffle the war drums. More serious is the question of "local" history. While I personally believe that local history must become *la nouvelle vague* in Canadian studies, I feel a self-imposed pressure to act against my conviction in the selection of material for publication: if a submission deals with a "national" question, it has an immediate advantage over a local or provincial subject. This is the force of habit and tradition—but it is a harmful tradition. For this reason I personally welcome the appearance of new journals in Canada and look hopefully for signs of vigour in the existing journals of local history.

Our French-English dualism is more serious. Nothing better illustrates the existence of two distinct cultural communities in Canada than the failure of the national historical journal to attract any significant number of contributions from French-language historians. They, of course, have always had their own journals, which in itself is significant. French-Canadian historians apparently do not feel *chez eux* in the

Review. The most important problem is not language—we publish in French or English; it is a problem of approaches to history and of areas of interest. I can describe this difference, without explaining it, by saying that English-Canadian historians have almost invariably been Canadian nationalists, French-Canadian historians just as invariably French-Canadian nationalists. Consequently the historical worlds they have been exploring have not always been the same—often they have been competing and clashing worlds.

Finally, Canada is a small country with a small historical profession. Nearly every Canadian historian knows every other practitioner in his field. The output of a small group is, naturally, limited. Smallness also reduces proportionately the stimulus of competition and clash of opinion that exists in larger groups. This difficulty is increased by the centralized nature of historical training in Canada. At least until very recently most of the advanced graduate work in English Canada has been done at Toronto. One school and one approach has consequently tended to dominate the field—though there have always been dissenters, even at Toronto. But the fact is that Torontonians have trained others in their own image. Consequently there is an unfortunate sameness about Canadian historical writing. Professor Creighton once remarked that Canadian history books often read like a play with only one character—the character being a person named Responsible Government. Regrettably, that remains almost as true today, though the character has changed. Professor Creighton's own work, along with that of the late Harold Innis, has been so influential as to have had Responsible Government replaced by Sir John Laurentian Macdonald, in various guises. This situation can only be changed by the emergence of strong new schools of history. For the health of Canadian historical writing, Toronto's monopoly must be broken.

As I look over these remarks, I realize that I have not really talked about the subject at hand as directly as I perhaps should have done. I have really been talking about the general problems of Canadian historical writing. But that is perhaps not a gross error, for historians get the kind of journal that they deserve. The future function of this journal can only be defined in terms of the growth and development of the historical profession in Canada. And that, I suppose, puts the *Canadian Historical Review* in about the same position as any other historical journal.

Canada

My First Seventy-five Years. By A. R. M. LOWER. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. 1967. Pp. xiv, 384, illus. \$8.95.

THIS ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND TIMES of Arthur Lower has, as its author says in his Preface, more of "times" than "life"—which gives it particular interest for the historian. For here is a distinguished fellow historian applying his craft to himself as subject, placing himself in the Canadian context he has lived through, and in the process saying a good deal about social and intellectual developments and academic life in Canada for well over half a century. His description of his early years in Barrie, for example, supplies an instructive study of small-town English Ontario society at the close of the nineteenth century. The narrative of his professional career—an undergraduate at prewar Toronto, on the staff of the postwar Public Archives, graduate work at Harvard, teaching thereafter at a straitened United College and finally at a more affluent Queen's—is in some respects an odyssey for a generation of Canadian historians; or one, at least, in which many of its members could find experiences akin to their own. And the record of his stands on external issues in the 1930s recalls the fervour and frustration of liberal-nationalist intellectuals at a time when there really was a debate in this country on Canadian, not American, foreign policy.

In all this, obviously, a large amount of the native A. R. M. Lower comes through; notably in the decided appraisals and self-judgments of an individualist with firm convictions and a considerable store of knowledge. These, moreover, are still personal memoirs, where the author tells what he wants to and spreads himself on topics that appeal to him. There is much recalling of times spent in the Precambrian lakeland he loves, whether as a young man working through bush summers, or as an older man holidaying at his northern cottage. And there are lots of resonant Loweresque remarks throughout (as perhaps in the ring of the title). Yet this work may well be regarded also as a minor, but not unimportant, contribution to Canadian historiography. For it supplies a direct account of the intellectual development of a major Canadian historian, the kind of account that does not often occur.

Here one can see Canadian liberal nationalism emerging from a Victorian British and Methodist middle-class background in Ontario, stimulated in self-consciousness by World War I, shaped into environmentalist economic channels by detailed research under Shortt at the Archives and by scholarly association with Innis. One can see the love of the North, the true Canada, infused with frontierist ideas acquired under Merk at Harvard. And one can see the collectivist, Fabian socialist—*cum* western progressive strains of the 1930s brought in—and the formulating of hypotheses on metropolitan power and hinterland relations in Canada as the logically satisfying consequence. Indeed, one may hope that Professor Lower's unpublished study on metropolitanism will yet come out to epitomize this whole course of development.

At any rate, here is the autobiography of a historian raised in one Canada, teaching in another, and still active in a third. Given the author's span of experience and perceptive qualities, it is bound to make a worthwhile book.

J. M. S. CARELESS

University of Toronto

Changing Perspectives in Canadian History: Selected Problems. Edited by K. A. MACKIRDY, J. S. MOIR, and Y. F. ZOLTIVANY. Don Mills: J. M. Dent. 1967. Pp. xxxiv, 373. \$4.00 paper.

Search for a Nation: French-English Relations in Canada Since 1759. By JANET KERR MORCHAIN. Don Mills: J. M. Dent. 1967. Pp. xii, 176. \$2.75 paper.

Issues in Canadian History, edited by MORRIS ZASLOW: ROGER GRAHAM, ed., *The King-Byng Affair, 1926: A Question of Responsible Government*; CAMERON NISH, ed., *The French Canadians, 1759-1766; Conquered? Half-Conquered? Liberated?*; ELIZABETH NISH, ed., *Racism or Responsible Government: The French Canadian Dilemma of the 1840's*; L. F. S. UPTON, ed., *The United Empire Loyalists: Men and Myths*. Toronto: Copp Clark. 1967. Pp. x, 140; viii, 184; viii, 184; x, 174. \$2.75 each, paper.

Canadian Historical Readings, edited by RAMSAY COOK, CRAIG BROWN, and CARL BERGER: BERGER, ed., *Approaches to Canadian History*; BROWN, ed., *Upper Canadian Politics in the 1850's*; COOK, ed., *Confederation*; COOK, ed., *Politics of Discontent*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1967. Pp. xii, 98, \$1.50; pp. xiv, 88, \$1.50; pp. xvi, 118, \$1.95; pp. x, 102, \$1.50. Paper.

IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD. More precisely, the spoken word was the principal medium of instruction until the advent of the Gutenberg era. Since then a formalized system has developed that still dominates higher education in these latter days. It generally includes the formal lecture and the "text," a general work that covers the subject, as well as recommended or required specialized reading available in a library and, in recent years, in paperback form. Another school of thought is growing, perhaps because of the response of academic budgeteers to the growing numbers of students in publicly financed institutions. According to this view the lecture can be conducted in a vast auditorium (or on television, film, or tape) but the course is supplemented by smaller discussion or tutorial groups of variable size. Textbooks that divide a subject into separate units are most suitable to this curricular format.

The problems approach to history can play a role in this far from ideal situation and in whatever better arrangement may exist to allow and encourage student and faculty interchange and interrelationship. This approach can provide the student with a view of the conflict of interpretation that makes history such an inexact but fascinating subject. Also the inherent contradictions within a well-chosen set of documents and interpretations remove the aura of definitiveness that infects even the most modest text book author and should destroy the naïve introductory students' reverence for the printed word. A conceptually sound set of problems presents history as a series of unresolved and possibly unresolvable questions. The very act of striving for solutions can aid an individual in trying to answer the profound questions of the meaning of existence and assist the members of a society to define what they are as a group. Most important, an environment can be inculcated in which discussion and debate can be developed and in which true education can evolve through this interchange of ideas.

Problems books have been in existence for a long time but only recently has the publishing industry seen a mass market in education and multiplied their production, especially for the many American institutions that offer introductory courses in European and United States history. Instructors in these fields are flooded with many works of varying quality and often face the ubiquitous itinerant agents who promote their wares with the personal touch. The problems phenomenon has now invaded Canada and the first examples of this type fall into three basic categories. First is the all-purpose collection of basic problems that runs the gamut of Canadian history from New France to the present (an ever changing present that will require constant revision). *Changing Perspectives* is an outstanding example of this format. *Search for a Nation* reveals the method at its worst. The Issues in Canadian History series offers a related approach. Here each pamphlet includes discussions of a separate subject by an authority with appropriate documents of the period and various interpretations. The Canadian Historical Readings series is similar but here each topic is discussed in a brief introduction followed by selected essays drawn almost exclusively from back volumes of the *Canadian Historical Review* and the Canadian Historical Association's annual reports.

Messrs. MacKirdy, Moir, and Zoltvany use good judgment in their division of important issues in Canadian history into twenty-one sections. The documents and interpretations are also generally well chosen and a good balance has been achieved between usual and unusual material, including much of a fugitive nature from pamphlets and CBC broadcasts where appropriate. The editors also show a talent for extracting the essence of a scholarly article in a minimum number of words. The discussion of the Loyalists, for instance, is a marvel of compactness by contrast with the entire pamphlet that L. F. S. Upton devotes to the same subject. The chapter "Men and Machines—The Response of the Churches" is unique and illustrates well changing religious responses to social questions, although some kind of Catholic response might have been included even if only a citation from Trudeau's *La Grève de l'amiante*. Also, the discussion of the two very different rebellions of 1837 is somewhat muddled by a lack of a clear division of the readings. Each section contains both contemporary documents and, where relevant and available, complementary and conflicting later interpretations as well as a concise bibliography. On the whole, the job is very well done.

The less said about *Search for a Nation* the better. Janet Morchain has chosen a set of problems that relate to French-English relations in Canadian history but her educational purpose is unclear. The book contains a narrative text, heavy with quotations, with unintegrated material at the end that somehow illustrates the general problems. Judging from her eagerness to translate such expressions as "le fait français," and "coureurs de bois" I would surmise that the book is aimed at the high-school level but her documents include untranslated French poetry. The text is trite and superficial. At some points it is apparent that she has not even read Mason Wade's *The French Canadians* very carefully but in her chapter, "The Crisis of the Rebellions," she has lifted most of her quotations from that source without so much as an "as cited by . . ." If the publishers had sent this manuscript to a number of reputable scholars in the field everyone might have been spared some embarrassment.

The Issues in Canadian History series edited by Morris Zaslow is useful for exploration in some depth of selected issues. The editors of the individual volumes are both competent and relevant in their choice of subjects and selection of documents and interpretations. The two books that relate to French Canada, by Elizabeth and Cameron Nish respectively, strive to explain the historical past of the French-Canadian question, one in the immediate post-conquest (if I may use that word) period, the other in the crisis period of the 1840s. Only one of their many merits is

the effort to clarify to English-speaking readers the conflicts among French-Canadian historians. The specific enthusiasms of any instructor will dictate his choices among these works. I particularly enjoyed Graham's *King-Byng Affair* which, by contrasting some clearly stated documents and interpretations with the long-winded oratorical obfuscations of Prime Minister King, may have provided the last word on that subject, outside of the classroom at least.

Finally, the Canadian Historical Readings series provides conveniently reproduced copies of the major interpretative articles that have appeared over the years in this journal and in the annual reports of the CHA. Some of the fundamental theoretical and conceptual work of A. R. M. Lower, D. G. Creighton, J. M. S. Careless, and others appears here. The instructor who strives to communicate the meaning of the vast body of Canadian history will be aided by *Approaches to Canadian History* which includes an introduction by Carl Berger and Careless' "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History." Also, discussions of Confederation can be augmented by use of the appropriate volume here which contains that enduring gem of brilliant writing and history, Creighton's "Economic Nationalism and Confederation," which first appeared in 1942. At a recent panel of editors of historical journals some participants complained that the mature scholars in their fields did not contribute articles. Here, in a sense, is the response of the *Canadian Historical Review*.

J. A. BOUDREAU

San Jose State College

Newfoundland, Island into Province. By ST JOHN CHADWICK. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1967. Pp. xiv, 268, appendices, maps. \$8.95.

OF THE EXTENSIVE WRITING on our national or provincial past published either as a result of or to coincide with the centennial of Confederation, none is likely to prove of more enduring quality than this work by Mr. St John Chadwick on the history of Newfoundland. The author himself, in his capacity as one of the expert British advisers to the Newfoundland National Convention, helped to pave the way for the island's entry into Confederation, but, happily, he does not confine his study merely to the recent past. Rather, he has attempted to provide "a modern history of Newfoundland from discovery to federation" (p. xi). Based more on a review and reassessment of facts already known than on primary research, it is intended as "an illustrative, rather than a comprehensive history: a study in constitutional development: an attempt to explain Newfoundland to herself as well as to Britain and to Canada" (p. xii). In short, the author has endeavoured to fill the long-existing need for a definitive history of Newfoundland.

On the whole, Mr. Chadwick has succeeded extremely well in his ambitious undertaking. The overriding tone of the book is one of critical and penetrating analysis, the judgments are balanced, and the literary style is masterly. The author is at his best in discussing the complex questions of international diplomacy in which Newfoundland was involved between 1857 and 1927—the problem of French fishing rights, fishery disputes with her continental neighbours, and the Labrador boundary issue—and much of the book is devoted to these subjects. All too scant attention is given to the pre-nineteenth-century period though the comments are none the less cogent, as, for example, the forthright rejection of the widely propagated myths that Newfoundland was definitely discovered by Cabot and was Britain's oldest colony. Surprisingly, the most disappointing part of the book is that devoted to the

post-1933 events with which the author was directly involved. There is a certain indecisiveness in his treatment of the Commission government, which he refers to as both a benign "dictatorship" (p. 182) and a régime under which "the essentials of democracy were not killed" (pp. 176-7). He fails to convey any of the great drama of the National Convention and gives a purely factual and outward account of the ensuing events culminating in entry into Confederation. No insight is provided into behind-the-scenes activity and insufficient credit is given to the crucial role of Mr. Smallwood and the other confederate leaders.

A more serious general criticism is that the study focuses too much on outside events as they impinged upon Newfoundland to the neglect of developments on the domestic scene. This is well illustrated, for example, in the discussion of the suspension of responsible government in 1933. One paragraph is devoted to the debate on this subject in the Newfoundland legislature (p. 163), while there is a full chapter dealing with the British parliamentary debate on the same question.

A word, in conclusion, in defence of the codfish. Setting aside altogether the question of its relative "beauty," as a person who grew up in a Newfoundland fishing village and the son of a fisherman, I can emphatically deny that Newfoundland codfish have the slightest propensity for eating "scissors, oil cans, old boots, books and keys" (p. 29).

The foregoing criticisms notwithstanding, the book adds immeasurably to the understanding of Newfoundland's progress from colony to province. It is a work of which any professional historian would be proud.

E. C. MOULTON

University of Manitoba

The Unification of Methodism in Canada. By J. WARREN CALDWELL. *The Bulletin*, 19. Toronto: Committee on Archives, United Church of Canada, in collaboration with Victoria University. 1967. Pp. 61.

THE EDITORS of *The Bulletin* are to be commended for making available to interested Canadians a valuable study of Canadian Methodism.

In recent years there have been some excellent studies on this peculiarly Canadian religion that has played such an important role in shaping the national character of English-speaking Canada. Mr. Caldwell, however, makes a rather unique contribution of his own, by stressing the importance of union negotiations in shaping the Canadian Methodist mind. An earlier attempt to define this mind was made by Professor Goldwin French in an article he contributed to a symposium on *The Churches and the Canadian Experience* (ed. J. W. Grant, Ryerson, 1963). Because of the complexity of the Methodist mind, no clear definition emerged: all that Professor French could say, without qualification, was that it was aggressively Canadian and closely identified with Canadian society. Mr. Caldwell's study explains clearly the complexity; for, as he points out there was not one Canadian Methodist mind, but seven. His article follows through the tangled course of negotiations and compromises, beginning in 1820, whereby individualistic frontier sects finally brought into being in 1884 the Methodist Church of Canada. Along the road to unity there were some rather ambiguous compromises and unexpected abandonments of firm positions—some partisans said, "for the basest motives." Grim financial embarrassments and the mobility of pioneer Canadians with the resultant disappearance of congregations helped the cause of unity. But it should also be noted that the missionary challenge of the west perhaps helped more than all else to break down the barriers to union and pave the way to an even greater union, the United

Chuch of Canada. Nevertheless, as Mr. Caldwell points out, a striking feature of the unions was their ambivalence. It is not surprising, then, that this is also a striking feature of Canadian national development.

Bulletin 19 can help us to understand why English-speaking Canadians behave the way they do in facing national crises and encourage us to believe that they will make the necessary adjustment of principles in order to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

H. H. WALSH

McGill University

La Victoire de Saint-Denis. Par ROBERT-LIONEL SÉGUIN. Montréal: Editions Parti Pris. 1968. Pp. 45, illustré.

CE N'EST PAS LA PREMIÈRE FOIS que l'histoire sert d'arsenal pour les batailles d'aujourd'hui. Avec ce très petit livre, Parti Pris inaugure une collection dont l'objectif est clairement défini par l'Editeur: "pour que tous les Québécois, tirant les leçons des événements de leur histoire, entreprennent la dernière phase de leur libération." Sans doute la foi a-t-elle ses droits, mais le bon sens a aussi les siens. En lisant cette pièce de propagande, nous nous sommes livrés à un petit exercice statistique qui montre jusqu'où peut conduire le goût de l'épopée. Nous avons ainsi tenté d'évaluer certaines implications du *récit* de R.-L. Séguin.

Effectifs britanniques	300
Durée du combat	6 heures ou 360 minutes
Nombre de soldats anglais tués et blessés selon le rapport officiel	6 t., 11 b.
Nombre de tués et de blessés selon Séguin	30 t., 60 b.

Nombre de tués ou blessés inférés du récit de Séguin:

—le Dr Allaire et son frère "ne perdent jamais une balle." Supposons qu'ils tirent un coup de fusil toutes les 10 minutes, ce qui leur laisse encore du temps libre, le nombre approximatif de leurs victimes serait de	72
—Blanchard, vétéran de Châteauguay, a trois hommes pour charger ses fusils. Il "tire sans arrêt." Supposons qu'il rate un coup sur trois, il n'est pas exagéré de lui attribuer	36
—Louis Lacasse, vétéran de 1812, "vise sur tout ce qui bouge devant lui." Supposons, à cause de sa blessure, qu'il ait été quelque peu erratique devant des cibles mouvantes, le nombre de ses victimes serait de	10
—Francs-tireurs patriotes qui "ratent rarement la cible": Courtemanche qui "culbute son soldat à chaque coup," Lafèche et Bourdages. En supposant qu'à trois, ils furent aussi efficaces que le Dr Allaire et son frère, le nombre de leurs victimes serait de	72
—Joseph Pérodeau et Lévi Larue "maniaient le fusil avec le même calme que s'il s'eut agit d'une pratique à la cible." Etant plus calmes, ils furent probablement plus lents que les autres	20
—Louis Pagé "couche impitoyablement tous les militaires qui grouillent devant lui." Comme les cibles se déplaçaient, il fut certainement moins meurtrier. On peut penser que certains soldats se couchèrent de leur propre gré	10

—Lévis Guertain et Augustin Carignan "entretiennent un tir d'une précision remarquable"; Dupont fait "preuve d'autant d'adresse" 36

TOTAL des victimes faites par ces 13 braves 256

Voilà du beau travail. Heureusement Séguin ne disposait pas d'informations concernant la conduite des autres patriotes participant à la bataille de St-Denis. Le résultat serait spectaculaire. Y aurait-il assez de soldats anglais pour attaquer St-Charles et St-Eustache? L'histoire aurait été changée.

FERNAND OUELLET

Carleton University

The Union of the Canadas: The Growth of Canadian Institutions, 1841-1857.

By J. M. S. CARELESS. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 1967. Pp. xvi, 256, maps, illus. \$10.00.

THIS VOLUME OF THE CENTENARY HISTORY covers one of the most interesting periods of Canadian development from the political point of view and the story it tells throws light both on the flexibility of English institutions and on the possibility of political co-operation between two communities speaking different languages and with very different cultural traditions. That the union of the two Canadas functioned and was able to move on to a federal state is perhaps an even greater miracle than the union of the thirteen American states. Since to the perils of falling apart was added the likelihood of annexation to the United States, either as a whole or piecemeal, either voluntarily or under pressure, it seems fair to say that Canada has had to face even greater hazards to her national existence than the United States has ever done except during the American Civil War.

The united province of Canada had one factor, however, working for unity—namely geography, carrying with it the advantages for all concerned of through water transport and a clear field for railroad building. But the distances were tremendous and the winters long, with the result that every effort to compete with the United States in rapid transit of freight to Europe was likely to be to some degree disappointing. Moreover the overseas trade as well as the trade between east and west had always been under the control of British merchants—a fact which certainly made the French Canadians show less enthusiasm initially for the building of roads and canals than did their English Canadian fellow subjects. Nevertheless the recognition by the British government that the best way of bringing peace to Canada after the rebellions of 1837 was to promote activity in public works, especially the building of canals, was its greatest contribution to the cause of Canadian union or federalism. Without the British Treasury's loan of one and a half million pounds for that purpose the administration of Lord Sydenham would scarcely have been a success story. The wiseacres in England were quick to say that once the money was spent future governors of Canada could whistle for the support which Sydenham received in his efforts to carry the union and put it into operation, support coming entirely from political leaders in Upper Canada and businessmen in Montreal and Quebec.

Once the union was achieved and the new parliament had completed successfully its first session, the credit for making the constitution work should go almost entirely to the middle of the road political leaders in what is now Ontario. English governors before Lord Elgin, with one notable exception, and English ministers before Lord Grey apparently believed that Canada could be governed without any real co-operation from the French Canadians. Sydenham evidently regarded the

exclusion of Lafontaine from the assembly as essential to the success of his policies and it was brought about by means which are utterly indefensible except on the grounds of dire necessity. Even Bagot who liked the French and really wanted to enlist their aid was determined to wean them from their alliance with Robert Baldwin whom he regarded as a dangerous radical. But the more levelheaded and astute of the political leaders of Canada West had made up their minds not only that they could work with Lafontaine but that there was no use in trying to turn French Canadians into Britons overnight.

Mr. Careless more than any earlier historian of the period has made it abundantly clear that responsible government was inevitable once Lord John Russell and Lord Sydenham decided that Canada must be governed by Canadian ministers. The Canadian politicians did the rest and did it without too great delay. Lord Stanley and Sir Robert Peel insisted that the governors should choose their ministers on a non-partisan basis so as to represent all shades of opinion. That theory broke down as soon as groups began to form in the assembly—groups that did not have much real coherence in the beginning but did have widely divergent views. The hope that any good would come of their trying to work out a joint policy, or that they would meekly accept a policy outlined by the governor was quickly shown to be an absurdity. Lafontaine is given all the credit by Mr. Careless for uniting the French members into a solid block, but since their first reaction had been to oppose the new constitution and work for the repeal of the union the credit for winning them to an alliance with one of the two Upper Canadian parties must go to Hincks and Baldwin, to Draper and Harrison. Cabinet government was to rest on a two-party system as it did in England even though the cleavage within the parties was sufficiently wide to give rise to the curious doctrine of "double majority."

The greatest peril the new state had to face came not from divisions in Canada but from the changes in British policy which put an end to imperial preference and threatened to ruin the trade in timber and grain. Canada was saved by the growth of her American market, which increased a good deal as a result of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. But that development led inevitably to the appearance of vociferous advocates of Americanization and in many cases of annexation to the United States. L.-J. Papineau, readmitted to Canada under the amnesty demanded by Lafontaine, became again the eloquent panegyrist of American institutions over those of England, and in Canada West the emergence of the Clear Grits led to the revival of the old cry of William Lyon Mackenzie for republican institutions. Fortunately the leadership of those radical groups clamouring for annexation mobilized forces in the province determined to resist any efforts to bring the province within the American orbit. In Canada East the Roman Catholic Church rightly regarded Papineau as the strongest threat to their influence; in Canada West those loyal forces which had carried elections for Francis Bond Head and Sir Charles Metcalfe rallied once more to the imperial allegiance. The return of prosperity and the excitement over the building of railroads, combined with the alarming state of politics in the United States in the 'fifties, put an end for the moment to annexation. The volume ends with a chapter on "the pattern of disunion" which demonstrates that seventeen years of union had led to little if any rapprochement between the laws and cultures of the two sections of Canada. The years had served to demonstrate, however, that federalism was possible because the leaders of French Canada could and would co-operate with British leaders elsewhere if they were given the internal control of their own province.

The volume deals in masterly fashion with an era of economic and social change and with the intricacies of the politics of the upper province. To the reviewer it seems that the author's grasp on the social and political history of what is now

Ontario is firmer than it is in the case of Quebec, as would indeed be natural enough. He refers more than once to the older aristocratic tradition of the French leaders before the rebellion, instancing Papineau and Viger. Papineau would no doubt be flattered but his house in Montreal still contains the yard where his grandfather operated a blacksmith's shop, and the rise in the social scale was exactly the same as for Lafontaine and Morin. Viger had never been a force in provincial politics except as Papineau's satellite. The real leader in the assembly next to Papineau was Louis Bourdages and not even F.-J. Audet has been able to throw much light on his background and lineage. He had been a sailor and became a country notary; little else is known. In writing about the Catholic church before the rebellion Mr. Careless again is vague and general; he writes as though there had been no serious threat to their authority. Yet it seems probable that the hold of the priests over the habitants was never as weak as in 1832 when the "loi des fabriques," written by Bourdages, sailed through the assembly only to be defeated, as were most popular measures, in the legislative council. At the same time the city of Montreal was torn by a deadly feud between the Sulpician Order and the Bishop, backed by the Quebec hierarchy. The excellent treatment of the work of Bishop Bourget and the revival of the Jesuit Order would carry more weight if it had been indicated earlier how much was needed to raise the Canadian church to the position of power it has occupied ever since. But the volume presents such an excellent and clarifying picture of the years covered that the reader will not complain.

HELEN TAFT MANNING

Haverford, Pa.

Salvation! O the Joyful Sound: The Selected Writings of John Carroll. Edited with an introduction by JOHN WEBSTER GRANT. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1967. Pp. 270. \$6.00 cloth; \$3.25 paper.

JOHN CARROLL (1809–1884) was by no means one of the most eminent Methodist ministers in nineteenth-century Canada, but he was a perceptive and often witty "chronicler of his times" with the distinctively colourful style of a self-educated *raconteur*. His literary reputation is deservedly based on several volumes of biographical sketches and descriptive reminiscences of pioneer life and evangelical religious experience in what is now Ontario. As Professor Grant explains in his informative introduction, Carroll was writing at a time—the 'fifties to the 'eighties—when Ontario was emerging from its pioneer immaturity, and when leisure and tranquillity were producing the earliest manifestations of a popular interest in the history of the province. Carroll both encouraged and benefited from this cultural awareness. Moreover, Carroll was familiar with the vicissitudes and secessions which plagued the Canadian Methodist Conference during his career, and this involvement gives significance to his writings as a source for the distinctly religious, as well as the more general social, history of the period.

The present collection of nearly sixty short excerpts is primarily drawn from three of Carroll's six major works, *Past and Present* (1860), *The School of the Prophets* (1876), and *My Boy Life* (1882), though a few extracts have been included from his five-volume biographical study of Canadian Methodism, *Case and His Contemporaries* (1867–77). These examples of John Carroll's "unique" writings have been assembled by Professor Grant to reveal the character of Carroll and his Methodist contemporaries against the background of nineteenth-century Canadian life. Nevertheless, the editor devotes considerably more space to a portrayal of Carroll himself

—accounts of his boyhood, his “getting religion,” and his experiences on circuit as an itinerant minister—than to graphic descriptions of his fellow preachers and other acquaintances.

This interesting collection of material would have been more readable and useful if it had been better organized. Explanatory and connecting passages between extracts would have given direction and unity to the selection and made it less fragmentary. Indeed, apart from a loose chronological organization of the events of Carroll's youth, there is no clear theme, and the concluding character sketches of the Methodist parsons, Lorenzo Dow, Henry Ryan, William Case, Robert Corson, William and Egerton Ryerson, Anson Green, and Samuel Nelles, seem to be appended as an afterthought. While a compilation of this nature is a matter of personal preference, more substantial material, perhaps from *The School of the Prophets*, or even from “*Father Corson*” (1879), in place of some of the purely narrative extracts from *My Boy Life*, would have made the book a more valuable aid to the study of Canadian Methodism. For the historian, theologian, or literary specialist who will still want to peruse *in toto* Carroll's few major works, this selection admirably whets the appetite, though the omission of page references to the original editions is unfortunate. The editor quite clearly indicates, however, that the volume is intended for the enjoyment of the “non-specialist lay reader,” who will indeed find it a delightful, if somewhat random, collection of Canadiana.

JUDITH FINGARD

Dalhousie University

British Columbia & Confederation. Edited by W. GEORGE SHELTON. Victoria: For the University of Victoria by the Morriss Printing Company. 1967. Pp. 250, illus.

EIGHT GRADUATES of the University of Victoria wrote an article each for *British Columbia & Confederation*. Stella Higgins contributed “British Columbia and the Confederation Era”; Paul Phillips, “Confederation and the Economy of British Columbia”; H. Robert Kendrick, “Amor De Cosmos and Confederation”; Olive Fairholm, “John Robson and Confederation”; Tim Trousdell, “‘From Sea to Sea’—Negotiations Between Ottawa and London”; Susan Dickinson Scott, “The Attitude of the Colonial Governors and Officials towards Confederation”; Derek Pethick, “The Confederation Debate of 1870”; and, Brian Smith, “The Confederation Delegation.” The authors, representing a wide variety of vocations, ages, and educational backgrounds, have a deep and abiding interest in the history of British Columbia and have thus been able to produce this unusual centennial project.

Collections of this sort are necessary: Confederation studies should be enriched by a series of regional analyses. The backgrounds, constitutions, economies, cultures, problems, leaders, and attitudes of each of Canada's components should be subjected to careful scrutiny. To at least a degree such material is available, but the emphasis has been on central Canada. Much remains to be done. *British Columbia & Confederation* makes a contribution, but a limited one. The quality of its articles is mixed, and the topics discussed are excessively traditional.

Paul Phillips' article on the economy of British Columbia is excellent and contains a mass of useful material (some in tabular form) on such topics as the gold rush, the debt, the mining industry, transportation, the population, lumbering, and fishing. Confederation was clearly not an economic movement; annexation was probably a more attractive alternative. The articles on De Cosmos and Robson are informative summaries of two important careers and provide insights into public opinion during the Confederation period. Susan Scott's article explains how the

Confederation settlement accommodated the interests of British Columbia's permanent officials and magistrates. Articles on the pre-Confederation constitution, the annexation movement, and post-Confederation opinion concerning Canada would have brightened the book considerably.

Some rather poor judgments mar the volume. Can one really believe (without considerable evidence) that there existed "an innate respect for the law among the miners. . . ." (p. 38)? Was it true that Canadian-born British Columbians like De Cosmos and Robson "had been bred in an environment that despised any form of discrimination . . ." (p. 150)? T. L. Wood's astute interpretation of Britain's strategic motives for supporting Confederation (pp. 176-7) is described as "his own version of the 'conspiracy theory of history' . . ." (p. 177)! Edgar Dewdney became Minister of the Interior in 1888, not 1881 (p. 189n).

The book is illustrated with some interesting photographs and a reproduction of a picturesque map of British Columbia. The latter was an unhappy choice, because the print is all but unreadable. A map with clear print, listing the place names referred to in the various articles, would be more helpful. The book is carefully documented, and the footnotes provide an introduction to the sources for the period.

In spite of the volume's faults and rather pedestrian nature, its authors have made a contribution to Confederation studies and are to be commended for the ambitiousness of their centennial project.

DONALD SWAINSON

Queen's University

Canada's First Bank: A History of the Bank of Montreal. Volume Two. By MERRILL DENISON. Toronto-Montreal: McClelland & Stewart. 1967. Pp. xiv, 454, illus. \$7.50.

EVEN THE ADMIRERS of Volume One of this history will find Merrill Denison's second and concluding volume a distinct disappointment. The bank's unique contribution to Canadian economic and business history in its first twenty-four years possibly justifies the author's decision to give its succeeding 126-year history no more than equal treatment. Within his self-imposed spatial limits, however, Mr. Denison fails to answer satisfactorily most of the questions that will be raised by any serious reader.

Why is the Bank of Montreal no longer "Canada's First Bank" in total assets? This elementary question is not only not answered; it cannot be posed on the basis of a text which ignores the fact that the bank has been surpassed. Perhaps this oversight stems from the author's tendency to neglect the other Canadian banks except when they are failing, being absorbed by the Bank of Montreal, or petulantly resisting its thrusts for *statut particulier* in the Canadian banking structure. Accordingly it is often impossible to begin to assess the comparative entrepreneurial performance of the bank's management, particularly in recent decades.

In a wider context Mr. Denison attempts to relate the bank's fortunes to fluctuations in the Canadian economy, but sheds dim light on the interrelationship of the banking system and the economy. Certainly the bank's consistent and controversial policy of withdrawing funds from Canada for operations in the New York money market was profitable to the bank. Whether it was profitable to the community in which the bank has always claimed to have so much confidence is a moot point that is not adequately considered. Nor are such specific charges as the claim that the bank's New York speculations in the 1860s were hair-raising convincingly refuted. Possibly the material on which to base conclusive judgments no longer exists. Faced

with non-existent documentation and a grossly inadequate bibliography, the concerned reader cannot know.

Volume One's attempts to relate the bank to the Montreal business community and its aspirations are now abandoned. Aside from being essential to any preliminary understanding of the role of Montreal in later Canadian economic development, a study of these relationships would surely have clarified the bank's participation in the Byzantine world of Canadian capitalist politics. Such issues as the bank and Confederation, the tortuous course of banking legislation in the 1860s, and the financing of the CPR are given sometimes inconclusive, sometimes unreliable, never definitive treatment. On the evidence cited only the most unreflective reader will accept the claim that E. H. King, the bank's general manager at the time, "probably played a decisive role in the unrecorded conversations that led to Confederation." Nor is it credible that throughout the 1860s King can have been both "the Napoleon of Canadian finance" (which he was) and a pillar of cautious, disinterested rectitude (which he was not) as he fought a bitter, losing battle to make the bank the Canadian equivalent of the Bank of England.

The chapter on the CPR is perhaps the most useful in the book because of the author's access to the Cantlie collection of letters from Macdonald to Stephen (which were used thirty years ago by J. M. Gibbon and unfortunately neglected since) and because of the bank's remarkable success in maintaining the Grand Trunk account throughout the period. Yet the details of the financing do not jibe with other accounts—the bank's brief abandonment of the government in the 1885 crisis is not mentioned—and Stephen's highly controversial financing of the St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Manitoba line is completely ignored. Only one active director of the Bank of Montreal has ever been prime minister; Abbott's term of office coincided with the momentous decision to make the bank Canada's financial agent in London. Any implications arising from these facts are not considered, if even to be denied; indeed the facts are so obscured in the text that few readers will notice their connection. In the pages of this volume, as in most company histories, the sponsor has had no political interests after 1900.

The Bank of Montreal's century-long determination to regulate the personal lives of its employees—a fascinating chapter in Canadian social history—is barely hinted at although the author claims to have interviewed two hundred of the bank's pensioners. Sir Charles Bagot arrived in Canada and "took up the cause of responsible government where Sydenham had left it." Industrialism appears to have come to Canada between 1866 and 1874. In 1856 two million Canadians bear a public debt of \$48 million which works out to "less than \$15 per capita." In spite of its interpretive and factual shortcomings the volume does introduce the layman to later Canadian banking history in a literate, coherent, lavishly illustrated presentation. With its companion it will grace many bookshelves and coffee tables, particularly those of Bank of Montreal employees to whom it is offered at a handsome discount.

In the Foreword to Volume One Mr. Denison documents such extraordinary generosity to an author by his sponsor (how many of us will ever be able to specify eight research assistants "among" the staff we are subsidized to employ?) that one cannot believe the Bank of Montreal expected only the "exploratory document" that the author has admittedly produced. This may be the first time that a privately owned Canadian company has sincerely hoped to sponsor a magnificent contribution to Canadian historiography. Unless professional Canadian historians establish some ties with the world of business and business history it will not be the last time that an insouciant author frustrates such worthy intentions.

MICHAEL BLISS

University of Toronto

Jules-Paul Tardivel, *la France et les Etats-Unis 1851-1905*. Par PIERRE SAVARD. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval. 1967. Pp. xxxviii, 409. \$10.00.

AGÉ DE DIX-SEPT ANS, le jeune Américain, J.-P. Tardivel, s'inscrit au collège de Saint-Hyacinthe. Quatre années lui suffisent pour maîtriser la langue française qu'il ignorait totalement, compléter ses études et s'attacher profondément à sa nouvelle patrie. Après quelques mois au *Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe* et à la *Minerve* il entre au *Canadien* où pendant sept ans le célèbre Israël Tarte lui enseigne son métier de journaliste. En 1881, il fonde son propre journal: *La Vérité* dont il sera, jusqu'à sa mort en 1905, l'éditeur-propriétaire.

Catholique militant et journaliste de combat, pendant plus d'un quart de siècle, Tardivel participe avec ardeur à tous les grands débats du Canada français et même à ceux de ce que l'auteur appelle "l'Internationale ultramontaine." La dimension internationale du mouvement ultramontain ne manque pas d'intérêt pour replacer ce courant de pensée dans une juste perspective historique. Mais, comme le souligne l'auteur, les réflexions de Tardivel sur la France et les Etats-Unis nous en apprennent plus sur le journaliste québécois que sur ces deux pays. On pourrait même dire que plus Tardivel s'éloigne des questions internationales ou de la défense des grands principes du catholicisme plus il devient intéressant parce que plus personnel.

Le combat acharné que livre Tardivel contre "le péril français" et "le danger américain" s'explique par des raisons religieuses mais aussi par des raisons nationalistes. Si l'on ne tient pas compte constamment de cette dernière motivation, on risque fort de comprendre plus ou moins bien le personnage étudié.

Je me contenterai de deux exemples pour illustrer ma pensée. Ainsi, dans les pages (434-8) qui traitent de Tardivel et la langue française on voit que le directeur de la *Vérité* pour défendre cette cause pousse les choses un peu loin et en vient même à proférer des sottises. Mais, contrairement à ce qu'on pourrait croire en lisant le volume de M. Savard, le vrai danger qui menace notre langue ce n'est ni la France impie, ni le modernisme, ni même l'anglicisme mais bien les Anglais, car "soyons persuadés, dit Tardivel, que, parmi les Anglais qui nous entourent, beaucoup désirent ardemment voir disparaître la langue française du sol canadien."¹ Pendant des pages et des pages Tardivel dénonce le monstrueux colosse américain. Mais, en 1901, il écrit que l'annexion du Québec aux Etats-Unis, malgré tout, vaut mieux que la formule d'un Canada indépendant!² Comment expliquer ce paradoxe sans faire appel à la pensée politique de Tardivel? L'auteur en négligeant quelquefois la dimension nationaliste de son héros nous donne un Tardivel amputé d'une partie essentielle de sa pensée et de son action.

Il se dégage de l'étude de M. Savard un Tardivel qui "se condamne le plus souvent à soutenir des combats d'arrière-garde" (p. 465). Bref, un personnage réactionnaire et ce n'est pas faux; mais il le serait un peu moins si on tenait compte de sa pensée politique. Sur ce terrain, il fait preuve d'une lucidité qui nous étonne encore aujourd'hui et qui le place, au moins dans ce domaine, à l'avant-garde de son époque.

A la remarquable étude du professeur Savard sur le journaliste ultramontain il faudrait ajouter (ou mieux intégrer) l'étude du précurseur de l'indépendance du Canada français.³

RENÉ DUROCHER

Université de Montréal

¹J.-P. Tardivel, *La Langue française au Canada*, 1901, p. 65.

²J. G. Pelletier, "La Presse canadienne-française et la guerre des Boers," *Recherches Sociographiques*, IV (sept.-déc. 1963), 348.

³Dans la *Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique française*, XXI (déc. 1967), 397-428. Mathieu

Les Mémoires du Sénateur Raoul Dandurand (1861-1942). Edité par MARCEL HAMELIN. Québec: Les Presses de l'université Laval. 1967. Pp. xiv, 374, illustré. \$6.75.

THERE ARE MEMOIRS AND THERE ARE MEMOIRS. Some are a mine of valuable information to the historian (like Chubby Power's *A Party Politician*); others are just a hole in the ground (no names, no pack drill). Of posthumously edited memoirs, however, we have had very few in Canada, and it is difficult to know just how to judge such works. Is the editor to permit the author to speak for himself? Or should he revise, amend, and correct with a free hand, intent only on presenting the most accurate story to the reader?

Professor Hamelin has had to face up to this task. He has, he tells us, switched the order of chapters, omitted certain passages, made modifications, and reduced the number of explicatory notes to the minimum. He has added an index, eight pages of biographical notes on the cast of characters, and a twelve-page introductory essay. But clearly, it is Senator Dandurand speaking for himself. The result unfortunately is something of a disappointment.

Certainly Dandurand should have had a story to tell. His connections were of the best: friend to Mercier, Marchand, and Gouin in Quebec; friend to Laurier and King in Ottawa. In fact, it appears that Dandurand was the ideal middle man, the perfect channel of communication between the federal and provincial Liberal parties. And he was something of an organizer, too. From 1890 to 1895 he was Geoffrion's right-hand man in the Montreal machine, and from 1895 to 1908 he was the *chef*. For his services, he was appointed to the Senate in 1898, and he sat in the upper chamber until his death in 1942 (establishing a record for Senate service that is almost certain never to be topped unless someone like Keith Davey lives forever). From 1921 he was the Liberal leader in the Senate and a member of each of Mackenzie King's cabinets. And there is still more: Dandurand handled diplomatic chores for Laurier, and he was sent to Rome in 1910; from 1924 to 1930, he was the Canadian representative at the League of Nations and the president of the Assembly in 1925; and he was the author of that most typical remark of the inter-war period, describing Canada as a "fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials." The reader might reasonably expect to find at least some gold here.

There is none. The *Mémoires* are full of generalities and the commonplace. Some correspondence is included, but most seems to be with Laurier. Few characterizations are striking, few phrases stick in the mind. Very little that is new is found here. The best sections cover Dandurand's career as an organizer and party wheel-horse, and there are some sketchy details on party finance. The most noble sentiments are those with which the book closes: "Ma patrie est le Canada, et voilà pourquoi je me dis Canadien. Que ceux-là qui ont deux patries continuent à s'appeler Anglo-Canadien, c'est logique; quant à moi, je n'en ai qu'une."

The editor's contribution to the volume is not noteworthy. The index is virtually useless, and the biographical notes are riddled with errors. Mackenzie King, to cite one glaring example, was not really a lawyer, was not out of parliament from 1919 to 1921, and did not die in 1948. The introduction, however, does give a useful chronology of Dandurand's career. Finally, the volume is published in paperback form, and to charge \$6.75 for it is ridiculous.

J. L. GRANATSTEIN

York University

Girard commençait la publication d'une série de trois articles sur le nationalisme de J.-P. Tardivel.

Report of the Committee on Election Expenses. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. 1966. Pp. x, 528. \$5.50.

Studies in Canadian Party Finance. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. 1967. Pp. xxviii, 598. \$3.00 paper.

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE ON ELECTION EXPENSES was appointed in 1964 to recommend measures "to limit and control federal election expenses." The committee initiated a research programme with Dr. K. Z. Paltiel as research director and, as is so often the case, the research studies are likely to be of more lasting significance than the recommendations of the committee. The first volume, in addition to the official report, includes useful summaries of methods of supervising, limiting, or subsidizing election expenses in Canada and other countries. It also includes a good deal of information on party revenues and expenditures for the federal election campaign of 1965, an election which doubtless complicated the work of the committee but also provided it with a unique opportunity to collect data. These are informative but the most important studies from the point of view of a Canadian historian are "The Patterns of Canadian Party Finance" in the *Report*, and the articles published in the volume of *Studies*.

There is no need to justify studies of the financing of Canadian political parties. Party finances are obviously a focal point for studying Canadian politics. Parties are essential institutions for representative democracy. Every party is shaped by the way in which it acquires and spends its funds. Without this information, election analysis is little more than a discussion of voters' attitudes. We can link party policies and campaign promises with the popular vote and so offer an explanation for election results but this still leaves many questions unanswered. Elections are not won with prayers—or even promises. Parties must advertise and get the vote out, and so they must have money. Where does the money come from? How are groups or individuals persuaded to contribute to a party? To what extent are party policies affected by gratitude for donations or by the need for funds? Until these questions can be answered our political history will continue to resemble old-fashioned military history which described "decisive" battles solely in terms of military tactics.

The studies in these two volumes do not provide all the answers but they go farther than any previous studies have done. The authors have had to cope with a dearth of information about party finances. The studies covering the years before World War II have had to rely on familiar sources—the bibliographies include the usual biographies, articles, and unpublished theses. It would be easy to point out snippets of information which the authors have not discovered; every research student has seen some correspondence about an expensive by-election or about campaign contributions which would have provided more data for this period. On the other hand, every reader of these volumes will learn facts which he did not know before. Much more significant, these studies show that traditional sources can reveal a great deal of information if the gleaner is prepared to go through the chaff once again. J. L. Granatstein, for example, has discovered a good deal in the Manion Papers for his article on "Conservative Party Finances, 1939–1945." And K. Z. Paltiel, in his stimulating essay on "The Pattern of Canadian Party Finance," has offered some admittedly tentative conclusions on the basis of the data which has been assembled.

The authors are sometimes too tempted to draw conclusions from the inadequate evidence. It is doubtful, for example, whether the Liberals and Conservatives had "a highly centralized system of party finance" before 1919 (*Studies*, p. 4) and even Manion's difficulties with the CPR cannot safely be described as "the root cause of the Party's difficulties" (*Studies*, p. 267) without more information on the attitude

of the mining and manufacturing interests. But the studies do focus attention on one of the fundamental aspects of our political life and, although the sources now available for earlier periods in our history will never provide full answers to questions on party finances, the studies show that we can still learn a good deal.

For the postwar years, documentary sources have been supplemented by interviews and by a national survey. Party officials provided a good deal of information for the CCF-NDP study by Paltiel, Noble, and Whitaker, and for the study of the Ralliement des Cr ditistes by Stein. A clear picture emerges of how much money was collected by parties in recent years and how it was spent, although there is less detailed information on the sources of funds. The national survey by Meisel and Van Loon deals primarily with public attitudes towards party funds. It is a praiseworthy model of cautious analysis. It carefully describes the sampling and survey procedures and warns the readers of the limitations of the study. Sixty-five tables are included but the authors are prepared to admit on occasion that no clear pattern emerges or that the responses to certain questions are not easily explained. There is less restraint in some of the other studies for this period. The connection between the Cr ditistes' political objectives and their financial methods, for example, scarcely justifies "findings" about "mass parties" (*Studies*, p. 450-2).

Interviews can obviously provide data on contemporary party finances which can rarely be found in documents. If we are to learn more about the nature of political parties, however, we must be prepared to free this research technique from the bonds imposed by traditional sources. Interviews are little more than an extension of these sources if they are restricted to party officials—who can only give us the party side of the story. The key to an analysis of party finances is the explanation of why contributors donate. Interviews or surveys of the actual contributors would have added a new dimension to the postwar studies in these volumes.

These studies, according to the preface, are intended to be "an effective guide to further study." They more than attain this modest objective. If they do nothing else they will make all political historians more hesitant about referring casually to party "friends" and far more concerned with assessing parties and elections in terms of party finances.

H. BLAIR NEATBY

Carleton University

United States

Wilderness and the American Mind. By RODERICK NASH. New Haven and London: Yale University Press [Montreal: McGill University Press]. 1967. Pp. x, 256. \$6.50.

FOR MANY YEARS THE FRONTIER'S INFLUENCE on the development of American society has been accorded a prominent place in United States history. Considerably less attention has been paid to the varying attitudes of Americans towards that same frontier. Professor Nash has attempted to redress the balance with a broadly conceived study of the role attributed to wilderness by American society. Beginning with a survey of European roots of American attitudes, supplemented by short but useful references to the quite different view of wilderness held by biblical and oriental societies, the study traces developing perceptions of wilderness from the grim years of frontier expansion, when the destruction of wilderness was either ■

crusade or a test of endurance, through the years of dawning appreciation first encouraged by the Romantics and later taken up by the preservationists, conservationists, and cultists who have today succeeded in convincing us that we must act positively and immediately to retain that wilderness which still remains. For the general public appreciation of wilderness was achieved only as the frontier ceased to be an immediate hostile reality; preservation of wilderness came only when complete destruction seemed imminent. Professor Nash's study of this development is more than an outstanding contribution to the study of the American conservation movement; it is also an important addition to the study of American culture.

An ingenious expository technique provides a vehicle for developing the theme on two fronts. By devoting three chapters to the work and ideas of individuals—Thoreau the philosopher, John Muir "publicizer," and Aldo Leopold "prophet"—Professor Nash provides a sense of the significance of individual contact with wilderness and its importance to the development of specific cultural attitudes towards wild land. At the same time a thoughtful and imaginative treatment of more general themes—the locale and impact of Romantic ideas of wilderness, the decline of frontier hostility to underdeveloped land, and the struggle to preserve the best of America's remaining wilderness—succeeds in maintaining a sense of the continuum of development. The technique has weaknesses; a concentration on a few figures, however prominent, means that others must be given less extensive treatment, and a presentation which alternates between panorama and detail almost inevitably shatters the sequence of the story. For example, we find that Thoreau "led the intellectual revolution that was beginning to invest wilderness with attractive rather than repulsive qualities" long after we are told of the contributions of William Cullen Bryant, James Fenimore Cooper, and Thomas Cole. Again, we learn much of Muir and Leopold but Pinchot, Mather, and even Roosevelt remain insubstantial figures. In general, however, the technique is a successful one; perhaps no other could as eloquently express the relationship between individuals, their society, and wilderness. Without it, the story of the development of cultural attitudes to wilderness could only be superficial and insubstantial.

The student of Canadian history will find the study a source of inspiration and disappointment. There are disappointingly few references to this country. We learn that Thoreau and Parkman were inspired by Canadian scenery but Professor Nash has not gone beyond this to give his study a continental rather than a purely national perspective. This was his prerogative and his decision was probably a wise one; Canadian studies in the area are a wilderness in their own right. For comparative purposes, however, the study is invaluable. The courses taken by the preservationist and conservationist movements in the United States have had their impact on similar movements in this country. On the other hand, the utilitarian arguments used to justify the first wilderness parks were bolstered in Canada by aesthetic arguments that did not appear in the United States for some years after the establishment of Yellowstone National Park. Behavioural variations of this sort spring not only from the different points in time at which movements originate; they spring from fundamental differences between the two social and political systems, differences which we have scarcely begun to explore.

Every page of this study attests to the thorough research with which it is supported. A short note on sources is supplemented by extensive footnotes which cite an extremely broad range of sources. If any fault is to be found here it can only be that Professor Nash has not consolidated all his sources in a comprehensive bibliography.

A. P. PROSS

Dalhousie University

The Papers of James Madison. III. March–December 1781; IV. January–31 July 1782; V. 1 August–31 December 1782. Edited by WILLIAM T. HUTCHINSON and WILLIAM RACHAL. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1963, 1965, 1967. Pp. xxvi, 381, illus.; xxviii, 486, illus.; xxx, 520, illus. \$10.00; \$12.50; \$12.50 (US).

READING THESE VOLUMES is a little like panning for gold. In Volume III, covering some ten months of the year 1781, there are, in some 347 pages, by rough count, twenty-two letters from Madison to various correspondents (most of them to Edmund Pendleton) and twenty-four or twenty-five from Pendleton to Madison. Of the twenty-four Madison letters, not more than a dozen are of real interest. The rest of the volume is taken up with drafts of committee reports, motions made in Congress, reports of the Virginia delegates to Governor Jefferson, Madison's credentials to Congress and such matters, plus, of course, the exhaustive footnotes that we have come to expect in editorial works of this scope. I would estimate that these footnotes take up at least half the text, but one should not grumble for they make up the more interesting part for all that.

Unfortunately, Madison was not a particularly lively letter writer. He addressed himself soberly and thoroughly to the task at hand. There are very few, if any flashes of wit or trenchant phrases. All very sober and very Puritan. He allows himself a brief tirade against the British: "They have acted more like desperate bands of Robbers or Buccaneers than like a nation making war for dominion. Negroes, Horses, Tobacco &c not the standards and arms of their antagonists are the trophies which display their success. Rapes, murders & the whole catalogue of individual cruelties . . . are the acts which characterize the sphere of their usurped jurisdiction." Typically, there is a footnote to the mention of British atrocities and another observing that even when writing to close friends (in this case Philip Mazzei), Madison refrained from remarking on the fact that lightning had struck his boarding house two days before.

In Volume IV things pick up somewhat. There are forty some letters from Madison and fifty-four from his correspondents. Fortunately, Madison outstrips Pendleton or we should have been inclined to propose retitling the first two of these volumes.

Volume V is rather more of the same. The tendency of recent editorial projects of this kind to tell us rather more than we need or want to know has already been commented upon by many reviewers and it is ungracious to carp, I suppose, about a work as conscientiously done and as handsomely printed as this one. I can only say that, in my opinion, great letters and revealing diaries should be published, but I confess I find it hard to understand why, with the availability of microfilm, routine letters and documents have to be published. Reviewers seem almost uniformly reduced to the same round of complaints and the same encomiums on the typography, binding, design, editorial apparatus, and so on.

C. PAGE SMITH

University of California
Santa Cruz

Unquiet Eagle: Memory and Desire in the Idea of American Freedom, 1815–1860. By FRED SOMKIN. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1967. Pp. xiv, 233. \$5.95 (US).

PROFESSOR SOMKIN is concerned with exploring an identity crisis which he believes characterized the American national imagination in the first half of the nineteenth century. He describes this situation in these terms: "Roughly from the Peace of

1815 to the death of Thoreau in 1862, America was engaged in a quest for a definition of self that would give meaning to the American past, present, and future. . . . It is my contention that some of the contradictions that appeared in American life during the first half of the nineteenth century . . . were largely due to an agonizing and finally unsuccessful attempt to retain the esprit of a sacred society, a family brotherhood, within a framework of conceptual and institutional constructs based upon freedom of contract."

Assuming then that the first generation of Americans had the responsibility to guard the virtue of the national republic established in 1789, Professor Somkin explores in his first chapter, "Prosperity the Riddle," the fears that increasing prosperity brought. Many Americans, like Lyman Beecher, feared that great wealth must lead to moral decay and that the American republic would follow the example of Rome and collapse under the weight of its materialism. His second chapter, "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," sets forth the dilemma of American thinkers who saw the revolution of 1776 cutting their nation off from the European past. If the United States now existed in a timeless present, how could one accept a timeful and dramatic future? Adding to the further anxiety of Americans, according to the author, was their inability to relate to physical nature. In the third chapter, "No Home on the Range," he writes: "They had not sprung from the soil, but had taken it. . . . Land whose title had been acquired by forcible rape could never become Mother Earth."

In his fourth chapter, "The Greatest Man in the World," Professor Somkin analyses the meaning of Lafayette's visit in 1824. He describes this triumphal tour as a religious ritual in which Americans found "symbolic solution of problems that can neither be faced nor mastered." National reverence to Lafayette served as a ritual demonstration that a generation of vast material growth and change had not moved the nation away from the timeless virtue of George Washington for whom Lafayette served as a vicarious representative.

Finally, in his last chapter, "The Priesthood of Democratic Believers," the author argues that the historian George Bancroft, in his multi-volume historical celebration of the triumph of Jacksonian democracy, provided a metaphysical argument which was supposed to prove that the American people could not lose the virtue of the founding fathers because virtue was instinctive in the heart and soul of every common man.

This is a valuable and worthwhile book. A revised dissertation, it far transcends the usual narrow pedantry of so many doctoral studies. Its weaknesses, however, are the weaknesses of even the best dissertations, given the framework of historical study in American universities. Professor Somkin is a specialist in early nineteenth-century America. He cannot, therefore, discuss the late eighteenth century or the late nineteenth century. He must operate on the assumption that the patterns he is discussing are unique to his time period. But certainly Franklin and other eighteenth-century men were concerned with reconciling virtue and wealth. And certainly late nineteenth-century Americans like Andrew Carnegie were desperately concerned with reconciling virtue and wealth.

Beyond the restraint of being a time specialist, the American historian is also restricted by the convention of national history. It could be argued that all of the particular dilemmas of wealth and time and space that Professor Somkin explores are central to the middle class of western civilization which had symbolically rejected the mediaeval past to search for both wealth and virtue, which in rejecting that past had committed itself to a timeless present, and which in rejecting the landed rootedness of aristocracy and peasantry had committed itself to endless mobility in space.

This reviewer hopes that soon historians will see the need for comparative studies

between time periods within particular nations, and between nations themselves. We may even come to compare American and Canadian history.

DAVID W. NOBLE

University of Minnesota

The Frontier Against Slavery: Western Anti-Negro Prejudice and the Slavery Extension Controversy. By EUGENE H. BERWANGER. Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press. 1967. Pp. x, 176. \$5.95 (US).

THE THESIS OF PROFESSOR BERWANGER'S workmanlike study is that racism and Negrophobia dominated the thinking of the region between Ohio and the Pacific during the slavery extension controversy. No one will be surprised to hear it. To his credit, Berwanger does not limit himself to providing detailed documentation for what everyone knows; rather, by meticulous examination of the sources, he offers us the first full-scale picture of western racism during the late antebellum period and in so doing demonstrates that the disease was even more rampant and pervasive than we might have imagined. Even specialists, who think they know the facts, and others who have grown accustomed to fresh evidence of anti-Negro barbarism will need a strong stomach for the story that is told here, although it is told with admirable restraint and objectivity.

Berwanger demonstrates the extent to which Republicans and Democrats, Free Soil men and slavery extension advocates, abolitionists and proslavery apologists all vied with each other in appeals to a deep-rooted Negrophobia. In particular he reveals the role played by the ever present fear of miscegenation in the politics of the period. As the current storm over William Styron's *The Confessions of Nat Turner* reminds us, the sexual dimension of the race problem in the United States is a matter of the utmost gravity. It always has been, and it may be sloughed off as a white Southern nightmare or a superficial manifestation only by those who are intent on ignoring the explosive obvious.

Berwanger begins his story in the old northwest and carries it over the plains states, across the Rockies, and into California, and the Pacific northwest. Among his secondary but important contributions are a fresh and thoughtful look at the Kansas question and a good contribution to the critique of Ramsdell's celebrated thesis of the natural limits of slavery expansion.

In his introduction Berwanger insists that the Free Soil dichotomy between opposition to slavery and opposition to slavery extension was false and ignored the union of the two in the central problem of the place of the Negro in American life. This judgment would seem arbitrary and excessively present-minded, but it would have been worth exploring. The single major failing in this able monograph is in its waste of space on an epilogue that is little more than a summary. Berwanger would have performed a great service by using that space to tie up the threads of his research in an evaluation of the legacy left by antebellum western racism to modern America.

EUGENE D. GENOVESE

Sir George Williams University

Government in Science: The U.S. Geological Survey, 1867-1894. By THOMAS G. MANNING. Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press. 1967. Pp. xiv, 257. \$7.00 (US).

CANADIANS CONVERSANT with trends in American historiography will recognize this excellent monograph as a blending of the history of science, public administration,

and western exploration. Perhaps Canadian historians have yet to exploit the field of government-sponsored scientific research encompassed by this volume and pioneered in the United States by A. Hunter Dupree *et al.* At any rate, it is a characteristic feature of this new school to reify or institutionalize science and set its practitioners apart from society. This the author does as he treats of the formative years of the Geological Survey. Although there are several books and articles touching on facets of this subject, it is the achievement of this work to present an integrated study of the United States Geological Survey based upon a most complete examination of the Survey's correspondence files and the extant manuscripts and published materials of most of the principals involved. The very thorough bibliographical essay at the conclusion of the book and the elaborate documentation throughout the text illustrate the breadth of scholarship involved and explain in part why with the dearth of later records this book did not cover twentieth-century developments.

The author's over-arching theme is that institutionalized science tends to proliferate and that where government is involved, as with the leading scientific bureau in the post-Civil War years, congressional resistance developed at the time that government-in-science posed political problems, that is when scientists quarrelled in public, when the public demanded retrenchment, and, especially, when scientists proposed serious reforms of society. Thus the state of government science reflected the values current in late nineteenth-century society. It is noteworthy that the government called on the National Academy of Sciences (the institutional voice of the scientific community) to propose the unification of the four western surveys in a permanent government agency which was created in 1879 as a part of the Department of the Interior. Since the dominant economic interests of the country did not want the land disposal system interfered with and did want the nation's mining resources surveyed, Clarence King, director of the Fortieth Parallel Survey and the most qualified mining geologist, was appointed director of the new United States Geological Survey. The author stresses the resistance King encountered in recommending a reform of the mining industry to put it on a non-speculative basis. One wonders whether it was this budgetary check so much as personal factors that led to King's resignation. Professor Manning is in closer sympathy with the new director who took office in 1881. For instance, John Wesley Powell is given credit for extending the work of the survey on a national basis and for staving off curtailment of survey activities in the economy wave of the Democratic interlude in 1886, a hitherto neglected accomplishment of Powell's directorship. Sadly, however, Powell's political acumen deserted him in the 1888 congressional irrigation survey struggle to prevent settlement at survey-located reservoir sites. Here the homesteader ideal and western-based individualism collided with eastern conservation impulses and a desire for land classification and orderly resource development. Manning's reconstruction of these dramatic congressional political struggles is impressive.

The author examines problems associated with the survey which he believes adhere to government-sponsored science in a democracy, alike in the space age and in nineteenth-century America. There was, for example, little public support for continuance of Army geological survey work in 1879. Government science was thus civilian science at that time. Economic geology prospered under Clarence King's sponsorship; under Powell's lead, palaeontology also made great strides so that both disciplines were at the forefront of research science in America. The survey also pioneered in protecting the Yellowstone region from commercial exploitation and conducted the surveys basic to the forest and mineral reservation policy inaugurated after 1891. The national topographical mapping project made progress under Powell and techniques were refined under his successor, C. D. Walcott. Scientists

found a congenial home in the survey and in the co-operating state surveys so that government revenue underwrote both pure and practical research and publication. This institutional history is extremely readable as its pages are enlivened with the throbbing pace of political contests, where national issues and scientists and political leaders of national stature take sides. The author in this volume sets a model for other studies of semi-independent science-oriented government bureaus in the federal establishment.

LAWRENCE B. LEE

San Jose State College
San Jose, Calif.

The Search for Order, 1877-1920. By ROBERT H. WIEBE. New York: Hill and Wang [Scarborough: Fitzhenry & Whiteside]. 1967. Pp. xvi, 333. \$7.25.

THE PERIOD BETWEEN RECONSTRUCTION and World War I was marked by the profound changes in American society indicated by the standard terms "industrialization," "nationalization," and "urbanization." Recent valuable interpretations of this period are S. P. Hays' *The Response to Industrialism* and R. Ginger's *Age of Excess*. Now, in *The Search for Order*, Robert Wiebe, professor of history at Northwestern and author of *Businessmen and Reform*, gives us a subtle, richly descriptive, and gracefully written interpretation of these years. As an overview of the period, Wiebe's work is without peer.

According to Wiebe, America changed from a society of island communities with local autonomy to a society based upon functionality, continuity, rationality, and administration. A managerial, bureaucratic government was born and values shifted from those based on village experience to those based on bureaucratic ideas "peculiarly suited to the fluidity and impersonality of an urban-industrial world" (p. 145). In the America of the island community, power had been personal but "America in the late nineteenth century was a society without a core" (p. 12). The anxiety created by the displacement of old values led many Americans to defend a vague creed of "community self-determination" and to attack the power and impersonality of monopoly. The Knights of Labor, Bellamy's nationalism, the Farmers' Alliance, and, above all, the Populist movement "sought to preserve individualism and democracy . . . by protecting America's communities" (p. 74).

Wiebe's view of the Populists as defenders of the small community may seem to support those critics who argue that populism was an anti-industrial and hence reactionary agrarian movement. But Wiebe makes the crucial distinction between criticism of the means of industrialization and criticism of technology itself. The Populists were critics of monopoly capitalism but not of technology *per se* which they wanted to reconcile with the humanistic values of community life.

The Progressives differed from these late nineteenth-century reformers in their positive feeling for the emerging bureaucratic order. The Progressives were a new middle class who regarded the new order as a fulfilment of their professional talents. "The heart of Progressivism was the ambition of the new middle class to fulfill its destiny through bureaucratic means" (p. 166). The Progressives then were less a "status threatened elite" (Richard Hofstadter, *et al.*) than they were reformers who thought that modernization through efficient scientific government would bring "opportunity, progress, order and community" (p. 170).

Wiebe's discussion of foreign policy is less original and persuasive than his earlier sections although it is a valuable synthesis of recent scholarly work and contains brilliant insights. He argues that the search for order in domestic life prevailed also

in the emergence of a foreign policy dominated by financiers and advocates of power. Both groups were largely composed of urban eastern Republicans who favoured stable centralized power used at home and abroad in a rational efficient way.

This imposing work would have more merit had it drawn upon relevant concepts and methods from other disciplines: use of the literature on urbanism beginning with the work of Tönnies, recent empirical studies of alienation, comparative data on modernization and studies of social change would have strengthened the analytic power of the central propositions. A greater cross-disciplinary focus drawing upon these concepts could provide richer and more extensive explanations for the shift of values in this period and a fuller understanding of the global significance of America's bureaucratization.

DAVID B. GRIFFITHS

York University

Woodrow Wilson, The Academic Years. By HENRY WILKINSON BRAGDON. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press [Toronto: Saunders]. 1967. Pp. xiv, 519, illus. \$9.95.

HENRY WILKINSON BRAGDON has written a first-rate treatment of Woodrow Wilson before he became governor of New Jersey in 1910. It is an excellent book, meticulously researched, sensitively written, sympathetic yet objective, and it possesses a tone of authority which comes from a nearly thirty-year search among the documents and the people who remembered Wilson in the groves of academe.

A central strength of this book lies in its method. Eschewing commitment to a single, predominant interpretation of Wilson's development which has marred some writing on the subject, Bragdon has let the sources guide him throughout his study. This approach has caused him periodically to cross the line separating history from antiquarianism, an irritating weakness in the early chapters of the book; yet at the same time it has helped him both to enlarge the familiar aspects of Wilson's life and also to develop other themes which have been hitherto slighted.

Bragdon reveals better than anyone else the extraordinary drive for power which characterized the pre-political Wilson. It is of course evident from the relevant sections of Link and Walworth that Wilson was an ambitious man, but by an intensive study of the early years Bragdon illuminates the full passion and energy which fired this ambition. Unfortunately the psychological reasons for this pursuit of power are not discussed at any length. Bragdon quite rightly dismisses the claims of Bullitt and Freud, but he develops no sophisticated explanation of his own in its place.

From the beginning, writes Bragdon vaguely, Wilson was moved "by a prophetic dream of future eminence." His youth was a remarkably self-conscious preparation for political leadership. He was constantly searching for the secret of success, disciplining himself, perfecting his oratory and writing, and studying the political art of Gladstone and Bright for helpful hints. He aspired to a life of action, not one of scholarly research. Thus when he found the curricula of Princeton and Johns Hopkins not to his taste in this regard he took his education into his own hands through voracious independent reading. He decided also to pass up the Ph.D. at Hopkins because he felt that it would be a boring, pedantic exercise. (He received the degree later, however, after he apparently changed his mind over its value for an academic career. The regular examination was waived and *Congressional Gov-*

ernment was accepted as his thesis.) As both student and teacher he was enthusiastically engaged in extracurricular affairs, and no other Princeton professor except Andrew West was more active in committee work. Moreover, he was immensely popular and successful in these endeavours until, as president of Princeton, he overreached himself in battles concerning the quad plan and the graduate college.

During all this time the popular teacher and public lecturer pondered the problems of leadership and government in a democracy, and Bragdon makes an important contribution by demonstrating the ideological flexibility which Wilson brought to this task. Furthermore, in tracing this intellectual odyssey, Bragdon shows that from his editorship of the *Daily Princetonian* forward Wilson stressed the need for efficiency and discipline in the organization of human affairs, and the important role that a highly trained élite would play in obtaining it. In other words, although it is clear that as an emerging reformer Wilson cherished the idea of liberty in the democratic state, it is equally clear that he really admired the idea of order more. But this is not surprising, for the man who Bragdon discovers through an analysis of his writings and lectures is more like one of those self-confident, efficiency-minded, bureaucratic-orientated, middle-class progressives described by Robert Wiebe in *The Search For Order* than the misguided moral idealist and individualist described by John Blum in *Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality*.

Bragdon levels the usual criticisms at Wilson—the frequent selfrighteousness, narrowmindedness, and personal aloofness—but in addition to introducing the physical factor of cerebral arteriosclerosis to help explain unusual outbursts of such behaviour, Bragdon also goes beyond them to develop a more complex and likable Wilson than is contained in the popular stereotype. His study, in conclusion, is important not only for what it reveals of Woodrow Wilson's academic years, but also for what it suggests of Woodrow Wilson's political years.

ROBERT CUFF

University of Rochester

Great Britain

Commonwealth and Protectorate: The English Civil War and Its Aftermath. By IVAN ROOTS. New York: Schocken Books. 1966. Pp. x, 326. \$8.50 (US).

The Fifth Monarchy Men. By P. G. ROGERS. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1966. Pp. viii, 168, illus. \$4.50.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND PROTECTORATE is a period to baulk at, if an author, or to leap at, if a teacher. It is a tangled web, full of knots and thorny problems of fact and interpretation, snarled by immense difficulties, a maze of parties and factions, theories and interests, and all still contended for, still surrounded by lively, even bitter, debate. At the same time the period contains such excitement, such protagonists, such issues, such enigmas, as make it a teacher's paradise. The formidable task of exploring the thick undergrowth and describing the loftier foliage at once has daunted so many scholars that no one has attempted such a thorough study since Gardiner and Firth. It has clearly been a lifetime work for Mr. Roots. Like Gardiner and Firth he has chosen to stress political and constitutional matters and he has adopted the narrative form. Yet he could never hope to attain their level of

clarity, for much that was clear to those grand whigs is not clear now, and much that was unavailable and unthought of is known. The comfortable certainties of earlier scholars are simply not possible. Instead, what Mr. Roots offers is a painstaking, thorough, and impartial parade of the multitudinous happenings. Given the density of the happenings, and the care with which so many issues are treated, it is not surprising that there is nothing strikingly original said. It is surprising and refreshing to find that the whole work is extraordinarily well written, spritely, and gripping.

It is partly nostalgia that makes us want to catch at a theme, at a coherent thread, and a clearly discernible overview. Mr. Roots' prose does not strike the solemn and majestic notes that Gardiner's found, for instance, at the moment of the King's execution. And Gardiner was not on the King's side at all. There is something here which can help us understand the change of tone that Mr. Roots has sounded: for Gardiner and Firth, for all their Victorian assumptions, were not afraid of grandeur and courage, of sublimity, or perfervid fanaticism. Judgments came easily to them. While Mr. Roots draws a contrast between "an iron age, an age of destruction, of the squabbles of kites and crows, of petty schisms, meanness and ignorance" and the "golden age, an age of construction, of the large wars of truth, of unity, generosity and knowledge" this contrast is subdued throughout the book until the very end. Times have changed and eroded our capacity for commitment; the characters seem to be carried forward by the events rather than the reverse; vignettes are avoided; and one cannot help feeling that larger decisions of historical interpretation and of perspective have been avoided too.

Yet what a welter of detail and information Mr. Roots has managed to contain artfully in less than 300 pages! His close account will be relied upon by students and scholars for many many years, until a brave scholar attempts to weave a sense of the momentous and complexity together.

Far less ambitious is Mr. Rogers' *Fifth Monarchy Men*. Here is a small group whose "ideology" or faith is set out more clearly than ever before. Louise Brown's older study of Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men may now be shuffled off the bibliographies. These active millenarians make entertaining history. Cromwell was not uninfluenced by their views, by way of Harrison, yet with the destruction of the Parliament of Saints he found himself faced with a crew of dedicated and dangerous enemies. What is not traced are the connections between these dissidents and old Leveller malcontents in the last years of the Protectorate, or between Vane and some of the Parliamentary Commonwealthsmen and these stiff-necked subversives, these back-alley conspirators. Yet we are given the sense of their vivacity; we are deeply moved by the telling of Harrison's execution; there is both sympathy and judgment in the telling of their continuous frustrations. While there was reason in reality to suspect that Christ's monarchy might be coming soon after the death of Charles I, the grounds evaporated with the passing years, as Oliver Cromwell interposed himself before Jesus Christ. And yet this forlorn group clung tenaciously to their hopes even after the Restoration. It would be tempting to slip into cynicism and scorn: Mr. Rogers has displayed none. He allows his subjects to speak for themselves, and we are grateful for the chunks from their pamphlets. A minor, fanatical sect who expected miracles just around the corner of time has been brought to life before our eyes, and though the subject was limited, perhaps because it was limited, Mr. Rogers has been able to perform in this resurrection a little miracle of his own, a beautifully wrought little book.

JOHN F. H. NEW

King's College

Lord North. By ALAN VALENTINE. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press [Don Mills: Burns & MacEachern]. Two volumes. 1967. Pp. xii, 568; viii, 517; illus. \$23.95 the set (US).

MR. VALENTINE has found a subject much more congenial to him than Lord George Germain, whose biography he published six years ago. That book suffered from the rare biographical fault that the author detested the man he was writing about too much to be fair to him; Lord North, by contrast, is handled sympathetically, with as much stress on his virtues as his defects, both of which were so prominent that Valentine has to accept, at the end, the paradox of a man "at once endearing and unpardonable" (II, 468). Endearing North certainly was; his charm and humour, to which these volumes do full justice, were famous in an age replete with both. Why unpardonable? Presumably because of his utter incapacity to lead. (In this respect Germain, for all his faults, was vastly his superior.) North once confessed that he "never could decide between different opinions" (II, 27), and he substituted bursts of tears for decision-making. The source of tears was doubtless frustration and self-pity: he was intelligent enough to realize two things, that the first minister had to direct the cabinet if it was not to fall apart, and that he was unable to direct. The longer the King forced him to remain in office, the more the government degenerated into autonomous departments.

More than half a century ago Reginald Lucas published his two-volume biography of North. Is that delightful and incompetent minister worth another two volumes now? The answer depends on how much Valentine has to contribute in the way of new material or new interpretation or both. His material ranges widely, from manuscripts to recent studies, but his principal reliance is on old, familiar authorities, and what he derives from them is illuminating rather than challenging. Furthermore, he has not consulted some of the significant work of the 1960s. For an unexplained reason his text underwent final revision three years before publication; hence he could not utilize the twelfth and most relevant volume of L. H. Gipson's *British Empire before the American Revolution*, which appeared late in 1965. But Piers Mackesy's *War for America* was available in 1964 and, if used thoughtfully, would have deepened Valentine's understanding of the administration in the war years, a period to which he devotes half of his two volumes.

One reason for the bulk of this biography is that ministerial manoeuvrings are treated in great detail. Such treatment breaks little new ground: I. R. Christie, J. S. Watson, Dorothy Marshall, Archibald Foord, and others have given minute attention to the story of "who loses and who wins; who's in, who's out." Retelling it at length seems unnecessary, the more so because it is tedious for the average reader. He soon grasps that politicians were constantly scheming for office and demanding rewards for their services; then he grows restive, unless he is a true devotee, at having every scheme and demand explained at length.

If Valentine's material is not novel, what about his use of it? In places he develops his theme with a sure hand. His characterizations of North and the King, and the complex relationship between them, are excellent; the constitutional uncertainties of an evolving cabinet system are clearly brought out, as is the nature of the creaking bureaucracy; the account of the young Pitt's fight to establish his ministry in 1784, unlike Dorothy Marshall's account, is dramatic. But in other places Valentine falters. He is occasionally naïve about eighteenth-century society, as when he implies that the Whigs had once been democrats in the modern sense, or that fundamental social change, rather than Yorktown, ended North's ministry (I, 57; II, 451-2, 454). His references to the war are often inaccurate; he assigns the King

a part in directing it for which there is no evidence and retains a few of the gross errors, particularly about the Saratoga campaign, that marred his *Germain*. But shortcomings that were serious in a biography of the minister who did direct the land war are much less so in one of North, who "evaded reality by withdrawing as much as possible from contact with military and naval problems" (I, 433).

Why this evasion? Why the bursts of tears, the deepening paralysis of will, the black moods of a man famous for his equability? What forces, in short, were working to erode North's real gifts and reduce him, at the climax of his career, to the shadow of a man? The question leads the historian toward psychological depths, which Valentine approaches with understandable caution. He emphasizes North's singular acceptance, even as an adult, of paternal domination and traces to this deference his indecisiveness and subordination to the King as a surrogate father. An intriguing theory, but it raises more questions. Why did North so easily accept parental leading strings? Was it because or in spite of them that he rose to high office? What finally enabled him to defy the King by resigning, and then to defy the King, his father, and his own principles by entering the notorious coalition with Fox? Valentine cannot be expected to provide the answers, but without them North remains an enigma. If reliable ways are ever found to explore the neuroses of the dead, some future psychohistorian will make fascinating use of the material these volumes contain.

WILLIAM B. WILLCOX

University of Michigan

Great Britain in the Indian Ocean, 1810-1850: A Study of Maritime Enterprise. By GERALD S. GRAHAM. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1967. Pp. xiv, 479, maps. \$12.50.

IT MAY BE UNFAIR to seize on an author's own admission as the fulcrum for a review, but it is true that there is no conscious *over-all* theme uniting the parts of this book: excepting only the geographical one implicit in the title. To an extent the police duty that both hit at piracy and gradually suffocated the slave trade was a common factor—an activity that was glorious in conception, difficult of execution, and (on the crews of H.M. ships) debilitating in effect.

But Professor Graham is aware that behind these activities, and in a way superimposed upon them, were the aims of a nation wearing a commercial soul and one who had also taken up a diplomatic stance in Europe. All these pressures came to the operational point on the quarterdecks of too few ships, supplied with too little information abroad. Witness the quotation from the diary of Midshipman Montagu Burrows, which the author says (p. 79) "went to the heart of the problem of Naval intervention in eastern diplomacy. 'I don't think our Captain and his advisers knew anything about the rights of the matter, but I suppose they were sent to support existing institutions for the sake of the commerce of Mauritius.'" And they went on to shift some local potentates around, rather in the manner of Nelson in his dealings with the Neapolitan monarchy.

Nevertheless there is a unity to all this. The book explodes the idea of either Machiavellian diplomatists with a master plan for the east, or of counting-house entrepreneurs to whom naval captains were mere servants. The book is a valuable explanation of how the British ran an unplanned, but not unwanted, empire on the cheap. It has yet to be proven that there is any precise relation between units of naval power and units of mercantile sea power. This book demonstrates carefully how difficult such a correlation is to reach.

The book is dedicated to the members of Professor Graham's seminar, 1949-67.

For a while, years ago, I was a member of that group. Other members would want me to return the compliment to him, and to say that his book like his seminar reflects his rugged individuality. Also that behind that sometimes gruff exterior there lurks a romantic heart, one that is revealed in this book which is crusted with the salt of the sea and which boldly testifies to the accomplishments of the men of the Royal Navy in the exotic east.

On page 450, Gerald Graham speaks of the men of empire thus: "The majority were ordinary men who sought far horizons, and sometimes achieved wonders which would have entirely eluded them had they spent their lives in the purlieus of Whitehall or the Royal Exchange." The remark might apply to many of his students, but they needed their time with the Compass Master at King's.

D. M. SCHURMAN

Queen's University

The Making of the Second Reform Bill. By F. B. SMITH. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1966. Pp. viii, 297. \$9.35.

1867, Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing of the Second Reform Bill. By MAURICE COWLING. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada]. 1967. Pp. xii, 451. \$12.00.

THERE HAS BEEN AN EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT OF INTEREST in the Reform Act of 1867 of late, aroused no doubt in part by its recent centenary. In 1965 Royden Harrison in his *Before the Socialists, 1861-1881* included an essay emphasizing the influence of working-class agitation on the passing of the bill; then in 1966 Gertrude Himmelfarb in the *Journal of British Studies* (vol. VI) sought to explode what she considered the Liberal myth about the Second Reform Act and to reinterpret Disraeli's policy as being latitudinarian rather than opportunistic; and in the same year, Robert Blake, in his brilliant biography of Disraeli, presented a perceptive short account of the affair, which gave Disraeli his due but had no illusions about his opportunism.

It is curious that two major monographs on the subject now appear within a year and from the same press.¹ Although they inevitably cover much common ground and make use of many of the same sources, the two books differ markedly in their point of view and even more in their method of presentation. Smith presents a straightforward, mainly narrative account of the subject, fifty pages describing the existing system and previous attempts at reforming it, about seventy pages on the 1866 bill, a little over a hundred describing the passage of the 1867 bill, and a brief conclusion of fourteen pages. His sympathies lie more with Gladstone than Disraeli on whose tactics he makes (with good reason) some sharp comments, but he fully recognizes the political failure of the former and triumph of the latter. He concludes that an act was finally passed in 1867 because parliament for the first time felt the necessity of doing so. He notes three new elements contributing to this situation: the influence of mass agitation (but he does not overemphasize this); Disraeli's determination to pass a bill (a view strongly endorsed by Blake); the setting in of a "mixture of boredom and confused disillusionment" among the members of the Commons. Every important decision, he observes, was made "by an unpredictable floating vote composed of . . . individuals entering one lobby or another according to their whim or muddled understanding of the question."

Cowling's is a larger and more complex work, by no means as easy to read, but

¹Dr. Smith's book is published in conjunction with the Melbourne University Press.

more thought-provoking. Both the title and the organization of the book are puzzling, the theme is often obscured by a massive wealth of detail, but the work is based on extensive and penetrating research and is full of interesting and perceptive asides. Like Miss Himmelfarb, Cowling sets out to refute the conventional Liberal interpretation of the events of 1866 and 1867, but he offers no simplistic alternative. He regards his study "as an essay in political sociology—an attempt to uncover the logic of conservative resistance"; he is also concerned "to suggest that sense of continuing tension *between* and *within* and *across* party," which he feels has been neglected by previous historians, including Dr. Smith. Mr. Cowling spends no time on the historical background, but plunges right into a brief summary account of the events of 1866 and 1867 in the first seven pages of his first chapter, which he entitles "Prelude." The rest of the chapter is devoted to a general consideration of several broad questions raised by the passage of the bill of 1867. Here the cart seems to be before the horse, for in the next chapter, entitled "Preliminaries," he goes back to an account of the defeat of the bill of 1866. There is less narrative of events than in Smith, but Cowling goes into some aspects of the subject, such as the political interconnections of various groups and individuals, more fully and he is more critical of Gladstone. Six chapters then follow roughly, but not entirely, in chronological sequence, dealing with the origins and passage of the Conservative bill of 1867. Within a particular chapter, however, the author's discussion ranges backwards and forwards without any strict consideration of chronological development, on the grounds presumably that the reader will keep firmly in his mind every detail provided in the summary of events at the beginning of the book.

The treatment of the all-important Hodgkinson amendment, which doubled the electorate without even the formality of a vote, is a good illustration of the sometimes baffling way in which Mr. Cowling unfolds his argument. The bare facts are first stated on p. 14 in the summary of events; the amendment is then discussed at some length in a section called "The Problem" (pp. 42–7); it receives another three pages (233–6) in chapter vi, and then after an interlude (chapter vii) on "The Public Agitation," we get a whole chapter (viii) entitled "The Acceptance of Hodgkinson's Amendment." In addition there are some fourteen further comments on or references to the amendment throughout the book. In a concluding chapter his most emphatic point is that "there was no capitulation to popular pressure," which makes one wonder why he included the word "revolution" in the title. The explanations of the developments of 1866–7 he says are to be found by studying the impact of events on various individuals and groups; the complete failure of the Cave, for instance, is seen in the inadequacy of the individuals who made it up. The differences between Gladstone and Disraeli he claims were in "manner, temper and direction" not in "fundamental principle." Gladstone antagonized a large number of his own followers "because he was less capable than Disraeli or Palmerston of the highest sorts of ambiguity." Disraeli was far more successful in adjusting to events and thus remaining in control, but Cowling admits that it is not clear that he knew where he was going.

Mr. Smith's book is to be recommended to the student who wants to be informed on this very complex subject. Mr. Cowling's is more difficult to read, but it will probably prove of greater interest to the scholar already familiar with the topic. He should be warned, however, that the author makes a complicated subject more complex by his love of lengthy speculations and of negative sentences, as well as by a frequently involved form of writing. Both books are independently worthwhile contributions to our knowledge of an important topic.

J. B. CONACHER

University of Toronto

Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform. By PAUL SMITH. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1967. Pp. x, 358. \$10.00.

WHO EDUCATED THE MID-VICTORIAN CONSERVATIVE PARTY, Disraeli or the forces of urban industrial society? Which concept eventually shaped the reality if not the mythology of modern Conservatism, Disraeli's tory democracy or Peel's rally of the bourgeoisie? Paul Smith, in each case, firmly chooses the latter. The basic theme of Disraelian conservatism may have been "the elevation of the condition of the people," he argues, but the fact remains that between 1867 and 1880 the Tory party attracted to itself so large a share of the "satisfied and self-defensive" middle class that it became the bastion of vested interest, both landed and industrial. Thus Randolph Churchill trod the primrose path of tory democracy in vain. His resignation from the Exchequer in 1886 was not a turning point in party history but only a clash between his restless energies and a party already set on a conflicting course.

The crucial event in the party's development was, according to this thesis, the passing of the Reform Act of 1867. Paradoxically, the Tory ministry which passed it seemed more willing to undertake paternalistic welfare legislation before the extension of the franchise to urban working men than afterward. Derby and Disraeli decided to initiate parliamentary reform, Smith thinks, not out of their desire to construct a Conservative democracy and not out of indifference to the consequences of a popular franchise, but because they wished to improve the tactical position of their party. The Act that emerged in the spring of 1867 dished the Whigs but also surprised the Conservatives. The election of 1868 showed that outside of Liverpool and Manchester the working-class voters felt little gratitude for the Tory reform, but party leaders noted that a small but encouraging number of wealthy Liberal industrialists and commercial men had joined the Conservative ranks. Gladstone's ministers in the four years which followed reinforced this trend by frightening men of property with their Irish Land Act and by enraging nonconformists with their education measure. Vigorous in making enemies to the right, the Liberal ministry did little to consolidate support from the left. Thus Disraeli's forces had, in theory, two choices: adopt a vigorous and convincing social welfare programme in hopes of detaching the working classes from liberalism or continue to exploit middle-class fears of creeping democracy and socialism. But even had he wished to do so (and Smith has his doubts), the author of *Sybil* was in no position to build a national party based on tory democracy. Instead he directed his gaze out from England's shores after 1874 and left the direction of domestic affairs in the efficient, bourgeois hands of R. A. Cross and W. H. Smith—a team Randolph Churchill derisively referred to as "Marshall and Snelgrove." After 1846, Smith argues, Disraeli did not proceed to construct modern conservatism; "indeed, in destroying Peel, he had retarded its main line of development, the absorption of the bourgeoisie, by some twenty years."

The main lines of this argument are reasonably familiar and convincing, but they meet one serious obstacle. The Conservative ministry between 1874 and 1876 compiled the most impressive record of the nineteenth century in the enactment of social reforms. Smith admits the difficulty and offers these explanations: that Disraeli had no programme of legislation in 1874 but merely reacted to pressures or opportunities; that most of the credit is due to the zeal of R. H. Cross; and that, with the possible exception of the generous Trade Unions Act, the measures were examples of "confused and nervous empiricism." In his distaste for state paternalism, his belief in permissive legislation, local government, and free enterprise, Cross was a classical economist—at heart an archetypal Peelite. This gives too little credit to Cross and the Prime Minister who maintained him in office and stood by him at

times of stress; it gives too much to Peel, whose social vision could hardly comprehend the legalization of peaceful picketing, compulsory purchase by state agencies in order to erect artisan dwellings, or the restriction of hours of employment for women and children in the factories. The myths of tory democracy have been under attack in recent years, and Smith's intelligent study effectively bolsters that attack. Disraeli did not, it seems, educate his party, but he did preside, in his last ministry, over a group of men who had learned some essential lessons.

JAMES WINTER

University of British Columbia

The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organization. By JOHN EDWARD KENDLE. London: For the Royal Commonwealth Society by Longmans [Toronto: Longmans Canada]. 1967. Pp. xii, 264. \$7.20.

THIS BOOK EXAMINES a well-worn theme: the turn-of-the-century debate about the relationship of the self-governing colonies to Britain. But if its theme is familiar its approach is not. It stresses the means used or advocated to communicate rather than what was communicated. It is essentially administrative rather than political history. But since so little of the imperial reorganization suggested by politicians, pressure groups, and civil servants was implemented, it is mostly about what was not done rather than what was achieved. The frustrated schemes of Chamberlain, Lyttelton, and Ward, of the Pollock committee and the Round Table, and of Sir Charles Lucas are based on rich documentation and set out with meticulous care.

By putting the simplistic rhetoric of the "centralists" and the "autonomists" in its proper perspective (i.e., ignoring or de-emphasizing it), Dr. Kendle isolates the middle ground of consensus upon which the administrative machinery for improved dialogue might have been built. But, he asserts, that consensus was not exploited. The colonial (imperial) conference system "possessed alarming deficiencies": no effective secretariat to dispense information, no means to provide continuity from one conference to the next, no opportunity for careful consideration of problems during the brief meetings in London. Dr. Kendle suggests that it was both possible and desirable to create machinery for effective consultation. But the apathy and procrastination of colonial politicians (particularly Laurier) and the inertia and conservatism of the Colonial Office staff during the first decade of the century blocked innovation. "The *status quo* was preserved by an unwitting partnership of hesitant colonial nationalism and Colonial Office intransigence."

This assertion needs qualification and Dr. Kendle's careful scholarship to some extent provides it. Laurier's tenuous position at home, whatever his personal inclinations, made "his commitment to detailed resolutions" limited. And the Colonial Office staff, "well-tuned to the instincts of Dominion nationalism," knew significant reorganization of the imperial structure was impossible. Yet the author regrets that a concerted attempt to improve the "flow of information between Great Britain and the Dominions on many problems of local concern" (particularly involving imperial foreign policy) was not made through a conference system. As proof of his contention that this attempt was feasible he cites the accomplishments of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

While this book clears up some misconceptions about the role of the Round Table and provides succinct summaries of the positions adopted by a host of participants in the Anglo-Dominion debate, its contribution as a study in administrative history is limited. Dr. Kendle might have set his work more explicitly within the context of late nineteenth-century administrative practice and concerned himself less with the

dialogue about improved imperial ties. Expert committees were making their impact on many aspects of government. And, in the realm of imperial problems, steamship subsidies, commercial activity, and submarine cables were examined by interdepartmental committees that took colonial sensibilities into account. These subjects surfaced at the conferences but Dr. Kendle does not stress sufficiently the continued attention given to them, as well as defence, in the meantime. Furthermore he does not emphasize that the Colonial Office's inertia stemmed not only from its awareness of dominion nationalism, but also from its subordinate role in relation to other departments (the Treasury, Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, and Board of Trade), when it came to imperial policy and organization. Given the difficulties, most of which Dr. Kendle mentions, it seems that one should not so much regret that the conference system worked poorly but be surprised that it continued.

ROBERT KUBICEK

University of British Columbia

Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908. By KENNETH BOURNE. London: Longmans, Green. 1967. Pp. xii, 439, maps. 63s.

MUCH TO THE ANNOYANCE OF AUTHORS, reviewers often suggest different titles for their works. In this case, the author's choice seems somewhat misleading, implying military action and alliances which never took place. Immodestly, then, may this reviewer offer another title: *British War Plans and the Balance of Power in the Northern Half of the Western Hemisphere, 1815-1908*? For this is what the book is all about—British military-naval plans which resulted from various Anglo-American crises and confrontations in that part of the world. The author has concentrated upon particular events or critical periods (the McLeod case, the Civil War, the *Trent* affair, Yankee expansionism in Central America, the Venezuela crisis, and so forth) and considered their impact upon Britain's military thinking and planning. At first, Professor Bourne examines the reactions and responses of leading political figures; then, as British military services grow more sophisticated, he looks at the plans of the defence committees. And thus the long tale is told of Britain's military and naval withdrawal from this hemisphere, beginning with the Anglo-American "stand-off" in years following the War of 1812 and ending on the eve of the Great War.

In a work such as this, it is probably unavoidable that defects emerge. The book often lacks internal continuity—a persisting and prevailing theme; indeed it is more a collection of essays loosely tied together by a general thesis than it is a cohesive study. At times the chronology becomes haphazard, leaving the reader adrift as the author sails back and forth through time. The style changes in focus from sharp and clear to fuzzy and vague; and a rather whimsical method of punctuation does not help matters. Here and there long quotations are inserted, sometimes strung together without analysis and often (it would seem) unnecessary. And the unfortunate result of all this is that the book is not easy to read.

But these are peccadilloes, distracting to the reader but not marring the essential work itself. Professor Bourne has written an extraordinary book which is destined to influence the history of Anglo-American relations. His approach to the period concentrates (p. viii) "on the decline of hostility rather than the rise of friendship. . . ." Thus it makes a superb companion piece to scholarly monographs such as Charles S. Campbell Jr.'s *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903* and A. E. Campbell's *Great Britain and the United States*, which explain the genesis and growth of Anglo-American amity largely in economic, sociological, and diplomatic

terms. Professor Bourne centres his attention upon strategic considerations and military planning; and the results of his research should leave no doubt in any one's mind why Great Britain sought friendship with the United States. He incontrovertibly demonstrates that Britain could have followed no other policy. Perhaps even before the United States was aware of the fact, Britain knew that the republic was the dominant power in North America and that there was no way by which she could arrest, control, or offset America's eventual progress towards hemispheric hegemony. By herself, Britain could not successfully play the balance-of-power game; and, out of self-interest, she could not involve other European powers. Long before the intense pressures placed upon Britain in the late nineteenth century by Russia, Germany, Japan, and France, it had become clear to British planners that their armies could not invade and conquer the United States, that their fleets could not effectually harass American shipping and devastate coastal cities, and that they could not defend Canada.

This is a solid, scholarly, and most useful work. Though it leans sensibly upon the efforts of other men, its chief supports are derived from the primary sources. Since these are mostly British, the book may be open to criticism from Canadian and American historians; but given Bourne's departure, his research is more than adequate. To have worked more extensively in Canadian and American archives (which are richer than he stated) would have added little to his general thesis. His book is a history of ideas, sometimes wild and fanciful—when, for example, an enthusiastic British patriot overreacts to a clash or confrontation. But most of the ideas are credible as well as provocative—when, for example, the author offers explanations for Britain's mid-century withdrawal from central America, and thereby explains her later position in negotiating the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.

This is not history written in the usual form. It does not follow a patterned development, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. It is not a chronicle of events. It is an analysis of the reactions and responses of British planners to events. The casual reader might falsely conclude that the book is a history of half-finished fortresses and abortive plans. But the serious student will discover how Britain's military planners viewed every significant crisis in Anglo-American relations, 1815–1908; and regardless of the student's own particular interest in the history of that relationship, he will always want to see what Bourne—and the planners—had to say about the subject.

ALVIN C. GLUEK, JR.

Michigan State University

The Economic History of the British Iron and Steel Industry, 1784–1879: Essays in Industrial and Economic History with Special Reference to the Development of Technology. By ALAN BIRCH. London: Frank Cass. 1967. Pp. xvi, 398, illus. 90s.

BECAUSE THERE IS NO OTHER MODERN SURVEY of British ferrous metallurgy in the nineteenth century, Professor Birch's title is bound to raise the hopes of general historian and economic historian alike. But as the subtitle indicates and the contents reveal, the book is really a collection of essays—some based partly on primary research in the documents of the iron producers, others based upon secondary materials which are already well known to specialists. Birch has made a considerable contribution through his archival researches. These tell us a good deal about some iron works—Dowlais, Silverdale, Haigh, and Cyfarthfa, in particular. His findings

do not modify any of the received versions of economic historiography, but they help to make more concrete and complete our understanding of financing, enterprise, labour and organization in this industry. Though less comprehensive than its title suggests, the work is therefore of value to specialists. Unfortunately, both for the specialist and for the non-specialist, its value is reduced by oddities of coverage and presentation.

Birch presents the facts of British iron and steel development in awkward ways and leaves out much information which the reader needs to make sense of the experience. For instance, the author gives two sets of output data—one national and one decomposed by region—without trying to reconcile them, even though they seem to come from different sources. On one occasion he offers a table (p. 363) of “iron and steel production” which contains no data on iron production. The reader must rummage in earlier chapters to find this information—and as Birch includes no list of tables, the reader’s task is not easy. Birch does not tell us systematically what happened to pig iron—what proportions of output were exported, cast, rolled, puddled, converted into steel, and so on. He makes no serious effort to estimate the changing input needs of the industry, or the profitability of capital invested in it. He notes the industry’s instability, and the frequency of bankruptcies in it, but he does not mobilize his evidence in such a way as to explain how an unstable and failure-prone industry could none the less attract new entrants so readily.

Much more serious for the non-specialist is Birch’s treatment of the industry’s technology. The author assumes that his readers know all there is to know about this subject. Hence he uses highly specialized technical terms—ganister, cupola, regenerative stove, guide roll, belly helve, reverberatory furnace, cementation—without definition. He does not even describe the chemical differences, and differences in capability, which separate pig iron, wrought iron, and steel from one another. Many of the critical inventions are not described at all. Others are discussed so perfunctorily that their significance is unclear. Some are discussed in the wrong context. For instance, in a chapter on the wrought iron industry and its technological change, there is a long discussion of the Neilson hot blast process—which is used for the production of pig iron.

Nor is Birch altogether clear about the impact of technological change. He knows that the locational shifts of the iron industry after mid-century were caused by coal-saving innovations, cheapening transport, and the search for non-phosphoric iron ores. But because he organizes his discussion of the subject in a chapter entitled “Ores for Steel,” the non-specialist reader is almost certain to miss the importance of the first two of these three themes. In considering the impact of the Neilson hot blast, he tells us that it made possible the utilization of certain Scots ironstone, but not why it did so; he observes that the hot blast plus anthracite transformed the Pennsylvania iron industry but had little impact in South Wales where conditions seem to have been identical, but he does not pause to explain this odd difference in effect.

In short, the general historian will find Birch’s book confusing, while the specialist in nineteenth-century economic history will find it useful but incomplete and sometimes annoying. However, the general historian will be pleased to find that Birch has avoided the “cliometrics” which are now so fashionable, and that he has tried to avoid generalization or abstraction by grounding his discussion in the particularities of individual businesses and businessmen. The attempt is worth making—even though this result is somewhat disappointing.

IAN M. DRUMMOND

University of Toronto

General

Nationalism. By K. R. MINOGUE. London: Batsford [Toronto: Copp Clark]. 1967. Pp. 168. \$4.00.

IN THE LITERATURE ON NATIONALISM, most writers appear to have conducted themselves a little like Humpty Dumpty. "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." Thoughtful readers of course have sometimes echoed poor Alice—"The question is whether you *can* make words mean so many different things"—but they have usually put up with Humpty Dumpty's nominalist rejoinder: "The question is which is to be master—that's all." So generations of students have gone skittering down the drear road to the past mouthing much nonsense and confusion about the growth of nationalism in the nineteenth century. Trying desperately to get the likes of Mazzini and Bismarck into some sort of reconciliation with Serb tribesmen or Aegean sea captains, they have not believed it all much more than have those paid to instruct them, but together they have helped perpetuate one more of the misconceptions on which the structure of written history (and present politics, *pace* Freeman) occasionally rests.

Happily, Mr. Minogue has decided to call a halt, to open the classroom window and let in both air and more light. Considering the varieties of nationalism in the past and the present, he proposes that the meaning of nationalism, if one seeks a generic definition, be looked for in the condition of alienation felt or expressed by élite groups. On this reading, nationalism is "a political movement depending on a feeling of collective grievance against foreigners." The collectivity is assumed to be the nation. But there may well be no such thing as the nation, no collective past in any domain. In this event, the nation has to be invented, in order to reassure those who are "persuaded that they share in the national grievance." This state of affairs has been notoriously the case with a number of contemporary nationalisms. But it was true also in the nineteenth century, so that the fantasies of, say, Arndt or Byron were not qualitatively different from those of Ben Bella or Lumumba. And not remarkably so, since nationalism is a European export.

Where differences become great is in the actual working out of nationalisms in the twentieth-century extra-European world. This part of the globe is divided to an extent not known in the European experience a century earlier. Thus the labours of Afro-Asian nationalists (who have been formed in a European matrix where they sustained the requisite sense of alienation *and* the ambition to create modernized states) are devoted to trying to substitute anti-Western, anti-imperial hostilities for traditional conflicts on which local authority (as well as imperial rule) so long rested. But the road these Afro-Asians follow branches off in various directions: Gandhi and Tagore found they were no longer travelling together; what moved Nkrumah was not what Nyerere had in mind. And so once the writer on nationalism moves beyond the loose abstraction of the word he has nothing but concrete, parochial, historical circumstances to discuss. Thus the contemporary truism that "the politics of modern nationalism is . . . the politics of underdevelopment" is of uncertain validity when applied to Europe of a century ago. As we are told here, the chameleon-like ideas of nationalism, moving from place to place, "add up less to a theory than to a rhetoric, a form of self-expression by which a certain kind of political excitement can be communicated from an élite to the masses."

The outcome of this experience of rhetoric, conceived in alienation and substituting mere aspirations for reality, is not a struggle between the imperial or oppressing power and the suppressed nationality, but rather a civil war for national leadership.

Mr. Minogue admits that nationalism has had the virtue of awakening much of the world to the possibilities of modernization, but he finds the cost to have been excessive—the encouragement of new irrational territorial struggles in the name of new slogans.

This brief work is a superior, thoughtful introduction to the subject. It complements rather than replaces the familiar existing general studies. Highly selective but wide-ranging, it is perhaps succinct to a fault. It rests, so far as one can tell, on no original researches but on a substantial array of pertinent books. Its distinction lies in the penetration of its inquiry and in its laconic suggestiveness. Despite the clarity of the writing, it is not an especially easy study; it is not obvious. But it is an exceptional essay which will repay careful consideration and open up debate and further inquiry.

JOHN C. CAIRNS

University of Toronto

Heaven, Hell, and History: A Survey of Man's Faith in History from Antiquity to the Present. By JOHN T. MARCUS. New York: Macmillan; London: Collier-Macmillan [Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada]. 1967. Pp. xxvi, 293. \$7.25.

THIS BOOK IS, in effect, an historical analysis of "the god that failed." In this case that means the idea of transcendent or redemptive history, an idea which has taken many forms and which today, at least in the Western world, is very much under a cloud. Professor Marcus feels strongly that "the crisis of values of our time is basically a consequence of the loss of a redemptive historical hope."

The idea that man may find meaning and purpose in life, indeed, may find release and redemption from incomplete and mortal human existence through the perpetuation of his identity and presence in some ongoing, progressive, perfectly realizable human ideal is a very ancient one. It finds its roots in Judaism and Christianity, even amongst the ancient Greeks, but it does not blossom into full flower until the religious milieu from which it sprang has been shed and complete secularization has taken place. This occurred during the Age of Enlightenment; hence, Professor Marcus devotes most of his work to the development of this idea during and since that time.

As man cannot live without some belief of being able to transcend the limitations of his human situation the hopes which had hitherto focussed upon an other-worldly eternity now necessarily switched to worldly ideals and objectives. Led by the rationalists and the *philosophes*, particularly by Jean-Jacques Rousseau with his faith in the natural goodness of man, aroused by the victories of the French Revolution men began to conceive of all manner of humanly realizable ideals in and through which man could save himself, as individuals by contributing to and losing oneself in a great work, as humanity by creating Utopia on earth. The list runs through the Republic of Virtue, the world of reason, liberalism, and Utopian socialism on to modern mass democracy, Marxism, nationalism, and all their many variants. The development has moved steadily towards increasing secularization and purely human effort.

Unhappily, over the past two centuries a series of magnificent achievements, inspired by commitment to these secular ideals, has been accompanied by a parallel series of drastic failures. In this sense the future was foreshadowed by the horrible collapse of the Jacobin Republic of Virtue in the bloody Reign of Terror but the full import of these successive failures was not brought home to ever-expectant man

until in this century the horrors of industrial civilization, world wars, and totalitarian régimes made them unavoidably evident. When at the same time scientists such as physicists began to talk about the relativistic and indeterminate nature of even our scientific knowledge; when psychologists began to stress the ineradicably irrational character of much of human thought and action and biologists revealed some of the unpleasant rigidities of evolution; when historians showed the patently relativistic nature of the human record, then a sense of doubt, anxiety, and futility began to settle over mankind, at least in the Western world.

It is, indeed, an ironic fact that the Westernization of the rest of the world has resulted in the export of Western ideas of redemptive historicity which now give drive to the new and revitalized states of Asia and Africa just at the time when these same ideas are being severely doubted or abandoned in the West. The sense of disillusionment has become so great in much of the West that many people see themselves as living in "an unendingly meaningless history" and this is, in truth, living in Hell.

Such is Professor Marcus's argument and conclusion in this volume. He sees this result of human striving as an inevitable outcome of man's mistaken effort of trying to live by an idea that has within itself a fundamental contradiction, that is the attempt to "achieve secular transcendence and immortality within historical time."

A second volume of this work is promised and in this the analysis of the present state of mind in the West will be continued but at the same time the author proposes to tackle the central problem as to whether "a new sense of self-transcendence can be formulated out of the collapse of historical expectations and values that would be relevant to our present experience." It will be interesting to see him try to deal with this crucial question. From the first volume he leaves this reviewer with the feeling that he believes that man cannot save himself.

This is a stimulating if rather depressing book. Sometimes repetitive it is generally well written. It could provide the basis for many discussions and lead to a further exploration of the subject through an examination of the books on the well-selected list of readings. This volume will either please or disturb depending on the reader's own outlook. It is without doubt a provocative work.

RICHARD M. SAUNDERS

University of Toronto

Australian Dictionary of Biography. I. 1788-1850, A-H; II. 1788-1850, I-Z.

DOUGLAS PIKE, general editor; A. G. L. SHAW and C. M. H. CLARK, section editors.

Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; London and New York: Cambridge University Press. 1966, 1967. Pp. xx, 578; xx, 634. £6 net per volume (UK).

THE APPEARANCE OF THE *Australian Dictionary of Biography* marks a more significant development in co-operative historical scholarship in Australia than does the appearance of its counterpart in Canada, the bilingual *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*. The two projects were launched formally within a year of each other in 1959-60, but the Australian venture was more of an act of faith. Its sponsors had no counterpart to James Nicholson's handsome bequest which could underwrite the enterprise, nor was there any local precedent for the nationwide co-operation of historians required by such a major research project. Nevertheless, an editorial board was established in Canberra, where the Australian National University provided a small headquarters staff, and working parties were created at other university centres. Once launched, the project attracted some financial support from outside the academic community, but most of the biographies represent the voluntary labour of their authors.

At present twelve volumes are projected to bring the work down to 1938: two volumes covering the period 1788–1850, four for 1851–1890, and six for 1891–1938. Thus the Australians are adopting chronological as well as alphabetical divisions. A notable variation from the Canadian practice is the decision of the Australian editors to place the biographies of those whose careers spanned break points in the volume dealing with the period when their most important activities *relating to Australia* occurred. Thus the biographies of the explorer, and later governor of Jamaica, Edward John Eyre (d. 1901) and of the imperial proconsul and New Zealand premier, Sir George Grey (d. 1898), both of whom achieved their greatest notoriety or fame in the second half of the nineteenth century, appear in this section. Since officials whose activities in London were significant in shaping Australian developments are also represented in the *Dictionary*, the biography of the third Earl Grey (d. 1894) is included in the first volume.

The alphabetical division between the two volumes of this era of the penal colony being transformed by the rise of the pastoral industry indicates a high proportion of biographies were of persons whose surname initial was in the first eight letters. That Australia did not attract the Scots in the same numbers as did Canada is reflected in the fact that but fifty-four pages are devoted to “Mc’s and Mac’s,” thirteen of them to those two architects of Australia, Macquarie, the last of the autocratic governors, and John Macarthur, breaker of governors and pioneer of the pastoral industry, and a further nine pages to other members of the Macarthur connection. (Incidentally, the articles on John Macarthur and Lachlan Macquarie, as well as that on William Charles Wentworth demonstrate that Australian historical scholarship has reached the point where the co-operation of no one individual is now indispensable in the proper carrying out of this type of an undertaking, a reassuring development for those of us who observed from a distance the pyrotechnics generated by disputes within the planning committee.)

In both volumes the explorers, the governors, the convicts who made good (such as the merchant, Simeon Lord, or the surgeon, William Redfern who “was born probably in Canada”), and the pastoralists are amply represented. Mary Reiby, convicted of horse-stealing in 1790 when aged thirteen who became a successful business woman, “a prosperous member of the group trained in the tough school of competition with American, Chinese, and Indian traders,” is an example of the enterprising women of early Australia whose exploits are recorded. Biographies of aborigines are much rarer than are those of Indians in the Canadian counterpart of this series. Jackey Jackey, guide and companion of the explorer E. B. C. Kennedy on the latter’s last expedition, is one of the exceptions. It seems that it was his loyalty to his leader, who was attacked and killed by hostile blacks, that earned him the entry.

Biographies which will be of particular interest to Canadians include: Edward Gibbon Wakefield who, we are told, was “a valuable adviser to three Canadian governors” during his sojourn in this country; William Charles Wentworth, journalist and advocate of responsible government, who later lapsed into conservatism when his favoured reforms were achieved; and John Dunmore Lang, clergyman, educator, politician, and general gadfly, attacking the Anglican establishment. Parallels with the Canadian scene will occur to many readers of these last two biographies. And it will be salutary for Canadians to discover the changes an antipodean vantage point can give to portraits of supposedly familiar personages. Of the third Earl Grey, for example, Professor John Ward writes: “He was the true begetter of responsible government in British North America, but he so misjudged political conditions in Australia that the colonists there regarded him as a major obstacle to their constitutional advancement.”

The biographies range in length from five hundred to over ten thousand words. References are usually appended. Unfortunately, no specific authority is cited for the remarkable accomplishment of the Irish convict adventurer, Sir Henry Browne Hayes, who constructed his country house in a snake-infested region. We are told: "Hayes surrounded it with a moat of turf which he imported from Ireland, and which he believed would keep the reptiles at a safe distance. Curiously, the turf appeared to have the desired effect."

The quality of these volumes indicates that the *Australian Dictionary of Biography* is a set which should be acquired by every university and major public library in Canada.

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Approaches to Modern Chinese History. Edited by ALBERT FEUERWERKER, RHOADS MURPHEY, and MARY C. WRIGHT. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1967. Pp. viii, 356. \$7.50 (US).

THIS VOLUME OF TWELVE ESSAYS on aspects of modern Chinese history by former students of John K. Fairbank, Professor of History and Director of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard, is dedicated to him by his students on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. The editors have tried to avoid the miscellaneous nature of the usual *Festschrift* by selecting contributions representative of different aspects of modern Chinese history. The essays presented here cover the period from the early eighteenth to the early twentieth century and centre round four main motifs: modern China's internal political-institutional history, aspects of intellectual life, the nature of the traditional and semi-modern economy, and the interplay between modern China's domestic history and its international relations. In their introduction the editors give some account of the recent application of Western methods to the critical study of Chinese history and the development of a high standard of technique and exposition which "seeks to place the study of modern China within the mainstream of historiography in Europe and America, on an equal footing with the study of any other country." Although individual contributions vary in quality and significance the over-all standard is high.

Three essays appealed to my own particular interests. The first was Harold Kahn's study entitled "The Education of a Prince: The Emperor Learns His Roles," which concerns the Manchu prince who reigned as Ch'ien-lung (r. 1735-1795) and the education which he received from the age of five until he became emperor in 1735. He was given a proper training for the roles he would have to play: in the charismatic functions of the emperor which were of a priestly nature, in neo-Confucian orthodoxy as interpreted by selected works which he studied under his tutors, and by a constant reading of Chinese history which he enjoyed. For Ch'ien-lung history was a "chronicle of moral signposts indicating the good and the bad . . . a veritable mirror of revealed truth, reflecting past choices as measures for current actions." This is an urbane study, elegant in style, historically conceived, and closely developed from a variety of Chinese sources. It is by no means esoteric, and historians of modern Europe might well find it stimulating to compare the education of Ch'ien-lung with that of a Renaissance prince or with the education of Louis XIV. The study entitled "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Case of Late Ch'ing China" by Akira Iriye focuses on the emergence of public opinion and the beginnings of nationalism in China in the first decade of the present century. His conclusion is that foreigners no longer found it possible to deal with a handful of

high officials, taking advantage of their mutual suspicions and jealousies; in future they had to take account of public opinion in China. John Israel's essay, "Kuomintang Policy and Student Politics, 1927-1937," illuminates the ideological gap between China's Confucian past and its Maoist present and helps to explain why the Nationalists failed to secure a greater measure of support from Chinese youth.

This volume not only celebrates the sixtieth birthday of a distinguished American scholar in a distinguished manner it also serves to mark the maturity of Western-trained scholarship in relation to modern Chinese history. It should act as an encouragement to scholars in Canada just now involved in the first developments of modern Chinese studies in their own universities and give them a standard by which to measure their own efforts in the next few decades.

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University of Toronto

Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
BY MARION MAGEE AND ANN LIDDELL

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later review; *TBR* following an entry indicates a review already in preparation.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

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Notes and Comments

KENNETH ALEXANDER MacKIRDY

ON MAY 7, 1968, KENNETH ALEXANDER MacKIRDY died while visiting the University College, Townsville, Queensland, Australia. He was on a sabbatical leave which involved a concentrated programme of research and writing, in addition to lectures at a number of Australian and New Zealand universities.

Dr. MacKirdy's essential interest in life was in individual people. On leaving the Royal Canadian Air Force at the end of the last war to enter Canadian academic life he began to correspond with, advise, and mix ideas with an ever redoubling host of people in all walks of life. Nor was his interest simply a thing of the moment, for in his prodigious memory he preserved a clear recognition of the individual value of each friend. He was ever concerned to stimulate them to see and realize their own potentialities and took infinite pains to further their private and public careers. To both his undergraduate and graduate students it was quite clear that his gifts were openly available to them at all times and for years to come. Among his colleagues on many campuses he was regarded as the catalyst who brought wide-ranging vistas, an exact sense of scholarly values, and personal concern to aid them in becoming a united band of scholars.

His special field of research lay in the history of colonies, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For him, the essential elements in this historical mosaic were again individual people. The yardstick by which he measured their activity was quite unique to him and was composed of various elements including a firm Presbyterian faith, the values of liberalism, and a requirement that scholarship be relevant to the needs of contemporary mankind. An infectious touch of humour bubbled up through his work, as in his conversations and in his lectures. His thoughts had been published regularly in learned periodicals and the first of his projected books. Within his special field he was already capturing recognition all over the world.

The Faculty of Arts at the University of Waterloo was just celebrating its first birthday when Kenneth MacKirdy joined his career to its destiny. In the ensuing years no one contributed more energy to its growth and articulation. His experience and enthusiasm devised new strengths for its curriculum, ferreted out new recruits for its ranks, and urged innovation in its organization and decision-making processes. In all these years of collaboration he was ever patient, humane, wise, and loyal—never small minded.

The community of historians in Canada has suffered a stunning loss in his passing from our midst.

PAUL CORNELL

University of Waterloo

HISTORIANS IN CANADA

AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA R. H. Roy has been named professor of military history, J. M. S. Careless has been appointed visiting professor, and G. Skelton is

on leave of absence; D. F. Chard, R. J. McCue, W. T. Wooley, D. C. McGowan, Miss H. K. Wright, and J. Kupp have joined the department. B. Wilkinson has accepted a visiting professorship in history at the University of British Columbia for 1968-69. J. M. Bak, J. I. Gow, E. J. Hundert, H. V. Nelles, and R. Tyler have joined the department; M. A. Ormsby, G. McWhiney, L. F. S. Upton, R. C. Walton, R. V. Kubicek, C. W. Stocker, and Fr. T. J. Hanrahan will be on leave of absence.

Professor L. H. Thomas has retired from the chairmanship of the department at the University of Alberta. C. J. Lowe, J. Barrington, Miss C. M. Martin, K. C. Taylor, Miss A. Thimme, E. A. Mitchner, G. Porges, J. L. Tobias, Mrs. T. Yedlin, and C. R. Young have joined the department. W. J. Jones, M. Katz, and G. A. Rothrock are on leave of absence. The University of Calgary has named J. B. Toews head of the department; U. F. Eyck, D. Williams, H. C. Klassen, and E. Lee have been appointed. Professor Hilda Neatby has been named a Companion in the Order of Canada and appointed A. S. Morton Professor of History at the University of Saskatchewan. P. M. Swan has been appointed assistant dean of arts. Jean E. Murray has retired and T. D. Regehr, R. M. Stewart and Edgar Dosman have been appointed to the department. T. F. Carney has been appointed head of the department at the University of Manitoba. W. D. Smith, K. Rees, and Fr. V. Jensen will be on leave of absence and F. G. Stambrook, M. K. Singleton, H. Burmeister, and A. Baran have joined the department.

Professor A. R. M. Lower was Queen's University Lecturer at the Scottish Universities in the autumn of 1967. A. M. Keppel-Jones has retired from the chairmanship of the department at Queen's and will be R. S. McLaughlin Research Professor during 1968-69. J. A. Leith has been named chairman and G. A. Rawlyk deputy chairman of the department. W. R. Graham has accepted the Douglas Chair in Canadian History and G. Lewis, Pierre Guillaume, and W. P. Morrell will be visiting professors at Queen's. K. Hansen, J. M. Stayer, L. Karchmar, A. Jeeves, and J. S. Pritchard have been appointed to the department. Dean G. F. G. Stanley and M. Bellavance will be on leave from the Royal Military College of Canada. F. F. Thompson has been named acting head of the department and M. Quinn has been appointed to the department. Miss M. J. Barber, J. G. Bellamy, R. E. Reynolds, R. C. Elwood, and M. J. Sydenham have joined the department at Carleton and G. P. Browne and N. E. S. Griffiths will be on leave of absence. J. K. Johnson and P. C. Merkley have been appointed to the department at St. Patrick's College, now a division of the Faculty of Arts of Carleton University.

Professor W. L. Morton of Trent University will visit the universities of London and Oxford during the fall of 1968. Bruce Hodgins has been awarded the Cruikshank Medal for Historical Writing by the Ontario Historical Society. J. Gilchrist, D. S. Macmillan, and D. McCalla have joined the Trent department. Professors E. T. Salmon and J. A. S. Evans will be on leave of absence from McMaster University and C. Luibheid will be visiting professor. F. K. Metzger, D. H. Avery, and G. Emery have been appointed to the department at the University of Western Ontario and M. Zaslow and A. M. J. Hyatt will be on leave of absence. L. W. Abbott and J. G. Snell have been appointed to the department at the University of Guelph. K. R. Davis, P. S. Smith and T. Barcsay have joined the department at the University of Waterloo and R. E. Wynne has been granted leave of absence. The Rev. F. J. Boland and J. K. A. Farrell are on leave of absence from the University of Windsor and I. C. Pemberton, D. M. Klinck, Miss K. McCrone, and L. L. Kulisek have joined the department. The Rev. L. Cadieux, chairman of the department, University of Sudbury, is the 1968 president of the Société historique du Nouvel-Ontario.

D. G. Creighton of the History Department, University of Toronto, has been appointed University Professor. J. Sherwood will be a visiting professor and the

Rev. J. Monet will have a part-time appointment in the department. R. C. Latham, W. C. Berman, M. S. Cross, H. A. Marcus, J. M. Bliss, M. G. Finlayson, and M. A. Marrus have joined the department and P. Brock, J. C. Cairns, J. M. S. Careless, H. L. Dyck, J. M. Estes, W. H. Nelson, and M. R. Powicke will be on leave. G. R. Cook, R. J. Storr, J. A. Ernst, C. A. Dent, P. M. Mitchell, C. E. Perrin, and G. Weider have been appointed to the department at York University. S. Eisen and G. R. Cook will be on leave, the latter to assume the Chair of Canadian Studies at Harvard University. E. W. McInnis of Glendon College has been named university orator and A. V. Tucker appointed chairman of the Department of History. I. M. Abella and M. Horn have accepted positions in the department. J. Woods and M. Dick have been appointed to the department at Atkinson College.

R. Lamontagne has been named chairman of the department at the Université de Montréal and C. Limoges and Y. Saint-Germain have joined the department. E. D. Genovese and W. Ausserleitner have been granted leave of absence from Sir George Williams University and J. Igartua, J. Hill, J. Laffey, and R. J. Duibaldo have joined the department. A. Kraditor will be visiting professor. J.-R. Chotard and A. Lachance have been appointed to the department at the Université de Sherbrooke and J. Monet and J.-P. Wallot will be visiting lecturers. D. Younker and W. L. Matson have joined the department at Bishop's University and G. E. Carter will be on leave of absence.

L. N. Shyu and P. A. Bruckner have joined the department at the University of New Brunswick. Peter B. Waite has been elected president of the Canadian Historical Association. J. E. Flint has succeeded P. B. Waite as chairman of the department at Dalhousie University. George A. Shepperson, University of Edinburgh, is Canada Council Visiting Professor at Dalhousie for the coming year. T. K. Hareven, Judith Fingard, and Peter Burroughs will be on leave. D. Facey-Crowther, D. Jones, M. MacLeod, and R. T. Pastore have been appointed to the department, Memorial University, and G. M. Schwarz is on sabbatical leave.

THE WATUMULL PRIZE FOR 1968

IN RECOGNITION OF outstanding historical writing in Indian history, the American Historical Association offers the Watumull Prize in the even-numbered years. This \$500 prize was established by the Watumull Foundation in 1944 to be awarded for the best book originally published in the United States on any phase of the history of India. The 1966 prize (joint award) went to Thomas Metcalfe for *The Aftermath of Revolt* (Princeton University Press) and B. R. Nayar for *Minority Politics in the Punjab* (Princeton University Press).

To be eligible for consideration books must be of a scholarly historical nature. Research accuracy, originality, and literary merit are important factors. Books published in 1967 and 1968 are eligible for the prize in 1968. One copy of any book submitted must be sent to each of the following three members of the committee as soon as possible: Ainslie T. Embree, 607 Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027, chairman; B. K. Gupta, Department of History, Brooklyn College, Bedford Avenue and Avenue H, Brooklyn, New York 11210; and Norman Palmer, Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Books received after October 31, 1968, cannot be considered.

- J. MICHAEL BLISS, editor of *Canadian History in Documents, 1763-1966* (1966), is a lecturer in History at the University of Toronto.
- NORBERT MACDONALD is an Assistant Professor at the University of British Columbia, where he teaches United States history.
- JUDITH FINGARD is on the staff of the Department of History at Dalhousie and is completing a doctoral thesis on the Church of England in British North America in the period 1783 to 1821.
- A Professor of History at the University of Kentucky, RICHARD LOWITT is the author of *George W. Norris, The Making of a Progressive, 1861-1912* (Syracuse, 1963).

REVIEWS (cont.)

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- BOURNE, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908*: by Alvin C. Gluek, Jr. 309
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- PIKE, ed., *Australian Dictionary of Biography. I. 1788-1850, A-H; II. 1788-1850, I-Z*: by K. A. MacKirdy 314
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British Strategic Withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere, 1904-1906*

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.

ONE ASPECT OF GREAT BRITAIN'S DEPARTURE from "splendid isolation" that has until recently received little attention from scholars of British foreign relations is the understanding with the United States which developed between 1898 and 1903. Most writers view British diplomacy in the years before World War I as revolving around the various commitments to Japan, France, and Russia.¹ American friendship was, however, an essential part of this diplomatic system. It was important both for the raw power possessed by the United States and for the freedom to concentrate on European affairs which this understanding, in conjunction with the Japanese alliance, gave British statesmen. The reduction of imperial garrisons and naval squadrons in Canada and the West Indies between 1904 and 1906 was one of the major results of this Anglo-American accord.

*An earlier version of this paper was presented on 29 December 1967 at the meeting of the American Historical Association in Toronto.

¹Representative of the traditional view are: Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919* (3 vols.; New York, 1922-23), III; André Maurois, *The Edwardian Era*, trans. Hamish Miles (New York, 1933); G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (11 vols.; London, 1926-38); and George W. Monger, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907* (London, 1963). In addition to specific studies of the Anglo-American understanding by Lionel M. Gelber, Charles S. Campbell, Jr., A. E. Campbell, and Bradford Perkins, several other recent works begin to place this accord in proper perspective for Britain: J. A. S. Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1964), R. Craig Brown, *Canada's National Policy, 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian-American Relations* (Princeton, 1964), Ian H. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907* (London, 1966), R. G. Neale, *Great Britain and United States Expansion: 1898-1900* (East Lansing, Michigan, 1966), and Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908* (London, 1967).

The initial impulse for the reduction of British imperial forces came from the War Office. It stemmed from the need for economy. In September 1903 Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster entered office as secretary of state for war with a mandate to modernize the army and create a mobile fighting unit for use overseas. This problem was in itself difficult enough, but Arnold-Forster also had to design a plan of reform which would allow a significant reduction in the army estimates. In addition, he had to operate within a hostile atmosphere created by opposition to previous reform plans and the presence in the cabinet of his two immediate predecessors at the War Office.²

Before beginning to reform the army itself, Arnold-Forster knew that a complete reorganization of the War Office was necessary. Prime Minister Arthur J. Balfour, working closely with his new Secretary for War, appointed a three-man committee to examine the operations of the War Office and make recommendations on its reform. This committee, composed of Lord Esher, Admiral Sir John Fisher, and Sir George Clarke, worked quickly and ruthlessly to renovate the War Office. When Arnold-Forster met opposition to the reforms within the cabinet, Esher and his colleagues overcame it by confronting the cabinet with a threat to resign unless their report was, as Fisher put it, "swallowed whole." These machinations worked—the cabinet adopted all of the Esher committee's recommendations, and new men came to the War Office to implement the reforms. Although parliamentary opposition prevented legislative sanction, Balfour carried through the reforms in the spring of 1904 by letters patent and orders-in-council.³

Having resorted to such high-handed tactics in reforming the War Office, Arnold-Forster found himself in a weaker position when, without any prestigious committee behind him, he turned to the larger job of reorganizing the army. He laboured at this task throughout the winter, but none of his plans satisfied the cabinet. When he proposed sharp reductions in the militia, his colleagues raised intense political objections. When, against his own imperialist preferences, Arnold-Forster moved in April to withdraw some of the troops in the colonies, the Canadian government refused to provide the garrisons for Halifax and Esquimalt. Indeed the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) "decided that an additional battalion must go to Bermuda, and the

²James R. Thursfield, "H. O. Arnold-Forster," in Sir Sidney Lee, ed., *Dictionary of National Biography, 2nd Supplement, 1901-1911* (London, 1912), pp. 61-3; Elie Halévy, *The Rule of Democracy, 1905-1914*, trans. E. I. Watkin (New York, 1961), pp. 163-6.

³Halévy, *Rule of Democracy*, pp. 165-7; Kilverstone Hall, Thetford, Fisher Papers, Fisher to Cecil Fisher, 21 Oct. 1903; Fisher to Esher, 7 Dec. 1903, Fisher to Sandars (private secretary to A. J. Balfour), 20 and 23 Jan. 1904, Fisher to Cecil Fisher, 28 Jan. 1904, in Arthur J. Marder, ed., *Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone* (3 vols.; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1952-9), I, 292, 299, III, 21-2.

Admiralty . . . declined to accept any responsibility for the defense of the coaling stations." After the Chancellor of the Exchequer found the economies of a new plan "wholly inadequate," Arnold-Forster insisted on 2 May that sufficient savings could be made only if the colonies assumed part of the responsibility for their garrisons and the navy defended a number of the overseas stations.⁴

This deadlock continued for more than a month. On 13 June the cabinet held a long meeting to discuss the finances of the latest army reform scheme, and while demanding further cuts in the budget, it would not sanction reductions in the colonial garrisons. Arnold-Forster complained in his diary that the "whole situation is very serious, and it seems not unlikely that all my plans may be upset." Balfour himself felt the question of army reform might even topple the government. The cabinet met twice the next day on this subject and directed Arnold-Forster to submit another plan with maximum estimates of twenty-nine million pounds for 1905–6 and twenty-seven million by 1907–8. The disappointed Secretary for War was confident he could make such a scheme but doubted if it would be acceptable. He commented testily: "This will be my last attempt. . . ."⁵

By 17 June the doctor ordered Arnold-Forster to stay in bed for several days of rest. Lord Esher visited him that day and wrote the Prime Minister that he had to encourage Arnold-Forster like a child, commenting that for him "criticism is fatal." Agreeing that his Secretary for War worried too much about small things and took all opposition personally, Balfour replied: "The truth is, as you know, that, though the best of good fellows, he is at once unconsciously inconsiderate of other people's feelings, and unduly sensitive in his own,—a rather unfortunate combination." But these faults were minor, Balfour continued, in comparison with his "burning zeal, and great ability. . . ." This was a sound estimate of Arnold-Forster, who, on the same day that he was ordered to bed, made considerable progress on his new proposals.⁶

Writing to the Colonial Secretary, Arnold-Forster made a strong argument for the withdrawal of numerous overseas garrisons which he contended were maintained for colonial rather than military purposes. He showed that these troops cost more per capita than those at home,

⁴British Museum (BM), Arnold-Forster Papers, Arnold-Forster, Memo No. 1, 4 Dec. 1903, Memo No. 2, 5 Dec. 1903, "Proposals for the Reorganization of the Army," 19 April 1904, "Reply by the Secretary of State for War to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Memorandum of 28th April, 1904," 2 May 1904; Thursfield, "Arnold-Forster," p. 62.

⁵Arnold-Forster Papers, diary for 13 and 14 June 1904; BM, Balfour Papers, Balfour to Lord Northcote, 15 June 1904.

⁶Balfour Papers, Esher to Balfour, 17 June 1904, Balfour to Esher, 30 July 1904; Arnold-Forster Papers, diary for 17 June 1904.

concluding that "nothing will enable me to reduce the Army Estimates with greater certainty and promptitude than the withdrawal of some or all of these outlying units." In a detailed schedule of withdrawals, Arnold-Forster proposed that the first troops to be removed come from Jamaica and Halifax, with other reductions to follow before the end of 1906. After considerable discussion and a few minor changes, the cabinet approved this proposal early in July, leaving the details to be worked out by the cm.⁷

In an important meeting on 8 July, 1904, the Committee of Imperial Defence discussed and generally approved Arnold-Forster's proposals for colonial withdrawals. While reviewing the defences of Halifax, the committee stated what became the essence of British strategy for the western hemisphere: "In the event of war with the United States, it is clear that the Western coaling stations could not be defended by the garrisons at present allotted to them . . . if the British navy were not able to be employed in full strength in the Western Atlantic. From this point of view, therefore, very small garrisons are desirable. As regards other Powers, it is not necessary to contemplate anything more serious than a raid by one or two armored cruisers." The cm concluded that the infantry battalion at Halifax could be withdrawn, but desired to retain the artillery and engineers in order to defend the dockyard and show the British uniform in Canada. With regard to Esquimalt, the committee felt that, in light of the 1899 agreement by which Canada undertook to share the cost of the garrison, no withdrawal could be made unless the dominion government agreed to take over the defences. It suggested that negotiations toward this end should be started if the Colonial Secretary felt the time was opportune, adding that "effective assistance was more likely to be obtained from Canada if the entire responsibility for infantry defence were thrown upon the Dominion Government."⁸ The committee also laid the groundwork for withdrawing all troops from the West Indies. It decided that no troops were required in Barbados and Trinidad and that no white infantry should remain in Jamaica. The status of the garrison at St. Lucia would be reconsidered, and the committee ordered a battalion of infantry withdrawn from Bermuda as "an attack from the United States need not be taken into consideration." Outside the western

⁷Arnold-Forster Papers, Arnold-Forster to Alfred Lyttelton, 17 June 1904, "Revised Proposals for Army Reform," 25 June and 2 July 1904. Other garrisons with proposed reductions included Bermuda, Esquimalt, Barbados, and St. Lucia in the western hemisphere, and Ceylon, Mauritius, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Egypt, and South Africa.

⁸Public Record Office (PRO), Cabinet Records, Cab 2/1, Minutes of the 48th meeting of the CID, 8 July 1904. For a different interpretation of the decision to withdraw from Canada, see Donald C. Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914* (Baltimore, 1965), pp. 176-86.

hemisphere, the CID decided to reduce the garrisons in Ceylon, Cyprus, Crete, Hong Kong, and South Africa.⁹

The conclusions of the forty-eighth meeting of the CID show no single view of the United States. In discussing Halifax the committee justified a reduced garrison by arguing that Britain could not match American power at that point, whereas with Bermuda it bluntly excluded the United States without further comment. Regardless of phrasing, it is obvious from the refusal to increase the garrisons or to ensure the presence of the fleet in the western Atlantic that British strategists felt war with the United States was unlikely. Still, it was the pressure of finance, and not sentiments of friendship toward America, which led the British government to decide on the reduction or elimination of garrisons in Canada and the West Indies.

Resistance to these proposed withdrawals persisted and increased within the government. Major General James M. Grierson and Earl Roberts, the most prominent military members of the CID, continued their opposition by filing a dissent to the committee's conclusions of 8 July. They called for the retention of troops at Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and especially at Halifax, which they felt should be defended "against any land attack which could be made by the United States in the preliminary stages of a war. . . ." Adding its weight to the opposition, the Colonial Office requested a review of the status of the West Indian garrisons by the Colonial Defence Committee, a subcommittee of the CID.¹⁰

Arnold-Forster was able to overwhelm the opposition within his own department, and he received valuable assistance in stemming the Colonial Office resistance from Fisher and Sir George Clarke.¹¹ Fisher went straight to the heart of the matter in a memorandum written during August. Pointing out that Halifax was necessarily of more value to Canada than to Britain, he argued that the dominion should have

⁹Cab 2/1, Minutes of the 48th meeting of the CID, 8 July 1904.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, Minutes of the 49th meeting of the CID, 13 July 1904, Roberts and Grierson, "A Dissent to the Conclusions of the 48th meeting of the CID regarding Colonial Garrisons," 13 July 1904; Cab 17/41, Grierson, Memorandum of 5 Aug. 1904; Arnold-Forster Papers, Arnold-Forster to Alfred Lyttelton (colonial secretary), 5 Sept. 1904.

¹¹Arnold-Forster Papers, Arnold-Forster, "New Army Scheme—Directions for carrying into effect the Proposals already sanctioned," 18 Aug. 1904, Arnold-Forster to Lt. Gen. Sir Neville Lyttelton (chief of General Staff), 15 Sept. 1904, Grierson to Arnold-Forster, 23 Sept. 1904, with Arnold-Forster's minute of 24 Sept.; Cab. 17/41, Clarke, Memorandum of 9 Aug. 1904; Balfour Papers, Clarke to Balfour, 9 July 1904. In writing Balfour on 9 July, Clarke urged the withdrawal of one battalion of infantry from both Bermuda and Halifax and all the troops from Esquimalt and St. Lucia. While he hoped that war with the United States was impossible, he felt that, in any event, an attempt to capture Bermuda was "a most unlikely course for the United States to adopt. . . ."

full responsibility for its defence, although he acquiesced in keeping a few redcoats as a "comforting spectacle to the old women of both sexes, in Halifax." He emphasized that the only real basis for opposing the garrison reductions was the fear, real or feigned, of an American attack on Canada. He bluntly stated that most sensible observers agreed that "war between Great Britain and the United States ought never to occur. Our foreign policy tends unmistakeably [*sic*] towards this conclusion. Of all the wars against which we may have to prepare, a fight with our cousins across the Atlantic is perhaps the most improbable." But Fisher's arguments alone were insufficient. Arnold-Forster had invested such a large portion of his political capital in obtaining his first reforms that he lacked the resources to push through the garrison reductions. It was to require Fisher's presence as first sea lord to effect the British strategic withdrawal from the western hemisphere.¹²

Fisher assumed his new post in October 1904. He brought with him advance government approval of a general plan to redistribute the battle fleet to cut unnecessary expenses and to gain a concentration of strength in home waters for possible use against Germany. By early December the Board of Admiralty had approved Fisher's first detailed fleet reorganization. With regard to the western hemisphere this plan provided for transforming the north Atlantic and West Indies squadron into a mobile training squadron and abolishing the south Atlantic and Pacific squadrons. While admitting the need for a small permanent force for police work in the West Indies, Fisher and his strategists called for complete withdrawal from the naval bases at Halifax, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Ascension, and Esquimalt and reduction of the one at Bermuda.¹³

At a meeting of the CMB late in November, the Admiralty presented its case for abandoning the naval base at St. Lucia and withdrawing the entire garrison. The committee accepted the Admiralty arguments, and to minimize any further resistance it reaffirmed the decisions of the forty-eighth meeting to withdraw an infantry battalion from both

¹²Cab 17/41, Unsigned (Fisher) memorandum on the defense of Halifax, n.d. (c. Aug. 1904); Arnold-Forster Papers, diary for 8 July 1904. Fisher was at this time writing to the King that Britain ought to clear out of the western hemisphere altogether. See Fisher to Lord Knollys (private secretary to King Edward VII), late Aug. 1904, in Marder, ed., *Fisher Correspondence*, I, 327.

¹³Fisher to Esher, 21 Aug. 1904, in Marder, ed., *Fisher Correspondence*, I, 324-5; Admiralty Library, London, Sir John Fisher *et al.*, *Naval Necessities* (3 vols.; privately printed, 1904-6), I; PRO, Admiralty Records, Adm 1/7736, Reports of the Battenberg committee on fleet distribution, 10, 11, and 29 Nov. 1904. *Naval Necessities*, Vol. I, was the massive printed outline of Fisher's reforms which the First Lord of the Admiralty accepted in principle in August and formally approved on 21 Oct. 1904, the day Fisher became first sea lord.

Halifax and Bermuda. As a result of Fisher's jealous guarding of the right to make all decisions on naval matters, the Admiralty had essentially settled the question of withdrawal from the West Indies by mid-December. The *cm* did not even discuss the closing of these naval stations.¹⁴

Late in December the Colonial Office notified the governors of the British West Indies that all white troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible. On 1 February 1905, Colonial Secretary Alfred Lyttelton authorized the governors to announce publicly that all British troops would be withdrawn and that the naval bases at Jamaica and St. Lucia would be closed. He assured them that a fast cruiser would be permanently stationed in West Indian waters to perform police and ceremonial duties and that a powerful cruiser squadron would visit each winter.¹⁵

The Colonial Office had received protests against the withdrawals and closures since mid-December, and these increased after the plans were made public. Late in March the West India Committee wrote asking the government to reconsider its recent decisions. Emphasizing that the rapid expansion of American influence in the Caribbean would be further increased with the completion of the Panama Canal, this powerful group of investors and planters contended that it was "most important that at the present juncture nothing should be done to weaken the tie which connects these Colonies with the Mother Country. . . ." The Colonial Office replied that Mr. Lyttelton regretted that he could offer no hope of His Majesty's Government reconsidering this decision.¹⁶

The government proceeded with its plans to withdraw the troops and close the bases, and pressure from the West Indians for protection of property and order continued into the autumn. Although the under-secretary for the colonies, Sir Montagu Ommanney, had informed a deputation of residents that the government could not alter its decision, the West India Committee requested that the Prime Minister receive a similar group. In discussing this in the *cm* on 7 November,

¹⁴Cab 2/1, Minutes of the 58th meeting of the CID, 22 Nov. 1904.

¹⁵Cab 11/2, Colonial Office to Governors of British West Indies (tel.), 23 Dec. 1904, Lyttelton to Governors (tel.), 1 Feb. 1905.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, West India Committee to Colonial Office, 25 March 1905, Colonial Office to West India Committee, 6 April 1905. At this same time Sir George Clarke suggested that the Prime Minister, in answering parliamentary questions on the withdrawals, emphasize the diminished need for naval stations and the fact that garrison duty in the Caribbean climate was injurious for white troops. He added that there was another powerful motive behind these withdrawals which could not be argued publicly: "What it is best not to say is that we believe that the idea of opposing the Navy of the United States in the Caribbean and the Western Atlantic close to its bases must be abandoned. . . . It is best to recognize facts, but not always to proclaim them from the house tops." Balfour Papers, Clarke to Sandars, 31 March 1905.

Ommanney said he felt the deputation would be somewhat reassured if Balfour would stress the Admiralty commitment to maintain a cruiser with a landing party in the West Indies; it would even be preferable, he suggested, to provide two cruisers owing to the distance between Jamaica and the other islands. The committee directed Ommanney to discuss this matter with the Admiralty and report at the next meeting. Meanwhile the troops on Barbados and most of those on Jamaica embarked for home in mid-November, and the government announced plans to withdraw the St. Lucia garrison in December.¹⁷

The CID met again on 21 November, and Lyttelton reported on the growing alarm at the departure of the white troops from the islands. He said that, while he had sent the colonial governors copies of the Admiralty letter pledging to station a third-class cruiser in West Indian waters and have the training squadron visit yearly, he felt it would be well to leave a force of 160 British artillerymen and engineers in Jamaica and to provide another cruiser for the southern islands. Fisher assured the committee that the Admiralty had every intention of fulfilling its pledges to the West Indians, but he "strongly objected . . . to the Admiralty being placed permanently under the obligation of undertaking police work in the West Indies," emphasizing that such duties interfered with training for war. Austen Chamberlain, chancellor of the exchequer, countered that the military power of the empire, as the last resort of police power, must be made available to the islands. He thought a mobile force to aid the civil police should be maintained there along with two cruisers. After considerable discussion, Balfour summed up the group's conclusions by saying that, while the Admiralty and the War Office could not send more forces to the islands and still maintain their fighting efficiency, there was still a need for an additional force of a mobile character which was beyond the resources of the islands themselves. The committee referred the questions of the feasibility and composition of such a force to the Colonial Defence Committee. This well-hedged conclusion was the Conservatives' last action on the withdrawals, for Balfour submitted his resignation to the King on 4 December. The Conservatives virtually completed the withdrawals before leaving office, and it remained for the Liberal government to decide if there would be any substantial modification in this policy.¹⁸

¹⁷Cab 2/1, Minutes of the 80th meeting of the CID, 7 Nov. 1905; Cab 11/2, War Office to Colonial Office, 3 Aug. 1905, Admiralty to Colonial Office, 6 Nov. 1905. Fisher took a stiff stand against using warships for this police duty, arguing to Lord Cawdor that it would require two first-class cruisers with two hundred marines to do what was requested. He had Captain Charles Ottley inform Clarke that such a step would mean "that the West Indies Station will have to be revived, at a great cost, and with a palpable sacrifice of the fighting efficiency of the fleet and its instant readiness for war." Cab 17/45, Ottley to Clarke, 13 Nov. 1905.

¹⁸Cab 2/1, Minutes of the 81st meeting of the CID, 21 Nov. 1905.

The Colonial Defence Committee reported on the proposed mobile police force late in December. Pointing out the limited effectiveness of local forces in past disturbances, it recommended that a minimum of 250 white artillerymen and engineers be retained in Jamaica for two or three years to form the basis of a reserve police force while adequate local units were being trained. To facilitate the establishment of local units, the committee proposed the loan of rifles and machine guns, improvement of local telegraph facilities, and annual inspection of the units by the British commanding officer in Jamaica. When the Liberals held their first CID meeting on 1 February 1906, the question of a West Indian security force headed the agenda. During discussion the new Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Elgin, charged that the Admiralty plan to withdraw the cruiser to Bermuda during the hurricane season was a violation of its pledge to have a warship permanently in the West Indies. He said he hoped the navy could arrange to replace the cruiser with another vessel during the hurricane season, and Lord Tweedmouth, the new first lord of the Admiralty, said he thought this could be done. The Secretary for War, R. B. Haldane, pointed out that the retention of 250 white troops in Jamaica was contrary to the proper distribution of forces but that, as the Colonial Office placed so much importance on it, he would adopt it for the present. With Haldane's grudging concession, the committee resolved to adopt the recommendations of the Colonial Defence Committee.¹⁹

Thus West Indian pressure forced the Liberals to retain a small security force in the islands. Had the government been more firmly established in its duties, it is unlikely that it would have granted even this limited concession. When disorders after the Jamaica earthquake early in 1907 caused many Englishmen to complain of the inadequacy of imperial forces in the West Indies, the government stood firm. It hastened to apologize to the United States for Governor Sir Alexander Swettenham's rude behaviour in rejecting the assistance of American naval forces, and within a month it withdrew the last infantry battalion from Bermuda, leaving no British infantry in the western hemisphere.²⁰ At the same time that the West Indians were forcing modifications in the withdrawal policy, Canada was leading the British government through a series of tortuous negotiations concerning the transfer to the dominion of the bases at Halifax and Esquimalt.

¹⁹Cab 5/1, CID Paper 38C, Colonial Defence Committee, Memorandum, 20 Dec. 1905; Cab 2/2/1, Minutes of the 83rd meeting of the CID, 1 Feb. 1906. The Admiralty later agreed that the cruiser would not be removed from West Indian waters if the colonial secretary felt her presence was required there; but if a disturbance occurred in her absence, the Admiralty would send her back only on the request of the colonial secretary, not at the behest of local officials. Cab 11/2, Admiralty to Colonial Office, 12 Feb. 1906.

²⁰Cab 2/2/1, Minutes of the 95th meeting of the CID, 21 Feb. 1907.

After the CMO reaffirmed on 22 November 1904 the decision to withdraw the infantry battalion from Halifax, the government then turned to the job of persuading Canada to assume responsibility for garrisoning both Halifax and Esquimalt. On 3 December the War Office notified the Colonial Office that it proposed to withdraw the battalion from Halifax by 1 April, and it asked for an early reply on whether the dominion would provide a replacement garrison. At a meeting of the CMO a few days later, Lord Minto, who had just been replaced as governor general of Canada by Earl Grey, reported that Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the prime minister, "had expressed the willingness of his Government to take over the defence of Halifax and Esquimalt." Despite Minto's warning that the Canadian militia was inadequate for such garrison duties and his reminder that the dominion cabinet had not yet authorized any formal offer, the committee confirmed its decision to hand over the infantry defence of Halifax to Canada while retaining for the present the British artillery and engineer units under the command of an imperial officer.²¹

The Colonial Office twice telegraphed the Governor General to inquire if his ministers would agree to provide the necessary garrisons, but Grey replied that the cabinet was away from Ottawa for the holiday season and he could get no immediate answer. On 14 December Grey wrote that the senior minister, Sir Richard Cartwright, had informed him that he personally felt there would be no objection to providing these garrisons "if no conditions are attached as to expenditure. . . ." After talking with Laurier, Grey wired on 29 December that he expected the cabinet would offer to take over the defence of the two ports, but he cautioned that the ministers were still on holiday and had not considered the proposal.²²

The next day the Governor General applied further pressure to gain an early decision from his cabinet. Writing Laurier of a press report that Sir Frederick Borden, minister of militia and defence, had stated in a Toronto speech that Canada was prepared to relieve the British taxpayer of every dollar of taxation for the protection of dominion territory, Grey said he would be glad to be informed if this were a government decision. He emphasized the need for quick action and, as Lyttelton had suggested in his wire of the seventeenth, pointed out the value of Canada's offering to assume this responsibility rather than waiting to be asked: "I am most anxious that the change of guard at Halifax and Esquimalt should be the result of *Canada's* offer to relieve

²¹Arnold-Forster Papers, War Office to Colonial Office, 3 Dec. 1904; Cab 2/1, Minutes of the 61st meeting of the CID, 9 Dec. 1904.

²²Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Records of the Governor General's Office, RG7, G21, No. 295A, Lyttelton to Grey (tel.), 9 and 17 Dec. 1904, Grey to Lyttelton, 14 and 29 (tel.) Dec. 1904.

her Mother of the burden which she has been carrying so long—and nothing must pass between us or between me and the Colonial Office to rob this incident of the charm and grace which will attend the action of the strong young arms when they unsolicited lift the burden off the old shoulders.”²³

Even Grey's sentimental plea did not move the dominion cabinet to immediate action. On 11 January Lyttelton wired that the War Office was urgently pressing for a reply. Grey answered the same day that the Privy Council could not meet for several days, and he added in a confidential postscript that it would probably ask to retain temporarily the present garrison at Canadian expense, a step which he would strongly recommend for reasons of efficiency, economy, and sentiment. In a separate telegram Grey reported, probably after a personal poll of the cabinet, that his ministers renewed in a formal manner their verbal offer of the 1902 colonial conference to assume the responsibility for garrisoning Halifax and Esquimalt. Later Grey forwarded a minute of the Privy Council of 20 January reiterating this offer and adding that Canada would like to have the advice of imperial officers on all military matters “as far as may be consistent with the principle of local self-government. . . .”²⁴ This Canadian offer assured the eventual withdrawal of British infantry, but the Laurier government's delays and sensitivity to the rights of the dominion indicated that difficulties were to be expected in working out the terms of the transfer.

The Governor General soon followed up his suggestion that the British troops remain at Canadian expense. On 12 January he forwarded to London a memorandum by Brigadier General Percy Lake, a British officer serving as chief of the General Staff of the Canadian militia. Lake saw three possible courses for the dominion government to follow in assuming responsibility for these two bases: it could take charge of them at once with whatever personnel could be gathered; it could retain the British troops at Canadian expense until adequate local forces were trained; or it could take over the proportion of the defences which it could properly manage now and use British troops for the rest. Although he did not recommend one course over another, his arguments strongly favoured the second alternative. Only retention of British troops, Lake felt, would ensure an efficient infantry force, and, furthermore, such a policy would save the Canadian government

²³PAC, Laurier Papers, Grey to Laurier, 30 Dec. 1904.

²⁴RG 7, G 21, No. 295A, Lyttelton to Grey (tel.), 11 Jan. 1905, Grey to Lyttelton (2 tels.), 11 Jan. 1905, Grey to Lyttelton, 20 Jan. 1905. Laurier had learned of the forthcoming reduction of the naval bases at Halifax and Esquimalt before this meeting of the council, and it apparently had no significant influence on the government's decision. See RG 7, G 21, No. 165, Lyttelton to Grey, 17 Dec. 1904; Laurier Papers, Alfred G. Jones to Laurier, 13 Jan. 1905.

about \$300,000 a year owing to the lower pay scale of the British army. It proved unnecessary for the dominion government to propose retention of the British infantry, but thinking in government circles followed the same lines as Lake's memorandum. The Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia wrote Laurier suggesting that, in view of the past difficulty in getting Canadian recruits, it would be more effective and half as expensive to maintain a British infantry force as the Halifax garrison.²⁵

The British government was not opposed to Grey's proposal. Late in December the Earl of Minto had strongly urged the cm to adopt a policy which would allow joint control of Halifax. Emphasizing that his six years as governor general had convinced him that the dominion government was "perfectly unreliable," he asserted that without supervision "Halifax will be treated merely as a valuable political asset—its military appointments to be politically filled, its building and supply contracts to be given to political supporters." In addition, Minto felt that the Canadian militia was inadequate for garrisoning Halifax and that it was "administered by a totally inefficient and incompetent headquarter staff." These outspoken views carried considerable weight in Whitehall. When accepting the Canadian offer of 20 January, Lyttelton himself suggested that imperial troops be retained for the present at Halifax and Esquimalt with the dominion paying Britain for their support. After pointing out that Canadian payment would be reduced as British troops were replaced, he said it was essential that Canada assume this expense on 1 April.²⁶

The Laurier government found these terms incompatible with its view of dominion autonomy. On 28 February the Privy Council proposed to modify the British suggestion to allow direct Canadian payment of the troops starting with the financial year on 1 July. While hoping that Canada could buy supplies from the War Office at basic cost, the council wanted a dominion officer to have command of all military forces and requested temporary commissions in the imperial army for certain Canadian officers who would be commanding imperial troops. After lengthy consideration in London, Lyttelton forwarded the Army Council's reply on 26 April. The army accepted 1 July as a suitable date for the transfer of responsibility, but it would not con-

²⁵RG 7, G 21, No. 295A, Grey to Lyttelton, 12 Jan. 1905; Jones to Laurier, 13 Jan. 1905.

²⁶Cab 5/1, CID Paper 17C, Minto, Memorandum on the transfer of the defences of Halifax to the Canadian government, 29 Dec. 1904; RG 7, G 21, No. 295A, Lyttelton to Grey (tel.), 8 Feb. 1905. Although most of these negotiations about the terms of transfer revolved around Halifax, British authorities planned to keep a few troops at Esquimalt. The transfer of Esquimalt was less complicated because Canada had paid roughly half of its cost for several years and it was a less important port than Halifax, which would still be used on a reduced basis by the training squadron.

sider turning over imperial troops for Canadian payment and administration. Although appreciating the Canadian constitutional objection to a direct payment to Britain, the Army Council pointed out that such a payment had been made for some years for Esquimalt and hoped that a way could be found to increase the amount to include Halifax. Finally, the council said it could not agree to turning over command to Canadian officers until the entire question of who would fill the top positions was settled.²⁷

Faced with a virtually complete rejection of their proposals, the Canadians responded with a compromise plan which sacrificed economy for autonomy. The Privy Council suggested on 18 May that, if the imperial officers and non-commissioned officers at Halifax and Esquimalt were given an opportunity to transfer to the dominion army, Canada would take over both stations on 1 July with her own troops augmented by the transfers. While asking that twenty-seven expert officers be left temporarily at their posts, the council pledged that the dominion would pay the whole cost of maintenance and supply for both garrisons. After another delay of almost two months, Lyttelton wired that the Army Council generally concurred in the plan but insisted that all transfers must be permanent. Noting that the proposed time of transfer had already passed, he said it could be done in the near future if the details on relative rank and command were completed quickly.²⁸

The transfer plan was the one used in completing the British withdrawal from Canada. Dominion infantry began to join the garrison at Halifax in May, and by 1 July they were in sufficient strength to take over the station although the British troops remained until early in 1906. In December Lord Grey wrote the Colonial Office that friction among the lower ranks at Halifax made it desirable to withdraw all imperial troops at once except those officers whose services had been requested for a longer period. The new Liberal cabinet approved this, and the Canadian government assumed formal control of Halifax on 16 January, 1906, and of Esquimalt on 1 May.²⁹

Despite the complicated imperial questions involved in the transfer of Halifax and Esquimalt to Canada, only a few officials at the Colonial and War Offices dealt with the terms of transfer after the basic

²⁷ RC 7, G 21, No. 295A, Grey to Lyttelton, 3 March 1905, Lyttelton to Grey, 26 April 1905.

²⁸*Ibid.*, Grey to Lyttelton, 19 May 1905, Lyttelton to Grey (tel.), 13 July 1905.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Grey to Lyttelton (tel.), 3 Nov. 1905, Grey to Elgin (tel.), 14 Dec. 1905 and 4 Jan. 1906, Elgin to Grey (tel.), 5 Jan. 1906. This dominion control covered only the garrisons. The transfer of the dockyards themselves came later and was completed by the issuance of imperial orders-in-council for Halifax on 13 Oct. 1910 and for Esquimalt on 4 May 1911. See C. P. Stacey, *The Military Problems of Canada* (Toronto, 1940), pp. 69-70.

decisions were made late in 1904. The problem in the western hemisphere which most concerned British strategists after the start of 1905 was the Canadian defence scheme.

For a number of reasons army planners sought to design a defence scheme for Canada which was based on the assumption of a war with the United States. The United States had always been the major potential enemy for Canada, and the War Office had begun work on a new defence plan based on this premise early in 1903 before the withdrawals were seriously considered.³⁰ Acceptance of such a plan would help the army to resist any major reduction in size by citing the need for preparedness against the United States, and it would also provide an opportunity to upset Fisher's plans for fleet concentration by demanding the retention of a number of small warships in Canadian waters for use on the Great Lakes in wartime. Consequently, the General Staff in December 1904 called for a decision by the *cm* on the duties of the navy in the event of war with the United States, "a contingency which, however improbable, is not impossible."³¹

With his plans for fleet redistribution already approved by the Board of Admiralty, Fisher was strongly against allowing the army to reopen the question. When asked by First Lord Selborne for his views on the General Staff paper, Fisher submitted what was probably an expanded version of the unsigned memorandum he had written for Clarke on the Halifax garrison. Shocked by what he saw as Fisher's violent hostility to Canada, Selborne reported to the Prime Minister that his First Sea Lord felt Britain could not possibly "escape an overwhelming and humiliating defeat by the United States and therefore he would leave Canada to her fate and no matter what the cause of the quarrel or merits of the case he would not spend one man or one pound in the defence of Canada." Since he thoroughly disagreed with these views, Selborne had told Fisher that he might send this paper to the *cm* as his personal opinion but not as an Admiralty statement. The First Lord sent the memorandum on to Balfour in the hope that he could pick out its flaws before it was presented to the *cm*.³²

Balfour replied that he did not have the papers with him to refute

³⁰Cab 5/1, CID Paper 3C, War Office, Memorandum on the standards of defence for the naval bases of Halifax, etc. . . . , 17 Sept. 1903, CID Paper 7C, Memorandum on the adequacy of the Halifax garrison and defences to resist a land attack, 11 Dec. 1903, CID Paper 10C, Grierson, Memorandum on questions now before the CID on which the War Office needs early decisions, 25 March 1904.

³¹*Ibid.*, CID Paper 15C, General Staff, Memorandum on the Defence of Canada, 13 Dec. 1904.

³²Balfour Papers, Selborne to Balfour, 26 Dec. 1904. The first lords of the Admiralty for this period were the Earl of Selborne (Oct. 1900–Feb. 1905), the Earl of Cawdor (Feb.–Dec. 1905), and Lord Tweedmouth (Dec. 1905–April 1908).

Fisher, "even if such refutation were possible." While promising to look into the question further in London, he did say that, if the Canadians wished to avoid annexation, he felt American power would be strained to the limit to accomplish it. And he agreed with Selborne that nothing could minimize the government's duty to study Canadian defences carefully, "whatever view we may take of the probability, or, (as I should prefer to put it,) the improbability of war, or as to the issue of hostilities."³³

Fisher never changed his view of Canadian defence. Almost three years later he wrote Lord Tweedmouth: "The Colonies one and all grab all they possibly can out of us and give us nothing back." And he emphasized to King Edward that the principles of imperial defence did not extend to the western hemisphere, for "whenever the United States wants to annex Canada she can do it. . . ."³⁴ Although Selborne's influence within the government was waning since he was leaving shortly to become high commissioner for South Africa, Fisher did honour his views by refraining from sending the offending memorandum to the CM. Instead he asked Prince Louis of Battenberg, who was just retiring as director of naval intelligence, and his replacement, Captain Charles Ottley, to draw up another study on Canadian defence which incorporated these same general views.³⁵

The Ottley-Battenberg memorandum, completed on 6 January 1905, was a remarkably forthright and inclusive statement of British strategic policy toward the United States. Putting sentiment aside, the writers argued that it was not in Britain's national interest to undertake extensive commitments in the defence of Canada against her only possible enemy. On the one hand, they adduced three main reasons why Canada should rely upon her own resources for defence against American invasion. Firstly, when comparing the rapid expansion of the American navy and its ability to concentrate in home waters with the worldwide responsibilities of Britain's navy and the growing jealousy of her European rivals, these analysts had difficulty conceiving the conditions under which all of the Royal Navy could be utilized in the western Atlantic against the United States. Secondly, the whole trend of diplomatic events since the Spanish-American War indicated that the American navy was not being built against Britain. Citing American statements approving a close understanding with Britain, they contended that efforts to improve Canadian defences could only arouse American suspicions and perhaps undermine this cordiality.

³³*Ibid.*, Balfour to Selborne, 1 Jan. 1905.

³⁴Fisher to Tweedmouth, 1 Oct. 1907, Fisher to King Edward, 4 Oct. 1907, in Marder, ed., *Fisher Correspondence*, II, 139, 143.

³⁵Fisher had known of Selborne's impending departure since early in October. See Fisher to Esher, 4 Oct. 1904, in *ibid.*, I, 329n.

And, finally, they argued that Britain should not pledge major assistance because "if Canada knows she will have to do the fighting, she will be cautious in provoking squabbles over petty questions!"³⁶

In examining, on the other hand, what Canada could do to defend herself, Ottley and Battenberg pointed out that she could keep a flotilla of submarines and torpedo boats at the mouth of the St. Lawrence for rapid transfer into Lake Ontario in case of war. But they found serious objections to this step. The United States would certainly resent such preparations and would probably erect fortifications on the American bank of the St. Lawrence. A Canadian flotilla for lake use might cause denunciation of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, and, in any shipbuilding race on the lakes, superior American resources would ensure Canadian defeat. After pointing out that even a major British victory at sea would not bring the United States to terms, the naval strategists concluded:

It appears then, that, however unwelcome, the conclusion is inevitable that in the event of an occurrence so much to be deprecated as the rupture of friendly relations with the United States, the position of Canada is one of extreme danger, and, so far as the Navy is concerned, direct assistance cannot be rendered.

The task of the Navy will be to deal with the American Fleet on the high seas, and it will be a task that will tax its energies to the utmost.

That war with the United States would be unpopular, and that the outcome of the struggle could only result, sooner or later, in the loss of Canada, are the conclusions difficult to avoid. It may be hoped that the policy of the British Government will ever be to use all possible means to avoid such a war.³⁷

Building support for his position, Fisher asked that this memorandum be sent to Arthur H. Lee, the civil lord of the Admiralty, for his perusal. In writing to ask for Lee's remarks, Ottley admitted that the views expressed in the paper were largely the result of a series of conversations he had had with Lee some five years before when both of them were serving as attachés in the embassy at Washington. He informed Lee that the CMB would soon hold an important session on the defence of Canada, adding: "If you can say anything which will strengthen the hands of those who believe that the best defence of Canada consists in a cordial understanding with the United States, I am sure you will not fail to do so." While he did not suggest a posture of complete submission to the United States, the new Director of

³⁶Adm 1/7807, Ottley and Battenberg, "Naval Notes upon the Defence of Canada," 6 Jan. 1905. The last quotation is from the marginal summary of the main points of the paper, and it was very likely added by Fisher.

³⁷*Ibid.* The argument about the futility of attempting to defend Canada was not a new one. British officials had advanced it on many occasions since 1815, frequently when there was an economic squeeze in the mother country. See Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908*, pp. 14, 43-7, 263-65, 324-29.

Naval Intelligence said one should keep in mind that, while an Anglo-American war was being fought, "the cause of human freedom throughout the world would be likely to suffer an irreparable setback."³⁸

Lee, whom Fisher once described as "the smartest man I've ever met," supported Ottley's views completely. Known to be an intimate friend of Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Henry White, Lee spoke with authority when he emphasized that the American navy was being built "against Germany—and against Germany alone. . . ." He pointed out that American officials firmly believed it would one day be necessary to defend the Monroe Doctrine against Germany, and they increasingly spoke of Anglo-American co-operation against a European combination. Settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute removed, he felt, the last possibility of serious friction with the United States, so that any naval expansion on the Great Lakes was both unwise and unnecessary. Lee offered to present further evidence, which he preferred not to commit to paper, if the *cm* wished to hear it, and he emphasized in conclusion:

I should regard a war between this country and the United States as the supreme limit of human folly, and I cannot conceive that any British statesman is willing to contemplate it under any circumstances, unless it were forced upon us beyond all possibility of avoidance.

In such a war we could not possibly win—no combination of Powers could successfully invade and conquer the United States—and the contest if persisted in could only result in the destruction of the British Empire and the downfall of the English speaking race.³⁹

The *cm* published the Ottley-Battenberg memorandum with Lee's remarks as a statement of Admiralty policy, but the First Lord insisted on adding a mildly dissenting introduction. Selborne first established his goodwill toward the United States, saying he felt that all British statesmen of whatever party considered "cordial friendship with the United States of America as the principal aim and object of British foreign policy." Yet, although British officials would rejoice at a permanent alliance with the United States, he contended it was their duty to consider the possibility of war until such an alliance was concluded. Basing his argument on "faith in the innate justice of the American people," he asserted that British assistance could enable Canada to resist an invasion long enough for the American people "to return to righteous sanity and to recoil with horror from a war of aggression. . . ." While he did not suggest increasing Canadian naval defences, Selborne emphasized that it was both dishonourable and

³⁸Adm 1/7807, Ottley to Lee, 25 Jan. 1905.

³⁹Balfour Papers, Fisher to Sandars, n.d. (c. 1 Feb. 1904); Adm 1/7807, Lee, Remarks on "Naval Notes upon the Defence of Canada," 5 Feb. 1905.

unnecessary to abandon the responsibility of protecting Canada against invasion.⁴⁰

In responding to the outspoken Admiralty memorandum on 17 March, the General Staff agreed "as to the extreme undesirability of war with the United States," but it pointed out that all possibilities for serious friction had not been removed, mentioning, for example, a French attempt to sell St. Pierre and Miquelon. The army planners contended that recent Admiralty decisions had changed the whole strategic situation in Canada, and they asked the CMD to determine the extent of naval responsibility in three cases: securing command of Lake Ontario at the start of war, commanding the tideway of the St. Lawrence up to Montreal, and continuing to guarantee all British territory against overseas invasion. Two weeks later, in an effort to strengthen its position, the General Staff asked the CMD to establish new scales of defence for Halifax and Esquimalt. The army argued that Halifax could be defended against an organized American attack and expressed the hope that adequate scales of defence would be established before these bases were handed over to the Canadian government. The army's goal in calling for simultaneous consideration of the standards of defence and naval duties was to force additional commitments on the British navy by utilizing the general desire to have the Canadians maintain the defences at a high level.⁴¹

Early in April the CMD twice considered Canadian defence without reaching any substantial conclusion. During the protracted discussions the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Neville Lyttelton, disclosed a fact which indicated the hypothetical nature of the committee's investigation. In explaining that increases could be made in the present standard of defence, he emphasized that "the Canadian Government were not acquainted with the existing Defence Scheme, and that no communication need be made in regard to any change in its provisions to them." The committee reaffirmed its pledge to devote all the resources of the empire to defend Canada against external danger but insisted that the British government retained the right to allocate these resources, and it called on the Colonial Defence Com-

⁴⁰Cab 5/1, CID Paper 21C, Ottley and Battenberg, "The Defence of Canada," 24 Feb. 1905, including Selborne's introductory minute of 10 Feb.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, CID Paper 24C, General Staff, Remarks on Admiralty Memorandum No. 21C, 17 March 1905, CID Paper 26C, Memorandum on Defence of Halifax and Esquimalt, 31 March 1905. The Admiralty replied to the General Staff's first two questions by pointing out that its statement of inability to guarantee command of the western Atlantic included the lesser demands of control of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario. It added that the "difficulty is that we cannot state that fact bluntly to the Canadian Government, which would blurt it all over the world." To the last question the Admiralty said its guarantee of protection against overseas invasion still held, but it had to be broadly interpreted. *Ibid.*, CID Paper 25C, Admiralty, Reply to General Staff Paper 24C, n.d. (printed in April 1905).

mittee to recommend new scales of defence for Halifax and Esquimalt. Late in May the Colonial Defence Committee reported that it felt Esquimalt could be abolished as a fortified naval base but that the defences at Halifax should be adequate to resist an attack by an organized expeditionary army and a fleet including battleships.⁴²

Still trying to join the issues of local defence standards and over-all naval duties, the War Office wrote on 6 June asking for precise answers to its questions of 17 March. The permanent undersecretary contended that the conclusions of the seventieth *cm* meeting had answered only the question of the naval guarantee against overseas invasion and said the General Staff needed decisions on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence in order to complete its studies of Canadian defence. The Admiralty did not allow these questions to be linked. On 28 June the *cm* considered the standards of defence at Halifax and Esquimalt and quickly adopted the Colonial Defence Committee's recommendations. The army succeeded in setting the Halifax scale of defence at a level which included the United States, but the committee postponed consideration of naval responsibilities in Canadian defence.⁴³

The *cm* finally considered the navy's duties in the defence of Canada on 13 July. Before discussion began the General Staff posed an additional question, asking if the Admiralty could recommend any steps that Canada could take to prepare for war on the lakes without breaking the Rush-Bagot Agreement or arousing American objections. Fisher answered each question in a way designed not to extend Admiralty commitments in the western hemisphere. He said the navy could not be responsible for securing the command of Lake Ontario at the start of war, because warships could not be stationed in the St. Lawrence in peace and after war was declared it would be impossible to get them to the lake before the Americans gained control. When General Grierson asked if submarines and torpedo boats could not be stationed at Halifax, the Chancellor of the Exchequer objected that such a step would cause the dominions to feel their only duty was local defence, whereas the government's policy was to encourage the dominions to build seagoing fleets for service with the Royal Navy. As to commanding the tideway of the St. Lawrence up to Montreal, Fisher said the Admiralty stood by its pledge to defend Canada against organized

⁴²Cab 2/1, Minutes of the 69th and 70th meetings of the CID, 5 and 12 April 1905; Cab 5/1, CID Paper 29C, Colonial Defence Committee, Memorandum on the Strategic Conditions of Halifax and Esquimalt, 26 May 1905.

⁴³Cab 5/1, CID Paper 30C, Col. E. W. D. Ward to Clarke, 6 June 1905; Cab 2/1, Minutes of the 73rd meeting of the CID, 28 June 1905. When the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence learned that Esquimalt was to be abandoned as an imperial naval base, he complained to Laurier that the dominion government had been put in a very awkward position "in 'taking over' a station which is abandoned!!" He added: "You may be quite sure British Columbia will raise a howl when the news comes out. . . ." Laurier Papers, Sir F. W. Borden to Laurier, 20 Sept. 1905.

invasion but that this did not mean prevention of occasional raids by a single vessel. Finally, he said the Admiralty could not suggest any measures for Canadian naval preparation on the lakes which would be within the terms of the Rush-Bagot Agreement and acceptable to the United States. The committee adopted Fisher's answers with only minor changes. It omitted his qualification about raids of a lone ship in the St. Lawrence and observed that the formation of a torpedo flotilla at Halifax "would not give the United States reasonable cause for complaint."⁴⁴

It is not surprising that Fisher's views on Canadian defence prevailed. The dominion government, after all, showed itself most reluctant to spend any money improving its own defences, and the cm by its authorization of the garrison withdrawals had already recorded its view that war with the United States was highly unlikely. Moreover, Balfour was not inclined to run against the desires of the First Sea Lord on a relatively minor matter such as this when he had only recently modified his selection of a new first lord to meet Fisher's demands. When Fisher had learned in March that Balfour planned to appoint Walter H. Long to replace Selborne as first lord, he wrote the Prime Minister that he would be obliged to accept an attractive offer from a shipbuilding combination should Long come to the Admiralty. After Long proved hesitant to leave the Local Government Board, Balfour selected the Earl of Cawdor as the new first lord, a step which left Fisher "overjoyed." Fisher's threat to resign and pressure from the King to retain him as first sea lord no doubt influenced Balfour, and Fisher found himself in a stronger position than ever in the summer of 1905.⁴⁵

Despite rejection by the cm of practically all its proposals for Canadian defence, the army continued to consider an American invasion during the early months of 1906.⁴⁶ This was most likely the result of a bureaucratic impulse to complete the Canadian defence scheme as well as the lack of a more pressing problem. It is significant that as the military conversations with France turned the attention of the army increasingly toward a continental strategy, the General Staff lost its concern for the American threat to Canada. This concern had been based initially on no more than a resistance to change and a

⁴⁴Cab 2/1, Minutes of the 75th meeting of the CID, 13 July 1905. See also Richard A. Preston, *Canada and "Imperial Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1919* (Durham, N.C., 1967), pp. 339-43.

⁴⁵Fisher to Balfour (copy to Knollys for the King), 3 March 1905, in Marder, ed., *Fisher Correspondence*, II, 53; Balfour Papers, Fisher to Sandars, 6 March 1905.

⁴⁶PRO, War Office Records, WO 106/44, Grierson, Memorandum on the military forces required for over-sea warfare, 4 Jan. 1906; Cab 17/47, Sir N. Lyttelton, Defence of Canada, 5 Feb. 1906.

desire to prevent the reduction of the size of the army, but as Fisher assumed the lead in efforts to cut the army further, military leaders responded by opposing various Admiralty proposals. Pressure from the army at the forty-eighth CMO meeting was probably the reason for considering the United States in relation to the garrison at Halifax but not at Bermuda. Army opposition to Fisher's plans for the western hemisphere ended in July 1905.

A final gasp of opposition to the lack of British military and naval power in the western hemisphere came, however, from the Foreign Office in the autumn of 1906. Sir Charles Hardinge, the new permanent undersecretary, sought to modify Fisher's fleet distribution to gain an increased number of gunboats for police and ceremonial duties in the Mediterranean and Caribbean. Old antagonists from the Colonial Office and new opponents like Sir George Clarke joined the fray, but Fisher fought them to a standstill by refusing to include the expenses for additional gunboats in the navy estimates on the grounds that it was not essential for national defence. By the spring of 1907 the First Sea Lord had overcome resistance to the withdrawal of practically all British military and naval forces from the West Indies and Canada.⁴⁷

The British military withdrawal from the western hemisphere originated in Arnold-Forster's effort to reform the army within a rigid budgetary limit, and it was approved by the government before Fisher returned to Whitehall. But, in view of the opposition which developed within the government, and in Canada and the West Indies, it is doubtful whether Arnold-Forster could have implemented the decisions without assistance from Fisher. Fisher's great political ability and his "ruthless, relentless, and remorseless" drive for increased fighting efficiency combined with economy assured the defeat of the successive groups that tried to modify the decision to withdraw.

Government officials are seldom motivated by sentiment, and it is difficult to analyze the influence on policy of such an intangible force as Anglo-American friendship. Realists in international affairs have

⁴⁷Royal Archives, Windsor, Hardinge to Lord Knollys (private secretary to King Edward VII), 23 Oct. 1906, W50/28, Fisher to Knollys (tel.), 6 Nov. 1906, W57/97; Adm 1/7904, Hardinge, Memorandum on new Admiralty fleet distribution, 25 Oct. 1906; Balfour Papers, Clarke to Balfour, 1 Jan. 1906; BM, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Clarke to Campbell-Bannerman, 17 July and 15 Nov. 1906; Adm 1/7904, Colonial Office to Admiralty, 3 Jan. 1907; PRO, Foreign Office Records, FO 371/364, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 11 Feb. 1907; Adm 1/7904, Foreign Office to Admiralty, 14 March 1907, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 28 March 1907; Adm 1/7804, Fisher, Memorandum, n.d. (c. May 1907). The author would like to express his appreciation for the gracious permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to make use of materials from The Royal Archives, Windsor Castle.

often criticized conclusions based largely on expressions of cordiality.⁴⁸ But in this instance the expressions of friendship came from the leading decision-makers in the British government, and they backed their attitudes with specific actions which denoted a sincere regard for friendly relations with the United States. When the British government found itself pressured by budgetary restrictions, the constant military difficulty of defending Canada and the West Indies, and an increasing threat from Germany, the assurance of American friendship allowed it to entrust its strategic interests in the western hemisphere to American protection. While there was some hesitation at first to admit this reliance on the United States, the crucial debates on the defence of Canada forced the government leaders to recognize the principles on which they had been acting.

Today we can see this withdrawal as the final step in accepting American domination in the western hemisphere. It is the conclusion of the trend which began with the Hay-Pauncefote treaties, was strengthened by the Venezuelan furore and tacit British acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine, and was virtually concluded in the Alaskan boundary settlement. The general significance of the withdrawal was also understood at the time it occurred. Early in 1905 an American marine visiting the British garrison on St. Lucia reported: "The Officer commanding the troops stated to me that he thought the island would be turned over to the United States. Even the small darkies on the streets greeted us with cries of 'The Yankees are coming.'"⁴⁹

⁴⁸In this regard, note especially the "realist" approach of R. G. Neale, *Great Britain and United States Expansion: 1898-1900*.

⁴⁹National Archives, Washington, D.C., Office of Naval Intelligence Register File, I-9-a, Record Group 38, Capt. J. T. Myers to Capt. J. M. Hawley, 10 Jan. 1905.

Grey, Bryce, and the Settlement of Canadian-American Differences, 1905–1911

PETER NEARY

THE YEARS 1903 AND 1911 stand out dramatically in the history of Canadian-American relations—the one because of the decision of the Alaska tribunal, the other because of the defeat of reciprocity and the downfall of the Laurier government. Conversely, the interval between these years has been little explored by historians, though this lack of interest is easily explained. It is not possible to point to any event between 1903 and 1911 which aroused great public interest, nor is the prosaic subject matter of that period's diplomacy—boundary waters, fisheries, fur seals, to mention only three items—likely to attract instinctively the enquiring mind. Yet the wealth of documentary evidence which has become available in the last decade makes it clear that a considerable transformation occurred during these years, not only in the relations of Canada and the United States to each other but also in the relations of both to Great Britain. Moreover, these sources cast new light not only on the major figures of the period such as Laurier and Roosevelt but also on a host of minor figures whose activities, if known before, have never been fully understood.

A good starting date for a discussion of Canadian-American relations in the years immediately after the Alaska débâcle is 3 May 1906. On that day the American Secretary of State, Elihu Root, who was to be the key figure on the American side in what was to follow, proposed the settlement of all outstanding Canadian-American questions in a letter to the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand.¹ Nearly fifteen months of preliminary negotiations had preceded the presentation of this important document, which was destined

¹Public Record Office (PRO), FO 414/193, Root to Durand, 3 May 1906. Quotations from Crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office appear by permission of H.M. Stationery Office.

to be the touchstone of Canadian-American diplomacy for the next five years. On the Canadian side the chief figure in these preliminaries had been the fourth Earl Grey, who had become governor general of the dominion in December 1904. Of a restless and interfering nature, Grey, who had earlier fallen under the spell of Rhodes, was eventually to press his powers as governor general almost to the breaking point. He was constitutionally incapable of playing the role of figurehead and his frequent initiatives often led to uneasy relations with the cautious and politically sensitive Laurier.

Grey had not been in Canada long before it became clear that his main interest would be Canadian-American relations. Like many of his countrymen in the first decade of the twentieth century, he was convinced that the future security of Great Britain lay in a close friendship with the United States. Accordingly, the absence of any acutely contentious Canadian-American issue at the moment of his arrival in Ottawa naturally suggested itself to him as affording an unparalleled opportunity for building upon the existing Anglo-American accord. Taking advantage of this opportunity, he began working towards the systematic settlement of all outstanding Canadian-American questions as early as February 1905. In pursuit of this objective he found a ready ally in the United States after Root became secretary of state in July 1905. Their negotiations culminated in the American proposals of 3 May 1906. Root's communication to Durand of that date referred to sixteen pieces of Canadian-American business in all. The first twelve had been on the agenda of the abortive Joint High Commission of 1898-9; the remaining four had come to occupy the attention of diplomats since then. Of the twelve which had been on the agenda of the Joint High Commission, only two—the north Atlantic fisheries and Bering Sea sealing questions—were of the first rank in importance.

The first of these revolved around the meaning of the fisheries article of the Anglo-American Convention of 1818 and had, of course, a long and complicated history. Since 1888, rather than stir up further trouble with the United States over the fisheries, Canada had allowed American fishermen, in return for a nominal licence fee, to enjoy extensive rights in Canadian waters, even though the United States was giving Canadians nothing in return. However galling to Canadian pride, this situation had existed for so long that it was no longer a matter of great public concern.

The Bering Sea sealing question also had a long history during which it had acquired an emotional charge for Canadians, though, like the Atlantic fisheries question, by 1905 it could scarcely have been considered as involving any vital Canadian interest. The crux of this

matter was the amount of compensation which should be paid to Canadian sealers for abandoning pelagic sealing in the Bering Sea, a practice which had attracted sealers first from the United States and then from Canada and Japan in the previous two decades. By 1905 the activities of the pelagic sealers had been responsible for the reduction of the seal herd in the Bering Sea to the point where its complete destruction seemed possible. When the Joint High Commission of 1898 had assembled in Quebec, Canada had agreed almost at once to the abandonment of pelagic sealing provided the United States would give the Canadian fishermen who stood to lose thereby adequate compensation.² The subcommittee of the Joint High Commission which had considered the Bering Sea question had therefore concerned itself with terms of compensation for Canadian fishermen. By the time the commission had ended its sessions this subcommittee had almost completed a draft agreement based on an American offer both to pay Canadian sealers five hundred thousand dollars outright and to give the dominion a percentage of future earnings from the capture of seals at the American-owned Pribilof Islands.³ It was at this point that Root now proposed to resume negotiations in May 1906. To this end, on 18 April he had forwarded Durand a draft treaty based on that drawn up in 1898-9.⁴ This proposal offered Canada 20 per cent of the annual revenue received by the United States government from the taking of seals at the Pribilofs until May 1910 and thereafter one-fifth of the total number of seal skins taken annually.

Of the four questions added to the dossier of Canadian-American diplomacy since 1899 only that relating to boundary waters, a matter which had been brought to the fore by rapid industrialization at the turn of the century on both sides of the border, was of first-rank importance. Involved in the boundary waters question were such issues as the extent of each country's right both to divert boundary waters for sanitary and irrigation purposes and to dam rivers which affected water levels across the border. The latter issue had become important because of the growing demand for electricity, particularly in the Great Lakes region, and the consequent need to make use of readily available water power resources. The possibility of opening negotiations on the use of joint water resources had been raised as early as 1895 but nothing concrete had been achieved until 1903.⁵ In that year

²For the history of the Joint High Commission see C. S. Campbell, Jr., *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903* (Baltimore, 1957).

³Foreign Office Library, FO Confidential Print 7135, Herschell to Salisbury, 7 Feb. 1899.

⁴FO 414/193, Root to Durand, 18 April 1906.

⁵C. J. Chacko, *The International Joint Commission between the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada* (New York, 1932), pp. 71-3.

Great Britain had accepted an American proposal for the appointment of an international commission consisting of three Canadian and three American representatives "to investigate in general the waters adjacent to the boundary line between the United States and Canada, the effect upon the shores produced by changes in the water levels, and the erection and location of a dam at the outlet of Lake Erie."⁶ Because of administrative delays the first meeting of this body, which had been styled the International Waterways Commission, had not been held until May 1905 and a year later, when Root presented his proposals for settling Canadian-American differences to Durand, its investigations were still incomplete.

In March 1906, however, the American commissioners had reported to their own government in relation to one particularly important issue: the threat being posed to the flow of water over Niagara Falls by the diversion of water from the Niagara River for power development.⁷ The report of the American commissioners had shown that works had already been authorized in the two countries for the removal of 60,900 cubic feet of water per second from the Niagara River and that this would result in 27 per cent of the average discharge and 33 per cent of the low water discharge ceasing to pass over the Falls. On 27 March 1906, prompted by a desire to preserve the scenic beauty of the Falls, President Roosevelt had sent this report to congress and bills had subsequently been introduced both in the Senate and House of Representatives to limit the diversion of water from the Niagara River on the American side provided Canada would reciprocate.⁸

Elsewhere in his letter to Durand of 3 May, Root noted the need for agreements to regulate the inland fisheries shared by the two countries, to provide for the final demarcation and marking of the Canadian-American boundary, to arrange for reciprocal rights with regard both to the conveyance of prisoners and wreckage and salvage operations in the waters contiguous to the Canadian-American boundary, and to settle all outstanding monetary claims.

During the summer of 1906 no further progress was made in the negotiations which Root had launched so promisingly in May. Indeed, it was not until 25 September, and only then after pressure had been applied from London, that Laurier sent an answer to the American proposals to Lord Grey.⁹ When he did finally reply, his reception of Root's proposals in relation to the two main questions which remained unsettled, Bering Sea sealing and North Atlantic fisheries, was anything

⁶FO 414/174, Choate to Lansdowne, 15 July 1902; FO 414/178, Lansdowne to White, 2 June 1903.

⁷United States, *Senate Documents*, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 242.

⁸United States, *Congressional Record*, XL, 4328, 5108, 5363.

⁹FO 414/193, Laurier to Grey, 25 Sept. 1906.

but encouraging. The abandonment of pelagic sealing by Canadians, he maintained, required that the United States not only compensate the Canadian fishermen who would be directly affected, but also give Canada "some substantial national consideration, commensurate with the importance of such a concession." This had always been the Canadian position. Thus, at the time of the Joint High Commission, Canada had sought from the United States in lieu of this "national consideration" an equivalent concession in relation to some other matter. Seen in the light of this longstanding demand the draft agreement which Root had presented was a poor one. The compensation it provided for Canadian fishermen was "hardly adequate" and it failed altogether to recognize Canada's "national claim."

Laurier also disagreed strongly with Root's proposal regarding the North Atlantic fisheries question which stated in effect that Canada should, without compensation, continue to grant American fishermen the privileges they had enjoyed in Canadian waters since 1888. The one encouraging aspect of Laurier's reply was that he accepted in varying degree most of the other American proposals, though this wide measure of agreement was, of course, completely overshadowed by the sharp difference of opinion on the two major questions. In a private letter to Lord Grey, sent with his reply to the American proposals, Laurier complained bitterly that Root had offered nothing in relation either to the pelagic sealing or north Atlantic fisheries questions "which would induce public opinion in Canada to surrender rights which fairly belong to us."¹⁰ Root's offer in relation to the Bering Sea question was less than the United States had been willing to give in 1899, while his proposal in relation to the Atlantic fisheries question was "a pure negative." "No government in Canada," Laurier uncompromisingly asserted, "would give in these issues on the terms proposed by Mr. Root."

To this view the Governor General was thoroughly sympathetic, pointing out in a letter to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, on 25 October that Laurier, by consenting to relinquish pelagic sealing at all, was running counter to a sentiment in the country which a skilful opposition might well be able to exploit to engineer the downfall of his government.¹¹ Yet Laurier was willing, Grey continued, to relinquish pelagic sealing in exchange for some *quid pro quo* which would render the settlement of all outstanding differences between the two countries possible. In the opinion of the governor general the United States could easily provide this *quid pro quo* by agreeing to settle the north Atlantic fisheries dispute on the basis of the unratified

¹⁰Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Grey Papers, Laurier to Grey, 29 Sept. 1906.

¹¹*Ibid.*, Grey to Sir Edward Grey, 25 Oct. 1906.

Chamberlain-Bayard treaty of 1888 which would have allowed Canada and Newfoundland to export a wide range of fishery produce to the United States duty free.¹² If the United States would allow the duty-free import of Canadian fish envisaged in that agreement, Laurier could consent to the abandonment of pelagic sealing with impunity and an *entente cordiale* between the two countries could be easily and quickly effected.

During the next few weeks Lord Grey continued to press for this exchange and found encouragement for his efforts in an article which appeared in the influential American periodical, the *Nation*, calling for a renewed effort to resolve the north Atlantic dispute.¹³ What had prompted this article was a new controversy which had flared up in 1905 between Newfoundland and the United States over fishing rights.¹⁴ Laurier's assessment of the situation was much gloomier than that of Grey. Realizing the political influence of the New England fishing interests—an influence that was clearly at work in the dispute between Newfoundland and the United States—he discounted the possibility of the United States ever negotiating a settlement along the lines envisaged by Grey.¹⁵ That his pessimism in this regard was not misplaced was clearly shown in December when his letter of 25 September in answer to the American proposals was, after long delay, finally communicated to Root by Durand. On 20 December Root complained to the ambassador that Laurier's reply had not dealt with all the points which had been raised in his own letter of 3 May and that it had failed to meet the United States halfway on those points with which it had dealt.¹⁶ Specifically, he criticized the Canadian reply for not having spelled out the "substantial national consideration" which was wanted in return for the abandonment of pelagic sealing.

By the end of 1906, therefore, the negotiations which had begun so promisingly earlier in the year were almost completely bogged down. In January 1907 Root visited Ottawa in response to the invitation he

¹²For the history of this agreement, which was defeated in the Senate, see C. S. Campbell, Jr., "American Tariff Interests and the Northeastern Fisheries, 1883-1888," *Canadian Historical Review*, XLV (1964), 212-28.

¹³*Nation*, LXXXIII (July-Dec., 1906), 342-3.

¹⁴For the history of this controversy, see P. F. Neary and S. J. R. Noel, "Newfoundland's Quest for Reciprocity, 1890-1910," unpublished paper, 1967. In 1902 Newfoundland had completed an agreement with the United States which involved both reciprocal trading concessions and special fishing rights for Americans in Newfoundland waters. This agreement had subsequently been blocked in the Senate by Henry Cabot Lodge at the behest of New England fishing interests anxious to avoid Newfoundland competition. In 1905, in an attempt to force the New England opponents of the agreement to give way, Newfoundland set about the systematic disruption of the American fishery on her shores.

¹⁵Grey Papers, Laurier to Grey, 28 Oct. 1906.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Durand to Grey, 21 Dec. 1906.

had accepted from Grey but his visit did not lead to any breakthrough in the negotiations. Socially, and from a public relations point of view, his sojourn in the Canadian capital was an overwhelming success, but his talks with Canadian officials were purely exploratory.¹⁷

It was at this critical juncture in the negotiations that a new protagonist arrived on the scene in the person of James Bryce, who replaced Durand as British ambassador early in 1907. Bryce, who had behind him in England a distinguished career in scholarship and politics, brought unique qualifications to the role of ambassador. He was well known to Americans through both *The American Commonwealth* (1888), which had already become something of a minor classic, and his other scholarly and journalistic writings. He had travelled widely in the United States, was an indefatigable speaker, and was popular with an important segment of the American public because of his longstanding advocacy of Anglo-American friendship. Moreover, he had many notable and influential friends in the United States, including some of the leading figures in the Washington foreign-policy-making élite. Immediately upon his arrival in the old embassy building on Washington Avenue he turned with great vigour to the work at hand in the field of Canadian-American relations.

Like Grey, whom he now replaced as the leading figure on the British side in the negotiations, Bryce recognized in the projected complete settlement of Canadian-American differences a unique opportunity to build upon the Anglo-American rapprochement of the previous decade. In March, George Gibbons, a Canadian member of the International Waterways Commission and a key figure in Canadian-American diplomacy during the next two years, reported to Laurier after visiting Washington that he had found the new ambassador "very much alive and keen and with an astonishing knowledge . . . of Canadian affairs."¹⁸ Bryce's plan of attack was simple and designed to bypass the cumbersome diplomatic machinery by which information normally flowed back and forth between the Canadian and American capitals: he proposed first to discuss the list of outstanding questions and the progress of the negotiations with Root and then, armed with the information he had thus obtained, to visit Ottawa for a similar discussion with Laurier before the latter left for London to attend the 1907 colonial conference. Having been adequately forewarned by Lord Grey about the state of public opinion in Canada towards the United States, Bryce was under no illusions about the work he was beginning. "From what I hear," he wrote to Sir Edward Grey shortly after his arrival in the United States, "Canada . . . is in

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Grey to Sir Edward Grey, 28 Jan. 1907; Grey to Bryce, 31 Jan. 1907.

¹⁸PAC, Laurier Papers, Gibbons to Laurier, 19 March 1907.

no humour for 'deals' or compromises, or at least for such as the U.S. are likely to agree to."¹⁹

That this judgment was well founded was amply demonstrated when Bryce went to Ottawa in March and was publicly confronted by Laurier with the charge that British diplomacy had in the past placed American friendship before Canadian interests.²⁰ Yet Bryce's visit was not entirely unproductive in that Laurier was much more amenable in private. Although no further progress was made towards resolving the north Atlantic fisheries and pelagic sealing questions, the consideration of other outstanding Canadian-American questions was more productive. Thus it was agreed that negotiations should go forward concerning two other matters Root had raised in May 1906—the regulation of inland fisheries and the final demarcation and marking of the Canada-United States boundary—and that a proposal should be made to the United States to refer to the International Waterways Commission the important task of devising a scheme for the future regulation of boundary waters.²¹ In relation to all these matters, however, it was decided that Bryce would not act officially until Laurier had discussed the state of Canadian-American relations with the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries, Sir Edward Grey and Lord Elgin. But it was agreed that Bryce could continue informal negotiations with Root. Not surprisingly, Bryce left Ottawa convinced that the hope of achieving the desired complete settlement of Canadian-American differences lay in first disposing of those questions on which both sides were more or less agreed, and it was to this purpose that he increasingly turned his attention from April 1907 onwards. The removal of the lesser irritants, he hoped, would "sweeten and soften the feeling between the two countries" and thereby create an atmosphere in which the more controversial matters might be tackled and resolved.²²

On his return to Washington Bryce first discussed Canadian-American business with Root on 11 April.²³ In accordance with the arrangement which had been made in Ottawa he did not make any proposal on behalf of Canada, but in the event another notable advance was made in the negotiations. Once again it was in relation to the boundary waters question that progress was achieved. When Bryce mentioned that Laurier was in favour of referring to the International Waterways Commission the work of formulating a scheme for the regulation of

¹⁹PRO, Sir Edward Grey Papers, Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 26 Feb. 1907.

²⁰Foreign Office Library, Bryce Papers, Bryce to Grey, 2 April 1907; Sir Edward Grey Papers, Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 3 April 1907. See also the *Globe*, 2 April 1907.

²¹Laurier Papers, Bryce to Laurier, 2 April 1907; FO 414/199, Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 9 April 1907.

²²FO 414/199, Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 9 April 1907.

²³Laurier Papers, Bryce to Laurier, 11 April 1907.

the waters in question, Root "argued and begged" that this should be done as soon as possible.²⁴ Writing the same day, Bryce strongly recommended to Laurier, who was now in London, that Root should be accommodated in this regard and that the Canadian members of the International Waterways Commission should be authorized at once to open discussions with their American colleagues. Laurier agreed and on 23 April instructed the Minister of Trade and Commerce in the dominion government, Sir Richard Cartwright, who was acting prime minister in his absence, to raise the matter for discussion in the cabinet.²⁵ Then, on 13 May, having pressed for decisive action on all outstanding questions with the United States before Root and Roosevelt left Washington for the summer, Bryce was authorized by Laurier to tell Root that Canada wished to proceed immediately with the negotiations concerning boundary waters, boundary demarcation, and inland fisheries.²⁶ Next, to simplify matters, it was decided that the work of negotiating a boundary waters agreement would be entrusted to the two leading members of the International Waterways Commission—George Gibbons for Canada and George Clinton for the United States—rather than to the commission as a whole.²⁷ The choice of Gibbons was to be an important one. One of the most prominent Liberals in western Ontario and a leading member of the tightly knit business oligarchy of London, Gibbons quickly emerged as a shrewd and determined, if sometimes overly dramatic, defender of Canada's interests in the negotiations.²⁸

During the summer of 1907 a great deal was again accomplished in the negotiations, despite the usual seasonal lull in diplomatic activity, prolonged in this instance by Root's absence from Washington until November. In May Root had submitted draft proposals in relation to the boundary demarcation question and before leaving in June he had submitted yet another draft agreement, this one for the settlement of a long-standing Canadian-American difference over the use of the Milk and St. Mary rivers (both of which flow across the Montana-Alberta border) for irrigation purposes. Moreover, in August there was a major breakthrough in the negotiations when Laurier agreed to the arbitration by the Hague court of the dispute with the United States over the fisheries article of the Convention of 1818.

The decision to arbitrate this major difference marked the climax of

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵Laurier Papers, Laurier to Bryce, 23 April 1907; Laurier to Cartwright, 23 April 1907.

²⁶FO 414/199, Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 10 May 1907; Sir Edward Grey to Bryce, 13 May 1907.

²⁷*Ibid.*, Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 16 May 1907.

²⁸See *London and Its Men of Affairs* (London, c. 1915), p. 32.

the controversy which had been in progress between Newfoundland and the United States since 1905. In that controversy Great Britain had clearly made friendship with the United States her first consideration and Newfoundland had been brusquely overruled in her attempts to limit the activities of American fishermen on her shores, the instrument of coercion having been an Anglo-American agreement concluded in October 1906. Under the leadership of Robert Bond, who had tied his political career to the stand he had taken on the fisheries question, Newfoundland had, however, resisted this *diktat* and it had become necessary for the imperial authorities to seek some other solution. The alternative which was decided upon in Whitehall was that of arbitration by the Hague court. This decision automatically drew Canada into the controversy since, having in some respects the same standing as Newfoundland vis-à-vis the United States under the terms of the Convention of 1818, the dominion would necessarily be affected by the decision of the court. When Bond, in an attempt to save face at home by having the 1906 Anglo-American fisheries agreement rescinded, accepted during the summer of 1907 the proposal for arbitration, Laurier had little choice but to accept also. To have refused would have been to place on the dominion the responsibility for prolonging a situation in Newfoundland which in the eyes of Britain was a serious threat to Anglo-American friendship. With the débâcle of the Alaska award fresh in his mind, it is not surprising that Laurier gave way to the wish of the imperial authorities in this regard with the greatest reluctance. Nevertheless his decision removed at a single stroke the most important obstacle standing in the way of the general settlement of Canadian-American differences towards which the diplomacy of the previous two years had been directed. The decision of this court, which, in the main, upheld the Canadian and Newfoundland claims, was eventually delivered in 1910.

During the summer of 1907 there was yet another reason for optimism about the state of the negotiations in the very considerable progress which Gibbons and Clinton were able to make in their consideration of the boundary waters question. They had begun meeting almost immediately after the decision to refer the question to them had been taken, and by September they had prepared a draft treaty which Gibbons, who was showing himself to be a skilled and adept negotiator, was able to forward to Laurier on 24 September.²⁹ On the whole Laurier reacted favourably to this draft, writing to Gibbons shortly after receiving it that it seemed at first glance "a very happy solution of a very dangerous subject."³⁰ There were, however, provisions to which he took exception and for this reason he directed

²⁹Laurier Papers, Gibbons to Laurier, 24 Sept. 1907.

³⁰*Ibid.*, Laurier to Gibbons, 26 Sept. 1907.

Gibbons to try to arrange a revised draft which would be acceptable in every detail. In this Gibbons encountered no great difficulty and on 2 December was able to report to Bryce that his negotiations with Clinton were proceeding smoothly.³¹ In yet another area of the negotiations which had been in progress now for over two years the end seemed at last in sight. Such, however, was not to be the case, for at this critical juncture Root began questioning the whole idea of a permanent boundary waters commission, the central recommendation of the Gibbons-Clinton draft.³² Root's alternative to such a commission was that boundary waters questions should be settled as they arose by joint commissions appointed on an *ad hoc* basis. To this proposal Gibbons was extremely hostile. Unlike the permanent commission envisaged in the draft agreement, he argued, the *ad hoc* commissions envisaged by Root would only be a source of mischief in the relations of the two countries.³³ "I think your attitude now," he cautioned Laurier in a letter which at once questioned Root's good intentions and Bryce's competence, "should be one of firm insistence upon a permanent Board to deal with all these matters."³⁴

Bryce's assessment of the situation was less pessimistic. Thus he did not think that Root was opposed in principle to the creation of a permanent commission but attributed his sudden reluctance to go along with the recommendations of the Gibbons-Clinton draft to a legitimate fear of the opposition which might be stirred up in the United States against the creation of a commission whose powers were considered too sweeping.³⁵ As a result of a conversation with Root on 3 January, 1908, Bryce became even more convinced of the validity of this analysis.³⁶ The Gibbons-Clinton draft, Root told him on this occasion, went too far and could not therefore be recommended to the Senate by the administration. The permanent commission envisaged in the draft would be independent of both governments but would be entrusted with "a large and unascertained number of questions, many of them still unexplored, many perhaps of high importance, affecting the economic and industrial interests of large areas and of populations which might some day be large." Not enough was known of these questions "to warrant so bold a step." Moreover, it was not in the Anglo-Saxon tradition "to deal in an abstract fashion with principles before the cases they were intended to cover had arisen and been examined." To illustrate this latter point, Root referred to a provision

³¹FO 115/1459, Gibbons to Bryce, 2 Dec. 1907.

³²Laurier Papers, Laurier to Gibbons, 9 Dec. 1907; Gibbons to Laurier, 16 Dec. 1907.

³³*Ibid.*, Gibbons to Laurier, 16 Dec. 1907.

³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵Laurier Papers, Bryce to Laurier, 14 Dec. 1907; Bryce Papers, Bryce to Grey, 18 Dec. 1907.

³⁶Laurier Papers, Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 4 Jan. 1908.

in the draft under which the right of navigation would take precedence over all other considerations in the use of boundary waters. This was a questionable stipulation he maintained, because in particular instances the use of water for irrigation purposes or for generating electrical power might prove more important. Another provision, to the effect that the two countries had to have equal rights to the use of all waters held in common, was open to a similar objection. Thus it had already been found necessary to depart from this principle in the division of the waters of the Niagara River.

In answer to these arguments Bryce "represented strongly" that agreement on principles to govern the decisions of the proposed commission would have the advantage of enabling disputes to be settled "with more evident impartiality" than would otherwise be the case. He argued, too, that it was safe to assume that, over a boundary as long as that dividing Canada and the United States, the application of the same principles to a large number of cases would not give either side an advantage over the other. Again, while admitting that some questions "of magnitude" might, in the course of events, come before the proposed commission, he nevertheless maintained that the "balance of advantage" was in favour of allowing all boundary waters questions, whether great or small, to be settled in the manner proposed in the Gibbons-Clinton draft. The existing waterways commission, he observed, had worked well and had shown its ability to deal with the business it had been called upon to handle "in a fair spirit." To leave boundary waters questions to be settled by the two governments "would be to leave grounds of controversy which might hereafter prove embarrassing . . . and a source of angry feeling among the inhabitants of the border regions of both countries." But for the moment, none of these arguments proved effective. Root clung to the view "that the issues likely to arise were too grave . . . to renounce control over" and "clinched the matter," as Bryce put it, by stating that in any event there was no hope of inducing the Senate to accept the Gibbons-Clinton draft. But Bryce's efforts were not entirely in vain since Root did agree to bring forward a draft agreement acceptable to the United States.

In reporting this conversation, Bryce conceded that, unfortunate though it was, Root was probably correct about the attitude the Senate would likely adopt towards the Gibbons-Clinton draft. "I cannot but recognize," he wrote, "that the difficulties which the attitude of the Senate presents are insuperable."³⁷ The clear inference of this comment

³⁷*Ibid.* On the same day Bryce wrote privately to Lord Grey: "... Root sees no chance of getting the Treaty for enlarging the powers of the International Waters Commission through the Senate in its present form. He is to send me his suggested alterations. How-

was that Canada should relax her demands and accept a compromise agreement. But to this Gibbons remained adamantly opposed, and in typically forceful fashion disputed the whole of the case Root had advanced, reserving an especially vitriolic attack for the latter's claims about the division of water at Niagara.³⁸ Although it was true, he protested to Laurier, that Canada was diverting about twice as much water from the Niagara as was the United States, the principle of equal rights had not been violated. The overriding consideration at Niagara, which both countries recognized, was the preservation of the scenic beauty of the Falls, and it was this, rather than Canadian rapacity, which lay at the root of the existing inequality. Canada had never claimed the right to more than half the water in the Niagara River and she was in practice taking more than the United States only because the location of the boundary allowed her to do so without spoiling the scenic effect. That she should be exploiting this natural advantage and utilizing as much of her share of the river as she could was "only reasonable" and for Root to have questioned her right to do so only showed how "petty" he could be.

In the clash of opinion on the negotiations which thus arose between Bryce and Gibbons, Laurier's sympathies were entirely with the Canadian. The issue at stake in the negotiations, he informed Grey in a letter dated 20 January 1908, was of such fundamental importance that Canada had no option but to stand firm, for unless an independent boundary waters commission was established there would never be a "regular and uniform system of rules" in relation to the use of boundary waters and justice would never prevail.³⁹ Accordingly, Bryce was instructed to stand firm in his dealings with Root and "insist upon the treaty as drafted."

The next move came towards the end of January 1908 when Root brought forward the substitute draft which he had promised. In place of the comprehensive plan which Gibbons and Clinton had recommended, he proposed the creation of a permanent commission which could be called upon by either government to investigate "all matters of difference . . . along the frontier" as they arose and to make recommendations for their settlement, such recommendations not to be binding on either side.⁴⁰ Early in February 1908 Gibbons returned to Washington to discuss these proposals. The conversations which followed were inconclusive but considering how radically Root's scheme

ever regretfully, I must admit that he is right in believing the Senate would refuse to part with the wide control this Draft Treaty proposes to extend to the Commission." (Bryce Papers, Bryce to Grey, 4 Jan. 1908).

³⁸Laurier Papers, Gibbons to Laurier, 31 Jan. 1908.

³⁹Grey Papers, Laurier to Grey, 20 Jan. 1908.

⁴⁰Laurier Papers, Gibbons to Laurier, 11 Feb. 1908.

differed from the one he had helped draft, Gibbons reacted to it with tact and moderation, joining with Bryce in attempting to find ways to supplement the American proposals so as to make them more acceptable to Canada. Working closely with the ambassador, he drafted for inclusion in the proposed agreement an article whereby the two governments could jointly refer for arbitration to the proposed commission any difference, whether relating to boundary waters or not, which arose between them, the decisions of the commission in such cases to be binding on both sides.⁴¹ Root did not reject this proposal, sweeping though it was, but he did insist that the article as drafted should be altered to make the participation of the United States in any such arbitration contingent on the "advice and consent" of the Senate.

Gibbons returned to Canada in an optimistic mood and, moreover, in full accord with Bryce's view that Root's fears about the Senate were genuine. On 11 February he confidently reported to Laurier that "a proper understanding" was much nearer than ever before.⁴² Root's proposals showed that he had at last accepted that the jurisdiction of the proposed commission should extend to all "matters arising anywhere along the frontier." Again, while he had not offered to include in the agreement any general principles to govern the use of boundary waters, he had become thoroughly sympathetic to the view that such principles should be agreed upon and only his doubts about the Senate prevented him from giving way on this matter. Root now, Gibbons assured Laurier, thoroughly understood the Canadian position and respected Canada for standing up for her rights.

Shortly after Gibbons wrote this letter, Bryce arrived in Ottawa for his second visit, determined to press to a conclusion those draft agreements put forward by the United States in relation to which no irreconcilable differences now seemed to exist. Both the boundary demarcation and inland fisheries drafts fell within this category and for weeks before leaving for Ottawa Bryce had tried to get the approval of the Canadian government for the completion of these agreements, only to be met with the most frustrating delaying tactics on Laurier's part. With regard to the boundary demarcation draft every important point which Laurier had raised had been satisfactorily resolved. Again, only the question of the inclusion of the north channel of Lake Huron in the waters to be regulated remained to be decided in relation to the inland fisheries draft. Yet Bryce failed again during his Ottawa visit to persuade Laurier to act on either of these proposed agreements. In private Laurier was willing to accept what had been negotiated but that was as far as he was willing to go. "The Cana-

⁴¹*Ibid.*, Bryce to Grey, 11 Feb. 1908. A greatly modified version of this article eventually became article 9 of the Boundary Waters Treaty.

⁴²*Ibid.*, Gibbons to Laurier, 11 Feb. 1908.

dians," Bryce wrote to Sir Edward Grey shortly after returning to Washington, "are quite heartbreaking in their habits of procrastination and delay. . . . As soon as I left Ottawa they fell back into the old rut and since then not a word have I been able to get from them enabling me to go to Root with official sanction for the settlements to which they informally agreed."⁴³ Bryce was disheartened but by no means defeated. Indeed in the weeks following his return to Washington he bombarded Grey with letters designed to persuade Laurier of the need to act decisively in the negotiations. Towards the end of May this persistence was rewarded when, at long last, Laurier approved the completion of the boundary demarcation and inland fisheries agreements. With the signing of these agreements by Bryce and Root on 11 April, 1908, a notable step was taken towards translating into reality the vision of the systematic removal of differences which had for so long been the goal of Canadian-American diplomacy.

In its final form the inland fisheries agreement provided for the establishment of a two-member international fisheries commission, one member to be nominated by each government.⁴⁴ The task of this commission was, in the first instance, "to prepare a system of uniform and common International Regulations" for the protection and preservation of the fisheries in fourteen bodies of water divided by the international boundary, from Passamaquoddy Bay in the east to the Gulf of Georgia in the west. What the boundary demarcation agreement did was to arrange for the definitive demarcation and marking, except in the Great Lakes region, of the entire Canadian-American boundary.⁴⁵ In the Great Lakes region the work at hand was left to the International Waterways Commission. In May Bryce was able to add to these initial agreements another which provided for reciprocal rights between Canada and the United States in relation to both the conveyance of prisoners and wreckage and salvage operations. When Root had submitted his original proposals in May 1906, he had offered to negotiate such an agreement on the basis of a draft for the same purpose which had been prepared by the Joint High Commission. Laurier had agreed to this but no action had been taken on the matter until February 1908, when Root had submitted a draft agreement for consideration. But thereafter, thanks largely to Bryce's efforts, the negotiations had moved forward fairly quickly and by early May the few points of difference which had arisen in relation to the American draft had been fully ironed out.⁴⁶

⁴³Sir Edward Grey Papers, Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, 6 March 1908.

⁴⁴*Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1908* (Washington, 1912), pp. 379-82.

⁴⁵*Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada in Force Between His Majesty and the United States of America, 1814-1925* (Ottawa, 1927), pp. 299-310.

⁴⁶For this agreement see *ibid.*, pp. 310-12.

In the meantime there had been important new developments in the boundary waters negotiations, notably a decision by Laurier to reject the scheme which Root had proposed in February and to hold out for an agreement which was closer to the Gibbons-Clinton draft.⁴⁷ Bryce had been unofficially informed of this decision when he had visited Ottawa later the same month, but it was not until almost a month had passed and the administrative delays which were almost an inevitable part of Canadian-American diplomacy had run their course, that Lord Grey forwarded to the State Department a minute of council formally stating the Canadian position. Thereafter nothing further had happened until 6 May when Bryce and Root had again discussed the question but failed to break the deadlock.⁴⁸ On that occasion Bryce had again called for "a treaty embodying fixed principles applicable to the solution of all questions affecting the use of Boundary waters, and . . . a permanent body empowered to apply those principles." But Root had rejected this solution for the same reasons as before, arguing once again that each case which arose ought to be dealt with on "its own merits," since it was impossible to devise principles which would be applicable in every instance.

Bryce had been left more convinced than ever by this conversation that a treaty as comprehensive in scope as that proposed by Gibbons and Clinton could not be obtained, and when he reported to Lord Grey on what had been said, he again implied that Canada should be willing to settle for something less:

Strongly as I personally feel the desirability of securing a Treaty as that drafted by Messrs. Gibbons and Clinton, and cordially as I agree with the ideas which have inspired the policy of Your Excellency's Government, I entertain little hope that the United States Government can be induced to adopt those ideas. The most that these present negotiations seem likely to secure will fall short of that treaty. For even if Mr. Root himself could be induced to assent to it, his conviction that he could not get it accepted by the Senate would prevent him from courting failure by submitting it to that suspicious body, in which the selfish interests of the frontier states, acting upon their own Senators would be sufficient to determine the action of the whole body.⁴⁹

But this hint was completely ignored by Laurier, who remained as adamantly opposed as before to any form of compromise.

In the month following his conversation with Root on 6 May, Bryce worked hard to find a means of breaking the deadlock, but by 9 June, when he left the embassy en route to the Republican convention in Chicago prior to returning home on leave of absence, all he had accomplished was to have arranged for Gibbons to return to Washing-

⁴⁷Grey Papers, Laurier to Grey, 12 Feb. 1908.

⁴⁸Laurier Papers, Bryce to Grey, 8 May 1908.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

ton for further talks. To this end Gibbons left for Washington on 16 June carrying with him a lengthy memorandum which gave a clear and forthright summary of the Canadian case. When he met Root the following day, a great breakthrough in the negotiations occurred. Contrary to Bryce's prediction and for reasons which the British and Canadian documents do not make clear, Root altered his previous stand, conceding that fixed principles should be agreed upon to govern the waters of at least the Great Lakes system and that a permanent commission should be established to enforce those principles.⁵⁰ Subsequently, Gibbons began negotiations with Chandler Anderson, who had been Root's chief adviser within the State Department on Canadian-American questions since 1905, to draft an agreement along those lines. Their negotiations, which were conducted while Bryce was in England, ran smoothly and on 25 August Gibbons was able to report to Laurier that they were on the verge of completing a draft agreement which would be acceptable to Canada in every detail.⁵¹ "Mr. Anderson entirely agrees with our contentions," he assured Laurier enthusiastically, "thinks we are right, and has so expressed himself to Mr. Root."

By the time Bryce arrived back in the United States towards the end of September, Gibbons and Anderson had reached such an advanced stage in their discussions that they could go no further with the drafting of the treaty until Root had considered and approved what had already been done. A lengthy delay ensued because Root was kept away from Washington campaigning for Taft. Indeed, it was not until after the presidential election that the new draft agreement received any serious attention in the State Department. But once negotiations were started again in earnest, a successful conclusion was reached fairly quickly. At the end of November Gibbons went to Washington for talks with Bryce and Root, and when he returned on 2 December reported to Laurier that the negotiations were proceeding "very satisfactorily."⁵² Two weeks later he forwarded to Laurier the completed draft of the treaty, and on 26 December went to Ottawa to

⁵⁰Laurier Papers, Gibbons to Laurier, 22 June 1908. In a subsequent letter Gibbons gave Laurier this account of what had happened: "I pointed out to him [Root] how essential it was that the two nations should themselves agree upon what were fair principles, or, in other words, what the law was to be, not leaving it to the whim of any set of commissioners or arbitrators, and that it was just as much in their interest as ours to put the whole thing upon a permanent basis. Any other course would mean a continuation of the condition he seemed so much to resent. . . . He wheeled completely around and said he was exceedingly glad that I was in the matter and thought that we would be able to work the thing out satisfactorily. He then went on to concede that general principles must be adopted as regards the Great Lakes System. . . ." (*Ibid.*, Gibbons to Laurier, 6 July 1908).

⁵¹*Ibid.*, Gibbons to Laurier, 25 Aug. 1908.

⁵²*Ibid.*, Gibbons to Laurier, 2 Dec. 1908.

give him a detailed explanation of its provisions. With Laurier's approval he then went to Washington to help Bryce get the agreement ready for signature. But just as it seemed once again that the end was in sight in the boundary waters negotiations, Laurier began questioning the agreement afresh.⁵³ Gibbons was completely exasperated by this development and in characteristically impulsive fashion interpreted the qualms which had developed in Ottawa since his departure as signifying a lack of confidence in his handling of the negotiations. Accordingly, he telegraphed Laurier from Washington asking to be replaced as Canadian negotiator if the treaty was not acceptable as it stood.⁵⁴ He then, however, returned to Ottawa and, after a further period of hard bargaining there, followed by another round of talks in Washington, managed to win acceptance for the agreement. On 11 January 1909 Bryce was at long last authorized to initial the treaty, which he did the same day, less than three weeks before Root's resignation as secretary of state. The completed agreement gave Canada almost all she had insisted on in the negotiations. Article 7 provided for the establishment of a permanent boundary waters commission to be styled the International Joint Commission, while article 8 provided that each country was to have "equal and similar rights" to the use of all boundary waters.⁵⁵

Given the scope and importance of the Boundary Waters Treaty it is not surprising that its ratification posed almost as many problems as its negotiation. Indeed the first evidences that there might be difficulties over ratification appeared within a month of signature. On the one hand Laurier developed new fears about the agreement because it failed to give the proposed International Joint Commission control over rivers which crossed the boundary, while on the American side opposition developed in the Senate and elsewhere over the proposed division of water at Niagara. Both these objections, however, were quickly and effectively answered by those who had negotiated the agreement. Thus, while readily admitting to Laurier the efficacy of having rivers which crossed the boundary placed under the International Joint Commission, Bryce, with the support of Gibbons, insisted that since this was unacceptable to the United States, the arrangement envisaged in the treaty was the next best thing.⁵⁶ That arrangement was, he maintained, a distinct improvement over the existing position under which Canadians had no legal redress whatever

⁵³Grey Papers, Laurier to Grey, 31 Dec. 1908; Laurier Papers, Bryce to Grey, 31 Dec. 1908, and Laurier to Gibbons, 1 Jan. 1909; Gibbons Papers, Gibbons to Laurier, 2 Jan. 1909.

⁵⁴Laurier Papers, Gibbons to Laurier, 1 Jan. 1909.

⁵⁵*Treaties and Agreements*, pp. 312-19.

⁵⁶Laurier Papers, Bryce to Laurier, 20 Jan. 1909; Bryce to Laurier, 31 Jan. 1909.

against the diversion in the United States of water which would otherwise flow across the boundary. Similarly, the American officials responsible for the agreement gave an equally determined defence of the article relating to the division of water at Niagara.⁵⁷

Subsequently, however, a more serious obstacle to ratification appeared in the form of a resolution which the Senate adopted qualifying its recommendation to the president that the treaty should be accepted. The resolution in question, which was introduced by Senator William A. Smith of Michigan, dealt with the division of water at Sault Ste Marie, where the natural flow of water favoured the United States. Its purpose was to safeguard the interests of an American company which had been granted a franchise to develop power on the American side of the rapids in the St. Marys River. When the possibility of some such qualifying resolution being introduced was first mentioned in mid-February, Bryce was confident that it could be worded so as to be acceptable to both Smith and Laurier and not to delay the ratification of the treaty. In this expectation he was overly sanguine, though initially it appeared that such a wording might be devised. On 26 February he met with Root, Anderson, and Gibbons in New York and a resolution was drafted which was acceptable to everyone present. This draft confirmed the rights of existing territorial and riparian owners at the rapids, which was what Smith wanted, but did so "without prejudice to the right of Canada to take within its own territory not exceeding one-half of the total amount of the waters flowing from Lake Superior into the St. Marys River available for power purposes."⁵⁸ But Smith refused to accept this wording, and when the Senate recommended the treaty for ratification on 3 March, the qualifying resolution it adopted was one which he had drafted and not the one which had been agreed upon in New York. To Bryce's great chagrin, Smith's resolution failed to mention Canada's right under the treaty to an equal share of the water of the St. Marys River, but declared simply that:

. . . nothing in this treaty shall be construed as affecting or changing, any existing territorial or riparian rights in the water, or rights of the owners of lands under water, on either side of the international boundary at the rapids of the St. Marys River at Sault Ste Marie, in the use of the waters flowing over such lands, subject to the requirements of navigation in boundary waters and of navigation canals, and without prejudice to the existing right of the United States and Canada, each to use the waters of the St. Marys River, within its own territory. . . .⁵⁹

⁵⁷Bryce Papers, Bryce to Grey, 4 Feb. 1909; Laurier Papers, Anderson to Gibbons, 6 Feb. 1909, Gibbons to Anderson, 8 Feb. 1909, and Gibbons to Laurier, 17 Feb. 1909.

⁵⁸FO 371/782, 9362, Bryce to Grey, 2 March 1909. See also Laurier Papers, Gibbons to Laurier, 26 Feb. 1909, and Gibbons to Laurier, 27 Feb. 1909.

⁵⁹*Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910* (Washington, 1915), p. 540.

The effect which this development had on the Canadian government is not difficult to imagine. Ever on the alert for American foul play, Laurier, not without some justification in this case considering the circumstances and the personalities involved, saw in Smith's resolution an underhanded attempt on the part of the United States to capture a greater share of water at the Sault by circumventing the principle of equal rights which the treaty embodied.

It would be pointless here to trace in detail the many attempts which Bryce made during the next year to persuade Laurier to ratify the treaty despite the Smith resolution. Suffice it to say that his correspondence in this regard occupies a large part of his entire private correspondence for the period. Briefly stated, Bryce produced two arguments, both of which were supported by Gibbons and Lord Grey, in favour of ratification: first, that the resolution passed by the Senate was not what it seemed, and that whatever Smith's intention might have been, his resolution did not in fact negate Canada's right to half the water available in the St. Marys River for power development; and secondly, that it was dangerous and foolhardy to throw such an important treaty, which was otherwise so advantageous to Canada, into jeopardy over such a small matter. In April he was able to produce convincing evidence in favour of the first of these arguments in the shape of a legal opinion drawn up by the attorney general of the United States, George W. Wickersham, which declared that the preservation of the existing territorial and riparian rights at the Sault under the Smith resolution would not detract from Canada's right under the treaty to an equal share of the water of the St. Marys River.⁶⁰ The argument in favour of ratification was clinched in Bryce's view by the announced intention of the United States government to expropriate the land in question on the American side of the rapids under the terms of a rivers and harbours bill which the Senate had approved on 3 March 1909, the same day that it had recommended the treaty for ratification.⁶¹

With the territorial and riparian rights referred to in the Smith resolution as good as in the possession of the United States federal government, and with a written declaration from the attorney general of that government that these rights did not interfere with Canada's right to an equal share of water, Bryce could see no reason for further delay.⁶² Yet Laurier remained unconvinced and vigorously rebuffed all attempts to force his hand on the issue. It was not until March 1910,

⁶⁰FO 371/782, 15816, Bryce to Grey, 19 April 1909.

⁶¹United States, *Senate Journal*, 60th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 268.

⁶²Laurier Papers, Bryce to Laurier, 26 April 1909; Grey Papers, Bryce to Laurier, 1 May 1909.

after the most agonizing reappraisals, that he was finally reconciled to the treaty as approved by the Senate, and it was not until May 1910 that Bryce finally exchanged ratifications in Washington.

While the fate of the Boundary Waters Treaty was being decided during 1909 and the early months of 1910 negotiations were in progress simultaneously on two other pieces of pending Canadian-American business. The first of these concerned the location of the boundary in Passamaquoddy Bay, a matter which had been in dispute for some time and which had figured in the boundary demarcation treaty of 1908. The second was the pelagic sealing question which had been hanging fire since Laurier had rejected the offer Root had made in May 1906. The Passamaquoddy Bay dispute was a relatively minor affair which involved nothing more than the location of the boundary in the vicinity of the Lubec Narrows which separate Campobello Island from the Maine coast.⁶³ The whole controversy hinged in fact entirely on the ownership of a tiny island called Pope's Folly, which lies slightly inward from the narrows, and a small fishing area, known as the Middle Ground, situated somewhat further from the narrows on the seaward side. Yet trivial though it was, the negotiations leading to its settlement extended over a period of nearly twenty-nine months. Ultimately, the United States received Pope's Folly and Canada the Middle Ground.

The pelagic sealing dispute was, of course, an immeasurably more complex and intractable problem than the Passamaquoddy Bay boundary question. During 1908 negotiations concerning the draft treaty which Root had submitted in April 1906 had continued on the same inconclusive course. On the other hand the difficulty in the negotiations was still confined solely to the question of the compensation which Canada should receive in return for agreeing to the abandonment of pelagic sealing. Both sides remained firmly committed to the proposition that pelagic sealing ought to be stopped. Further, the difference as to compensation had lost much of its force since 1906 owing to a gradual weakening in the Canadian bargaining position.⁶⁴ This weakening had been due partly to the settlement of the north Atlantic fisheries dispute, which had removed the lever which Laurier had hoped to use to extract a major concession from the United States in return for the abandonment of pelagic sealing, and partly to an unexpectedly rapid diminution in the seal herd itself which had been caused by a marked increase in Japanese sealing operations in the

⁶³For the history of this question see A. C. Gluek, Jr., "The Passamaquoddy Bay Treaty, 1910: A Diplomatic Sideshow in Canadian-American Relations," *Canadian Historical Review*, XLVII (1966), 1-21.

⁶⁴Laurier Papers, Bryce to Grey, 13 Nov. 1908. See also Thomas A. Bailey, "The North Pacific Sealing Convention of 1911," *Pacific Historical Review*, IV (1935), 1-14.

vicinity of the Pribilofs. Unable to compete with the Japanese, who were unrestrained by international regulations regarding sealing which Canada had accepted in 1893, Canadian sealers had been forced to abandon the hunt in large numbers, and in 1908 only eight vessels had sailed from Canadian ports as against approximately thirty-five when the industry had been at its height.

The result of these developments was that by 1909 Canada had lost all chance of obtaining any "substantial national consideration" from the United States in return for abandoning pelagic sealing, and was instead faced with the choice of either accepting the compensation which Root had offered in 1906 or of seeing the seal herd exterminated. In these altered circumstances the squabble which had developed in the negotiations was transformed into nothing more than a question of how the compensation which Root had offered in 1906 should be paid. On the one hand, the State Department refused to make any alteration in the arrangement which Root had put forward, while, on the other, Laurier insisted that the Canadian sealers who would be affected by the proposed agreement should receive full compensation from the United States at the same time that the prohibition against pelagic sealing came into effect.

On 21 January 1909, only a few days before leaving office, Root sent identical notes to Russia, Japan, and Great Britain, the three powers interested in preserving the Pacific seal herds, proposing a conference to work out a multilateral settlement of the pelagic sealing problem. Russia and Japan readily accepted but Laurier refused to do so until the question of compensation for Canadian sealers had been satisfactorily settled.⁶⁵ No progress was made towards removing this stumbling block until late in the summer when Bryce, acting entirely on his own initiative, managed to work out a compromise with the State Department.⁶⁶ According to this compromise, Canada would receive annually the one-fifth share of the seals taken at the Pribilofs which Root had offered in 1906, but she would also be guaranteed that the value of her share would not fall below a fixed yearly minimum. In addition she would be advanced a sum of money by the United States in lieu of her future annual instalments out of which she could compensate her sealers when the ban against pelagic sealing came into effect. Bryce discussed these arrangements with Laurier during a brief visit to Ottawa in September and won acceptance for them in principle, but it was not until February 1911, that the details of the scheme were finally settled and an agreement signed. Ultimately the cash advance

⁶⁵Bryce Papers, Grey to Bryce, 13 April 1909, and Laurier to Grey, 28 July 1909.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, Bryce to Grey, 4 Sept. 1909; FO 371/1018, 11616, Bryce to Knox, 4 March 1910.

which Canada received with which to compensate her pelagic sealers amounted to two hundred thousand dollars.

With Canada satisfied on the question of compensation the way was finally clear for the proposed four-power conference, which eventually met in Washington in May 1911. Bryce and Joseph Pope, the under-secretary of state in the Canadian Department of External Affairs, were the British representatives, and Bryce played a leading part in the discussion. The conference proved a notable success and on 7 July the final chapter of an historic controversy was written when the representatives of the four powers signed a treaty which banned pelagic sealing in the entire north Pacific for a period of fifteen years.⁶⁷

With the completion of this agreement in 1911 the last difference of any consequence between Canada and the United States was obliterated and the long process of settlement which had been started in 1905 completed. Altogether eight different treaties and agreements had been concluded: in 1908 treaties for the final demarcation of the boundary between Canada and the United States, for the regulation of the fisheries in their inland contiguous waters, and for reciprocal rights between them with regard both to the conveyance of prisoners and to wreckage and salvage operations; in 1909 both an agreement for the arbitration of the north Atlantic fisheries dispute and the Boundary Waters Treaty; in 1910 agreements for the settlement of the disputed Passamaquoddy Bay boundary and for the arbitration of outstanding pecuniary claims; and in 1911 a treaty for the regulation of pelagic sealing in the North Pacific. The pecuniary claims agreement, which has not been considered in detail here, disposed of all such British and American claims, Canadian included. Of the various treaties and agreements completed the two most important were the north Atlantic fisheries agreement, which concluded the most ancient and, in the short term at least, potentially most explosive of Anglo-American differences, and the Boundary Waters Treaty, which removed from the sphere of diplomacy and put into the hands of a permanent commission a vast area of possible conflict between Canada and the United States.

Everything considered, the completion of all these agreements between 1905 and 1911 was a remarkable achievement and one which deserves more recognition in the history of Canadian-American relations than it has hitherto received. Indeed, seen in wider perspective, the period from 1905 to 1911 clearly marks a new departure in Canadian-American relations. In the Alaska affair Great Britain had learned that Canada could be an albatross round the imperial neck.

⁶⁷*Treaties and Agreements*, pp. 391-6. It should be noted that this agreement altered the terms of compensation Bryce had arranged but in a direction favourable to Canada.

The result was that after 1905 she withdrew from anything but a formal involvement in Canadian-American relations, leaving Canada a greater freedom in her relations with the United States than she had ever had before. Thus while Bryce and Grey played an active and at times a crucial role in the settlement which was achieved between 1905 and 1911, prodding Laurier at every stage of the negotiations, they did so largely on their own initiative. In relation to Canadian-American questions they seldom received guidance from London, nor did they always bother reporting home on the minutiae of the negotiations in which they were engaged. And, of course, they adhered to the principle, by now firmly established, that no arrangement could be made in Washington in the name of Canada which did not have the approval of the dominion government. But it was not only in terms of Canadian freedom from imperial restraint that this period represented something new in the history of Canadian-American relations. What is even more significant is that Canada was able to bargain more effectively with the United States during this period than she had ever done before. The Boundary Waters Treaty in particular represented something new in the relations of the two countries. Never before had Canada come out of a major negotiation with the republic with such a fair and equal bargain. Ironically, it was a government which could justifiably lay claim to this achievement which went down to defeat in 1911 amidst cries of a sell-out to the United States.

The Social Gospel and the Reform Tradition in Canada, 1890-1928

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THE LITERATURE OF SOCIAL REFORM has not been extensive in Canada even though a sizable movement of reform was abroad in the land from the 1890s through the 1930s, a movement that was found in church and in secular society, and at municipal, provincial, and, progressively, federal levels. In the last chapter of his *Progressive Party in Canada*, Morton sees the decline of that party as a result in part of the waning of the impulse towards reform in society as a whole. Underlying and accompanying the movement towards reform through the political system had been the social gospel, a movement of which the most important function was to forge links between proposed reforms and the religious heritage of the nation, thus endowing reform with an authority it could not otherwise command. At the same time it attempted to create the religious and social attitudes thought necessary for life in a world reformed. But the world proved too intractable for the realization of the movement's high socio-religious hopes, and in the wake of the frustrating experiences of the early 1920s, supporters of the social gospel, and other reform movements, took different paths; some withdrew from politics, some retreated to pragmatic politics, some transferred their enthusiasm to other causes (notably peace movements and personal religion), and others moved towards a new radicalism. The reform movement may be viewed from many standpoints, but only when it is looked at as a religious manifestation, a striving to embed ultimate human goals in the social, economic and political order, is its success and failure fully appreciated. The history of the social gospel in Canada is an account of that process.

The social gospel rested on the premise that Christianity was a social

religion, concerned, when the misunderstanding of the ages was stripped away, with the quality of human relations on this earth. More dramatically, it was a call for men to find the meaning of their lives in seeking to realize the kingdom of God in the very fabric of society. It was a measure of the radicalism implicit in the Social Gospel that the Methodist church in 1918 called for complete social reconstruction by a transfer of the basis of society from competition to co-operation. It was a measure of the conservatism inevitably associated with such a call that even some of the most radical supporters of the social gospel believed that in the family as they knew it, and in the political democracy of their time, two essential elements of the society toward which Jesus pointed men were already in existence, or virtually so. Such a reduction was necessary to apply a pan-historical and transcendent concept to immediate needs. And without such reduction the reform movement would have enjoyed considerably less power.

The Protestant background out of which the Canadian social gospel had to emerge was one dominated overwhelmingly by the Anglican, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches. The similarities and disparities in the social outlook of these churches prior to the onset of depression in the late nineteenth century may be suggested by their reactions to a strike of the Toronto Printers' Union in 1872. The Anglican *Church Herald* condemned the labourers for usurping the role of the employer and blamed the strike upon "the insidious whimperings of a foreign-born league." The *Presbyterian Witness* argued that labour's campaign "strikes at the very root of . . . personal independence and perpetuates their social demoralisation. . . . No man ever rose above a lowly condition who thought more of his class than of his individuality." The Methodist *Christian Guardian* declared a profound sympathy with all honest workingmen and a sincere desire for their betterment, but went on to say: "we seriously question the wisdom and advantage of this movement—especially the strikes to which it is likely to lead."¹ When news of Henry George's Anti-Poverty Society reached Toronto in 1887, the other two churches would probably have echoed the response of the *Christian Guardian* on 29 June: "We have no faith in the abolition of poverty by any laws that can be made in legislatures. . . . The best

¹These reactions of the church press are cited in Stewart Crysedale, *The Industrial Struggle and Protestant Ethics in Canada* (Toronto, 1961), pp. 18–19. It is not unlikely that among the strikers and those who rallied to their support were some who were not prepared to accept the editors' opinions as to their Christian duty (See Doris French, *Faith, Sweat and Politics*, Toronto, 1962). For a fuller account of the social stance of Methodism and Presbyterianism in these years, see Marion Royce, "The Contribution of the Methodist Church to Social Welfare in Canada" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1940), and E. A. Christie, "The Presbyterian Church in Canada and Its Official Attitude Towards Public Affairs and Social Problems, 1875–1925" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1955).

anti-poverty society is an association of men who would adopt as their governing principles in life, industry, sobriety, economy and intelligence." Such an individualistic ethic was unable, however, to withstand the combined onslaught of extended depression, the rapid growth of industrial urban centres, and the spread of new social conceptions.

It has been argued that the social gospel in Canada was an indigenous development.² Although it is possible that a Canadian social gospel might have developed simply in response to domestic urban and industrial problems, it did not in fact happen that way. To be sure, the earliest expressions of the social gospel in Canada may still lie in sources untouched by historians' hands. And in those sources, the rise of the social gospel may be obscured by the gradual nature of its separation from older forms of Christian social expression characterized by a concern for church-state relations, education, political corruption, and personal and social vice. But almost all evidence regarding the emergence of the social gospel from this tradition points to currents of thought and action which were sweeping the western world, none of which originated in Canada. To trace this "North Atlantic triangle" of culture and religion underlying the social gospel at large and its transmission to and development within Canada is a worthy but massive project. In this paper, only a description of some of its salient features can be attempted.

The inspiration of the pioneers of the social gospel in Canada and the origin of some of its prominent institutions reveal the extent of its indebtedness. W. A. Douglass in the 1880s expressed his disagreement with individualistic methods of social regeneration by tirelessly campaigning for Henry George's panacea of the single tax.³ Salem Bland, later to become the philosopher and mentor of the movement, was an omnivorous reader, and in the decade of the 1890s when he seems to have first formulated a social gospel outlook, was especially influenced by Carlyle, Tennyson, Emerson, Channing and Thoreau, by the historical critics of scripture, and by Albert Ritschl, the great German theologian whose optimistic theology played a great role in the emergence of a social gospel theology. At least as significant for Bland was the literature of evolution.⁴ The notes for his first socialist lecture, "Four Steps and a Vision," acknowledge various works of Darwin, Drummond's *Ascent of Man*, and Kidd's *Social Evolution*, as well as *Fabian Essays*, Arnold Toynbee, Edward Bellamy, and Henry George.⁵

²Crysdale, *The Industrial Struggle and Protestant Ethics in Canada*, p. 22.

³C. D. W. Goodwin, *Canadian Economic Thought* (Durham, N.C., 1961), pp. 32-8; *Toronto World*, 7 Feb. 1898; *Grain Growers' Guide*, 21 Nov. 1917, pp. 32-3.

⁴United Church Archives, Toronto (UCA), reading lists in the Bland Papers.

⁵Bland Papers.

Canadians had attended the three great interdenominational conferences in the United States on social problems in 1887, 1889, and 1893, and one follow-up conference had been held in Montreal in the latter year.⁶ Institutional vehicles and expressions of the social gospel such as the Brotherhoods, institutional churches, settlements and labour churches derived ultimately from British models, although American mediation and modification took place in some instances. This pattern of influence continued throughout the life of the social gospel in Canada.

The optimism of the social gospel drew on more than a generalized sense of progress, and even on more than the influence of evolutionary concepts. One of the more significant religious developments of the nineteenth century was the expansion of evangelicalism—expressed variously in German pietism, the Methodism of the English-speaking world, the missionary movement, and American revivalism. As against the reformed tradition of Calvinism, evangelicalism stressed free will, an immanent God, religious emotion, and a restrictive personal and social morality which made its followers formidably austere. Among its doctrines was a belief in the possibility of personal perfection beyond the temptation of sin. In the course of the nineteenth century it made an immense impact on all Christian traditions, especially in North America. As evangelicalism became more diffused in the latter half of the century and awareness of the social problem arose, the individualism of the evangelical way seemed to many to be less and less appropriate.⁷ The demand “save this man, now” became “save this society, now,” and the slogan “the evangelization of the world in our generation” became “the Christianization of the world in our generation.”⁸ The sense of an immanent God working in the movement of revival and awakening was easily transferred to social movements, and hence to the whole evolution of society. Thus Josiah Strong in the United States could speak of the “great social awakening,” and many could come to view secular social action as a religious rite.

Such combinations of ideas and impulses were apparent in a sermon given to the first Brotherhood group in Canada on 14 April 1895. Speaking on “Social Resurrection,” J. B. Silcox argued that Jesus’ “resurrection means that humanity shall rise . . . into higher, nobler, di-

⁶C. H. Hopkins, *The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 1865–1915* (New Haven, 1940), pp. 110–15.

⁷For an expression of this transition, see the introduction to General William Booth, *In Darkest England and the Way Out* (London: International Headquarters of the Salvation Army, 1890).

⁸The distinction was between bringing the message and creating the social reality. For an illuminating discussion of this process, see Donald B. Meyer, *The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919–1941* (Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1960), chap. 1.

viner conditions of life." He joined several British thinkers, preachers, and writers, he said, in predicting a worldwide revolution for the people in the twentieth century. "This uprising of the people is divine in its source. . . . God is in the midst of it. . . . To the ecclesiastical and industrial Pharaohs of today, God is saying, 'Let my people go.'" He concluded by calling for "a political faith in Jesus" based on the charter of the Sermon on the Mount.⁹ C. S. Eby in *The World Problem and the Divine Solution* (1914) was somewhat more philosophical in expression. Jesus Christ was the "type of coming man on this planet." The ultimate reality of which Christ was the revelation was in and through all things: "the universal spirit of Christ would reconstruct man and mankind." Trade unionism, socialism, and business organization were a work of this spirit developing a new social order.¹⁰ On this basis Eby built his Socialist church in Toronto in 1909.¹¹ Many influences from the world of letters, science, religion, and reform were held in solution in the social gospel in various proportions. Few distilled the solution as did Douglass, Bland, Silcox, and Eby, and while they might be more radical than most, their thought represented the tendency of the movement as a whole.

The pressures of the last years of depression in the early 1890s precipitated a quickening interest in new forms of social thought and action among a growing group of Christian ministers and laymen. One of the most important centres of this interest was the Queen's Theological Alumni Conference, instituted by Principal G. M. Grant in 1893. At its annual meetings, the conference discussed papers on such topics as biblical criticism, economic development, the problems of poverty, socialistic schemes, the single tax, social evolution, interpretations of modern life by modern poets, studies of the prophets, Tolstoi, the relation of legislation and morality, and Christianity in its relation to human progress. As a Methodist minority among Presbyterians, Salem Bland was probably the most radical of the regular members.¹² At the beginning of the decade a pirated edition of General William Booth's *In Darkest England and the Way Out* was selling vigorously.¹³ Booth's scheme, involving the establishment of labour exchanges, farm

⁹UCA, J. B. Silcox, *Social Resurrection*.

¹⁰C. S. Eby, *The World Problem and the Divine Solution* (Toronto: William Briggs, 1914).

¹¹W. S. Ryder, in a paper presented to the Pacific Coast Theology Conference, 1920; *Western Methodist Recorder*, Sept. 1920, pp. 4-5. See also David Summers, "The Labour Church" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1958).

¹²Kingston *Daily News*, 14 Feb. 1894; 13 Feb. 1896; 20 Feb. 1896; 11 Feb. 1897; *Queen's Quarterly*, V (April 1898), 316-18; VI (April 1899), 314-16; VII (April 1900), 332; VIII (April 1901), 388.

¹³Robert Sandall, *The History of the Salvation Army* (3 vols; London, 1955), III, *Social Reform and Welfare Work*, 80.

colonies and industrial towns, model suburban villages, paid holidays, and an intelligence service for processing useful social data, was branded by some as socialistic, but encouraged others to view social action as an essential part of true religion.¹⁴ Two Canadian ministers, S. S. Craig and Herbert Casson, taking their cue from John Trevor in Manchester, attempted to found labour churches. Nothing more is known of Craig's venture in Toronto,¹⁵ but Casson's attempt at Lynn, Massachusetts, lasted from 1893 to 1898, after which he became a well-known socialist lecturer in Canada as well as the United States.¹⁶ The Congregationalist layman, T. B. Macaulay, in 1894 brought the Brotherhood movement from England to Montreal, whence its "brief, bright and brotherly" meetings, which mixed gospel songs with social reform, spread across the nation.¹⁷

Among social problems, those of slums and immigration prompted the larger part of the institutional response of the social gospel within the churches. Again, it was in the last decade of the nineteenth century that the more ambitious innovations were undertaken with the establishment of St. Andrew's Institute in 1890 by the Presbyterian, D. J. Macdonnell, and the Fred Victor Mission in 1894 by a Methodist group under the impetus of the Massey family. Together providing facilities for night school, library, savings bank, nursery, clubrooms, gymnasium, medical centre, and restaurant, they reflected ventures pioneered in England, Scotland, and the United States in the previous decade.¹⁸ Further institutional response to urban problems came after 1902 with the development of settlement houses by Miss Sara Libby Carson, working under the Presbyterian church. By 1920 there were at least thirteen settlements in Canada, probably all of them formed under the impulse of the social gospel.¹⁹ Where Miss Carson was not involved directly as organizer, she was often associated as consultant, as in the cases of the Toronto and McGill University settlements (1907 and

¹⁴Alexander Sutherland, *The Kingdom of God and Problems of Today* (Toronto: William Briggs, 1898), p. xiii.

¹⁵Bland Papers, Salem Bland, Sermon at St. James Bond United Church, 31 Oct. 1937.

¹⁶Summers, "The Labour Church," pp. 427ff; Hopkins, *The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 1865-1915*, pp. 85-7; French, *Faith, Sweat and Politics*, pp. 129-30.

¹⁷*Social Welfare*, Oct. 1923, pp. 14-15; W. Ward, *The Brotherhood in Canada* (London: The Brotherhood Publishing House, [1912]). See also F. D. Leete, *Christian Brotherhoods* (Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham, 1912).

¹⁸J. F. McCurdy, *The Life and Work of D. J. Macdonnell* (Toronto: William Briggs, 1897), pp. 23-4, 289-309; Minutes of the Toronto City Missionary Society of the Methodist Church, 29 Dec. 1894, 10 Dec. 1895. For the less well-known Scottish side of the story, see Stewart Mechie, *The Church and Scottish Social Developments, 1780-1870* (London, 1960).

¹⁹*Social Welfare*, Feb. 1929, p. 113. *The Social Service Congress of Canada, 1914* (Toronto: Social Service Council of Canada, 1914), pp. 134-6.

1909 respectively), which grew out of social concern in the student YMCAs. When the University of Toronto opened its Department of Social Service in 1914, the University Settlement provided the framework for practical work, and Miss Carson and the Rev. F. N. Stapleford of the Neighbourhood Workers' Association, among others, were recruited as lecturers.²⁰ Under J. S. Woodsworth, the settlement approach to the problems of north Winnipeg became a more potent spearhead of social reform, and the beginning, for Woodsworth, of an ever more radical formulation of the social gospel.²¹

In the 1890s, the churches were deeply involved in a mounting campaign against "drink." This was rationalized by leading figures such as F. S. Spence as part of the great gospel of liberty.²² Significantly, however, a rude sort of environmentalism was creeping into the "ideology" of prohibition, placing it in the context of a reform programme based on the strategy of reform Darwinism: that the way to reform the individual was through alterations in his environment. As a wider array of social problems began to engage the minds of clergy and laymen alike, new committees and church structures were required. The Methodist Committee on Sociological Questions from 1894 to 1918 presented to general conference ever more progressive and comprehensive reports for church guidance. By 1914 committees or departments of temperance and moral reform had become full boards of social service and evangelism. The social task had been placed alongside that of evangelism in the official hierarchy of concerns of the Methodist and Presbyterian churches, and committees of social service were common in the other denominations. In 1913, when Methodists and Presbyterians combined in a programme of social surveys of major Canadian cities (and some rural areas), a systematic attack, chiefly upon the complex environment of the cities, was in the making.²³

In the background of this escalation of social gospel enterprise was an ambitious effort at institutional consolidation. The Church Union movement, initiated in 1902, was making headway, and in 1907, an alliance of church and labour groups, having won the Lord's Day Act, blossomed into the Moral and Social Reform Council of Canada, jointly headed by J. G. Shearer and T. A. Moore, social service secretaries of the Presbyterian and Methodist churches respectively. Although until

²⁰*Canadian Student*, Oct. 1919, pp. 16-20; *Social Welfare*, Feb. 1929, p. 113; Murray G. Ross, *The YMCA in Canada* (Toronto, 1951), pp. 215-32.

²¹Kenneth McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics* (Toronto, 1959), chap. iv.

²²*Social Service Congress of Canada*, p. 307.

²³UCA, Methodist Church of Canada and Presbyterian Church in Canada, *Reports of Investigations of Social Conditions and Social Surveys, 1913-14*: Vancouver, Regina, Fort William, Port Arthur, London, Hamilton, Sydney.

the middle of the second decade the provincial units of the council were largely engrossed in temperance campaigns, for several years thereafter they promoted a broad programme of social reform and community action that won the praise of young radicals like William Ivens and William Irvine.²⁴ In 1913 the national organization changed its name to the Social Service Council of Canada and further broadened its perspectives.²⁵

These years were exciting ones for progressive churchmen. Not only were they advancing their campaign to win the churches to what they called sociological concepts, but they were also making significant progress in liberalizing the restrictive personal disciplines of their denominations and gaining ground for historical criticism and a reformation of theological curricula.²⁶ During and after 1908 a lively discussion on the relation of Christianity to socialism developed. The subject had been kept alive by a small group among whom were Bland, the Rev. Ben Spence, the socialist-prohibitionist who in 1904 managed A. W. Puttee's campaign to win a second term as a labour MP,²⁷ A. E. Smith, who endorsed labour candidates in successive pastorates at Nelson, B.C., and Winnipeg and Brandon, Manitoba,²⁸ and the Rev. W. E. S. James, who was general secretary from about 1905 of the Christian Socialist Fellowship in Ontario and organizer in 1914 of the Church of the Social Revolution in Toronto.²⁹ A wave of millennial socialism in Britain after the election of 1906, the controversy surrounding R. J. Campbell's *New Theology*,³⁰ and touring lecturers such as Keir Hardie (1908 and 1912) and the Rev. J. Stitt Wilson (1909 and 1910), who preached the message of socialism as applied to Christianity, undoubtedly spurred discussion in Canada.³¹

Both socialists and clerics picked up the theme. In 1909 W. A. Cotton, editor of the Canadian socialist journal, *Cotton's Weekly*, developed the notion that Jesus had been the original labour leader.³² In 1910 a large meeting in Montreal heard an exposition of socialism based on the Bible, and the prominent socialist from British Columbia,

²⁴*Voice*, 8 Dec. 1916, p. 8; *The Nutcracker*, 17 Nov. 1916, p. 8.

²⁵UCA, Moral and Social Reform Council, *Minutes of the Annual Meeting*, 5 Sept. 1913.

²⁶See H. H. Walsh, *The Christian Church in Canada* (Toronto, 1956).

²⁷A. E. Smith, *All My Life* (Toronto: Progress Publishing Co., 1949), p. 33.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹W. E. S. James, "Notes on a Socialist Church," in Summers, "The Labour Church," pp. 690-6.

³⁰For an able discussion of these factors in their British context, see Stanley Pierson, "Socialism and Religion: A Study of their Interaction in Great Britain, 1889-1911" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1957).

³¹*Canadian Annual Review (CAR)*, 1908, p. 101; 1909, p. 307; 1910, p. 315; 1912, p. 277.

³²*Ibid.*, 1909, p. 306.

E. T. Kingsley of the Socialist Party of Canada, declared Christianity and socialism to be identical. The current did not run all one way, of course. A group of Toronto socialists in November 1910 devoted at least one evening to the subject, "Why a Socialist Can Not Be a Christian."³³

After 1908 professed socialists in the churches seem not to have been so isolated or so peripheral. In that year the Rev. Dr. D. M. Ramsey in Ottawa described socialism as "carrying into economic regions the Christian doctrine of human brotherhood."³⁴ The Rev. Elliott S. Rowe organized socialist leagues in Sandon and Victoria, B.C.³⁵ Bryce M. Stewart in his survey of Fort William in 1913 found a considerable number of Christians sympathetic to socialism, and observed: "It is beyond question that in purity of purpose, ethics, and scientific reasoning the socialist position is far beyond any other political organization, and should appeal especially to the Christian."³⁶ In the same year, the Rev. Thomas Voaden of Hamilton, in a series of lectures later published, presented the thesis that socialism was the effect of Christianity forced outside the churches.³⁷ But that socialism was not entirely outside the churches was becoming more and more apparent. In a survey of London, Ontario, in 1913 by the Brotherhoods of that city, it was found to be common opinion in the churches that neither unions nor socialist groups threatened or interfered with the church's work, and further, men of both organizations were found among the church's workers.³⁸

Given the groundswell that seemed to be building up for the social gospel as the twentieth century entered its second decade, it was not surprising that when the Social Service Council called a national congress on social problems for March 1914, the response was overwhelming. For three days over two hundred regular delegates from across the nation, representing welfare organizations, churches, farm and labour groups, municipalities, provinces, and the federal government, were subjected to a barrage of social statistics, social conditions, social challenges, and social exhortations.³⁹ Most of the forty Canadian

³³*Ibid.*, 1910, pp. 315-16.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 1908, p. 99.

³⁵Paul Fox, "Early Socialism in Canada," in J. H. Aitcheson, *The Political Process in Canada* (Toronto, 1963), p. 89.

³⁶Methodist and Presbyterian Churches, *Report of a Social Survey of Port Arthur* (n.p., 1913), p. 10.

³⁷Thomas Voaden, *Christianity and Socialism* (Toronto: Methodist Book Room, 1913).

³⁸Methodist and Presbyterian Churches, *Report of a Limited Survey of Educational, Social and Industrial Life in London, Ontario* (n.p., 1913), p. 43.

³⁹*Ottawa Free Press*, 2 Mar. 1914; *Ottawa Evening Journal*, 3 Mar. 1914; and the record of the conference proceedings cited above, *Social Service Congress of Canada*, 1914.

speakers were from central Canada, and although the rural problem was considered, speakers overwhelmingly represented urban areas: social workers, city judges and politicians, city doctors, labour leaders, college professors, city clergy. Although city oriented, the world of business management and ownership was conspicuous by its absence.

This was primarily a professional man's conference. Its social sources lay outside and below the centres of power which were forging the new Canada. The lines of sympathy were clear in the enthusiastic response to the claim of a visiting speaker that "there is so much religion in the labor movement and so much social spirit in the Church, that someday it will become a question whether the Church will capture the labor movement or the labor movement will capture the Church."⁴⁰ Not all the speakers gave evidence of the social gospel, but when their concerns were related to other information about them, the inferences seemed clear: Dr. Charles Hastings, Toronto's medical health officer, was a Presbyterian elder, a past chairman of the Progressive Club, and a member of the Public Ownership League;⁴¹ J. O. McCarthy, Toronto city controller, was a leading figure in the Canadian Brotherhood Federation and a member of the Methodist Board of Social Service and Evangelism;⁴² James Simpson, vice-president of the Trades and Labor Congress, was a Methodist local preacher, a lecturer for the Dominion Prohibition Alliance, a vice-president of the Toronto branch of the Lord's Day Alliance, and a perennially successful socialist candidate for offices of city government in Toronto who was consistently supported in his campaigns by the Epworth League, the Methodist young people's organization.⁴³ In short, it seemed that to scratch a reformer at the congress was to find a social gospeller.

So popular were the evening open meetings that the *Ottawa Citizen* could not recall any recent visiting theatrical production to rival them and, when the tumult had subsided, concluded on 6 March that the congress had been "one of the greatest assemblages ever held in Canada to grapple with . . . social and economical problems." The congress represented the social gospel entering a crest of influence. C. W. Gordon (Ralph Connor), writing the introduction to the report, was excited by the challenge thrown down to the "economic and social conditions on which the fabric of our state is erected." He may not

⁴⁰Charles Stelzle, "Capturing the Labour Movement," *Social Service Congress of Canada*, pp. 35-8.

⁴¹*Canadian Men and Women of the Time*, 1912.

⁴²UCA, Canadian Brotherhood Federation, *Constitution* [and list of officers and General Council], c. 1916.

⁴³*Canadian Men and Women of the Time*, 1912; *Canadian Forum*, Nov. 1938, p. 229; Summers, "The Labour Church," pp. 690-6.

have been aware of the hint of incongruity in his conclusion that "there is in our nation so deep a sense of righteousness and brotherhood that it needs only that the light fall clear and white on the evil to have it finally removed."⁴⁴ Was reform to be won so cheaply? An unevangelicalized Calvinist might have been pardoned his doubts.

During the generation of its ascent, from 1890 to 1914, the social gospel front had remained remarkably united. One could now discern three emphases or wings beginning to crystallize, however. The conservatives were closest to traditional evangelicalism, emphasizing personal ethical issues, tending to identify sin with individual acts, and taking as their social strategy legislative reform of the environment. The radicals viewed society in more organic terms. Evil was so endemic and pervasive in the social order that they concluded there could be no personal salvation without social salvation—or at least without bearing the cross of social struggle. Without belief in an immanent God working in the social process to bring his kingdom to birth, the plight of the radicals would surely have been desperate. Between conservatives and radicals was a broad "centre party" of progressives holding the tension between the two extremes, endorsing in considerable measure programmes of the other two, but transmuting them somewhat into a broad ameliorative programme of reform. The harmony of these wings was not to last. Between 1914 and 1928 the social gospel enjoyed and endured at one and the same time a period of crest and of crisis. Its growing differentiation in church, interdenominational, and secular organizations multiplied its impact on Canadian society, and at the same time initiated interaction between the various modes of its expression. These were the conditions of its potency. They were also the conditions of its crisis, for the encounter with social reality was the true test of social gospel concepts, and the very complexity of that reality and the conflict inherent within it inevitably set one wing of the social gospel in conflict with another. This involved process culminated in the years 1926-8, and the movement generally entered a period of weariness, reaction, and reconsideration.

The war of 1914-18 was the occasion, and in considerable measure the cause, of a crisis in relations between the radicals and the church. In the course of the war four radicals, then or later of some prominence, lost their professional posts: William Irvine, J. S. Woodsworth, Salem Bland, and William Ivens. The situation of each man was complex, but while they all believed their fate to be the result of

⁴⁴*Social Service Congress of Canada, 1914.*

increasing commercialism in the church and growing reaction in the state, and while Professor McNaught adopts the radicals' arguments as to what happened to them, the thesis is hardly acceptable.⁴⁵ It can only be maintained by slighting a number of facts: the acceptance of their radicalism, either prior to their appointment or without protest during a considerable period before severance of employment; the obvious support all had in the courts of the church; the complicating factor of pacifism in two cases; a host of evidence that Bland was more likely a victim of retrenchment in Wesley Theological College; and most important, the growing progressivism of the churches throughout the war period.

The evidence of church progressivism, 1914 to 1918, is more than substantial. All churches were dismayed by the outbreak of war, and the Methodists and Presbyterians at least condemned the profiteering that accompanied it. The Methodist general conference in the fall adopted the strongest reform programme to date and promised a further instalment in four years.⁴⁶ The Presbyterian Department of Social Service in 1916 regarded with hope the increase of nationalization and social control of industry in allied countries, and took heart at new Canadian legislation on prohibition, female suffrage, workmen's compensation, and protective legislation, the beginnings of provincial departments of labour, government encouragement of fishermen's co-operative societies in Nova Scotia, and the establishment of a bureau of social research under Woodsworth by the prairie provinces.⁴⁷ The Social Service Council sponsored regional congresses carrying on the spirit of its Ottawa success, added several more secular affiliates to its roster, and just prior to the war's end established the first national social welfare publication.⁴⁸ The church declarations of social policy in 1918 were further left than the manifestos of any major Canadian party, and approximated the British Labour party's programme for national minimum standards.⁴⁹ The Methodist call for a complete social reconstruction received international circulation, and, stated the *New Republic*, placed that church in the vanguard of reform forces.⁵⁰

⁴⁵McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics*, pp. 79-85. For a detailed discussion from another point of view, see A. R. Allen, "The Crest and Crisis of the Social Gospel in Canada, 1916-1927" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1967), chap. II.

⁴⁶See for instance the early reactions of the Methodist Church, *Journal of Proceedings of the General Conference*, 1914, pp. 404-6; 1918, pp. 290-3.

⁴⁷Presbyterian Church in Canada, *Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1916, Appendix, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁸CAR, 1918, p. 598. Social Service Council of Canada, *Minutes*, Annual Meeting, January 1918.

⁴⁹See the first issues of *Social Welfare*, beginning Oct., 1918; *Methodist Journal of Proceedings*, 1918, pp. 290-3; Statement of the Presbyterian Board of Home Missions and Social Service, *Presbyterian and Westminster*, 10 April 1919, p. 351.

⁵⁰*New Republic*, 8 Feb. 1919.

Radical social gospellers like Ernest Thomas of Vancouver, Bland, and A. E. Smith,⁵¹ had played an important role in the formation of these church resolutions, but for the radicals the most important consequence of their mid-war crisis with church and state was the impact of their association, and hence of the social gospel, on agrarian and labour movements. J. S. Woodsworth was to be found addressing meetings of the Federated Labour party in Vancouver, and writing in the *B.C. Federationist*. William Irvine had become a leading figure in the Non-Partisan League in Alberta, editor of its journal the *Alberta Non-Partisan*, and a key person in the Dominion Labour party in Calgary. William Ivens in 1918 undertook an organizing tour in the prairie region for the Dominion Labour party,⁵² stepped into the high priesthood, as the *Voice* put it, of labour forces at Winnipeg by founding a thriving labour church, and became editor of the *Western Labor News*.⁵³ From 1917 to 1919, Salem Bland contributed a regular column to the *Grain Growers' Guide*, and during the summer of 1918 addressed tens of thousands of westerners (with Henry Wise Wood) from the Chautauqua platform. Adding their voices to the journalism of reform were two more radicals of the social gospel, A. E. Smith as editor of the *Confederate* in Brandon,⁵⁴ and James Simpson as editor of the *Industrial Banner* in Toronto.

Despite the wartime crisis, the progressive and radical social gospellers had by 1918-19 reached a position of considerable power and consequence in the Canadian reform movement. And in the conservative wing, the progress of prohibition was startling. The war economy aided the cause, and in 1918 a government order-in-council prohibited further manufacture and sale of liquor until a year after the war's end. But it must be admitted that the temperance forces had won a national consensus on the subject. By 1919 only Quebec held out as a province, and it was at least two-thirds dry by local option. The farm organizations for some time had officially endorsed the reform, and now labour was finding near prohibition a stimulus to union membership.⁵⁵ Anglican publications joined other church journals in declaring that if prohibition was good in wartime, it was good in peace as well.⁵⁶

There can be no doubt that the unrest, and especially the great

⁵¹*Hamilton Spectator*, 12 Oct. 1918; *Western Methodist Recorder*, March 1919, pp. 5-6.

⁵²*Voice* (Winnipeg), 19 Apr. 1918.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 21 June 1918; 5 and 12 July 1918.

⁵⁴Summers, "The Labour Church," pp. 379-80.

⁵⁵*Edmonton Free Press*, 10 May 1919; *Industrial Banner*, 10 Oct. 1919; *Youth and Service*, Aug., 1919, pp. 114-15; *Western Methodist Recorder*, Oct., 1920, p. 3; *Alberta Labor News*, 25 Sept. 1920; *Christian Guardian*, 30 July 1919, p. 2, quoting John Queen of the Winnipeg strike committee.

⁵⁶*Canadian Churchman*, 28 Nov. 1918, p. 763.

Winnipeg strike of 1919, dealt the social gospel a rude jolt—and yet the impact can be easily exaggerated. The radicals, of course, were in the midst of it, sometimes carried to enthusiastic excesses of rhetoric which could easily be misunderstood. Their social millennialism undoubtedly contributed to the élan and discipline of the strike, but also to an element of unreality in which it was shrouded.⁵⁷ The Labour church provided its focus and strove as eight continuing churches in Winnipeg to maintain the essential unity of the left and the religious sense of labour's purpose which had been generated.⁵⁸

The critical question, however, was how the progressive social gospel at large reacted to the events of 1919. The problem was complicated not simply by the growth of conservative reaction inside and outside the churches, but by the complex of attitudes in progressive minds to employers, unions, and social conflict. Generally sympathetic to labour, and persuaded that the spirit of Jesus was in social unrest calling the church to her true function as a defender of the oppressed,⁵⁹ they nevertheless believed that the “day of club and bludgeon is gone by,” as Creighton described it in the *Christian Guardian*.⁶⁰ Misreading the face of power in industry, they were often, as was H. Michel in the *Canadian Churchman*, as pleased with the ending of a strike with improved conditions and shop committees as with recognition of a union and bargaining rights.⁶¹ Nevertheless, the social gospel position held remarkably firm. Of the church press inclined toward the social gospel only the *Presbyterian and Westminister* attacked the Winnipeg strike outright.⁶² The *Western Methodist Recorder* sympathized with labour and strike action but attacked the most radical element of strike leadership.⁶³ The *Churchman* reluctantly conceded the case in the face of government charges of sedition.⁶⁴ But the *Christian Guardian* and *Social Welfare* supported the strike throughout.⁶⁵ Clergy in and out of Winnipeg frequently spoke out on behalf of the strikers and questioned the government's interpretation and intervention. While the strike was on, numerous church conferences were in progress

⁵⁷See William Ivens' euphoric mixture of prophecy, platform rhetoric, and industrial tactics in *Western Labor News*, Special Strike Editions, e.g., No. 3, 19 May 1919.

⁵⁸For more extensive discussion of the Labour Churches in Canada, see McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics*, Allen, “The Crest and Crisis of the Social Gospel,” Summers, “The Labour Church,” and D. F. Pratt, “William Ivens and the Winnipeg Labor Church” (unpublished B.D. thesis, St. Andrew's College, Saskatoon, 1962).

⁵⁹Editorial, “I Was Hungry,” *Christian Guardian*, 27 Nov. 1918, p. 6.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 5 Mar. 1919, p. 5.

⁶¹*Canadian Churchman*, 27 Feb. 1919, p. 133; 10 Apr. 1919, pp. 234–5.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 29 May 1919, p. 344; 10 July 1919, p. 441.

⁶³*Western Methodist Recorder*, June 1919, p. 8.

⁶⁴*Presbyterian and Westminister*, 22 May 1919, p. 497; 29 May 1919, pp. 518–19; 5 June 1919, pp. 549–50.

⁶⁵*Social Welfare*, 1 Aug. 1919, pp. 266–70; *Christian Guardian*, 28 May 1919, p. 5; 4 June 1919, pp. 4–5; 11 June 1919, p. 3; 18 June 1919, p. 4; 25 June 1919, p. 4.

across the land, and it is difficult to find a case where social policies were modified in the face of unrest—quite the reverse.⁶⁶ S. D. Chown, superintendent of the Methodist church, in many addresses urged members to continue to cry out against injustice and to consider the social gospel the voice of prophecy in their time.⁶⁷ He has been charged with pronouncing a “ban” on the strikers.⁶⁸ He did not, but he was concerned that there was an indiscriminate injustice in the general strike weapon which he could not sanction, and believed that if labour continued such tactics the church might have to be more reserved in its support.⁶⁹

Three events taken together served to heighten that reservation, however, to stalemate the progressives’ programme for industrial peace and to perplex the social gospel. Even radicals of the social gospel had long argued that the very collective organization of industry bore out their arguments about the nature of society and hence the nature of the ethic required of modern man.⁷⁰ The businessman and industrial owner would surely come to recognize this. However, when in September 1919 the government gathered a national industrial conference with representatives from management, labour and the public, it was almost a total failure.⁷¹ But when the churches conducted an immense Inter-Church Forward Campaign in the winter and spring to equip them for their enlarged social role in the new era, it was an immense success.⁷² Some, like Chown, saw in the success a new alliance for progress—the socially minded clergyman and the “new businessman.”⁷³ For some months, the Methodist social service officers had been aware of a small flood of enquiries from businessmen asking guidance as to how to apply the church’s policies to their business operations.⁷⁴ J. G. Shearer in *Social Welfare* was astonished at the number of plants that had instituted joint industrial councils, although he was suspicious that some at least were intended to forestall unionization.⁷⁵

The dilution of progressivism such developments entailed was completed for many by the printers’ strike of 1921, in the course of which

⁶⁶For a detailed discussion of the more general church reaction, see Allen, “The Crest and Crisis of the Social Gospel,” chaps. vi, vii.

⁶⁷*Western Methodist Recorder*, June 1919.

⁶⁸McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics*, p. 118.

⁶⁹*Christian Guardian*, 25 June 1919, p. 2; *Toronto Daily Star*, 12 June 1919, pp. 1, 8.

⁷⁰See for instance UCA, Bland Papers, Salem Bland, “Four Steps and a Vision.”

⁷¹*Social Welfare*, 1 Nov. 1919, p. 39; 1 Dec. 1919, p. 75; *Christian Guardian*, 1 Oct. 1919, p. 6.

⁷²*Canadian Baptist*, 1 May 1919, p. 4; 31 July 1919, p. 3; *Presbyterian and Westminster*, 19 June 1919, p. 603; 25 Dec. 1919, p. 594; *Christian Guardian*, 15 Oct. 1919, p. 22.

⁷³*Christian Guardian*, 30 June 1920, pp. 18-19.

⁷⁴*Western Methodist Recorder*, Oct. 1921, p. 4.

⁷⁵*Social Welfare*, 1 Sept. 1919, p. 287; 1 Aug. 1920, pp. 316-17; 1 Aug. 1922, p. 235.

the church publishing houses, the Methodist in particular, experienced at first hand the hideous complexities of industrial conflict. The Methodist house encouraged union membership. Depressed business conditions of 1921 precluded meeting all union demands. Nevertheless, with most other printing establishments in Toronto, it was struck on 1 June. Its manager allowed himself to be drafted as chairman of the employers anti-strike committee and soon found himself in the midst of an outright open shop campaign. The union on the other hand not only rejected reasonable offers, but turned on the Methodists with special fury because they seemed not to be living up to their progressive declarations of 1918. Despite an outcry from Methodist summer schools, and frantic negotiations by Ernest Thomas of the Social Service Department, there was little that could be done. Neither the church nor any other business could live now on the terms of the envisaged economic order of social gospel prophecy.⁷⁶ Creighton concluded that strikes were simply stupid, and had no constructive word for labour in the great British Empire Steel and Coal Company conflicts of the mid-decade.⁷⁷ The Social Service Council drifted from its celebration of the significance of labour in its Labour Day issues to its calm notices of the day at the decade's end.⁷⁸ The United church's pronouncement on industry in 1926 simply launched the new church on a sea of ambiguities, which many recognized, but which none could chart more accurately.⁷⁹ The bright vision of the social gospel seemed to be going into eclipse.⁸⁰

For a time the upward course of the agrarian revolt and the Progressive party offered new opportunities. From the earlier days of E. A. Partridge, the social gospel had had an intimate role in the theory and practice of the agrarian movements.⁸¹ The churches had attempted to foster social life and community ideals through institutes, conferences, and summer schools.⁸² The *Guide* promoted the notion of the church as a community centre.⁸³ Farm leaders like Drury, Good, Moyle, and Henders were prominent members of social service councils.⁸⁴ Bland and the Congregationalist, D. S. Hamilton, worked closely with S. J. Farmer and Fred Dixon in Winnipeg on behalf of

⁷⁶See A. R. Allen, "The Crest and Crisis of the Social Gospel," chapter xi.

⁷⁷*Christian Guardian*, 25 Mar. 1925.

⁷⁸*Social Welfare*, Aug. 1927, p. 483; Aug. 1929, p. 242.

⁷⁹"The Christianization of Industry," *Social Welfare*, 1 Aug. 1927, pp. 488-9; see also, United Church, Department of Evangelism and Social Service, *Annual Report*, 1924-5, p. 10.

⁸⁰See Creighton's reflections on this possibility, *New Outlook*, 12 Jan. 1927, p. 19.

⁸¹*Grain Growers' Guide*, 14 and 28 Aug. 1909; 30 Sept., 6 Oct. 1919.

⁸²McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics*, pp. 74, 74n.

⁸³*Grain Growers' Guide*, 7 June 1916; 20 Dec. 1916.

⁸⁴Moral and Social Reform Council, *Minutes*, 10 Sept. 1909; Social Service Council of Canada, *Minutes*, 5 Sept. 1913; Manitoba Conference of the United Church, *Minutes*, 1932, p. 42.

the single tax and direct legislation.⁸⁵ Henry Wise Wood counselled his farmers to look to the church for a social saviour, for it was just now beginning to recognize Jesus as a social leader as well as a personal saviour.⁸⁶ Wood's whole programme of civilizational reform was built on the theological assumptions of the social gospel.⁸⁷ Since 1903, from Wesley College, Winnipeg, Salem Bland had been sending out young ministers of the social gospel who frequently became members of local units of the Grain Growers' Associations.⁸⁸ By 1919 the social gospel had become, in effect, the religion of the agrarian revolt,⁸⁹ and its continued involvement in the process of party and policy formation was such that Norman Lambert, secretary of the Canadian Council of Agriculture, observed that religion and social work were inextricably linked with the farmers.⁹⁰

The victories of the Progressive party can, then, be viewed in part as victories of the social gospel. But equally, the failure of the Progressives in 1926 must be weighed on the social gospel scales. In brief, it must be conceded that the social gospel belief that in the rise of such movements true religion and genuine democracy were triumphing together in the modern world contributed to the Progressive party's sense of being something other than a traditional party, and of fulfilling something more than a political role. This non-politics of hope inevitably was ground to pieces in a parliamentary world where alliances were necessary, but compromising, where decisions were mandatory, but the better alternative seldom clear.

At mid-decade, although the great accomplishment of Church Union brightened the horizon, that victory had been won at some cost. The drive to consolidate social service in the new church had worked to the disadvantage of other expressions of the social gospel. Support was withdrawn from the Brotherhood Federation, and the Social Service Council ran afoul of church financing and personal animosities. The former collapsed completely, and the latter, also hit by depression conditions, the counterattacks against prohibition, and the death of its secretary, G. J. Shearer, lived on in a maimed condition.⁹¹ The campaign for a national church made church social service leaders more

⁸⁵CAR, 1913, p. 578; Manitoba Conference, *Minutes*, 1929, p. 60; *The Single Taxer and Direct Legislation Bulletin* (Winnipeg), III, 8 (1916).

⁸⁶See his Circulars Nos. 9 and 10 for United Farmers of Alberta Sunday, 27 May 1917, Bland Papers, UCA.

⁸⁷*Grain Growers' Guide*, 29 Jan. 1917; 4 Dec. 1918.

⁸⁸*Christian Guardian*, 17 Mar. 1920, p. 25; 15 Dec. 1920, p. 14.

⁸⁹For further elaboration of this suggestion, see A. R. Allen, "Salem Bland and the Social Gospel in Canada" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1961), chaps. v and vi.

⁹⁰*Presbyterian Witness*, 23 June 1921, pp. 10-11.

⁹¹The documentation for this is too diffuse to be suggested through a few citations, but may be found in A. R. Allen, "The Crest and Crisis of the Social Gospel," chaps. XIV, XV, XVI.

hostile than they would otherwise have been to the labour churches which had spread to at least ten other cities before collapsing in 1924-5.⁹² T. A. Moore of the Methodist Social Service Department had for three critical years of their life played a dubious role with the RCMP in its investigation of the churches.⁹³ The labour churches, however, died chiefly of their own inadequacy as a religious institution. After 1924 they followed their logical course, with a transfer of religious commitment and zeal to the creation of a more radical reform party via Woodsworth's Ginger Group, and in A. E. Smith's case, one might observe, to the Communist party.⁹⁴ Not only did Church Union further drain progressive social gospel energies in the task of institutional reconstruction, but on the morrow of Union, the critical battle in defence of prohibition had to be fought. One by one after 1920 the provincial temperance acts had gone down to defeat. In 1926 the last main stronghold, Ontario, was under attack. The church which was to rally the forces of social righteousness was already fighting a rearguard battle.

At stake was the survival of the conservative social gospel. In the aftermath of defeat the temperance forces were shattered beyond repair.⁹⁵ "Old Ontario" has died, declared Ernest Thomas as he launched a careful critique of temperance strategy.⁹⁶ The consensus, carefully built up over the years, had disappeared, just as the association of social work and religion so long nurtured under the social service formula was now giving way to secular organizations quite outside, and often severely critical of, the churches.⁹⁷

It was no coincidence that the crisis in the social gospel coincided so nearly with the crisis in Progressive politics and in the reform movement at large. The categories in which they all worked, and the

⁹²*Ibid.*, chap. x.

⁹³See correspondence between Moore and Hamilton from 25 May 1920, to 25 April 1922, Papers on Methodist Industrial Relations, 1920-2, UCA.

⁹⁴A. E. Smith, *All My Life*, pp. 76-7.

⁹⁵United Church, Department of Evangelism and Social Service, *Annual Report*, 1927, pp. 24-5, 27-9; *New Outlook*, 21 Mar. 1928, p. 2; 8 Jan. 1930, p. 46; Dobson Papers, Union College Library, B.C., Hugh Dobson to L. C. McKinney, 30 April 1929.

⁹⁶*New Outlook*, 22 Dec. 1926, p. 5; 8 Jan. 1930, pp. 31, 44.

⁹⁷In 1926 the Canadian Association of Social Workers was formed, and in 1928 the Canadian Conference of Social Work held its first national meeting. The immediate shrinkage in size of the Social Service Council's annual meetings indicated the impact of these developments on the stature of the council. For an expression of the rationale upon which the council was founded, see *New Outlook*, 10 June 1925, p. 23. For expressions of the new social worker's outlook see J. D. Ketchum, "Judge and be Judged," *Canadian Student*, Nov. 1925; *Social Welfare*, June-July 1926, pp. 189-90; and for a warning about the dangers of a social work that had lost its sense of God, see United Church, Department of Evangelism and Social Service, *Annual Report*, 1927, p. 25. The social gospel stress upon the immanence of God of course abetted the very secularism about which some of them were now concerned.

divinities which moved them all, lay shattered. Nevertheless, the lessons of the encounter with reality were not easily absorbed, in part owing to the ease with which the social gospel could transfer its passion from one cause to another. Partly as a positive expression of the social gospel, but also, one suspects, as a sublimation of frustration, much progressive zeal in 1923 transferred itself to a resurgence of pacifism, and after 1926 to a more broadly conceived peace movement.⁹⁸ Only among a few individuals like Ernest Thomas and leaders in the Student Christian Movement were penetrating questions being asked about the adequacy of social gospel concepts.⁹⁹ Prosperous church expansion in the later 1920s was accompanied by an introversion religiously and by small fellowship groups.¹⁰⁰ But out of the latter, the reconsiderations of the more critically minded, the struggles of the survivors of the political wreck of Progressivism, and a growing dialectic with more radical forms of socialist thought, was to come a new thrust of a reconstructed social gospel in the 1930s.

⁹⁸See for instance, *Canadian Student*, Jan. 1924, p. 99; *Christian Guardian*, 20 Feb. 1924, and issues of subsequent months for discussion of the subject; *Social Welfare*, April 1923, pp. 137-9; *New Outlook*, issues of July through December 1925; *Canadian Churchman*, 21 Jan. 1926, p. 36.

⁹⁹*New Outlook*, 12 Aug. 1925, pp. 5-6; 12 Feb. 1930, p. 153; *Canadian Student*, March 1925, p. 163; March 1926, pp. 165-6. Student Christian Movement Archives, Minutes of the General Committee, 24-26 Sept. 1926.

¹⁰⁰[Ernest Thomas] *Fellowship Studies* (Toronto: United Church Department of Evangelism and Social Service [1927 or 1928]); *Canadian Student*, March 1926, p. 168; Dobson Papers, Dobson to Armstrong, 14 May 1928.

Some *Repatriement* Dilemmas

DONALD CHAPUT

I

IN 1871 FERDINAND GAGNON, a Canadian living in New England, declared: "Tout homme bien né doit aimer son pays, et doit désirer, s'il en est éloigné, de l'habiter."¹ Télesphore St-Pierre, a Canadian with years of journalistic experience in the midwest, wrote in 1895: "Les efforts de tous les hommes qui ont à cœur le bien de nos compatriotes doivent avoir pour but de les dissuader de ces voyages continuels, dans lesquels ils gaspillent leur capital et leur vie, sans profit pour eux-mêmes et sans avantages pour leur patrie."² Both Gagnon and St-Pierre obviously believed that Quebec was the only home for a *Canadien*. That many of their compatriots did not is abundantly clear, however, when we examine the frustrations these men, and others like them, experienced in the work of repatriation. Although emigration and, to a lesser degree, repatriation, have been intensively investigated by Canadian and American historians, it is difficult to discern in most of these studies the feelings and actions of those directly involved—the expatriates themselves. Through Gagnon and St-Pierre, however, it is possible to glimpse the core of French-Canadian society in the United States. Both men were hardworking journalists, familiar with grassroots parish and fraternal organizations. Both expatriates were intellectually committed to the French culture; their newspapers frequently were the only links that other expatriates had with Quebec.

By the 1870s Canadian emigration to the United States was heavy, and increasing. The first significant movement had been during the political crisis of 1837–8. The American Civil War resulted in further emigration, as some Canadians joined the armies of the North, and

¹Ferdinand Gagnon: *Biographie, éloge funèbre, pages choisies* (Manchester, New Hampshire, 1940), p. 100. The bulk of this work, edited by Malvina Martineau, Gagnon's niece, consists of his speeches.

²Télesphore St-Pierre, *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan et du comté d'Essex, Ontario* (Montreal, 1895), p. 307.

many more joined the labour force in northern factories. The rapid industrial expansion in the postwar American economy further stimulated Canadian emigration.³ The economic attractions of the United States were indeed strong magnets for Canadians, but economic problems in the dominion also influenced the decision of many farmers from Quebec to leave. Depressed agricultural prices, low wages, and the unwillingness of the government to permit or encourage colonization of huge tracts of undeveloped land contributed to the *Canadiens'* feeling that a move to New England was preferable to stagnation in Quebec. Thus, between 1861 and 1871 about 125,000 dissatisfied *Canadiens* went to the United States.⁴

Attitudes to this emigration in Canada and Quebec are not easily summarized. True, George-Etienne Cartier had said of the emigrants: "Laissez-les partir, c'est la canaille qui s'en va."⁵ It is also true that the Quebec clergy opposed emigration, fearing that the manufacturing centres of New England would have a negative effect on the rural-oriented *Canadien*. They preferred to encourage the colonization of eastern Quebec, the American midwest, or the Canadian prairie provinces.⁶ In the end, however, the Quebec and federal governments came to realize that internal Canadian conditions were the cause of the emigration. One of the ways chosen to offset this leakage was the promotion of a colonization plan for the eastern townships of Quebec. Once these areas were opened, it was hoped that the *Canadiens* in New England would return to settle there.⁷

The dominion government had agents in the United States whose chief purpose was to gather prospective settlers for the prairie provinces. Although these were "immigration" agents, they soon found that one of their most receptive groups was discontented *Canadiens*. In 1874, for example, the Detroit agent was asked to "make an enquiry into the state of the Canadians settled in the United States, with a

³The literature of the French-Canadian emigration is vast. Some of the specific studies which are pertinent to this paper are W. Roney, "Recruiting and Crimping in Canada for the Northern Forces," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, X (1923), 21-33; Robin Winks, "The Creation of a Myth: Canadian Enlistments in Northern Armies during the American Civil War," *Canadian Historical Review*, XL (1959), 24-40; Albert Faucher, "L'emigration des Canadiens-français aux Etats-Unis au XIX^e siècle: position du problème et perspective," *Recherches sociographiques*, V (1964), 277-317. Sound general summaries of *Canadien* emigration are in Gustave Lanctot, éd., *Les Canadiens et leurs voisins du sud* (Montréal, 1941); Alexandre Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine* (Worcester, Mass., 1911); and Volume VI of *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (15 vols.; New York, 1909).

⁴Lanctot, éd., *Les Canadiens*, p. 294.

⁵Quoted in Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, p. 14. Others referred to emigration as "the desertion of the Fatherland" (*Catholic Encyclopedia*, VI, 272).

⁶Mason Wade, "French Canadians in the United States," in *Writings on Canadian-American Studies* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1966), p. 9.

⁷Lanctot, éd., *Les Canadiens*, p. 295.

view to their repatriation.”⁸ The Ottawa immigration agent reported that in 1874 “a very large number of single young men returned [from the United States].”⁹ In 1876 the Winnipeg agent reported “. . . the immigration of 322 French Canadians, most of whom came from the New England States. . . .”¹⁰ The Detroit agent wrote in 1876 that “a French newspaper *Le Courrier*, has just been established at Detroit, which will greatly help to make known the rich prairies of Canada.”¹¹ C. Lalime, writing from New England, claimed responsibility for sending 361 people to Manitoba. He attributed his success to the fine co-operation of the New England French-Canadian press.¹²

II

It was in the midst of this immigration and repatriation fervour that Ferdinand Gagnon began to work officially at what he had been doing unofficially for years. Designated as an *agent de repatriement* for the Quebec government in New England in March 1875, he wrote to Pierre Garneau, Quebec Minister of Agriculture and Public Works: “. . . je n'épargnerai ni temps ni trouble pour remplir la mission patriotique que vous m'avez confiée.”¹³

It was at high tide of the emigration that Ferdinand Gagnon had left Quebec and settled in New England. Born in Saint-Hyacinthe, 8 June 1849, he attended school there until 1865, and then served in a law office until 1868, when he moved to Concord, New Hampshire, to join his parents who had emigrated the previous year.¹⁴ After brief careers in teaching and law, Gagnon entered journalism as editor of the Worcester (Massachusetts) *L'Etendard National*, the first issue appearing on 3 November 1869.¹⁵ From this time until his death in 1886 Gagnon was the outstanding French-Canadian journalist in New England. His foremost concern was the preservation of French culture and the Catholic religion among his compatriots in New England. Gagnon felt that because most of the *Canadiens* would return to Quebec, his journalistic efforts should be aimed at reminding them of their heritage and encouraging them to repatriate.¹⁶ Although *L'Eten-*

⁸Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1875, VIII, “Report of the Minister of Agriculture for the Calendar Year 1874,” p. xiii.

⁹*Ibid.*, “Annual Report of the Ottawa Immigration Agent,” pp. 33–4.

¹⁰Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1877, X, “Annual Report of the Winnipeg Agent,” pp. 41–2.

¹¹*Ibid.*, “Report of Special Immigration Agent, Detroit,” pp. 80–1. This report mentions a circular distributed in Detroit entitled, *A nos compatriotes des Unis-Etats et du Canada. Emigrez à Manitoba*.

¹²*Ibid.*, “Canadian Immigration to Manitoba,” pp. 101–9.

¹³Quoted in Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, pp. 93–4.

¹⁴Ferdinand Gagnon, pp. 12–13.

¹⁵Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, p. 73.

¹⁶Ferdinand Gagnon, p. 13; for a contrary view, see Belisle, *ibid.*

dard National was short-lived, later Gagnon publications—*Le Foyer Canadien* (1873) and *Le Travailleur* (1874)—became known throughout New England.¹⁷ Gagnon was also known personally throughout the region. He spoke at schools, churches, and fraternal meetings and the titles of some of these speeches reveal his dedication to preserving the *esprit canadien*: “Notre Patrie,” “Discours patriotique,” “Restons français,” “Respectons notre clergé.”¹⁸

On his appointment as *agent de repatriement* Gagnon immediately sought the assistance of the most powerful *Canadien* group in New England—the clergy. The parish priests who had only recently arrived to look after the expatriates generally held the view that residence in the United States was only temporary. Thus they were easily convinced by Gagnon that the time had arrived for repatriation: work was slow; salaries were low; working conditions in the factories were far from ideal.¹⁹

One proof of Gagnon’s sincerity came in the fall of 1875, when he persuaded his parents to return to *la patrie*.²⁰ Gagnon continued to spread his repatriation message throughout the New England states. He did more than merely explain Quebec’s plan for colonizing the eastern townships; he dangled every possible lure in front of his audiences. In his speeches to patriotic and fraternal organizations he spoke glowingly of the contributions of Champlain, of Perrot, of Talon, and often concluded with a poem or remark on the majestic scenery along the St. Lawrence. When speaking before labour groups, he began by contrasting the grime, sweat, and long hours of New England’s factories with the pure, healthy air of Quebec’s forests and fields, and then pointed to the colonization plan as the solution: “Retournez donc au pays; retournez donc vers notre cher et bien-aimé Canada; allez y fonder, au milieu des forêts, de puissantes familles canadiennes et catholiques.”²¹

Gagnon decried the materialistic values of American life, values which *Canadiens* should not share. The American search for the dollar, the American natural law of assimilating minority cultures [“flotsam of foreign nationalities”], were evils that *Canadiens* should avoid. Patriotism, respect for the church, love of family—these great *Canadien* characteristics could best be preserved by returning to *la patrie* and living among one’s *concitoyens*: “Serions-nous donc déjà prêts à

¹⁷Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, pp. 74, 88.

¹⁸Ferdinand Gagnon, p. 279.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 95, 104–7.

²⁰Ferdinand Gagnon, p. 24. “Pour commencer je vais repatrier mon père et quelques autres parents,” in a letter from Gagnon to S. Lesage, Department of Agriculture, Quebec, 18 Aug. 1875, complete letter in Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, pp. 106–7.

²¹Ferdinand Gagnon, p. 103, from a speech on naturalization and repatriation made in Worcester, September 1871.

tout oublier, respect humain, gloire, souvenirs, épreuves, troubles, difficultés, pour nous jeter dans les bras des autres peuples?"²² Gagnon also used effective legal arguments to encourage a return to Canada. He detailed all the ramifications of becoming a naturalized American citizen. Though he was fair in pointing out some advantages, he emphasized that if one became an American citizen, and *then* wanted to repatriate, his path would not be easy. Certain professional activities and other protections accorded British subjects could only be enjoyed after a three-year period in Canada.²³

Where he could not go, Gagnon's message was carried in his newspapers, and in the many communications he had with other editors and the clergy.²⁴ Even at this period, though he had lived in the United States for only seven years, he was regarded as the "father of French American journalism."²⁵ The Gagnon message was strong and consistent: some, he admitted, were probably right in deciding to remain in the United States, but the majority of *Canadiens* must, for patriotic, cultural, social, religious, and economic reasons, return to Canada.

Gagnon, however, was not to be a prophet. Although at times he showed great perception in understanding American economy and politics, it took him much longer to realize that though the *Canadiens* in New England valued their French heritage and Catholic religion, they also valued American wages and potential social mobility. In the late 1870s, Gagnon's position gradually shifted. He still glorified *Canadien* culture, but he no longer spoke or wrote about the dismal aspects of American life. In earlier years he had preached against the evils and corrupt values of American culture. By the end of the decade he made a distinction between cruel factory owners and the rest of American society.²⁶

By 1881 it was obvious that the campaign for repatriation was a failure, not through any fault of Gagnon's or any lack of appreciation for *Canadien* culture, but rather because the *Canadiens* were adjusting admirably to the Yankee environment. In 1881 the state of Massachusetts published a report, prepared by Colonel Carroll Wright, which denounced *Canadien* immigration and blamed the *Canadiens* for many of New England's economic and social problems. Gagnon replied to this accusation in a speech entitled "Plaidoyer patriotique," given in Boston on 25 October 1881. He answered the charges point by point,

²²*Ibid.*, p. 87.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 98.

²⁴Almost every issue of *Le Foyer Canadien* and *Le Travailleur* had articles and editorials on repatriation in the early and mid-1870s.

²⁵*Catholic Encyclopedia*, VI, 277.

²⁶His modified position can be seen in a speech given on 24 June 1879, entitled "La St-Jean-Baptiste," *Ferdinand Gagnon*, pp. 142-52.

emphasizing the great progress the *Canadiens* had made in the previous ten years: thirty churches, many schools, and a sound record of home ownership.²⁷ He criticized Wright for maintaining that the *Canadiens* took no interest in public affairs, failed to become American citizens, and had no interest in voting. Gagnon showed that, in a survey of thirty-one communities, almost 13,000 of the 66,000 students were *Canadiens* and claimed that 4000 had been naturalized.²⁸ Admitting that the *Canadiens* in New England had not made their presence known by any series of great deeds, Gagnon stressed that they deserved respect because of their behaviour as good, loyal, obedient citizens.²⁹

This cataloguing of the *Canadiens'* progress over the years was no listing of facts by a repatriation agent. The dream of resettlement in eastern Quebec had vanished, not only for most *Canadiens*, but also for Gagnon. On 19 October 1882, Gagnon himself became a naturalized American citizen.³⁰ In a speech at Cohoes, New York, Gagnon explained why he no longer believed in repatriation and why he had become an American citizen.³¹ It is possible, he now claimed, to be a good citizen of the United States and remain at heart a *Canadien*. To prove this he cited cases of well-known, Canadian-born men who became successful American businessmen and politicians, yet still took pride in their French heritage.³² "L'allégeance à un pouvoir ne change pas l'origine du sujet ou du citoyen; elle ne change que sa condition politique." The solution, he maintained, was to be completely loyal to the government of the United States, but at the same time to conserve the *Canadien* language, religion, and culture. Apparently forgetting his earlier examples of the great American tendency toward assimilation of other cultures, he felt that a continuing French culture was possible in New England. "Loyaux, mais Français, soyons-le toujours et nous serons respectés."³³ His greatest rationalization was that "... la naturalization n'entraîne pas de rigueur l'assimilation, des origines et des coutumes; elle n'entraîne que l'assimilation des intérêts politique."³⁴

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 164–5.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 166.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 170.

³⁰His naturalization record is in Washington, D.C., National Archives, Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group 85. One of the witnesses for Gagnon's naturalization was Alexandre Belisle, who succeeded him as leader of the *Canadien* press in New England.

³¹Speech entitled "Restons Français," *Ferdinand Gagnon*, pp. 172–85.

³²He particularly praised Louis-Vital Bogy, senator from Missouri.

³³Gagnon's "... mais Français" was indeed optimistic. J. G. Le Boutillier, in the Preface to Belisle's *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, gives the awkward example of sessions of the Union Saint-Jean-Baptiste d'Amérique in which English, rather than French, was used.

³⁴*Ferdinand Gagnon*, p. 106.

This was a great departure for the man who in 1871 had said: "Naturalization may benefit the individual, but repatriation benefits the repatriated and our country."³⁵

Gagnon died on 15 April 1886 and was buried at Worcester.³⁶ Until the end of his life he believed in the possibility of being both a *Canadien* and a United States citizen. The fame of his last newspaper article ("Nos Adieux"),³⁷ praise by Benjamin Sulte,³⁸ and recognition from the non-French press,³⁹ confirm that he was the leading French Canadian in New England. One final comment about Gagnon's family. His father, Jean-Baptiste, died in Quebec in 1885. However, several years later his mother returned to the United States—an example of expatriation of the repatriated.⁴⁰ Gagnon's wife, Malvina, continued working on *Le Travailleur* for several years after his death. She, too, stayed in Worcester, and died there in 1933.⁴¹ The Gagnons' seven surviving children remained in the United States, living in such places as Worcester, Brooklyn, and Long Island.⁴²

III

Télesphore St-Pierre was never officially connected with the repatriation movement, but his activities in the midwest helped to shape the thinking of the *Canadien* expatriates. He was born in Lavaltrie, 10 July 1869; his father, Jean-Baptiste, was a farmer.⁴³ While still in his teens, St-Pierre moved to the Windsor-Detroit region and began work as a printer. He was self-educated and had developed a lifelong interest in the story of French exploration and settlement in the Great Lakes area. Belisle mentions that St-Pierre spent every spare moment in the Detroit libraries and became an authority on New France.⁴⁴ He joined *Le Progrès* of Windsor in 1885 and staunchly defended the Riel rebellion; in 1888 he founded *L'Ouest Français*, at Bay City, Michigan.⁴⁵ Late in 1889 he moved to Lake Linden, Michigan, a community on the south shore of Lake Superior, where he founded *L'Union Franco-Américaine*; under St-Pierre's direction, this became the best French journal in the midwest.⁴⁶

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, p. 76.

³⁷*Le Travailleur*, 12 mars 1886.

³⁸Quoted in Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, pp. 77–8.

³⁹*Boston Herald*, 16 April 1886.

⁴⁰*Ferdinand Gagnon*, pp. 24–5; she died at Worcester on 6 Nov. 1906.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁴²*Ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

⁴³Acte de naissance, District de Joliette, Province de Québec.

⁴⁴Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, p. 293.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶Georges J. Joyaux, "French Press in Michigan: a Bibliography," *Michigan History*, XXXVI (1952), 276.

But St-Pierre only stayed with *L'Union* for about a year, and then he moved on to found or edit several other French newspapers in Michigan. He felt from his first days in Michigan that the drama of French settlement deserved a chronicler. During his years there he kept copious notes from his readings, hoping eventually to write such a work. So dedicated to this task did he become that he temporarily retired from journalism to complete it. The work, *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan et du comté d'Essex, Ontario*, was published in Montreal in 1895.⁴⁷ The newspapers, magazine articles, and books by St-Pierre prior to 1900 show his belief that all other ends should be subordinate to encouraging knowledge and love for *la patrie*. Belisle wrote that St-Pierre had one fixed idea: ". . . réveiller l'idée française, la fierté de la race, en rappelant notre origine, les luttes héroïques des ancêtres pour la conservation de notre langue, de nos mœurs et de notre foi. C'était presque-une manie chez lui."⁴⁸

Though large numbers of French immigrants had settled in Michigan, as in New England, after the American Civil War, French influence in Michigan had a long history. Sault Ste Marie had been founded by the Jesuits Dablon and Marquette in 1668, Michilimackinac (Fort de Buade, at St. Ignace) in the 1670s, Fort St Joseph (Niles) in 1693, and Detroit in 1701. Even after the successive British and American régimes, the majority of Michigan residents were French.⁴⁹ By the 1840s, however, heavy immigration from the eastern states led to a rapid decline in French influence; by the time of the Civil War, Frenchmen were centred around Detroit, St. Ignace, and Sault Ste Marie. Michigan's great copper and iron discoveries of the 1840s led to rapid industrial expansion during the Civil War years. These mining developments, in addition to the huge lumbering operations of the 1870s and 1880s, resulted in a critical labour shortage, which was met in part by thousands of emigrants from Quebec. The same impulses which drove the *Canadiens* into New England also pushed them into Michigan; only the lure was different.

St-Pierre saw in this movement of Frenchmen to Michigan a chance to revitalize French culture.⁵⁰ He felt it his duty to assure that the newly arrived *Canadiens* would not be swallowed by the Yankee culture. At the same time, he hoped that Frenchmen in the older communities would look upon these immigrants as a means to reopen contact with Quebec.⁵¹ French history, culture, and language became

⁴⁷This book was highly praised by Benjamin Sulte, Alexandre Belisle, and others, and to this day is the finest work of its kind for any of the midwestern states.

⁴⁸Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, p. 293.

⁴⁹Russell Bidlack, *The Yankee Meets the Frenchman* (Lansing, 1967), pp. 3-9.

⁵⁰St-Pierre, *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan*, p. 224.

⁵¹"As a rule they [French newspapers] were founded . . . to combat complete Americanization of their countrymen," Georges J. Joyaux, "French Press in Michigan," *Michigan History*, XXXVII (1953), 159.

the dominant themes of St-Pierre's newspaper articles. Sketches of personalities such as Jacques Cartier and Samuel de Champlain appeared in every issue of *L'Union*.⁵² St-Pierre felt that the newcomer must retain his pride in his origins; he deplored the practice of anglicizing names, which he claimed was "unworthy of honest people."⁵³ But St-Pierre knew that a French press alone could never preserve French culture. He realized that strong support would be found among the resident *Canadien* clergy who would look after the spiritual, cultural, and economic well-being of their flocks. He also believed that strong fraternal societies would aid cultural survival.⁵⁴

French societies in Michigan had had an auspicious beginning with the founding of the Lafayette Society in Detroit in 1857, the second oldest French society in the United States.⁵⁵ Their influence was at its height in 1869, when a joint programme was held in Detroit to honour Napoleon I. Midwestern mayors, French consuls, and Canadian guests participated in the programme, which included speeches, parades, and general merriment.⁵⁶ However, what many felt to be a blossoming of French society activity soon took quite a different turn.

One of the speakers on this occasion was Médéric Lanctot who, in addition to praising Napoleon, was also gathering recruits for his annexation plan.⁵⁷ Lanctot apparently thought he had found fertile ground for his scheme, for he stayed in Detroit and in November founded a weekly journal, *L'Impartial*.⁵⁸ Lanctot's programme called for Quebec to break ties with the British empire and then ask to be annexed to the United States. He reasoned that American concepts of tolerance, suffrage, good education, and separation of church and state would be preferable to the current imperial status. Lanctot did not feel that annexation would necessarily mean cultural assimilation.⁵⁹ In the speech he gave at the Napoleon festival, he subtly implied the benefits of annexation: "He referred to the many acts and public measures of Napoleon which should endear him to the hearts of French Canadians for all time, declaring that his whole life was but a struggle against the aristocratic government of England."⁶⁰ The message was

⁵²In *L'Union Franco-Américaine* (Lake Linden), 16 jan. 1890, he stated his hope that these sketches would teach *Canadien* youth the virtues and accomplishments of their forefathers.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 3 avril 1890.

⁵⁴"Nos sociétés doivent être nationales avant tout, ou elles n'existeront pas." St-Pierre, *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan*, p. 254.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 226n.

⁵⁶For a series of articles on this event, see *Detroit Free Press*, 8, 15, 16, 17 Aug. 1869.

⁵⁷Details of the plan are in *Programme Indépendant* (copy in Bibliothèque de la Ville de Montréal, Collection Gagnon).

⁵⁸Silas Farmer, *History of Detroit and Michigan* (Detroit, 1884), p. 678.

⁵⁹Lanctot, *Programme Indépendant*, pp. 8-9.

⁶⁰*Detroit Free Press*, 17 Aug. 1869.

obvious: the events of 1837 and the failures of Confederation compelled the *Canadiens* to adopt the attitude of Napoleon and resist the Anglo-Saxon imperial might. Lanctot, though, believed that the break with Britain could be accomplished without violence.⁶¹ He claimed that it was obvious that the *Canadiens* hated British oppression: "Le peuple canadien n'ayant pas la liberté chez lui, l'a cherchée aux Etats-Unis; la preuve qu'il l'y a trouvée, c'est qu'il y reste."⁶²

The annexationist movement hurt the prestige of French Canadians and hampered the internal unity of many of the societies.⁶³ Annexation was a troublesome topic for newly arrived *Canadiens*; unsure of their status and uncertain of their future, they were perplexed by Lanctot's proposals. The societies quarrelled within themselves and with each other over the topic. *L'Impartial* came out only ten times, after which it was succeeded by another Lanctot paper, *The Anti-Roman Advocate*, a Chiniquy type of paper that was discontinued in August 1870.⁶⁴ St-Pierre's view of the Lanctot efforts in Detroit was forcefully and humorously stated some years later in his *Histoire*: "Lanctot retourna ensuite au Canada et il eut le bonheur de revenir à la foi de ses pères."⁶⁵ In the mid-1880s, when St-Pierre began his journalistic career, he believed that French unity in Michigan was in peril owing to a series of circumstances: the Detroit bishops were trying to americanize the parishes; many of the parishes were of mixed nationality, which led to a financial crisis when it was decided to create separate parishes; and Frenchmen were now scattered throughout Michigan, which increased the problem of cultural retention.⁶⁶ It was therefore unfortunate that, in the midst of these problems, the fraternal organizations were split over the annexation issue.

By 1895 St-Pierre estimated that the French population in Michigan was 140,000 (probably a conservative figure) and still growing.⁶⁷ This rapid increase, coupled with the problems of unity and the scattered settlement pattern, made the task of preserving French culture almost impossible. In such a dilemma, it was reasonable that many people considered repatriation. St-Pierre saw clearly the dilemma French

⁶¹Lanctot, *Programme Indépendant*, p. 10.

⁶²*L'Impartial* (Detroit), 20 nov. 1869. At an evening banquet following the Napoleon ceremonies in August, Lanctot and seven others were asked to give toasts. Lanctot's was: "Aux patriotes du Canada.—Puissent-ils vivre assez longtemps pour voir le jour de la délivrance" (St-Pierre, *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan*, p. 242).

⁶³St-Pierre, *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan*, p. 247.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 246; Silas Farmer, *History of Detroit*, p. 678.

⁶⁵St-Pierre, *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan*, p. 246.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 261–2; see pp. 263 ff. for St-Pierre's analysis of how the bishop of Detroit "stole" the parish of St. Anne's from the French community. This particularly rankled St-Pierre, as the parish, founded in 1701, was one of the oldest in the United States.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 305.

Canadians faced, but he had only partial answers. He deplored emigration from Quebec, because he felt that the emigrants "... végètent pendant de longues années avant de se faire aux mœurs de leur patrie d'adoption, de pouvoir apprendre la langue, et de se mettre sur un pied d'égalité pour la lutte de l'existence avec ceux qui sont arrivés avant eux."⁶⁸ If, then, emigration were an unwise choice, what of the tens of thousands who had already come to Michigan? Here, St-Pierre's fierce nationalism was dominated by his realism. Many *Canadiens* had put in years of hard labour in Michigan. Repatriation would mean selling their property at a loss, and leaving friends and relatives. Repatriation would also handicap the work of the already shaky parish and fraternal organizations.⁶⁹ And, indeed, what would a repatriate find in Quebec? He had no land, little money, and did not wish to begin the struggle anew. What happened, according to St-Pierre, was that many of those who were repatriated returned to the United States after a short stay in Quebec, and he cited a repatriation movement in Lake Linden in 1894. Widely acclaimed at the time, the major effects of this affair, however, were the disruption of the French community and hardship for many families.⁷⁰

Though he regretfully rejected repatriation as a solution, and though he was aware of the tendency towards assimilation in the United States, St-Pierre felt that French culture could be retained to some degree by encouraging nationalism—through the church, schools, and press. Yet, his normally keen perception seems here to have been blurred. He wrote: "Loin de favoriser l'anglicisation des peuples catholiques qui vivent aux Etats-Unis, c'est notre humble opinion que l'église devrait les encourager à conserver leur langue et leurs traditions, tout imprégnées qu'elles sont de l'esprit catholique."⁷¹ He gave tribute to a dying cause, however, for already he had noted the americanization of the churches⁷² and the schools in French communities in which English had become the language of instruction.⁷³

St-Pierre apparently felt that he was one of the few who should be repatriated; and in 1889 he returned to the province of Quebec, where he worked for the *Montreal Herald*, *La Minerve*, and the *Gazette*. He retained his interest in history and was responsible for gathering documents on the crisis of 1837–8. In 1895 he published *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan* and another respected work *L'Histoire du commerce canadien-français de Montréal: 1535–1893*. He was also identified with the labour movement and twice was elected president

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, p. 307.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁷²*Ibid.*, pp. 261–2.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, pp. 271–2.

⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 309.

of the legislative press gallery.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, St-Pierre was not to be repatriated for long. In 1899 he moved to another expatriate community, Worcester, Massachusetts, where he became editor of *L'Opinion Publique*.⁷⁵ In 1903, still concerned for those removed from *la patrie*, he moved to Winnipeg, where he became associated with the *Manitoba Free Press*.⁷⁶ He also founded the short-lived *L'Ouest Canada* (Winnipeg).⁷⁷ He died at St-Boniface, Manitoba, on 25 October 1912.⁷⁸

IV

St-Pierre, like Gagnon, believed to the end that it was possible to keep the French language and traditions alive, even in the midst of Anglo-Saxon influences. Both men gave consideration to repatriation of their countrymen; Gagnon even acted as an agent for the Quebec government. At the peak of their careers, however, both men rejected repatriation, urging rather that the *Canadiens* in the United States and western Canada do everything possible to retain their heritage, while remaining loyal to their new political sovereigns.

Mason Wade has noted that Gagnon's slogan "Loyaux, oui, mais Français toujours" made some Yankees suspicious of the *Canadiens* in their midst.⁷⁹ This seems to have been a groundless fear, as nothing in Gagnon's speeches, writings, or attitudes suggested that he was less of a loyal American than his neighbours. Neither is there reason to suspect St-Pierre's evaluation of the Michigan *Canadiens*: "S'ils sont fiers du rôle que leurs pères ont joués dans l'histoire du pays, ils sont aussi fiers d'être des citoyens américains. . . ."⁸⁰ Both Gagnon and St-Pierre believed strongly in the spirit of *la patrie*, and they spread this message wherever they went—the New England states, Michigan, and Manitoba. Their hopes for a continuing French culture in the United States proved overly optimistic, however, for within a generation after St-Pierre's death, *Canadien* culture had all but died out in Michigan.

Canadiens continued to move into New England after World War I, but repatriation and "fight assimilation" were no longer the slogans in

⁷⁴*Manitoba Free Press* (Winnipeg), 29 Oct. 1912; Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, p. 293; Henry James Morgan, ed., *The Canadian Men and Women of the Time* (Toronto, 1898), p. 903.

⁷⁵Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, p. 293.

⁷⁶*Free Press*, 29 Oct. 1912.

⁷⁷*Le Manitoba* (Winnipeg), 30 Oct. 1912.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*; *Free Press*, 30 Oct. 1912.

⁷⁹Wade, "French Canadians in the United States," p. 12.

⁸⁰St-Pierre, *Histoire des Canadiens du Michigan*, p. 309.

the French community. Though French parishes, schools, and newspapers continued, they served as avenues for assimilation, not as spokesmen for those groups in Quebec which considered these *Canadiens* as only temporarily removed from the province. By the turn of the century, Edmond de Nevers summarized what was to become the typical attitude towards repatriation:

Certes, on ne saurait trop le répéter, les assises les plus solides d'une nation sont la possession de la terre: Que la question du "repatriement" c'est-à-dire du retour dans les districts agricoles de la province de Québec, reste à l'ordre du jour. Emparons-nous du sol, autant que les circonstances nous le permettront. Encourageons les jeunes gens non mariés à se faire colonisateur, mais ne cherchons plus à ramener au pays natal les pères de famille qui ont su se créer aux Etats-Unis une certaine aisance par leur travail, habituons-les plutôt à considérer la maison qu'ils habitent comme leur maison, le ciel sous lequel ils vivent comme leur ciel, et entretenons en eux le doux espoir de l'union prochaine sous un même drapeau.⁸¹

⁸¹Edmond de Nevers, *L'Avenir du Peuple canadien-français* (Paris, 1890), p. 439. His suggestion to forget about repatriation is sound, but the comment about "approaching union under the same flag" is a point of view not shared by *Canadiens*, either in Quebec or in New England. Wade mentions that the Franco-Americans "were not content to be merely transplanted French Canadians and soon became integrated into American life . . . the Franco-American has become as typical of New England as the vanishing Yankee and the well-established Irishman;" "French Canadians in the United States," p. 14. In the twentieth century, Gustave Lanctot expressed hope, and confidence, that the *Canadiens* in New England had the opportunity to retain their culture, yet even he concluded that "it remains to be seen how much time will lapse before they succumb to the incessant forces of Americanism;" *Les Canadiens*, p. 298.

Canada

Federalism and the French Canadians. By PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU. Toronto: Macmillan. 1968. Pp. xxviii, 212. \$5.25 cloth; \$2.50 paper.

THIS BOOK OF ESSAYS written between 1954 and 1967 could be reviewed from two quite different perspectives. The first would consider it as a scholarly contribution to the literature of contemporary Canadian government. Assuredly it is this. The second would judge it as the work of a *politicologue engagé*—and it is this continuing engagement which leads Trudeau away from the usual distinctions of scholarship—distinctions between fact and preference, between analysis and action, between explanation and exhortation. There is in this man a remarkable consistency between his formulations of a decade and more ago when he was a relatively isolated and relatively uninfluential social critic in Quebec and his spontaneous 1968 response to a reporter's question as perhaps the most purposeful prime minister of Canada since Macdonald.

In terms of basic political ideas, Trudeau is an unreconstructed son of the Enlightenment. Someone has remarked that contemporary Canada has been profoundly shaped by the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries and bypassed by the eighteenth. But here is the fundamental political perspective of Trudeau in his brilliant polemic of 1964 against Quebec nationalism: "Quebec's revolution, if it had taken place, would first have consisted in freeing man from collective coercions: freeing the citizens brutalized by reactionary and arbitrary governments; freeing consciences bullied by a clericalized and obscurantist Church; freeing workers exploited by an oligarchic capitalism; freeing men crushed by authoritarian and outdated traditions. Quebec's revolution would have consisted in the triumph of the freedoms of the human being as inalienable rights, over and above capital, the nation, tradition, the Church, and even the State" (p. 205). In the same year Trudeau joined seven other French-Canadian intellectuals to write in a manifesto, *An Appeal for Realism in Politics*: "In the present context of Canadian politics, it is necessary above all else to reaffirm the importance of the individual, without regard to ethnic, geographic or religious accidents. The cornerstone of the social and political order must be the attributes men hold in common, not those which differentiate them. An order of priorities in political and social matters that is founded upon the individual as an individual, is totally incompatible with an order of priorities based upon race, religion or nationality." This is a formulation of liberalism deriving directly from the French and American Revolutions and is almost unique in a political community in which both English- and French-speaking Canadians have had a profound disposition to assert historic and prescriptive rather than natural rights.

From this variant of liberalism, Trudeau evolves a defence of federalism as the general political solution most consonant with law and reason. The French and American Revolutions raised national self-determination as the overriding principle of political legitimacy. However, the practical consequences of every group that defined itself as a people attaining sovereignty would be impotence for most groups. Federalism was the answer. Here is a paradox, because the impulse for national self-determination which provides the impetus for federalism makes federations somewhat unstable. A federation can deal with this instability in one of two ways. It can commit an enormous amount of its resources to the "glue of nationalism" at the level of the central government. But this is likely to bring about an escalation of nationalist impulses focused on one or more of its regions. The more effective method is to maintain what might be called continuing pay-offs of a non-nationalistic variety, so that every group which has the potential of destroying the federation has a stake in maintaining it.

Trudeau believes profoundly that the Canadian federal experience has been a fortunate one and that Canadian federalism has unrealized possibilities for pursuing liberal values. The distribution of legislative powers under the British North America Act corresponds almost exactly with French Canada's needs to sustain its particularity and to develop habits and attitudes of self-government. The much-criticized tradition of constitutional interpretation by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has contributed to stability. In Trudeau's view, Confederation is menaced by measures which would in any essential way challenge the original distribution of legislative powers. During the 1950s the menace was from federal encroachment on provincial matters through the spending power. In this decade Confederation is in jeopardy owing to pressures toward a particular status for Quebec which would almost inevitably diminish the role of Quebecers in the affairs of Canada as a whole.

Is Trudeau a pragmatist or an absolutist? I believe there are unresolved tensions here. For example, in his analysis of the place of the French there is pure *realpolitik*. "The Canadian community must invest, for the defence and better appreciation of the French language, as much time, energy, and money as are required to prevent the country from breaking up" (p. 32). But if one pursues a consistent policy of weakening Quebec nationalism the incentives for other Canadians to recognize the French language are diminished. And if *realpolitik* prevails one cannot logically appeal for bilingual rights in the name of justice. There are absolute strains. "... the state must take great care not to infringe on the conscience of the individual. I believe that, in the last analysis, a human being in the privacy of his own mind has the exclusive authority to choose his own scale of values and to decide which forces take precedence over others. A good constitution is one that does not prejudge any of these questions, but leaves citizens free to orient their human destinies as they see fit" (p. 11). I do not know how to apply the pragmatic test of this kind of statement in the sense of judging what is involved if one accepts it. Further, in the absolutist vein, Trudeau calls for the entrenchment of a bill of rights in the constitution. Such a measure would not, as he claims, "guarantee" human rights but would rather vest their final determination in the judiciary—quite a different matter.

Trudeau's political perspectives were evolved in the context of domestic political struggles in Quebec, in a society where, as he so acutely analyzes it, the basic attitudes and predispositions of liberal democracy have not been firmly established. Throughout, he asks a great deal of Quebec. But what demands does he make on the rest of the Canadian community? It seems to me that these are limited to the kind of recognition of the French language that is now proceeding

apace and a respect for provincial powers as these are delineated by the British North America Act. On this basis, I would agree that Trudeau offers Canada outside Quebec too little to challenge its energies and imagination.

In writing in 1944 to explain Mackenzie King's successful political career, Frank Underhill spoke of "our Canadian preference, in spite of the clearness of our physical climate, for living constantly in an atmosphere of mental haze. We never make issues clear to ourselves. We never define our differences so that they can be understood clearly or reconciled." This book and the man who wrote it may lead us to do better.

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Histoire de la littérature française du Québec, I. By PIERRE DE GRANDPRÉ *et al.* Montréal: Librairie Beauchemin Limitée. 1967. Pp. 368, illus.

THE CENTENNIAL YEAR brought with it no fewer than three new histories of French-Canadian literature, of which this is by far the most ambitious, being "la première histoire de la littérature française du Québec rédigée en collaboration" (p. 7). It is not made clear how "la littérature française du Québec" differs from French-Canadian literature, nor are we told to what audience this particular history is directed. In a lengthy introduction, Pierre de Grandpré, after reviewing the efforts of his predecessors, proposes a judicious combination of historical and critical methods for the study of French-Canadian literature and undertakes a wide-ranging survey of modern approaches to literary criticism. His text bears little relation to what follows but its full application may be apparent only when the second (twentieth-century) volume appears later this year.

The opening chapter, one of the most original in the book, presents Georges-André Vachon's view that French-Canadian literature must be seen historically as a collection of documents for the study of the national ideology. "Cela entraîne deux conséquences: d'abord, qu'il n'y a aucune raison de privilégier l'étude des romans, des nouvelles, des recueils de poèmes, au détriment des textes 'non-littéraires'; et ensuite, qu'on ne peut aborder ces œuvres, d'emblée, par une méthode spécifiquement littéraire, applicable aux seules œuvres dont le statut d'objets esthétiques est certain" (p. 31). Unfortunately, these interesting methodological suggestions are not followed up in subsequent chapters. In a second preliminary chapter, Claude Galarnau provides a brief historical introduction which includes such fond statements as that French-Canadian classical secondary education can be equated to "l'enseignement par excellence de l'Occident médiéval et moderne, la pierre d'assise de la culture savante" (p. 39), or that, since the eighteenth century, "tous les grands écrivains et penseurs français sont lus dans la province de Québec en même temps qu'à Paris" (p. 40).

The bulk of the book is made up of short chapters grouped in four chronological sections: 1534-1760, 1760-1830, 1830-1860, and 1860-1900. These are the traditional divisions of almost all histories of French-Canadian literature, and no attempt seems to have been made to re-examine them here. Certain anomalies inevitably result: in order not to disturb the scheme, Emile Nelligan, for example, whose poetic career ended in August 1899, has to be held over for the second volume, as do all the poets of the *Ecole littéraire de Montréal*.

The quality of the contributed chapters in these four sections varies considerably: disappointing in the two early parts, it improves as one nears the end of the book. The first section, devoted to the French régime, consists of four superficial chapters whose chief interest lies in the illustrative extracts they

include; this part of the book does not approach the level of scholarship established nearly forty years ago by Antoine Roy's thesis *Les Lettres, les sciences et les arts au Canada sous le régime français*, a study which, significantly enough, is not mentioned in any of these chapters.

The second section (1760–1830) opens with a somewhat tendentious sociological analysis, a chapter on folklore, and an admirably concise three-page statement by Gaston Dulong on the language of French Canada. There follow three lamentable chapters devoted to journalism, poetry, and history in the period; the first is a clumsy digest of the early volumes of Séraphin Marion's *Lettres canadiennes d'autrefois*, and the other two are largely imitated, even to the choice of quotations, from Camille Roy's *Nos origines littéraires*.

The third part (1830–1860) is less derivative. Introduced by Michel Têtu and ably concluded by Pierre Savard, it includes satisfactory treatments of the early fiction and of the role of F.-X. Garneau by Arsène Lauzière, of journalism and the poetry of Crémazie by Michel Têtu, and of political and religious oratory.

As is to be expected, most space is given to the period 1860–1900, and this is by far the best portion of the book, thanks to the fact that six of its nine chapters are contributed by Pierre Savard who brings to his task an historian's close knowledge of primary sources and a fresh judgement of men and movements. Two other competent chapters, on poetry and fiction, are the work of Michel Têtu and Arsène Lauzière; the chapters on drama, here and in the previous section, are both disappointing.

One wonders why, with so many genres and periods to be covered, so few contributors have been called upon. The best reason for including additional authors must surely be to make available their specialized knowledge of particular areas, yet manifestly the writers of certain chapters in this co-operative volume have no special competence for their topics, as evidenced by the obvious errors scattered throughout the book. One does not, for example, expect a specialist to attribute the authorship of all Cartier's *Voyages* to the explorer himself (p. 46), to call Michel Bibaud the son of his own son Maximilien (p. 121), to write *Epreuves poétiques* for *Epaves poétiques* (p. 263) or to be unaware of Paul Wyczynski's discoveries about the authorship of *Véronica* (*ibid.*).

In its typographical format and its illustrations this is an attractive volume, although there are too many misprints and the more than 150 illustrations are of uneven quality, haphazardly juxtaposed, and arbitrarily gathered to suit the convenience of the binder. There are good indexes of names and titles, but these reveal some surprising omissions in both categories (John Hare, Marie Tremaine; *François de Bienville*, *Jeanne la fileuse*, and so on).

In short, this is a book which has in its favour the novelty of its composition, its illustrations (including a very colourful cover), and half-a-dozen good chapters contributed chiefly by De Grandpré, Vachon, and Savard. It is certainly not a work of reference, and the scholar will find in it almost nothing that is not available in more satisfactory form elsewhere. As a manual for students or as an introductory text for the general reader, it leaves a good deal to be desired in the accuracy and completeness of its information, in its bibliographical documentation (largely out of date), and in its critical judgements. Indeed, unless the forthcoming second volume is far superior to the first, this newest venture in the historiography of French-Canadian literature will have to be written off as a bold but unsuccessful experiment.

Ideas in Exile: A History of Canadian Invention. By J. J. BROWN. Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and Stewart. 1967. Pp. xii, 372, illus. \$15.00.

THIS BOOK, the first comprehensive history of Canadian invention, is a curious combination of historical scholarship and special pleading. It might be classified as "activist" history, using the lessons of the past—as the author sees them—to impress Canadians with the need for changes which will advance Canadian technological innovation in the future.

Historians of technology are few and far between, and Dr. Brown is extraordinarily well qualified to write a history of Canadian invention. A graduate of Toronto, he earned his doctorate in history—on the role of technology in social history—at Yale. He has taught English at Cornell, been a technical editor and management consultant, and in 1963 founded the Institute for Entrepreneurial History; he has written best-selling works of the "how-to-get-rich-quick" variety and innumerable articles for both popular and serious periodicals; he has also found time to champion the cause of scientific and industrial museums in Canada and to be active in professional organizations of scientists and engineers. This combination of the serious and the popular—of academia, journalism, and business experience—perhaps accounts for the book's style, which ranges from the dullest academic prose to racy journalese, and its schizoid nature of both scholarly work and political tract.

The preface begins with the statement, "This book cost a hundred and twenty-thousand dollars to research and write," and Brown proceeds to explain his difficulties in obtaining funds to support his voluminous research, which included not only published materials but also interviews and communications with hundreds of scholars, librarians, curators, industrialists, and inventors. The book is a monument to Dr. Brown's industry and perseverance.

It is also a monument to Canadian invention. Brown's working definition of "a Canadian invention" is one where "either the inventor was educated here or the basic concept of the invention came to him while he was living in Canada" (p. 4). While Brown sometimes mentions inventors such as John C. Garand (inventor of the Garand automatic rifle), he is careful to point out that Garand, though born in Canada, did all his work on the M-1 rifle in the United States. At times the book is remarkably modest in making claims for Canadian "firsts" in invention; indeed, Brown sometimes disproves certain such claims. For example, he points out that Benjamin Franklin Tibbetts was not the inventor of the compound marine engine in 1845; that neither Hamilton or Brantford, Ontario, produced the first railway sleeping cars (p. 123); and he casts doubt on the claim that Charles Fenerty of Halifax discovered the process of making paper from wood fibre (pp. 173-5).

By and large, however, the book is a gigantic list of Canadian "firsts" in invention—enough to make any Canadian proud of the ingenuity and innovative ability of his countrymen. Some Canadian inventions and discoveries have been extremely significant—Gesner's kerosene, Saunders' Marquis wheat, and, of course, Bell's telephone. Some might be considered trivial—Bovril beef extract, Pablum baby cereal, the retractable beer-carton handle, and the paint-roller for do-it-yourself housepainting. Trivial or important, they testify to Canadian ingenuity.

However, Brown never asks why Canadians were so prolific in their inventive activity. Instead, he poses another question: Why did Canadians not establish industries based upon their fecundity in invention? Indeed, the book's thesis is expressed in its title: Canadians had the original ideas for many inventions—but

the inventors and/or the ideas then went into exile, usually to the United States, where they were developed into profitable innovations by others.

The book's first half is a straightforward history of Canadian technology, intermixed with social and economic history, from the French régime—it "amounted to very little" (p. 27), through the introduction of English military technology in the period 1760–1812—"a dramatic improvement took place . . . immediately after the Conquest" (p. 31), to developments in various fields by the beginning of this century. The special pleading occurs in the last half of the book where Brown gives examples of missed opportunities in the twentieth century. These include Turnbull's invention of the variable-pitch propeller (exploited by Curtiss Wright in the United States); the diesel locomotive (first built by the Canadian National Railway, but a victim of the 1929 depression); Eric W. Leaver's AMCRO (Automatic Machine Control by Recorded Operation); Weinberger and Delcellier's engineered yarn (one kind of fibre wound spirally around a continuous fibre of another type, usually nylon wound around cotton cord); Morse Robb's electronic organ; Maurice Levy's automatic postoffice (to code envelopes for automatic mail sorting); and, most particularly, the Avro jetliner, the first successful commercial jet aircraft.

Inevitably in such a comprehensive listing of inventions, there are some errors of fact and interpretation. Brown claims, for instance, that "Bell's telephone is unique in that it had relatively few forbears [*sic*], and seemed to spring almost fully developed, out of one man's mind" (p. 136). While Bell deserves major credit for the telephone, the fact is that many others had the same idea and had invented similar devices, and that Bell profited by earlier work in the field. Brown also credits Bell with the research team (p. 213) through founding the Aerial Experiment Association in 1907; but industrial research laboratories using the research team concept were in existence before then, for example, at General Electric in Schenectady, N.Y. One is puzzled also by Brown's allegation that I. C. Mackie, who worked out a system for controlled cooling of steel rails, was "deliberately deprived of credit for his invention by the machinations of a learned body in the United States" (p. 220). From Brown's subsequent account, it is not clear that Mackie was deprived of credit, but if so it was not done by a learned body but by a trade association, and the evidence of "machinations" is virtually nil.

Brown concludes with a diatribe against Canadian conservatism, which makes Canadians look askance at anything new and prevents them from fostering innovations based upon their technical creativity, and with specific suggestions for improving public education and means of capital formation which would enable Canada to take advantage of its inventors' creativity. His final suggestion—a museum of "simultaneous invention" on the Expo '67 grounds—would seem to be a worthwhile historical project to stimulate innovation.

In addition to some excellent plates, the book has many illustrations of title pages of old books. Such illustrations do little to explicate or elucidate the text, but they undoubtedly add to the book's cost—and the Canadian publishers have here borrowed an idea from Americans, rather than the other way round, namely, overpricing a text.

Despite its shortcomings, its stylistic deficiencies, its minor errors of interpretation and fact, Dr. Brown has written an important book containing much new material and many valuable insights. It should stimulate other Canadian historians to investigate in detail the important contributions made by Canadian inventors.

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MELVIN KRANZBERG

Les Imprimés dans le Bas-Canada, 1801-1840, Bibliographie analytique. I. 1801-1810. Par JOHN HARE et JEAN-PIERRE WALLOT. Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal. 1967. Pp. xxiv, 383. \$9.50.

THIS VOLUME, which is a continuation of the work of Marie Tremaine listing the Canadian imprints of the eighteenth century, is the product of a group of scholars, working together under the designation Griscac, on the intellectual history of French Canada, with the backing of the University of Montreal and the University of Ottawa. The first reaction of the reviewer was that it must surely be unnecessary to devote a volume to such a short period, and that the work would have been more useful if it had covered twenty years instead of ten. But a more careful examination shows that there are no wasted pages and that in their treatment the two compilers, or it might be better to call them authors, have really written a new kind of history of ten important years. It adds greatly to our knowledge of the political and cultural development of French Canada. Much the largest number of items had their origin in the political life of the province, broadsides issued by candidates or parties before elections to the assembly, journals of the assembly with committee reports, political pamphlets. But there are also the *mandements* of the bishops, the sermons of protestant clergy, and the directions for holding service for both churches. Then there are a certain number of brief publications by would-be literary lights both French and English, displaying their knowledge of the classics and their scientific hobbies. Particularly amusing is the description of a brochure of Ross Cuthbert, an English seigneur with some French affiliations, a holder of many offices, which attempts to refute Newton's theory of the tides in order to substitute his own.

The second part of the volume lists the newspapers of the province, in order of their birth, giving an excellent characterization of their place in provincial politics, and also the part played by journals like the *Quebec Gazette* in keeping the better educated classes in touch with world events and also with contemporary literature in Europe, especially Great Britain.

The whole volume deserves praise for its judicious comments and summaries. These are of course in French but there are many quotations from English originals all of them as accurate in spelling and punctuation as are the quotations from the French. The only error noted is that John Neilson is spoken of as the younger brother instead of the nephew of the founder of the *Gazette*, Samuel Neilson. Since John Neilson was still flourishing in Canadian politics in 1843 the influence of two generations of the Neilson family on the cultural life of the province is considerable. The firm of Neilson and Cowan imported books from England and France and played its part in rendering the French classics and philosophers of the Enlightenment available to educated men and even a few women of the Roman faith whatever bishops and curés might have to say about it. They also kept both races abreast of events in England and the United States familiarizing them with liberal or even revolutionary trends of the day. As the authors truly say in their introduction, the degree of illiteracy and total ignorance of the population of the province in this decade has been exaggerated. Shopkeepers, schoolteachers, merchants, and even a few farmers, who were certainly not a part of the intellectual élite, need not be regarded as sunk in a slough of ignorance. News and ideas did get around. It is very important to get this point across in writing the history of French Canada in the nineteenth century.

HELEN TAFT MANNING

Haverford, Pa.

The Opening of the Canadian West. By DOUGLAS HILL. London and Toronto: Heinemann. 1967. Pp. xii, 291, illus. \$8.50.

THE HISTORY OF WESTERN CANADA from fur-trade days until the end of the nineteenth century can be presented effectively, if not completely, in terms of the penetration of the wilderness by traders, missionaries, miners, explorers, surveyors, railwaymen, and settlers, particularly if due attention is paid to their associations with the Indian people of this vast area. Twentieth-century western Canada, in contrast, does not permit of similar treatment, for this later epoch is distinguished by distinctive provincial patterns of behaviour and experience in political, social, and economic affairs. It is the earlier period, with its unifying theme of pioneering enterprise, which Mr. Hill has selected for treatment in his book.

The Opening of the Canadian West is designed for the reader who wishes a brisk narrative of events, emphasizing colourful detail, and not weighted with original interpretative and analytical discussion. It is obvious that the author, who was raised in Prince Albert, shares a number of the convictions of the best-known citizen of that Saskatchewan city: that the West has suffered from the obtuseness of the federal authorities, that the Indian and Métis peoples have often been treated with less than justice, and that most pioneers of oriental and continental European stock have had to endure idiotic prejudice and snobbery; these viewpoints emerge with commendable force and clarity.

Nevertheless a good popular history requires more of the author than humanitarian sympathies and the capacity to produce readable narrative. He must possess enough depth of knowledge to avoid the danger of distorting complex episodes, and he must expend sufficient time on the enterprise to ensure accuracy in the presentation of facts. Unfortunately this book is marred by haste and inattention in these respects. The following are some of the corrections which should appear in a new edition: the Council of Assiniboia did possess legislative and executive authority (p. 46); Palliser did not state that a railway could easily be built through the mountains (p. 61); the Hudson's Bay Company retained a vast acreage of land after 1870, not just the plots around its posts (p. 72); the NWMP, while very helpful in Indian treaty deliberations, were not the prime negotiators (p. 137); Hungarians are not Slavs (p. 228); Battleford was named the territorial capital in 1876, not 1877 (p. 171); Mattawa is west, not east of Ottawa; David Fife did not breed Red Fife wheat (p. 242); Lieutenant Governor David Laird was not the sole territorial lawmaker; his council was not appointed by him, it possessed both executive and legislative powers, and elected councillors were provided for in the Act of 1875, not in a later amendment. The Bell Farm and Cannington Manor are not co-operative farms (pp. 175-6). The author would have been well advised to avoid the complexities of the wheat pool movement (p. 270) which has led him into inaccuracies of statement and is beyond the proper limits of his narrative. Less excusable is the misleading outline of the separate school controversy of 1905 (p. 274).

It is distressing that a book with attractive qualities, including an index of above average utility, should be marred by errors easily avoidable by more careful use of the many excellent published works listed in the bibliography.

LEWIS H. THOMAS

University of Alberta

The Valley Comes of Age: A History of Agriculture in the Valley of the Red River of the North, 1812-1920. By STANLEY NORMAN MURRAY. Fargo: North

Dakota Institute for Regional Studies. 1967. Pp. xvi, 250, illus. \$7.50 (US).

THIS IS A WELL-EXECUTED geographical and economic study of the development of agriculture in the Red River Valley on both sides of the border. The history of that development receives a sober, well-balanced presentation. Any one wishing to be informed of the background of the history of the valley, or any phase of its agricultural development will find it most useful to consult this book. The account of bonanza farming is the most novel and rewarding part of the study.

This book is, in short, a valuable addition to the history of the Red River region. It will establish itself as an authority on the history of what is one of the world's great agricultural regions, and which was, as the author properly stresses, the beachhead for the agricultural development of the northwestern, American and Canadian.

It is somewhat disappointing, therefore, to find the author saying, (p. 219) that Red River farmers were, "the first to pay the price of careless one-crop farming." On the plains this was true, but in North America the *habitant* wheat farmer of Quebec and the tobacco planters of Virginia had paid much stiffer economic and social prices for one-crop farming. The study is, perhaps, a bit too regional.

W. L. MORTON

Trent University

Some Letters from Archbishop Taché on the Manitoba School Question. By MARGARET SCOTT MACGREGOR. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1967. Pp. viii, 136. \$5.95.

IF THIS HANDSOME LITTLE VOLUME had simply presented Archbishop Taché's letters in chronological or topical order, along with some explanatory notes and perhaps an introduction, it would have performed a most useful service. Instead, the letters (or fragments of them) are inserted into a narrative which makes no sense from beginning to end. The result is a most curious production. It was apparently printed at the author's expense.

The book is hardly likely to mislead students who seek to inform themselves on the Manitoba School Question; it is more apt to convince them that the issue is an utterly incomprehensible one which is best left alone.

LOVELL CLARK

University of Manitoba

The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945. By J. L. GRANATSTEIN. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1967. Pp. xii, 231. \$6.50.

THIS BOOK IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION to Canadian political history. The Conservative party in the years from 1939 to 1945 has always seemed peripheral and almost irrelevant to federal politics; in retrospect we treat the official opposition as an anachronism because we know that the Liberal party had been, was, and would be in office. Students of the period have concentrated on Mackenzie King's successful efforts to survive the crisis of conscription and the threat from the left. By focussing on the Conservative party, Professor Granatstein has added an important dimension to the politics of this era.

The Conservative party was adrift in 1939. It had been the party of the British connection and although it had officially accepted the principle of autonomy, many of its leaders and supporters had not changed their spots. Loyalty to Great Britain was still part of the Conservative ideology. In domestic affairs, Macdonald's National Policy had also become outmoded with the settlement of the west. R. B. Bennett had extended the role of government by providing some protection for the producers of natural products and for consumers but his defeat in 1935 strengthened the more traditional elements of the party who still clung to the older version of *laissez-faire*. Many Liberals also shared these sentiments of loyalty to Great Britain and a faith in national capitalism but within the Liberal party these sentiments were being held in check and gradually eroded by appeals to national and party unity. The emphasis of historians on Mackenzie King's policies has tended to obscure the extent of these sentiments. The history of the Conservative party during the war reveals the continuing support for these traditions.

Arthur Meighen emerges as the focal point for the antiquated emphasis on the British connection and on free enterprise. At the leadership convention of 1938 he made an impassioned appeal for open participation in imperial defence but allowed Manion to be elected almost by default. Meighen criticized from the sidelines until the war but then he could no longer stomach King's betrayal of Great Britain or Manion's unwillingness to wave the Union Jack. He became increasingly critical of Manion and then of Hanson because they seemed lukewarm about the empire and the related issue of conscription and finally concluded that only he could redeem the honour of his party and his country. In 1941 he accepted the leadership from a conference of party leaders rather than from a national convention but there is nothing to suggest that a convention would have made a different choice. The call of empire had become louder after the fall of France and Arthur Meighen seemed the logical response to this call.

Meighen's defeat in York South a few months later was not a rejection of conscription. As Professor Granatstein shows, the issue of the war effort was countered by the issue of social welfare and postwar reconstruction, and the detailed analysis of the polls reveals that, in comparison with the election of 1940, the Conservative vote in York South increased in the wealthier districts but declined in the working-class districts of the constituency. Meighen himself remained unrevised and unrepentant but some Conservatives concluded that free enterprise could only be preserved by guaranteeing some degree of social security. The Port Hope conference of 1942 was an attempt by Conservatives like J. M. Macdonnell to qualify the *laissez-faire* traditions of the party. Meighen saw only a betrayal of immutable conservative principles.

The formal unity of the party was preserved because John Bracken was available. Bracken was Meighen's choice for the leadership because Meighen saw him as the man who could unite loyal Canadians behind the war effort. The "Port Hopefuls" accepted Bracken because they saw him as a progressive. By 1945 Bracken had confirmed Meighen's judgment to the extent that Bracken had given priority to the war. The strength of the sentiment of loyalty had nullified the efforts to have the Conservative party take the initiative in planning social reconstruction.

This book is notable not only for its lucid political analysis but also for the extensive research on which it is based. Professor Granatstein has taken full advantage of the wealth of personal papers deposited in various archives and has also gained access to some private collections. He notes with regret some collections which are still closed but it seems unlikely that any new information would contradict his conclusions. These conclusions are already convincingly docu-

mented. Professor Granatstein has even managed to piece together a good deal of information about party finances and campaign funds, and has shown how financial support influenced policies and the choice of leaders. He has supplemented his documentary sources with interviews with many of the central figures involved in the events he recounts. It is also worthy of note that, in spite of this extensive research, the author has managed to assimilate his material and has written a well-organized and a most readable narrative. Professor Granatstein does not claim to have exhausted his subject. He would doubtless have preferred to know more about the state of each of the provincial Conservative parties, since the federal party was to some extent an extension of these parties. Short of beginning with the separate history of each provincial party, however, it is difficult to see how this study could have been more complete.

The author may have exaggerated the strength of the social reformers within the party. R. J. Manion was at odds with the powerful financial backers of the party and with Meighen, but this may be fully explained by Manion's insecurity and his resentment at any hint of pressure or interference. There is little to suggest that he had any coherent policy of reform. Nor is it certain that the Port Hope conference represented a significant body of opinion within the party. The effective pressures on Bracken all seem to have come from the traditional elements of the party. The author may have been unduly influenced by his interviews with Richard A. Bell on these points. Even if this impression is justified, the merit of this study is not in question. This is a book of major importance both for the history of the Conservative party and for the political history of the period.

H. BLAIR NEATBY

Carleton University

Documents on Canadian External Relations. I. 1909-1918. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs. 1967. Pp. x, 906. \$10.00.

THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS has been a long time in labour, but it has at last brought forth a book; and an impressive and valuable book at that. Students have been waiting a good many years for Canada to follow the example of other countries and begin the publication of its diplomatic documents. Now that this volume, designed to be the first of a series, has seen the light, it is to be hoped that others will follow it without any avoidable delay. It is clear that the series is going to be a "completely indispensable tool" for the study of Canadian external policy.

The volume covers the first decade of the history of the department, which includes the tragic and pregnant years of the First World War. It may be worthwhile to rehearse the main headings under which the contents are arranged: The Conduct of External Relations; The War, 1914-18 (nearly 200 pages); Imperial Relations; Boundary Questions; Fisheries; Asian Immigration; and Relations with Individual Countries (including the better part of 100 pages on the United States, which of course also figures prominently under some of the other headings). A high proportion of the documents have never been published before, and everyone working in the field of Canadian external policy in this period will have reason to be grateful for the book. It is quite out of the question to list all the material included that seems to this reviewer new and interesting, but a few examples can be given. We all know Borden's famous "toy automata" letter to Perley (4 January 1916), which is here in its place; but it is new that after eight days' reflection the Prime Minister followed it up with a cable instructing Perley to "take no further steps" in the matter at present. There is a fascinating

memorandum by Borden (15 June 1918) describing how he called Sir Arthur Currie to London and how the Corps Commander, clearly still full of bitter memories of Passchendaele, poured out an indictment of British military leadership. There are extracts from the records of the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 concerning the participation of Sir Frederick Borden, and from those of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1912 setting out Sir Robert Borden's view of what a "national spirit" would demand in future in the way of a voice in foreign policy; representation on the cm, he broadly hinted, would hardly meet the needs. There are glimpses of the difficult *débuts* of a "self-governing colony" in diplomacy, notably the reports of the "Canadian delegate" (Joseph Pope) from the pelagic sealing conference in Washington in 1911. There are documents concerning the mission of the young Mackenzie King to India and China in 1909. One could go on at length.

The professional historian will have some reservations about the book in various matters of detail. Notably, there is absolutely no information, either general or particular, about the provenance of the documents. One assumes that they are all in the files of the Department of External Affairs, but we are not told even this. Sometimes one would welcome more information about particular sources, such as those of the important footnote on page 309 concerning the origins of Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference, 1917. Although it is stated that "the selection of documents for the series has been made by professional historians working in conjunction with successive Departmental editors," the people concerned are not named (the only name on the book is that of Mr. Paul Martin). There is only gossip to tell one that the mainspring of the project through the early stages was Mr. G. P. de T. Glazebrook. Surely this is carrying our honoured British heritage of the anonymity of the civil service a bit far. Much effort has clearly been devoted to a detailed and useful "analytical index," but one regrets the comparative exiguousness of the table of contents. Subdivision by topics could usefully have gone further; thus under "Boundary Questions" a document on the functioning of the International Joint Commission stands next to one on the Labrador dispute with Newfoundland simply because of the accident of date. There are few elisions in documents of moderate length, but where elisions have been made and can be checked they are occasionally difficult to account for (a case in point is Document 404 on pages 279-81, an important paper on Borden's naval policy).

These are quasi-technical points. The vital matter is that the Historical Division of the Department of External Affairs has embarked on a project of the greatest significance for Canadian historical scholarship and the intelligent study of Canadian external policies. And it is very essential now that the department and the government at large should give the project much more generous support than it has enjoyed heretofore, so that it can move forward at proper speed. We need more volumes of this sort, and we should not have to endure the lapse of years before we get them.

C. P. STACEY

University of Toronto

An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Edited by STEPHEN CLARKSON.
Toronto: McClelland and Stewart for the University League for Social Reform.
1968. Pp. xiv, 290. \$4.95 paper.

IN THE PAST TWO YEARS the two sacred clichés of the Canadian public, the United Nations and the Commonwealth, have shown convincingly their powerless-

ness in the living rooms of the nation. The housewife who watched the cynical wranglings of the Security Council debates on the Middle East or the fratricidal carnage in Nigeria was predictably aghast. The shock value of these belated realizations cuts two ways. Clearly the University League for Social Reform looks upon an enlightened public as the crucial element for forging an independent foreign policy for Canada. The twenty-five authors of the nineteen chapters are nothing less than cosmic in their view of Canada's future influence in world politics. But the underlying assumption that the grubby, distasteful business of compromising interests (which is what politics is all about) can strike a fancy in the general public is also nothing short of heroic. Growing familiarity is as likely to breed contempt as enthusiasm—a contempt not much dissimilar from the sanctimonious isolationism of the interwar years.

The core of the book is to establish a difference between the quiet diplomacy of affiliation and its opposite, the sometimes squeaky diplomacy of independence, the former being the preserve of the professional, the latter, so far, largely the prerogative of the academic. Whether the academic will be able to carry the public once the message is out that quiet diplomacy is a secret, pusillanimous bore depends ultimately as much on the nature of the public as the intrinsic worth of the policies offered by the ULSR. Thus one must take *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?* as largely a *pamphlet de guerre*, exhorting the former and overstating the case for the latter. Public aside, since policy choices are largely a question of present style and emphasis (and only posthumously, if ever, a matter of empirical proof), what counts are the assumptions about the nature of international society and statecraft. Those of the ULSR are contrasted side by side in Mr. Clarkson's conclusion under the headings of quiet approach and independent approach. As formulated, the independent approach wins hands down—few would subscribe to the degree of sycophancy towards the United States implied in the quiet approach—and one would certainly be surprised if Professors Lyon and von Riekhoff, the two strongest exponents of quiet diplomacy in the book, agreed with that formulation of their views. It is thus worth bearing in mind that the policies here dubbed independent are not altogether foreign to the East Block and that the policies described as quiet are not altogether operational.

The authors dealing with the dangers of the American liaison all agree some extra-territorial duress is inevitable given our geographical location and close economic links. Those in whom these facts induce caution (Professor Lyon and Miss Jewett) are as right as those (Professors Stairs and Rotstein) for whom they are a source of freedom of manoeuvre. Affiliation or independence depend on circumstances some of which, at least, are still within our control. The real problem is to count the cost of various degrees of political independence. A foreign stake of \$33 billion in our economy—\$13 billion direct American investments—and borrowing requirements of up to \$1 billion a year in the New York market should make the creditor pause as much as the debtor. But so long as we choose to invest our money in life insurance and to handicap our economic growth by a tariff structure one of whose not incidental results is a productivity per head 30 per cent lower than the United States, we shall continue to be neither poor nor pure.

On the domestic front, Trudeau's victory will probably swing power away from the provinces. Quebec's incipient insolvency will weaken its bargaining position and likely Ottawa will exact stiffer terms in the next round of negotiations. It would be a pity if these terms included a negation of Quebec's legitimate interests in some foreign policy issues. Unfortunately, of late, the Quebec premier's drive for provincial autonomy has subsumed deliberately the articulation of these views

into the constitutional issue of who shall implement them. Professor Painchaud's concern to outflank Mr. Johnson leads him to the anachronistic contention that Quebec would only have specific foreign policy interests were it to become an independent state. The force of his argument is thus to deny validity to specific and persistent French-Canadian views at the present time, to say nothing of past Quebec views on foreign issues. So, in a sense, does Professor Sabourin's conclusion that on balance both Ottawa and Quebec have a good constitutional case. The effect of channelling Quebec's foreign policy interests into the sterile confines of a legal argument acknowledges that Ottawa has been unwilling thus far to make room for francophone views but also tends to confirm the (hopefully wrong) impression that it has been unable.

It is regrettable that none of the senior people in External Affairs contributed a chapter to the section on policies in the Atlantic world. If they had, two factors might have emerged—Canadian policy-makers have an extraordinary range of choice because, as things stand, our country has no security problem; this range is sometimes limited severely by *external* constraints. If that sounds paradoxical, consider the business of renewing NORAD as seen from the East Block. Militarily NORAD no longer adds to Canadian defence. With the advent of invulnerable second strike capabilities and ballistic missile defences our real estate is irrelevant and no scenario can be constructed in which NORAD can do a plausible job of either deterrence or defence. Thus in the spring of 1968 Ottawa had a unique opportunity to get rid of an obsolescent military obligation and a tiresome political liability with no loss to Canadian security. But in the face of American asseverations that manned bombers are still a threat, External Affairs (still not sharing this military evaluation) had to recommend a policy based on hard American insistence that continental bomber defence was crucial to its security. External Affairs dismissed the theoretical possibility of trying to prevent physically the United States from using our air space; it dismissed the notion of giving them outright access to it and our bases as too corrosive of Canadian sovereignty; it reluctantly plumped for a share in the running of North American bomber defence (at a minimal cost, about 7 per cent) as the only realistic option given the disadvantages of their alternatives. Professor Granatstein is thus quite right to remark that our newly unified armed forces are not only equipped to deal with the acceptable task of peacekeeping but also to fit into the next generation of NATO and NORAD commitments. And Professor McNaught is also quite right to state that "as long as Canada accepts the alliance basis of security she will accept the shackles of nuclear loyalty and the stigma of total commitment." But as the NORAD case suggests, our range of options is in some instances pitifully small while as regards NATO any arguments against it are unlikely to match the cogency of Professor von Riekhoff's case for continued membership. It must then be asked whether it is still possible to advance McNaught's three priorities—the enhancement of the UN at the expense of regional alliances, nuclear disarmament, and increased foreign aid spending—without ditching the alliances. While not so sanguine about the UN (a commitment to whatever two-thirds of the General Assembly decides is no more intrinsically independent than a commitment to a unanimous decision of the NATO council), it is simply different—advancement of these priorities is a question of skill and will, not of limited resources or alliance commitments. Canada has so far lacked not the wherewithal but the imagination for an independent foreign policy.

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Public Opinion and Canadian Identity. By MILDRED A. SCHWARTZ. Foreword by SEYMOR MARTIN LIPSET. Scarborough: Fitzhenry and Whiteside. 1967. Pp. xviii, 263. \$9.50.

THERE WERE MANY COMPELLING REASONS for not attempting the study which Professor Schwartz has undertaken. Even if all the data since 1941 from the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion polls had been available to the author, doubts over their quality would have remained. After all, the results were based on fairly small *quota* samples of varying sizes, representing answers to questions which underwent a variety of formulations. Without being able to estimate the sample error, and with often doubtful comparableness of content, the problems of trend analysis must have seemed overwhelming. Still, it was possible to conclude, as the author must have done, that anything was better than nothing, that the significance of the theme at hand required that one try to make use of such a body of data rather than leave it forever in limbo.

Under such circumstances the author bore a heavy responsibility to her readers: the conceptual framework had to be clearly stated; limitations of the analysis had to be pointed out at every turn; and, crucially, if the results were to be of any use to a wider readership, each step in the development of the argument had to be clearly presented. Unfortunately Professor Schwartz fails to satisfy us on all three counts. The result is a confusing and often irritating book.

Part of the trouble is that it is not so much a book about public opinion and Canadian identity as it is about Canadian *parties* and national identity. Professor Schwartz insists on making a great deal of the role of political parties, but unfortunately what she has to say about the subject is not especially revealing. The author is convinced that if Canada had "broad-based parties of principle" these would be effective in attracting supporters from all significant strata of society and uniting them through an appeal to some overriding principle. The cleavages inherent in a heterogeneous society would thereby be overcome. But Professor Schwartz recognized that neither the Conservative nor the Liberal party fits her criterion of a broad-based party of principle and that the NDP is not sufficiently broadly based to do the job. Nevertheless, she questions "whether political parties influence the opinions of their adherents sufficiently to contribute to or suppress the development of national unity." At this point the real problems of analysis begin, for although she appears to appreciate that to use the word "influence" is only a "shorthand concept for describing the existence of a framework of opinions associated with a specific party," on most occasions she proceeds as if there were a direct causal connection from political party to attitude. "To suggest that party identification alone influences opinion would be to take an absurd opinion" (p. 45), according to the author; but she *is* prepared to argue that parties have an impact on political attitudes. Moreover, she is prepared to accept evidence of an association between a set of attitudes and support for political parties as evidence of the causal link from party to attitude (p. 130).

For this crucial step in the analysis there is no justification. When assumptions about the direction of the causal connection lead her to write that "according to the views of the supporters as these were measured by the Index of Group Homogeneity, the CCF/NDP was best able to control inter-group differences" (p. 132), it is clear that the argument is totally out of hand. Why not assume with equal credibility that opinions come first and that party support arises from the effort of the voter to match as closely as he can his own set of opinions with those espoused by a political party? What conceivable mechanism exists by which a party so directly influences the opinions of its general supporters that one might

appropriately use "control" to describe the relationship? Supposing that there is *reciprocal* causality—a set of attitudes leads respondents to support for one party or another, after which party identification re-enforces opinions and even influences them—which might be said to be the critical attitudes in a set of political attitudes (without which the party identification is non-existent)? Just to raise the questions is to indicate the inadequacy of the present study. For, although the Index of Group Homogeneity (IGH) may be a useful method of dealing in a summary way with a large amount of data when the purpose is to determine whether or not differences of opinion are greater within groups than between groups, the methodology does not lend itself at all well to inferences about causal relationships. Besides, it is soon revealed that party identification is less important than almost every other major variable (such as region, sex, age, and social class) as an "influence" on opinion. That fact should have finished the party theme before it reached the pages of her manuscript, but unfortunately Professor Schwartz has insisted on pursuing it doggedly to the end.

Had she not been saddled with a typology of political parties (the substance of which has been published elsewhere) and the notion of party as an influence on opinions, we might have had an interesting analysis of *public opinion*. As it is we learn very little about the structure of public opinion in Canada, either about change within any one item or about the interrelationship of one set of opinions and another.

From this reader's point of view the most serious feature of the book is that at several points it will undoubtedly confirm the worst prejudices of the critic of behavioural methods. Actually the fault has nothing to do with the methodology, which is relatively modest and unsophisticated. (Even the novel Index of Group Homogeneity turned out to be unnecessary. It might have had some point if actual IGH scores had been reported, but when they were not and when decisions as to what constituted "high" and "low" scores were based on the significance of the chi square, only the latter and more familiar statistic was called for.)

Many difficulties can simply be traced to carelessness—a problem not copyrighted by any particular approach. Over and over again she makes unqualified generalizations from the skimpiest of percentage variations, often on the basis of data which are not strictly comparable. Sometimes she ignores the burden of proof of her own data. Perhaps the most serious difficulties are encountered in the chapter on problems of symbolic representation. In the text it is argued that there has been a "consistent trend downward in approval for the Union Jack," but on the table on the following page we see that whereas in 1943 (during wartime!) 42 per cent thought that we should continue to use the Union Jack, only 26 per cent held a similar view immediately after the war. In fact the proportion of the population wishing to keep the Union Jack increased slightly in the intervening years. Had Professor Schwartz compared the 25 per cent of the total respondents in 1963 who wished to retain the Union Jack with a similar proportion in late 1945 she would have concluded that over more than a decade there had been no change whatsoever in approval of the Union Jack.

Much of the other evidence is handled in an equally disconcerting manner. The same chapter concludes with a statement that "from the foregoing it is apparent that approval for native Canadian symbols is high and has *grown over the years*" (p. 118, my italics), but there is little solid evidence to support it. Precisely the same proportion of respondents thought that the governor general should be a Canadian in 1944 as in 1957; as we have seen there was no change in attitude toward the Union Jack. One can hardly reach so sweeping a conclusion

from the evidence of completely non-comparable questions as set out in Tables 47 and 48; and Table 45 actually contradicts the main argument.

Because one's concern is aroused over the author's respect for the data in the first half of the book (where "trends" in opinions are discussed), it is harder to accept with an open mind much of the second half, which deals with the relationship between parties and attitudes. How meaningful, how unambiguous, one keeps asking are the items which have been selected for the summary comparisons? Of course Professor Schwartz cannot be blamed for the unsatisfactory nature of much of the data collected by the CIP0—undoubtedly she, like other users of the data, would have preferred that better questions had been devised in the first place and that these had been repeated at intervals without alteration. But she has presumed to publish a major study based on these materials. Unfortunately it still remains to be shown whether there is much point to all the effort that has been involved.

DAVID HOFFMAN

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Britain and the Commonwealth

Winston S. Churchill. I. Youth, 1874–1900; II. Young Statesman, 1901–1914.

By RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL. London: Heinemann. 1966 and 1967. Pp. xxxvi, 608, illus.; xxx, 775, illus. \$10.00 per volume.

"HE SHALL BE HIS OWN BIOGRAPHER." The idea was a seductive one, and yet it seems unsuited to either the author or the subject. Winston's speeches and letters and memoranda are a delight: witty, informed, moving. But they are not brief, and they are not much concerned with other people. They take up so much space that it is not easy to find room to explain the general situation in which they were written, and they do not show any great appreciation of the case—whatever the issue—that Winston was opposing. This is no criticism of him: a politician fights to win, and Winston fought hard. But his own writings, standing by themselves, are not easy to place in context. Nor are they a complete guide to his own political position: for instance in the ten years before 1914 Churchill's closest political friend was Lloyd George—they met practically every day. Naturally they did not exchange many letters, and as a result their relationship is given distinctly less than its due importance in this biography.

The author does not seem to have been completely happy about the 1900–14 period of his father's life. Most of Volume I flows easily enough; it is private biography rather than history, though there are some interesting sidelights on upper-class habits and customs, and Winston's consuming ambition for fame and power are illustrated very clearly. It is also strikingly apparent that he was a boy of considerable but overlooked promise, and that this promise burst into flower for the first time just about the time his father died. Lord Randolph, at least from his letters, seems to have been a very heavy father indeed; as he sank into the shadows, his son began to reveal his talents. When those talents found expression in a non-political way, the author does justice to them. When it comes to politics Randolph seems to be unable to stick to the job in hand. It is worrying to find him using the word "Radicals" as a synonym for "Liberals" in the 1890s

(p. 448) and it is distracting to find a jibe at the fact that Herbert Morrison was a conscientious objector in World War I (p. 498). This becomes worse in Volume 2: Randolph has a bad habit of making statements that are neither accurate nor relevant, ranging from "Burgoyne capitulated at Saratoga in 1776" (p. 163) to saying that R. A. Butler was called "First Secretary" when he was Home Secretary (p. 365). One or two of the digressions throw a happy light on Winston as a father in the 1920s, and we can accept them gratefully because we would otherwise have been deprived of them by the author's untimely death, but there is no such justification for giving a two-page biography of Baron de Forest (pp. 156-8), a man of the utmost insignificance. Randolph can hardly have imagined that his father's life needed these irrelevant ornaments to make it interesting, and at times it feels as though he disliked watching the whole process by which his father moved to the left and found he needed something on which to work off his impatience. The result is that Winston's political evolution is not made at all clear; how did it happen that an imperialist, with a budding interest in social reform, who was on friendly terms with Joseph Chamberlain, remained a devoted free trader when men like him, such as Amery, were becoming tariff reformers? Apparently Winston left no papers showing whether he was ever tempted to abandon free trade, and Randolph has nothing to suggest. The story is a little clearer once Winston is in office; the Board of Trade chapter is interesting and is a happy blend of political narrative and domestic life. In contrast, the chapter on his period at the Colonial Office, which naturally concentrates on South African affairs, is less satisfactory. Part of the reason is that Randolph clearly did not understand the slogan "one vote, one value" (p. 152), which was rather important in the postwar settlement. Randolph continues to flail about with some coat-tailing remarks in later chapters; Bonar Law was "a pliant tool" of Beaverbrook's (p. 461) and Austen Chamberlain was a more talented man than Neville (p. 480). There is nothing to suggest that these views were Winston's; their insertion is an act of self-indulgence by the author, and in any case the judgements themselves are not very sensible.

At last Winston gets to the Admiralty, in 1911; here Randolph can sympathize with him and feel that worthwhile work is being done. There are no more digressions, no more snipings at Randolph's personal enemies. The last two hundred pages of Volume II are straightforward administrative history of a great department under a great minister—it is rather specialized, but there is a great deal quoted from Winston, and he could make anything interesting and gripping. It is all the same a little hard to decide who the book is designed for; anyone who could follow the masses of departmental material with only the slight commentary that Randolph provides must be something more than a "general reader," yet there are no footnotes for the serious scholar. So far as Winston's own papers are concerned this is not a great obstacle; they are being printed, in separate volumes, and can be consulted with only slight inconvenience. (Considering how much of the value of the work depends on an accurate transcription of Winston's papers, it is a little alarming to see that in two cartoons in Volume 2, facing pages 306 and 466, the captions in Max Beerbohm's handwriting have not been transcribed accurately.) But the absence of footnotes makes it impossible to know what Randolph has read on a particular event apart from his father's papers. For instance, he tells the story of the Tonypandy coal strike as though no soldiers had taken any part in it (pp. 375-8). Has he read Macready (or even Dangerfield)? Soldiers were at Tonypandy, and they behaved well—as Randolph points out, it was at Llanelly that the soldiers shot the strikers. Footnotes might also make the narrative clearer at some places. The account of the fleet movements at the time of the Curragh incident (pp. 498-9) is practically incomprehensible, and the

reason is that Randolph wants to tell the story and at the same time to contradict the accounts of the episode given by Lady Asquith and Sir James Ferguson. If he told the story in the text, and contradicted the other authors in a footnote, it would be easier to follow.

The idea that he should be "his own biographer" has not been completely successful. And what makes it all the more unfortunate is that another model of biography lay close to Randolph's hand. Winston's *Life of Lord Randolph Churchill* is a masterful example of a biography which takes its subject and sets him in his period, explains his relationship to the other great men of the time and to the underlying social movements that statesmen have to interpret. It is passionately pro-Lord Randolph, just as Randolph's is pro-Winston and none the worse for it, but it is not anti-anybody. Winston was going through the politically and emotionally strenuous process of changing his party when he wrote his father's *Life*; the temptation to hit out and to score points must have been considerable. But he resisted it. Randolph's *Life* of Winston would have been better if he resisted temptation in the same way.

TREVOR LLOYD

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Winds of Change, 1914-1939 and *The Blast of War, 1939-1945*. By HAROLD MACMILLAN. London, Melbourne, Toronto: Macmillan. 1966, 1967. Pp. viii, 664, illus.; xvi, 765, illus. \$10.00; \$11.95.

IN 1943 HAROLD MACMILLAN was Britain's Minister of State with Allied Forces Headquarters in North Africa. Much of his time was spent in trying to reconcile divisions within the French National Committee so that it might develop into the provisional government of a liberated France. The challenge demanded diplomatic patience and tact; fundamental differences between de Gaulle and Giraud were exacerbated by American mistrust of de Gaulle's intentions. "I learned," says Macmillan, "not to interfere *too* much and not to appear *too* interested in the result." He became interested enough, however, to establish a working sympathy with de Gaulle, whom he found "attractive and yet impossible, . . . by nature an autocrat, just like Louis XIV or Napoleon. He thinks in his heart that he should command and all others should obey him." Their discussions were not confined to the immediate politics of a government in exile. On one occasion Macmillan told de Gaulle that "his views on social matters were probably very like mine. In Britain we believed that great advances could and ought to be made in social legislation. . . . Great wealth would pass away. Property would be regarded as a trust, for the general benefit."

The relationship and the quotation are worth dwelling on for a moment because they provide one of the few points of continuity between these two volumes of autobiography. They are remarkably disparate in content. The first is preoccupied with economic and social problems between the two world wars; the second with the politics and diplomacy of the Allies in North Africa, Italy, and Greece from 1943 to 1945. They are connected only by the thread of Macmillan's public experience, most of it told with a fine sense of style and judgement, but raising a serious question about the value of autobiography at such length as this. It could only have been written by a man so thoroughly convinced of his place and the historical relevance of his observations that he would write two large volumes of autobiography and not yet touch upon the only significant part of his political career, which lay in the period from 1951 to 1964.

The first volume begins with a brief account of his family background, his days

as a student at Eton and Oxford, and then as a captain in the Grenadier Guards during World War I, but most of it describes his fifteen years as a backbench Conservative. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1924, before he was thirty, and all through the depression he represented Stockton-on-Tees, an industrial town in the northeast. During this time his mind developed a sympathetic concern for social distress and a clearer understanding of complex economic problems. He became the most outspoken member of The Next Five Years Group, perhaps the counterpart in the 'thirties of the present Bow Group. His concern lay specifically with the high level of unemployment, low wages, undernourishment, and poor housing. As solutions he advocated a planned economy, a protected and better organized industry, more efficient and cheaper distribution of basic goods, and pressure by government to force savings into industrial expansion. For Macmillan during this period a steady unemployment rate of 17 per cent was disastrous; it was becoming increasingly impractical to leave "market demand to regulate the balance of production." At the same time he came to believe that the controversy between individualism and socialism was irrelevant; "our economy will comprise . . . both direct State ownership and control, . . . and also a sphere in which private competitive enterprise will continue within a framework of appropriate public regulation."

For these views he received congratulatory letters from a number of men of liberal conviction, such as Maynard Keynes, Gilbert Murray, and Harold Nicolson. Nor does Macmillan hesitate to declare his respect for Lloyd George or to acknowledge his debt to Allan Young, who left Sir Oswald Mosley and the Labour party in 1931 to become Macmillan's economic adviser. Holding such views and receiving the praise of these particular men, one is inclined to wonder why he was Conservative at all. But temperament, training, connection, all led him to the Conservative party. There is no examination in these volumes of an alternative; he never considered one. Describing his experience as under-secretary at the Ministry of Supply in 1940, he viewed it as sterile and silly that socialists should have objected to management of the Royal Ordnance factories by businessmen from private enterprise. Harold Nicolson wrote in his *Diaries* that Macmillan in 1931 was sympathetic to the policies of Mosley's New Party but that he would not for a moment leave the Tories to join it, not at least until the New Party had proven itself, which it never did. If Macmillan was a maverick during the 'thirties, he was a restrained and tactful one; critical of Baldwin and Chamberlain as mediocrities, yet carefully loyal and shrewd in his dissent.

This quality of shrewdness emerges forcefully from the two volumes. It goes hand in hand both with a high degree of intelligence and with a condescending, paternal, even a righteous outlook. One is reminded of Nigel Nicolson's remark about his father, again in the Nicolson *Diaries*: "He knew that he belonged to an élite, an élite more of intelligence and achievement than of birth, and he tended to feel that people outside that élite had something wrong with them. . . ." Macmillan gives no overt expression of this outlook but it is evident in such descriptions as his admiration of the Finnish soldiers because they reminded him so much of the Brigade of Guards. On major issues, as in his handling of de Gaulle, he could be misled. While Macmillan was one of the few among Anglo-American politicians who grasped the real issues of conflict within the French National Committee, he overestimated his impact on de Gaulle. The latter hardly mentions Macmillan in his memoirs and when he does it is simply as another spokesman for British self-interest; yet Macmillan devotes whole chapters to the French problem in North Africa and assumes that in the end his contribution to resolving the Giraud-de Gaulle conflict was a significant one. He was in fact a

skilful mediator of sound intuitive judgement, not much more. The only book on World War II which singles out Macmillan for fulsome praise is *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis*, and it should be said that Macmillan in turn dwells on Alexander as the outstanding general of the whole Mediterranean campaign, from North Africa to Italy and Greece.

He admired Alexander, and rightly so, both as strategist and as diplomat; but temperament and character drew the two men together as well as ability and circumstance. Macmillan notes a number of times the calm and judicious manner of Alexander in dealing with allies or subordinates, the mixture of understatement with firmness in reaching decisions, the balance and restraint throughout every headquarters that he commanded. These were the qualities of the English gentleman at his best, as Macmillan understands the term, and the level of that understanding points to the conclusion which must be made about these two volumes. Though they fill out the record on the Conservative party in the 'thirties, on de Gaulle in 1943, and on the British settlement in Greece in 1945, in the perspective of history they will also be judged as the dull account of the public career of a man who found it impossible to reveal much of himself, whose sense of propriety and of politics restrained his observations about the central figures around him, and whose analysis was dimmed by the slightly pompous conviction that the career of a backbencher and of a junior minister lay in the mainstream of twentieth-century English history. Subsequent volumes may tell a different story but to date Macmillan's autobiography remains a prolix supplement to the record that is already in print.

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The Elizabethan Court of Chancery. By W. J. JONES. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1967. Pp. xviii, 528. \$15.00.

WHEN THE HISTORIAN finally acknowledges his ignorance of institutional structures, Dr. W. J. Jones will allow him no excuse concerning the equity side of Elizabeth's chancery. The author has identified, distinguished, and described the law court's offices, procedures, and functions. The data centre on Sir Thomas Egerton's dual career as master of the rolls and as lord keeper during the last seven years of Elizabeth's reign; but, the definitions for chancery fairly safely obtain for at least a century before and after; and, when they do not, Dr. Jones documents the procedural changes. All of the pieces to the institutional puzzle were delved from law reports, the many chancery collections in the PRO, and various manuscripts extant in Great Britain and North America. The organizational mode deserves to be a model for future students of legal institutions. Dr. Jones emphasizes legal process, weaving the strands of equity into the variegated crazy-quilt of jurisdictions that unfolds from and into Westminster Hall. The literary style may be occasionally involuted, occasionally scintillating, but it is always confident. Everything that can be known about equity process in the Elizabethan chancery is here in this superb and exhaustive study.

There are times when the book begins to read like any one of a dozen early seventeenth-century vademecum; indeed, an Elizabethan litigant might well envy the guidance given by Dr. Jones to the modern. Happily this is both a reference work essential to the legal historian and a comprehensive administrative history for the 1590s, because "legal history . . . cannot be separated from an administrative analysis of legal institutions, the problems of the clerks, and the tale of

competition for office" (p. 7). So, Dr. Jones tells us who presided step by step and how process moved or faltered, but he does not tell us who the chancery litigants were and what redresses they demanded. Surely this is a missed opportunity to inform the historians of Tawney's century on the realities of tenure and conveyancing or on the actual importance of equity to society's litigious minority.

Dr. Jones seems unhappy with the fact that the major personalities in this period were not activists and reformers. Even Egerton accepted all "... prevailing assumptions about offices and profits. He did not really produce a new idea of administration or a new concept of the performance and remuneration of a clerk." Hence, late-Elizabethan society "... did not believe in new ideas or in attempts to wipe the slate clean in preparation for fresh starts" (pp. 169-70). All of this is undoubtedly true; but it begs a most important question concerning the nature of conscious change in sixteenth-century society. Perhaps post-Reformation Europe remained incapable of translating the zeal for true reform from the religious to the secular sphere. If true, why? Dr. Jones can hardly be expected to answer the reviewer's question, but his scholarship clearly turns many a fertile furrow.

In sum, this is a monumental accomplishment, if only because Dr. Jones is gifted with a precision and rigour of mind that can lay bare the complexities of Elizabethan equity. He does not provide the reader with actual input or output for the court; rather, he meticulously reconstructs what happens between the initiation and the resolution in all chancery suits. The usefulness of the book will outlive its author. As an approximation to immortality, no young scholar of history could ask for more.

D. J. GUTH

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The Elizabethan Puritan Movement. By PATRICK COLLINSON. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1967. Pp. 528. \$10.00 (US).

THE PUBLICATION OF DR. COLLINSON'S BOOK will be some relief, I suppose, to those who have beaten a path over the years to his doctoral dissertation, but there is a good deal more in it than that. Indeed there is a quite fantastic amount of material, when you take into consideration that the author has deliberately set himself against rewriting anybody else's book, and to all intents and purposes everything in this one is new. Thus there is very little, except by implication, on the Puritan ethos and practically nothing on theology, even the theology of ecclesiastical polity close though this is to his subject. (Though I imagine he is one of the few people alive who know what a Non-separating Congregationalist is.) There is less than one might expect, and even wish, on Thomas Cartwright. This last must have been a hard choice, because while Knappen, Haller, Perry Miller, and Christopher Hill have written on aspects of Puritanism clearly distinct from Dr. Collinson's theme, to speak of the movement without its acknowledged elder statesman is a little like *Hamlet* without Polonius.

The word *movement*, in the title, is operative. Dr. Collinson is concerned not with the inner life or spiritual struggles of his characters, their visions or their dreams, but with their partisan activities in bringing about a desired change in their society, and with their relations with each other and with their adversaries and sympathizers in the course of those activities. The characters that bulk large are the busiest and most influential and not necessarily the most profound. We see the Puritans in their public selves as reformers and even agitators rather than

as private saints; we observe, indeed, that a large part of their reforming and agitating was done behind the scenes, but not without dust and sweat.

The changing fortunes of the Puritans and their noble or political patrons at court and at the council table are a part of the story and are told here in some detail. Probably the most interesting part of the book, however, is what the author has to tell about the grass-roots organization of Puritanism, "prophesying" and "classis" (two things, incidentally, which he draws a sharp distinction between). Even about our old friend the Dedham Classis we learn a great deal more than R. G. Usher ever dreamed there was to learn. We shall be apt to come away with more respect for the "classical movement" than before, and a fuller realization of the many reasons why it was no more of a success—one reason being the lack of the lay support without which one could not, on paper, have a church godly reformed. For the movement Dr. Collinson describes is still a movement of clergy and clerically-minded laymen, in which the great lay patron is rather less prominent than we have been accustomed to see him, and the unsophisticated parish elder is still as absent as ever.

Dr. Collinson sees that the movement was not destroyed when Whitgift and Bancroft turned on the heat in the 'nineties; that essentially the same men with revised but perfectly compatible aims were the "Puritans" that James threatened to harry from the land. But he ends the "movement" after Hampton Court because what failed to happen at that confrontation was the last chance of what the Elizabethan Puritans had hoped to achieve by all their organization and all their tarrying for the magistrate. The men and the principles remained but the movement, as a single phenomenon with a single history, was over. This appears to me to make sense, and it also offers a way through what can be a particularly irritating semantic maze, the question "what is a Puritan?" For Dr. Collinson, an *Elizabethan* Puritan is someone who was engaged in the Elizabethan Puritan movement. I think his refusal of red herrings is perfectly successful, and appropriate to his period; in a later period it would hardly work.

Dr. Collinson knows the Elizabethan religious underworld thoroughly, and has written eloquently and judiciously about it, with a wealth of new information which is impressive even when it is regarded as the fruits of thirteen years' labour. It is a book that the Tudor historian is going to need, so I am happy to be able to say that there is no reason why he should not enjoy it.

ELLIOT ROSE

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An Expanding Society: Britain 1830–1900. By G. KITSON CLARK. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: Macmillan]. 1967. Pp. xvi, 188. \$5.00.

LIKE THE AUTHOR'S PREVIOUS BOOK, *The Making of Victorian England* (1962), which was based upon his Ford lectures at Oxford, this too had its origins in a series of lectures, given at the University of Melbourne in 1964. But whereas in the first instance he had reworked the lectures extensively, here he offers them in virtually their natural state, "produced to some extent in extemporaneous fashion"—and they retain in book form a freshness and immediacy which make them a delight to read. Brief but wide-ranging, the book covers the heart of politics and society in nineteenth-century England; it is not surprising, then, that some of the material should be familiar, in contrast to the new disclosures and finds one would look for in a tightly constructed monograph on some particular aspect of the period. Indeed, seven of the eight chapters are ideal lectures: they mix the

familiar with the sort of imaginative and often profound insights that we expect from Kitson Clark, along with exciting calls for new investigations into the working of Victorian society.

He is a historian who will not accept received opinions, but views the field afresh, and his students, as testified in the recent *festschrift* in his honour and in their own volumes, have pursued his insights and substantiated them by their investigations. At the same time, this book and its predecessor are evidence that he has "held the ring." That is, he has offered some sort of comprehensive overview of Victorian society, while his students' views of it, necessarily, have been more microscopic as they have set out to challenge generalizations in special areas within the whole. The trail has led into the suburbs, into party offices, into officials' offices, and the finds have not been insignificant. But as always with the microscopic view there is some danger of exaggerating the trivial, of seeing more than is in fact there, and to my mind, it is when the investigations of his students cast light on traditional political concerns, as in R. T. Shannon's *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876* (1963), that they are at their best.

Kitson Clark richly deserves his position as doyen of Victorian studies in England; and the present volume is further evidence of the great contributions he has made. It also suggests the limitations as well as the advantages inherent in the historical attitude that inspires it. These lectures are far ranging, and Kitson Clark wisely exploits their being delivered in Melbourne to point out how the new English cities—as one may call them—of the United States, Canada, and Australia share many characteristics with such cities as Manchester and Birmingham. In this sense the "two nations" of England were world-wide, and the divisions and affiliations extend beyond economics and politics to architecture and literature. At the same time he is unwilling to discuss this development as an aspect of "imperialism"; in fact, he would prefer not to use the word. He briefly traces its history, and rightly regards it as a "masked word"—the phrase is Ruskin's—and of no further use. But it would appear that he would extend this dismissal to any other term of generalization, as being likely to mislead the historian. No doubt such generalizations, and the easy recourse to them as explanations, are highly dangerous, but commonsense and pragmatic answers are not in themselves quite enough to substitute for them. Kitson Clark profoundly admires the quality of "bottom" which gave English society its great strength; this quality of English character made solid and enduring the achievements of the nineteenth century. And while he fully acknowledges that the period from 1830 to 1850 was penetrated and permeated by ideas, he calls deserved attention to its being a period not so much of *laissez-faire*, as the conventional view would hold, but of considerable, indeed overwhelming government activity: however much was being thought, still more was being done.

Yet in his flight from misleading generalizations, as well as in his very proper suspicion of them, Kitson Clark does perhaps go too far, and "bottom" may triumph a little too much over "head." The eighth chapter of his book, "The Modern State," three times as long as any of the others and approximately a third of the book, is in effect a defence of himself and his school, a response to the attack launched by Jennifer Hart in *Past and Present*, generously cited in the bibliography for the chapter. Kitson Clark is right in calling into question the emphasis placed upon the great intellectual figures of the nineteenth century as determining the events of the century as they occurred, and he is right to believe that it is not among abstractions that all answers are to be found. He finds his own answers in the mid-nineteenth century when the course of social policy as it was practised, not thought about, shaped modern England. But generalizations and theories have their value to historians as well as particularities, and surely it

is an excessive preference for "bottom" over "head" when Kitson Clark remarks about the use of such term as "the period of laissez-faire" and "period of collectivism": "Worst of all, it tends to divert men's attention towards theory and away from the most powerful factor involved, the impact of particular circumstance." Ideas are excessively demoted, and to some degree history is reduced to inevitable events which determined the behaviour of those who made decisions and took actions in the nineteenth century. "What they thought affected what they did, but a preponderant factor in any decision they had to make was always the need to find a practical solution to the immediate problem which necessity, or their sense of humanity, presented to them: and that need might easily override preconceived principles." And at the very end of the book, he writes, "but men's intentions had to conform, not to what was recommended by theory, but to what was demanded by fact, and they were not masters of the future." In fact Kitson Clark is himself within the great Tory tradition of anti-ideology; working within that tradition he and his students have produced some of the most important work to be done on the nineteenth century in recent years.

PETER STANSKY

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Britain and Australia, 1831-1855: A Study in Imperial Relations and Crown Lands Administration. By PETER BURROUGHS. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1967. Pp. xii, 419, maps. \$14.00.

DR. PETER BURROUGHS OF DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY has produced an important and carefully detailed study of selected aspects of imperial relations between England and Australia from 1831 to 1855, with particular reference to the administration of crown lands. The long title is necessary to dissipate expectations that the author cannot fulfil. Changes in imperial land policy are his theme, and he examines relations between England and all the colonies of Australia, giving New South Wales the most attention. The study does not try to be exhaustive, but concentrates on those people and events that impinged most closely on the unfolding land policy. The abolition of penal transportation, economic expansion, the struggle for a more democratic government, these are largely ignored. Only emigration policy is carefully discussed, mainly because of its vital effects on land policy. Dr. Burroughs emphasizes the enormously complex factors that must be considered in imperial policy-making. "The history of Britain's relations with her overseas dependencies," he writes, "can most appropriately be written in terms of an interplay between the demands of imperial policy and the response of colonial conditions." Unfortunately, a single book cannot carry this out. At times Dr. Burroughs is like a juggler with too many balls in the air. His balls include conditions in England, conditions in Australia as they are understood in England, conditions in Canada and the other colonies and in the United States of America, and, most importantly, the climate of British opinion on colonization and the various theoretical and philosophical writings on colonization in England.

Most fortunately, Dr. Burroughs has managed his theme with intelligence and proper selection. He opens with a first-hand account of the imperial ideas on land policy, with particular reference to the theories of Edward Gibbon Wakefield. He then shows how the Wakefield ideas are converted into policy through the work of the enthusiastic followers of this complicated man. Dr. Burroughs concentrates on the episodes which helped make land policy, recognizing always the complexity of crown lands management. Starting with the new policies of 1831 embodied in the Ripon Land Regulations and the inception of assisted emigration, he deals with the problems of Western Australia, Van Diemen's Land, and New South

Wales. After discussing the squatter problem and the imperial significance of the pastoral industry, the establishment of South Australia, and the imperial reassessment of 1838 to 1842, he concludes with a clear delineation of the struggle for security of tenure by the squatters in the 1840s, culminating in the surrender of imperial control to the colonies in the early 1850s.

Dr. Burroughs is adept in showing how the success or failure of imperial regulations are determined by realities of the local conditions. For example, he indicates the failure of the colonial office to recognize differences between the colonies (for example, Western Australia *versus* Van Diemen's Land, or Port Philip *versus* New South Wales), or the fact that Australian land was much more suited to the pastoral or grazing industries and that a number of Wakefield's ideas really applied to agricultural lands. He also succeeds in showing the *ad hoc* character of these policies, while still clinging to some endearing principles. In other words, he makes a clear distinction between theory and practice.

Wakefield's machinations do not deceive Dr. Burroughs. Though at times he gives him too much the benefit of the doubt, at one point Dr. Burroughs writes that Wakefield's influence was "subtle and insidious," and at another, that he was clever as a "coordinator and popularizer," and finally, at the very end he writes: "Although imperial practice was not synonymous with systematic colonization, and the Colonial Office was never entirely won over by the Wakefieldians, the colonists could effectively support their claim by pointing to the theoretical basis of imperial land policies and to the speculative reasoning employed by officials to justify certain abstract principles of administration" (p. 382).

Dr. Burroughs never answers the question why the Colonial Office had unreserved confidence in the agricultural potentialities of New South Wales, but admits that the prevailing physical and economic forces promoted the sheep industry (grazing) and placed restrictions on farming. He brings out Wakefield's influence on various select committees of the House of Commons and in the House of Lords and how he agitated parliament. He also demonstrates the importance of the creation of the commissioners for Land and Emigration in 1840. The problems faced by Sir George Gipps, governor of New South Wales from 1838 to 1846, are described, particularly his opposition to the idea of a fixed price for the sale of land rather than the auction system; but he fails, however, to give credit to Gipps in his handling of the depression of 1841-3, particularly the daring innovation of borrowing £50,000 in debentures.

Dr. Burroughs has exhausted the British sources, both official and unofficial, and has read very deeply in Australian secondary works. At times he relies too much on Brian Fitzpatrick and Professor Stephen Roberts, and is not always aware of the factual mistakes made by Professor Roberts. Apparently, Dr. Burroughs has not been in Australia to utilize the rich resources of the Mitchell Library. A wider use of the local newspapers and a study of the colonial secretary papers (of New South Wales) would have changed some of the emphases, though not the conclusions.

This is an excellent study of a very difficult subject. In the end Dr. Burroughs is particularly clear in showing how the graziers united New South Wales in 1844 in opposition to Governor Gipps, yet their selfishness caused a split in 1847 when they received too much in the Act of that year, and thus alienated the farming group. In summary, he has shown the importance of British imperial policy moulding the growth of Australia. Though it is unfortunate that some of the characters do not come to life, his style is clear and forthright.

Colonial Sequence, 1930 to 1949: A Chronological Commentary upon British Colonial Policy Especially in Africa. By MARGERY PERHAM. London and Toronto: Methuen. 1967. Pp. xxvi, 351. \$10.50.

MARGERY PERHAM is the acknowledged *grande dame* of British Africanists. In this book, she has collected a number of her writings beginning with her first trip to Tanganyika in 1930 to (for more obscure reasons) the year 1949. Given her reputation both as a scholar and as a "friend of Africa," and the fact that most of these articles were originally published in *The Times*, the volume is instructive not only of British colonialism during these two decades but, perhaps even more importantly, of the attitudes at the time of the liberal establishment to Africa and Britain's role therein.

As edifying as her writing always is, and as pleasurable to read, these articles were quite explicitly tendentious. Miss Perham adopted two major causes during the 1930s and 1940s, and they provide the themes which run through the book. During the earlier decade she was, as a Gold Coast student pointed out in 1934, the "ablest unofficial advocate" of indirect rule in Africa, a system which, she believed, provided that necessary tutelage in local government which was preparing traditional African leaders to assume, at some stage in the distant future, self-government.

Although she seems to have had in those years few personal African friends, Miss Perham was never unaware of the hostility of educated Africans to indirect rule; its purpose, they insisted, was to perpetuate the authority of conservative tribal leaders while excluding the urban "intelligentsia" from the political process. To be sure, Miss Perham acknowledged such criticism but was unmoved by it. We must infer from her silence on the matter that the many colonial officials with whom she met on her frequent African journeys never revealed to her their bitter antipathy to the emerging class of educated "natives" and their related (and belated) discovery that traditional African society—once universally condemned as immoral and savage—embodied great virtues which must be preserved.

Nor does she make clear the very circumscribed areas of power which indirect rule left to the various "native authorities" while all major decisions were being made by alien Europeans in the distant capital. Similarly, the failure—or, more accurately, the inability—of most native authorities to carry out any serious development or welfare projects, and the failure of colonial officers to urge them to do so, is evident only by the absence of any reference to such matters; her warm tribute to the version of indirect rule which Phillip Mitchell introduced in Tanganyika, for example, must be set against that country's appalling economic backwardness when it became independent in 1963.

With the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, and the active participation of many Africans in the allied war effort, the demands of educated Africans for rapid self-government accelerated precipitately. Against what she considered such premature demands Margery Perham adopted a firm stand, and for reasons which shed light on her earlier advocacy of indirect rule and indeed on her general perception of the African continent. Above all, she could not bring herself to consider that the majority of African people, who existed in such primitive and backward conditions, were prepared for the responsibilities of self-government. Until the Europeans' trusteeship in Africa was properly fulfilled, the continent could not be returned to its aboriginal rulers. As late as 1947 she was arguing that "few who know tropical Africa can believe that the peoples living in these arbitrary pieces of the continent, with their separate tribes and languages, their poverty and ignorance, can be ready for many years to

conduct their own governments. There is still much for us Europeans to do and many years in which we must go on doing it."

Nine years later, the Sudan became independent, followed by Ghana a year later. It is not necessary to claim that the course of events in these independent states invalidated her argument. For the argument itself is untenable. Miss Perham, it is true, is a good British liberal. She was among the most articulate postwar advocates of increased British funds to help the colonies in their economic and educational development, preparatory to their being granted self-government—an end with which she was, needless to say, in complete sympathy as an abstract ideal. Not insignificantly, the same proposition—that Africans are not "ready" to rule themselves—continues to this day to be trotted out by white southern Africans. But when is a people "ready" for self-government? Does it depend on the level of the GNP? Or the number of university graduates? Or the proportion of the peasantry participating in the money economy?

Miss Perham, quite understandably, never attempted to establish such arbitrary and impossible criteria. Yet they are surely logically necessary to her argument. Nor did she assess whether that postwar development which England did promote in her colonies substantially affected the level of "backwardness" by the time independence was granted; but the number of university graduates in, say, Tanganyika and Zambia pointed to that answer. Nor, finally, did she ever once question the moral right of a European, during and after World War II, to question another people's "readiness" for self-rule.

Miss Perham has still a prominent voice in Britain on African affairs. She remains, moreover, a liberal (she opposes the Smith régime, for example, but equally opposes the use of force to overthrow it), and she is clearly a very courageous woman. For she continues to aspire to be considered a friend of Africa, and only a person of considerable courage would have consented to republish these pieces in the light of that aspiration.

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United States

Union Pamphlets of the Civil War, 1861–1865. Two volumes. Edited by FRANK FREIDEL. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press [Toronto: Saunders]. 1967. Pp. xx, 564; x, 565–1233, illus. \$20.00 the set.

IN MOST WARS, and certainly in every American war, ink has flowed as freely as blood. In the case of the Civil War the generation-old debate over the nature of the federal union, the morality of slavery, and related questions continued with unabated intensity after the outbreak of hostilities in 1861. Pamphlets, broadsides, newspapers, books, and other kinds of printed material poured from the presses in torrents. To provide a generous sample of this writing Frank Freidel has edited fifty-two of the pamphlets and has also written an explanatory introduction. In some respects the work is a companion piece to Bernard Bailyn's *Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750–1776*, although Freidel's pamphlets were written at a time of actual and widespread fighting.

The reader will find some well-known names represented among the contributors, among them John Lothrop Motley, Orestes A. Brownson, Wendell Phillips,

John Stuart Mill (a reprint of his pro-Northern *Fraser's Magazine* article of February 1862), Edward Everett Hale, S. F. B. Morse, Robert Dale Owen, Charles Sumner, James Russell Lowell, and Robert Charles Winthrop. Some pamphlets made simple appeals to the masses, while others were aimed at a well-educated élite. Of particular interest, as casting light on the contest for men's minds, is C. J. Stillé's *How a Free People Conduct a Long War: A Chapter from English History*. At a dark period of the conflict, in 1862, Stillé sought to show that the British people had endured heart-breaking setbacks during the Peninsular War but had won out when it had been shown, in Wellington's words, that their infantry could "pound the longest." About half-a-million copies of this pamphlet were circulated, probably more than of any other.

Americans came into the war with a vast experience in the organized production of pamphlets, stemming especially from the activities of political parties, anti-slavery societies and religious groups. It was inevitable that this experience would be built on during the war. In this respect the most active bodies were the Board of Publications of the Philadelphia Union League and the Loyal Publication Society of New York City; they circulated several million pamphlets between the years 1863 and 1865. On the other side was the Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge, maintained by New York Democrats, which levelled a constant barrage of criticisms at Lincoln, the Republicans, and the war effort generally. Several other bodies also promoted the distribution of material supporting or opposing the war, directed at the troops or the home front. The struggle to influence the Northern mind was many-sided, strenuous, and unceasing.

Some themes in the pamphlets echo in a modern ear. Brownson argued that you had to give the American people "another battle-cry than that of 'Law and Order,' or you will not stir their heart." He also asserted that the struggle was for "the very existence of the nation . . . the nation is above the Constitution," while George F. Comstock, an eminent lawyer, combated "one of the delusions of the hour . . . that the Union must be maintained at the expense of the Constitution, and even after the Constitution is overthrown." Wendell Phillips said that the country was "tending with rapid strides . . . toward that strong government which frightened Jefferson; toward that unlimited debt, that endless army," and he hoped Americans would get something "out of this peril . . . worthy of the crisis." He hoped, with the abolition of slavery, to make "our institutions . . . homogeneous": then "we grapple the Union together with hooks of steel—make it as lasting as the granite that underlies the continent." Finally, a member of the gentler sex, speaking for the "Loyal Women of the United States" denounced the draft evaders: "When these fainéants return, who have skulked to Canada and Nova Scotia to cheat their country out of the only service they were ever likely to render—that of stopping a bullet which might otherwise have reached a better man—let them meet the reception they deserve." Against this may be balanced *The Lincoln Catechism, Wherein the Eccentricities & Beauties of Despotism are Fully Set Forth. A Guide to the Presidential Election of 1864*.

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An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906–1909. By CHARLES E. NEU. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: Saunders]. 1967. Pp. xii, 347. \$6.95.

IN THIS THOROUGHLY RESEARCHED AND HIGHLY READABLE VOLUME, Charles E. Neu has provided a sound analysis of Theodore Roosevelt as a diplomatist and of

American handling of the crisis with Japan which dominated so much of the period from 1906 to 1909. This crisis, sparked by the segregation of Japanese children in the San Francisco primary schools, really stemmed from the increasingly hostile reaction of residents of the Pacific coast states to the sharp rise in the number of Japanese working-class immigrants. Underneath these particular disputes lay the issue of whether the United States would attempt to restrict what the Japanese saw as their rightful place as the leading power in east Asia.

Neu clearly demonstrates that Roosevelt had a consistent and realistic approach toward Japan's position in Asia. Fully in control of decision-making throughout the Japanese crisis, the President resisted pressures from within the State Department and outside the government to use the dispute with Japan to unite the nation behind a more active Asian policy. Convinced that the American people would not fight to maintain the territorial and administrative integrity of China, Roosevelt treated American interests in Asia as limited and essentially commercial in nature. He assumed throughout the difficult months that "Japan would exercise its power with responsibility and restraint." When the balanced antagonisms which formed the basis of his mediation of the Russo-Japanese War began to break down, Roosevelt decided that American interests could best be protected by "a close understanding with Japan." Despite tactical variations, this remained his diplomatic goal for Asia throughout his last years in office.

Professor Neu advances a balanced and convincing estimate of Roosevelt as a diplomatist. While pointing out the former Rough Rider's tendency to exaggerate and dramatize his own role in events, Neu emphasizes that Roosevelt's perceptions were keen and his actions invariably calculated and restrained. Although slow to appreciate the importance to Japan of the immigration dispute, the President acted quickly and effectively when he realized the gravity of the situation. He used varied forms of pressure to restrain the California legislature and local officials in San Francisco from giving further insult to Japan. Abandoning his one-sided demand for a treaty of mutual exclusion of labourers, Roosevelt accepted the assurances of the Japanese cabinet that an administrative solution would be equally effective and politically less costly. And faced with the need to stimulate support for further naval expansion and the desire to show residents of the Pacific coast that the administration was determined to protect their vital interests, the President ordered all the navy's available battleships on a practice cruise into the Pacific. As so often occurred, Roosevelt then turned this cruise into a means of attaining other objectives. He determined to send the Great White Fleet around the world in order to encourage a more permanent settlement of outstanding issues with Japan, to emphasize the common Pacific interests of America, Australia, and New Zealand, and to impress all the powers with American strength and preparedness. Based on these varied manoeuvres and on the intricate settlement achieved in the Root-Takahira Agreement of 30 November 1908, Neu with good reason concludes that "Roosevelt's diplomacy during the Japanese-American crisis of 1906-1909 was shrewd, skillful, and responsible."

This volume is based on a wide range of archival sources from the United States, Japan, Canada, and Great Britain. One of its strongest features is the thorough examination of the connections between the crisis with Japan and American naval policy. Neu provides a most enlightening account of how Roosevelt used the immigration dispute to gain increased appropriations for naval construction and to force the army and navy to adopt more realistic strategic planning. Also impressive is the analysis of how the President attempted to use W. L. Mackenzie King, Deputy Minister of Labour and Immigration, in creating a coalition with Canada and Great Britain to bring pressure on Japan.

In evaluating Neu's work one naturally compares it with Raymond A. Esthus' recent volume, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan*. Although examining many of the same problems, the two studies are quite different. Esthus devotes more than a third of his volume to developments before 1906, a period which Neu utilizes only as background. Neu devotes considerably more space to attempted American co-operation with Canada and Great Britain and to naval and strategic questions. The two scholars differ substantially on their interpretations of the King missions and the Root-Takahira negotiations. Both volumes are well-conceived and admirably done, but Neu's work presents the more incisive picture of Theodore Roosevelt as a statesman and a better perspective on the position of the United States among the great powers.

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The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948. By IRWIN ROSS. New York: New American Library. 1968. Pp. viii, 305. \$8.75.

ONE OF THE GREAT DRAMAS of modern American political history occurred in 1948, the year of Harry Truman's apotheosis. Irwin Ross, a journalist, has felicitously reconstructed the history of that incredible election, with its unanticipated dénouement, in *The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948*. It is a pleasure to report that this work is not just another rehash of that well-known story, but is, rather, an analytically sophisticated and factually reliable account of the 1948 campaign. Replete with fresh information about and sharp insights into the men and issues of that election, *The Loneliest Campaign* is required reading for any student interested in the recent political past.

Among the important but less well-known figures of the Truman era was Clark M. Clifford, President Truman's special counsel and his most trusted political adviser in the period from mid-1946 until the Korean War. Ross makes it clear that Clifford played the key role in devising the strategy which Truman used in his successful campaign to retain control of the White House. That strategy consisted of a leftward turn on domestic issues—especially civil rights—for the purpose of revitalizing the New Deal political coalition; and a firm anti-communist stance in foreign affairs, which Clifford thought "should exert a definite appeal" among urban Catholic voters. Here, then, in embryo was the programmatic basis of post-World War II liberalism: containment overseas and token welfarism at home.

While Truman sought to capture the "vital center" of American politics, he was being assaulted on the left by Henry Wallace, the former vice president, and challenged on the right by Dixiecrats, who were destined to be led by Strom Thurmond, the governor of South Carolina. The Republicans, in the meantime, were full of good cheer as they viewed the disarray in Democratic ranks. Convinced that 1948 was going to be their year, most Republicans expected that the candidate selected at the party convention would be the next president.

An especially noteworthy aspect of *The Loneliest Campaign* is the author's discussion of how the smooth and resourceful Thomas E. Dewey, governor of New York, secured the Republican nomination. Ross reminds his readers of Dewey's opposition to the Mundt-Nixon bill, the precursor of the McCarran Act of 1950, and notes how this stand helped him to defeat Harold Stassen in the crucial Oregon primary. Dewey's victory in Oregon practically assured him of the nomination, which he won on the third ballot. His running mate was Governor

Earl Warren of California. "Barring a political miracle," *Time* felt, "it was the kind of ticket that could not fail to sweep the Republican Party back into power."

Ross's account of the Democratic convention does not differ substantially from what has already appeared in print. He does add, though, some new information to the story about the extraordinary fight over the civil rights' plank; and has fresh detail concerning Truman's brilliant tactical manoeuvre of calling the Eightieth Congress back to Washington to enact the platform which the Republican convention had just endorsed.

The author's description and analysis of the actual campaign is certainly the high point of his narrative. He captures Truman carrying the attack to Dewey in a tenacious and sometimes disingenuous manner. New Deal rhetoric, coupled with support for such new programmes as medical insurance, was galvanizing the old Roosevelt coalition. On election day, Truman's victory confirmed the fact that a majority of voting Americans remained Democrats.

Was Truman's election really in the best interest of the country? In a fascinating final chapter, Ross suggests that if Dewey had won in 1948 the Republican party and the United States would probably have been better served. A Dewey administration might have prevented the rise of McCarthyism. Furthermore, with Dewey in the White House, the Republicans would not have needed General Dwight Eisenhower in 1952, thereby preventing the drift to the right which characterized Republican presidential politics after 1948. Ross also contends that Dewey's executive leadership would have guaranteed the passage of reform legislation, since congressional Republicans would not have deliberately sabotaged the legislative programme of their first president in twenty years.

The one point which Ross fails to make about a Dewey victory has to do with foreign affairs. Truman's election froze all policy options, especially with respect to Europe. With his defeat, a more flexible, less ideological foreign policy might have issued from Washington, thus preparing the way for a *détente* which Winston Churchill would soon advocate as the only way to prevent World War III.

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America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966. By WALTER LAFEVER. New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley and Sons. Pp. xiv, 295. \$6.50 (US) cloth; \$2.95 (US) paper.

ALTHOUGH IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN whether the Cold War has run its course, it is obvious that the orthodoxies sustaining it no longer command the kind of allegiance they once did in the United States. One of the byproducts of the crumbling of the Cold War consensus has been a questioning of traditional historical interpretations of American foreign policy in the postwar period. To what extent was the United States responsible for beginning the Cold War? What kinds of goals and pressures have shaped American policy? What effect has the policy had on American society and on the rest of the world? These questions all seem to require fresh answers—answers which make sense in light of Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, Santo Domingo, and riots in the cities and on the campuses. Some of the answers are being provided by a group of what can loosely be called "new left" diplomatic historians who are busily revising conventional notions about American foreign policy since the turn of the century. LaFever is one of the most prominent and talented members of this group.

His first book, *The New Empire*, was a prize-winning study of American expansionism from the 1860s through the 1890s. In it he argued that the predominant motive for expansionism was the desire on the part of businessmen and politicians for markets for trade and investment. Only by keeping an "open door" in foreign markets was it thought possible to siphon off the surplus production which might otherwise glut the domestic market, trigger a depression, and unloose social and political unrest. Expansionism was thus a conscious and realistic attempt to come to terms with industrial capitalism. It was on this basis that America's "new empire" (as opposed to its already established continental empire) was built. LaFeber has been greatly influenced by William A. Williams, whose writings have inspired and provided the seminal ideas for the work of the new left diplomatic historians. Williams' own writings draw from an intellectual tradition running from Marx through Charles Beard.

LaFeber's latest book could very well have been subtitled *The New Empire Revisited*, for one finds in it some of the same line of analysis of his earlier volume as well as the continuing influence of Williams and his sympathizers. In his first chapter (appropriately titled "Open Doors, Iron Curtains") he states that the Cold War "developed on a foundation of half a century of Russian-American distrust and apprehension." A good part of this distrust stemmed from the threat which Russia appeared to pose after 1917 to the kind of liberal-free enterprise world cherished by American policy-makers. As World War II drew to a close it became apparent that a confrontation was in the making, since the Russians were not eager to maintain an "open door" in Eastern Europe. Truman and his advisers did not shrink from this confrontation, believing that they held the upper hand because of America's economic might and its monopoly of the A-bomb. But Stalin refused to budge and by March of 1946 the Cold War was on. In the years since America has fought two "limited" wars (LaFeber rightly questions the implications of this concept), practised interventionism on a global scale, and built a military-industrial complex at home—all in an attempt to contain communism and revolutionary instability.

In describing the course of the Cold War the author dismisses the view that America has reacted defensively and justifiably to a series of "crises" provoked by the Communists. American policy, as he interprets it, has a thrust and direction of its own, springing largely from forces generated *within* American society rather than from the presence of an external threat. It is the interaction between domestic forces and foreign policy and the clash between American and Soviet ambitions in Europe and the underdeveloped world which provide the basic structure for his narrative. Within this structure he constructs a number of subordinate themes. He contends that liberal intellectuals and politicians must share in the responsibility for indoctrinating the country in anti-Communism. His prime targets are Truman, Reinhold Niebuhr, and the Americans for Democratic Action. He dispels the notion that American policy-makers have been flexible and fair-minded in dealing with the Soviets. Both the Marshall Plan and the Baruch Plan for controlling atomic weapons, for instance, took a form which made Soviet co-operation extremely improbable. He also stresses the manner in which presidents from Truman to Johnson have acted unilaterally in foreign affairs without consulting congress or America's allies. He is less critical in his analysis of Soviet diplomacy, though it would be unfair to say that he has simply reversed conventional Cold War typecasting by making the Russians the "good guys" and the Americans the villains. He has not, however, assumed that Russian motives have always been sinister or that they have been dominated by ideological considerations.

LaFeber is not, of course, the first scholar to write a critical account of America's role in the Cold War, nor are his criticisms entirely original. Indeed, some of them turn up in the work of non-revisionists, and others are drawn from the leftist critique of the Cold War which has emerged in the past few years. The importance of the book is that it will probably reach a large audience, especially among academics and university students. It is compact, briskly written, intelligently organized, and based on a large published literature and on a number of important manuscript collections. It bears the mark of an astute historian who can argue a controversial point of view without stooping to outright invective or simple-minded reductionism and who is not afraid to relate present predicaments to past policies. It is the kind of book which deserves to be read and be taken seriously.

There are, however, a number of reservations which I have about it. One is that LaFeber, while not disregarding the economic interpretation of his earlier book, fails to pursue it as fully as one might expect. He does not spend much time in analyzing the growth of the American economy or the amazing dispersion of capital and corporations into foreign markets. Here, it would seem, is grist for the mill; yet, strangely, he does not make use of it. If there is a case to be made for an interpretation of the Cold War along the lines of the *New Empire* it is not to be found in this book. Aside from the early chapters, economic expansion seems to figure less prominently in his analysis than anti-Communist ideology. One wishes that the author had explored the relationship between the two more fully. Finally, it is well to remember that revisionism is itself revised as perspectives change and new materials become available. This has been true, to cite just two examples, of revisionist interpretations of American entry into both world wars. This is meant as a cautionary note, not as an attempt to equate LaFeber with Harry Elmer Barnes. At this stage the writing of Cold War history is a precarious enterprise and it would be unfortunate if, in the present mood of dissatisfaction with America's ways, revisionism were to be uncritically accepted as the new orthodoxy.

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NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later review; *TBR* following an entry indicates a review already in preparation.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

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